CourtListener opinion 11231628

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The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
 constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
 the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
 cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
 Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
 should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

 SUMMARY
 December 24, 2025

 2025COA96

No. 24CA0231, In re Marriage of Teruel De Torres — Family
Law — Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act — Modification of
Custody or Decision-making Responsibility; Civil Procedure —
Declaratory Judgments

 A division of the court of appeals concludes that, when

adjudicating a dispute concerning which name the parents should

use when referring to their minor child, a district court may not rely

on C.R.C.P. 57 to modify a prior order allocating decision-making

authority under section 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025, of the Uniform

Dissolution of Marriage Act. This is because section 14-10-131(2)

has specific statutory requirements with which the court must

comply that are absent from the court's determination of whether to

grant declaratory relief.

 The division also concludes that, if the court restricts either

parent's public speech concerning the child's name, that content-
 based restriction must satisfy the demanding standard from In re

Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 536 (Colo. App. 2008), to justify

an infringement on the parent's First Amendment rights. The

division provides guidance by analyzing factors other courts have

considered when addressing free speech rights in the context of

parental non-disparagement orders.
 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA96

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0231
Jefferson County District Court No. 19DR683
Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jocelyn Javernick,

Appellant,

and

Juan Javier Teruel De Torres,

Appellee.

 ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
 REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

 Division VII
 Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
 Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

 Announced December 24, 2025

Griffiths Law PC, Duncan Griffiths, Christopher Griffiths, Kimberly Newton,
Lone Tree, Colorado, for Appellant

Sherr Puttmann Akins Lamb PC, Tanya L. Akins, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee
 ¶1 This is the second appeal involving the parents' dispute over

 what name their minor child — whose full legal name is "Javier

 Reece Teruel" — should be called on a day-to-day basis in public.1

 See In re Marriage of Teruel De Torres, (Colo. App. No. 20CA0893,

 Aug. 26, 2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Teruel De

 Torres I).

¶2 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving

 Jocelyn Javernick (mother) and Juan Javier Teruel De Torres

 (father), mother appeals the district court's December 22, 2023

 order (December 2023 order), which modified an earlier order and

 determined that, under C.R.C.P. 57, which governs declaratory

 judgment claims, the parents may only refer to the child (1) by his

 full legal name when enrolling him in or completing forms for

 school, health care, or extracurricular activities and for "anything

 and everything else that requires a registration"; and (2) as "Javier"

 1 In our opinions, we generally do not refer to minor children by

 name. We also generally avoid references to other information that
 might identify a child. This case is an exception, however, given
 that the parents' primary dispute is about the child's name, and
 another division of this court has already issued an opinion in
 which the child's full name appears. See In re Marriage of Teruel De
 Torres, (Colo. App. No. 20CA0893, Aug. 26, 2021) (not published
 pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

 1
 or "Javi" (and not his middle name, "Reece") in other public

 settings.

¶3 Mother's appeal focuses on the court's second requirement,

 contending that (1) the court did not have jurisdiction to modify its

 prior order or grant relief under C.R.C.P. 57; and (2) the December

 2023 order violates her freedom of speech and freedom to parent

 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

 Constitution, respectively, as it restricts what she can call the child,

 as well as compels what she may say to third parties in public

 about his name.

¶4 We address and decide an issue of first impression, whether —

 as mother contends — the court erred by applying C.R.C.P. 57 to

 modify the provision of the court's prior order addressing the name

 dispute. Based on the procedural posture of the parents' dispute

 and the statutory framework of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage

 Act (the UDMA), §§ 14-10-101 to -133, C.R.S. 2025, we determine

 that a district court may not rely on C.R.C.P. 57 to adjudicate a

 parent's request to modify a prior order concerning the allocation of

 decision-making responsibility because doing so improperly

 bypasses the modification standards specified in section 14-10-

 2
 131(2), C.R.S. 2025. In light of our agreement with mother —

 although not based on the reasons she advances — we reverse the

 December 2023 order.

¶5 Specifically, the court disregarded the language in section 14-

 10-131(2), which provides that a court must leave intact a prior

 order allocating decision-making responsibility unless the court

 finds one or more of the five circumstances specified in section 14-

 10-131(2)(a) through (2)(c). Because the court failed to consider

 whether any of those circumstances applied under the appropriate

 standard of proof, it improperly modified the prior order.

¶6 Therefore, on remand, the court must determine whether

 father's motion for declaratory relief filed on October 10, 2022

 (October 2022 motion) satisfies the standards to modify the prior

 order under section 14-10-131(2). To that end, the district court

 may reopen the case, allow the parents to present additional

 evidence (especially given the passage of time during the pendency

 of this appeal), and conduct further proceedings consistent with

 this opinion.

 3
 I. Background

¶7 The court dissolved the parents' marriage in May 2020. The

 parents have one child, who was born in September 2018. The

 child's full legal name is Javier Reece Teruel. During the

 dissolution proceedings, mother requested that the child's name be

 changed to Reece Teruel Javernick, claiming that the parents had

 called him Reece since birth. Father objected, arguing that mother

 was trying to distance the child from him by changing the child's

 name, particularly as the child shares father's first name.

¶8 In the March 25, 2020 permanent orders (March 2020

 permanent orders), the court denied mother's request to change the

 child's legal name on his birth certificate. But the court found that

 the "strongest and most credible evidence [was that] the [parents]

 referred to the [c]hild [as] Reece since his birth" and that father had

 only recently begun calling the child "Javier," "Little Javier," "Little

 Javi," or "Javi." The court found that allowing the parents to use

 two different names would be "confusing for the [c]hild" and,

 therefore, ordered the parents to call him "Reece" and to "require

 third parties, including family, friends and professionals" to call the

 child solely by that name.

 4
 ¶9 The March 2020 permanent orders also adopted the parents'

 stipulation as to the allocation of decision-making responsibility,

 specifying that, while the parents had joint decision-making, in the

 event of a disagreement, mother had "tie-breaker authority on

 medical and education [decisions] until such time in the future that

 the [parents were] exercising equal parenting time via agreement or

 court order." Neither the parents' stipulation nor the March 2020

 permanent orders addressed tiebreaking authority in the event the

 parents could not agree on what the child should be called in

 public. The March 2020 permanent orders further provided that,

 when the child turned four, the court would determine whether it

 was in the child's best interests to modify decision-making

 responsibilities so that neither parent had tiebreaking authority.

¶ 10 Father appealed the name portion of the March 2020

 permanent orders, arguing that the district court lacked authority

 to direct the parents to call the child by a particular name. See

 Teruel De Torres I, slip op. at ¶ 14. A division of this court vacated

 that aspect of the permanent orders, concluding that a remand was

 necessary for further proceedings. Id. The division instructed the

 court (1) to ascertain whether mother's counsel had conceded the

 5
 name issue, thereby possibly rendering court intervention

 unnecessary; (2) to allow the parents to brief the issue more fully if

 it remained unresolved; or (3) to determine whether, through

 counseling, the parents had resolved the issue themselves. Id. at

 ¶ 19.

¶ 11 On remand, the parents continued to address other pending

 disputes, such as parenting time and child support. The court had

 appointed a parental responsibilities evaluator, Dr. Bill Fyfe

 (Dr. Fyfe), to assist with those issues. The court instructed that, if

 the parents had not reached an agreement on the child's name,

 Dr. Fyfe was to address the name issue in the report he was

 preparing for a February 2022 hearing. Specifically, the court

 asked Dr. Fyfe to address "the impact, if any, of referring to the

 minor child by different names in the two different households."

¶ 12 The court held two hearings, one in February 2022 and the

 other in March 2022, dealing with the parents' other issues

 involving parenting time and child support, as well as the child's

 name. Dr. Fyfe testified at the February 2022 hearing on his

 opinion about the child's name, recommending that the child be

 6
 referred to as "Javi." Following the hearings, the court set the

 matter for an oral ruling.

¶ 13 Also in March 2022, the parents entered into a stipulation

 (March 2022 stipulation), which the court adopted as an order,

 providing for equal parenting time starting in May 2022 and that

 the parents would have joint decision-making responsibility. This

 allocation of decision-making responsibility superseded the portion

 of the prior decree (i.e. the March 2020 permanent orders) vesting

 mother with tiebreaking authority in the event of an impasse.

¶ 14 The name issue, however, remained unresolved. The court

 issued an oral ruling on the name dispute, which it later adopted as

 a court order (March 2022 order). The March 2022 order "enjoined

 [the parents] from using anything other than the full name of Javier

 Reece Teruel on any official records, including school records,

 medical records, dental records, signups for plays, [and] signups for

 extracurricular activities." The court said "the child's name is

 Javier Reece Teruel and that's the name that will be used." The

 court ordered the parties to use the name Javier, in part, because

 the child was named after father, father's Puerto Rican heritage was

 7
 important to father, and testimony supported a conclusion that the

 parents had called the child by his first and middle names.

¶ 15 But the court noted its limited authority to enter an order

 addressing what the parents could call the child in their respective

 homes. The court said that the child could "go by one name in one

 family" home and "then go by another name in the other, but in the

 public eye and in the official records, it will be Javier Reece Teruel."

¶ 16 Neither parent appealed the March 2022 order.

¶ 17 In October 2022, father filed a motion seeking declaratory

 relief under C.R.C.P. 57 in the form of clarification of the March

 2022 order. In his motion, father argued that an additional order

 was necessary because he had obtained evidence that the child was

 still being called Reece at preschool, at schools the parents were

 touring to possibly enroll the child, and at the pediatrician's office.

 He requested an order declaring that "the minor child shall be

 called Javier or Javi in the public eye." In response, mother said

 that she did not dispute the child's legal name, as she was using it

 on official documents. But she argued that the court lacked

 authority to "enter any declaratory judgment that requires teachers,

 doctors, and other non-parties to call the child any specific name."

 8
 She also challenged the March 2022 order on First Amendment

 grounds.

¶ 18 The court initially issued an order in November 2022 granting

 father's requested relief. But mother filed a motion for

 reconsideration, contending that an evidentiary hearing was

 necessary to resolve disputed facts. The court agreed, vacated its

 November 2022 order, and held an evidentiary hearing in July 2023

 to resolve the factual disputes.

¶ 19 Following that hearing, the court issued its December 2023

 order, determining that Rule 57 "was designed for the current issue

 and is completely applicable and appropriate" to "settle and afford

 relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status,

 and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and

 administered." The court further said in the December 2023 order

 that its November 2022 order did not expand the March 2022 order

 but merely clarified the court's intent in entering such order.

¶ 20 The December 2023 order said "Javier will be enrolled in all

 programs and activities as Javier Reece Teruel and the

 staff/providers will be told he goes by Javier or Javi. They will not

 be told he goes by ‘Reece' or any other name." It specified that

 9
 mother "may refer to Javier as Reece or any other name she wishes

 to use" but that "in all registrations, health care providers, school

 and school activities requiring registration[,] she shall refer to him

 as Javier or Javi."

¶ 21 In analyzing mother's First Amendment arguments, the court

 relied on the standards expressed in In re Marriage of Newell, 192

 P.3d 529, 536 (Colo. App. 2008), and In re Marriage of McSoud, 131

 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Colo. App. 2006), in which divisions of this court

 held that "proof that a parent's exercise of parental responsibilities

 caused ‘actual or threatened physical or emotional harm to a

 child,'" Newell, 192 P.3d at 536 (quoting McSoud, 131 P.3d at

 1216), would likely be "sufficient to establish a compelling state

 interest sufficient to justify interference with the parent's" freedom

 of religion or freedom of speech, id. But the "harm to the child . . .

 should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be

 demonstrated in detail." Id. (quoting McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1216).

¶ 22 The court in its December 2023 order noted the "ongoing

 animosity" between the parents but concluded that, on the existing

 record, it could not "make the detailed and extensive findings of

 ‘substantial harm' necessary to survive constitutional scrutiny."

 10
 Implicit in the court's holding that it could not "make the findings

 that the harm to Javier [wa]s so compelling so as to justify a

 restriction on Mother's free speech rights" was that the court was

 not restricting mother's First Amendment rights by requiring her to

 solely use the child's first name in public settings. The court did

 not address mother's argument regarding the applicability of

 section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2025, which governs the modification of

 parenting time orders.

 II. Modifying an Allocation of Decision-Making Responsibility
 Order

¶ 23 Mother contends that the court lacked authority to modify the

 March 2022 order through the November 2022 order and similarly

 erred by entering the December 2023 order. Mother also asserts

 that the court did not have authority to modify the March 2022

 order under C.R.C.P. 57 because the court could only amend its

 prior judgment under C.R.C.P. 59 or 60, and father did not seek

 relief under either of those rules. Father counters that the court

 properly exercised its jurisdiction to provide clarity and certainty

 regarding the parents' use of the child's name in public by declaring

 11
 the rights of the parents under C.R.C.P. 57 and that the court could

 modify or clarify its order as needed.

¶ 24 We agree with mother that the court lacked authority to

 modify the name provision under C.R.C.P. 57, but for different

 reasons than mother advances.

 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 25 Issues involving a court's jurisdiction, as well as a court's

 interpretation of court rules and statutes, are questions of law that

 we review de novo. In re Marriage of Vega, 2021 COA 99, ¶ 13.

 Whether the court applied the correct legal standard also presents a

 question of law that we review de novo. In re Parental

 Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.

¶ 26 When interpreting statutes, we give effect to the General

 Assembly's intent. People v. Disher, 224 P.3d 254, 256 (Colo. 2010).

 The courts use the rules of construction applicable to statutes when

 construing a Rule of Civil Procedure. People v. McLaughlin, 2023

 CO 38, ¶ 23. To determine that intent, we first look at the statute's

 language and give the words their plain and ordinary meanings.

 Roup v. Com. Rsch., LLC, 2015 CO 38, ¶ 8. We read and consider

 the statute as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible

 12
 effect to all its parts, and we presume that the General Assembly

 intended the entire statute to be effective. People v. Buerge, 240

 P.3d 363, 367 (Colo. App. 2009). If the statute's language is clear

 and unambiguous, we look no further. People v. Jenkins, 2013

 COA 76, ¶ 12.

 B. Analysis

 1. C.R.C.P. 57

¶ 27 Relying on Toncray v. Dolan, 593 P.2d 956, 957 (Colo. 1979),

 the court reasoned that the "primary purpose of [the] declaratory

 judgment procedure is to provide a speedy, inexpensive, and readily

 accessible means of determining actual controversies which depend

 on the validity or interpretation of some written instruction of law."

 The court said at the July 2023 hearing that C.R.C.P. 57 was

 coextensive with or a substitute for the UDMA. It noted, "Certainly

 a motion to modify could result in the same . . . result, a

 clarification of prior orders." And the court said that "as long as it

 doesn't modify decision making[] or restrict parenting time[,] it's a

 best interest standard that applies." Therefore, in its view, the

 court could clarify its March 2022 order as to what name the child

 13
 would be called in official documents by requiring the parents to

 only use one name when referring to the child in public.

¶ 28 But the court's use of C.R.C.P. 57 — regardless of whether

 father requested relief under that provision — disregarded the

 General Assembly's intent that district courts use the framework

 and standards in section 14-10-131(2) to determine whether to

 modify an order allocating decision-making responsibility.

 Specifically, as discussed below, the court was incorrect in saying it

 was simply clarifying its prior order. Also, we disagree with the

 court that C.R.C.P. 57 is coextensive with or a substitute for the

 UDMA; the specific presumptions and standards for the

 modification of decision-making orders in section 14-10-131 are

 matters that a court should not consider under C.R.C.P. 57. This is

 because when parents have joint-decision making authority — to

 which the parents had stipulated before the court decided the name

 dispute — the court must first determine whether the standards in

 section 14-10-131 are satisfied before analyzing whether one parent

 may be allocated sole decision-making authority with respect to the

 disputed issue. Only once these steps are followed and there

 remains an impasse is the court authorized to act as a tiebreaker.

 14
 ¶ 29 Even though the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all

 proceedings under the UDMA, except as otherwise provided, see

 § 14-10-105(1), C.R.S. 2025, a statutory provision that governs

 substantive, rather than procedural, rights prevails over a

 conflicting supreme court rule, see People v. Prophet, 42 P.3d 61, 62

 (Colo. App. 2001). As we discuss below, we conclude that the

 standards and presumptions in section 14-10-131(2) are not

 procedural but substantive. And to the extent Colorado's Uniform

 Declaratory Judgments Law, §§ 13-51-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2025, is

 likewise considered substantive, a maxim of statutory construction

 requires courts to apply the more specific statute, see Jenkins v.

 Pan. Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 30 By concluding that the court erred by not adjudicating the

 parents' name dispute under section 14-10-131, we acknowledge

 that, at first blush, it may appear that we are violating the party

 presentation principle. Neither parent expressly sought relief under

 the UDMA, and, generally, we are bound by the party presentation

 rule requiring that we address only the issues raised by the

 litigants. See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 ("In our

 adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first

 15
 instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party

 presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for

 decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters

 the parties present." (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S.

 237, 243-44 (2008))).

¶ 31 The party presentation principle, however, does not obligate us

 to perpetuate parties' erroneous assertions of the law, nor does it

 require us to sit by and allow the district court to guess a course of

 action as to the correct governing law. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin.

 Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) ("When an issue or claim is

 properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular

 legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the

 independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of

 governing law."); accord Panzarella v. Navient Sols., Inc., 37 F.4th

 867, 877 n.11 (3d Cir. 2022); Torcivia v. Suffolk County, 17 F.4th

 342, 356 n.24 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Robl, 8 F.4th 515,

 528 n.32 (7th Cir. 2021); Does v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 792-93

 (9th Cir. 2020).

¶ 32 We could simply vacate the court's order and conclude that

 C.R.C.P. 57 was an improper vehicle to decide the name issue,

 16
 without informing the court of the correct legal standard. This was

 the approach the prior division took. In Teruel De Torres I, slip op.

 at ¶ 19, the division simply stated that, if further proceedings were

 necessary on remand, the district court could "address the issue

 more thoroughly based on a fuller briefing of the legal issue."

 Certainly, at times, this court uses such broad language to provide

 the parties and district court with flexibility to conduct further

 proceedings on remand. But the complexity of this issue and the

 longstanding nature of the parents' dispute on this specific issue

 counsel us to take a more directive approach. Particularly because

 this is the parents' second appeal on this issue, we are loath to

 simply reverse the order without explaining why C.R.C.P. 57 was

 inapplicable and that the court should have applied section 14-10-

 131(2) to resolve the parents' name dispute.

 2. The UDMA Framework

¶ 33 We agree with the division's interpretation of section 14-10-

 131(2) in In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA 92M, ¶¶ 17-18. In

 that case, the division had to interpret section 14-10-131(2)

 because the district court had erroneously resolved a parenting

 time dispute by modifying decision-making responsibility under

 17
 subsections (2)(b) and (2)(h) of the parenting time statute, section

 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025. Humphries applied the plain language of

 the UDMA in rejecting the argument that a court could modify

 decision-making authority under those two subsections.

¶ 34 The division reasoned that the district court could not modify

 decision-making under section 14-10-129.5(2)(b) because the court

 misinterpreted what "previous order" meant. The provision states

 that, if a parent "has not complied with the parenting time order or

 schedule and has violated the court order," the court may issue

 "[a]n order modifying the previous order to meet the best interests of

 the child." Humphries, ¶ 13 (quoting § 14-10-129.5(2)(b)). The

 division determined that the term "previous order" referred to the

 prior parenting time order or schedule, not an allocation of

 decision-making responsibility order entered under section 14-10-

 131. Id.

¶ 35 Likewise, Humphries rejected the assertion that the court

 could modify decision-making authority under section 14-10-

 129.5(2)(h) — a "catch all" provision "that authorizes a court to

 issue ‘[a]ny other order that may promote the best interests of the

 child or children involved.'" Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting § 14-10-

 18
 129.5(2)(h)). The division concluded that the district court's

 expansive reading of subsection (2)(h) was inconsistent with the

 standards for modification of decision-making responsibility in

 section 14-10-131. Id.

¶ 36 Humphries then turned to the standards in section 14-10-

 131(2). That statute authorizes a district court to modify decision-

 making responsibility if it finds, "on the basis of facts that have

 arisen since the prior order or which were unknown to the court at

 the time of the prior order," that "(1) a change has occurred in the

 circumstances of the child or the party to whom decision-making

 responsibility was allocated, and (2) the modification is necessary to

 serve the child's best interests." Humphries, ¶ 17 (citing § 14-10-

 131(2)).

¶ 37 Humphries noted that, because the district court had decided

 decision-making responsibility under the parenting time statute

 instead of section 14-10-131, the court failed to address two

 specific requirements. Id. First, "the court did not presume that

 the prior order allocating decision-making responsibility must

 remain in effect absent a showing that one of the specified

 circumstances exists." Id. at ¶ 18. Indeed, section 14-10-131(2)

 19
 states that "‘the court shall retain the allocation of decision-making

responsibility established by the prior decree" — meaning the

existing decision-making responsibility order — unless one or more

of five specific circumstances exist. Humphries, ¶ 18 (quoting § 14-

10-131(2)). The five circumstances are

 (a) The parties agree to the modification;

 (b) The child has been integrated into the
 family of [one party] with the consent of the
 other party and such situation warrants a
 modification of the allocation of decision-
 making responsibilities;

 (b.5) There has been a modification in the
 parenting time order pursuant to section 14-
 10-129 . . . that warrants a modification of the
 allocation of decision-making responsibilities;

 (b.7) A party has consistently consented to the
 other party making individual decisions for the
 child which decisions the party was to make
 individually or the parties were to make
 mutually; or

 (c) The retention of the allocation of decision-
 making responsibility would endanger the
 child's physical health or significantly impairs
 the child's emotional development and the
 harm likely to be caused by a change of
 environment is outweighed by the advantage of
 a change to the child.

Id. (quoting § 14-10-131(2)). Second, the court did not give effect to

or apply the heightened standard for modification of a prior order

 20
 under section 14-10-131(2)(c), which, in that case, was the only

 relevant subsection of the statute implicated.

¶ 38 Although we are not obligated to follow precedent from another

 division, we give deference to those decisions. Est. of Becker v.

 Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 563 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd sub nom., In re

 Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2002). We are persuaded by

 the statutory interpretation in Humphries and, therefore, adopt it.

 Indeed, Humphries' conclusion that the parenting time provisions in

 section 14-10-129.5 cannot substitute for the standards to modify

 decision-making responsibility under section 14-10-131(2) applies

 equally, if not more so, to our conclusion that a district court

 cannot use C.R.C.P. 57 to avoid applying the standards in section

 14-10-131(2). We thus turn to how the court erred by not relying

 on section 14-10-131.

 a. The Prior Order

¶ 39 We first must identify what the court's "prior order" was in

 October 2022 — when father filed the October 2022 motion that

 resulted in the December 2023 order — because this is crucial to

 our analysis. Indeed, how the "prior order" is denominated affects

 the court's analysis of the section 14-10-131(2) presumption that

 21
 the "prior order" is retained unless one or more of the five

 circumstances in subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c) are satisfied.

¶ 40 Recall that father appealed the name portion of the March

 2020 permanent orders, which resulted in Teruel De Torres I.

 Because, in that appeal, the division remanded the case to the

 district court for a ruling on the name dispute, the March 2020

 permanent orders were not final as to that particular issue when

 Teruel De Torres I was announced. The March 2020 permanent

 orders only became final when the court decided the name issue in

 the March 2022 order — which enjoined the parents from calling

 the child anything but Javier Reece Teruel on official forms. Thus,

 when father filed his October 2022 motion for declaratory relief, the

 March 2022 order was the "prior order" the court needed to

 presume remained in effect unless one of the five circumstances in

 section 14-10-131(2)(a) through (2)(c) was satisfied.2

 2 This opinion is not intended to hold that every parental dispute

 concerning a minor child's name must be resolved through an
 allocation of decision-making responsibility order under section 14-
 10-131, C.R.S. 2025. But we need not decide the circumstances
 when a parents' dispute over a child's name would not be a "major"
 decision; in this case, the record supports it is a "major" decision,
 particularly given mother's prior request for a legal name change.

 22
 ¶ 41 The March 2022 stipulation does not affect whether the March

 2022 order was the "prior order" for section 14-10-131(2) purposes.

 In the March 2022 stipulation, the parents agreed to joint decision-

 making authority without a tiebreaker and equal parenting time

 starting in May 2022. Thus, the March 2022 stipulation was a

 modification of decision-making responsibility authorized under

 section 14-10-131(2)(a), as the parents "agree[d] to the

 modification." The March 2022 order on the name issue, however,

 only dealt with that particular dispute, an issue that the parents

 strongly contested.

¶ 42 Neither parent appealed the March 2022 order; thus, it is the

 "prior order" for purposes of the presumption that it must remain in

 effect and cannot be modified unless the court finds that new facts

 have arisen since the court entered such order, and one or more of

 the circumstances in 14-10-131(2)(a) through (2)(c) are satisfied. In

 other words, because the parents had joint decision-making

 authority over the child's name, the court first had to determine

 whether the standards in section 14-10-131(2) were satisfied so

 that one parent could retain decision-making authority over this

 issue. If the standards could not be satisfied, however, then — and

 23
 only then — could the court act as the tiebreaker. See In re

 Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶¶ 36-37 (authorizing a court

 to act as a tiebreaker when parents with joint decision-making

 authority could not decide which school the child should attend).

¶ 43 Now that we have clarified which order is the "prior order," we

 turn to father's arguments in his October 2022 motion.

 b. Father's October 2022 Motion

¶ 44 Father's October 2022 motion raised "facts that ha[d] arisen

 since the prior [order] or that were unknown to the court at the time

 of the prior [order]." § 14-10-131(2). Specifically, father alleged

 that, since the March 2022 order, the child was still being called

 "Reece" at preschool; mother had disenrolled the child from

 preschool based on either the name dispute or financial reasons;

 mother continued to call him "Reece" in the new educational

 setting; the teachers and the child's cubby at his new preschool

 referred to him as "Reece"; and mother had attempted to

 "manipulate" health care professionals to call the child "Reece."

 Given these new facts, father requested relief "declaring that the

 child should be called Javier in the public eye . . . as opposed to his

 24
 entire legal name which is Javier Reece Teruel pursuant to

 C.R.C.P. 57."

¶ 45 In addition to alleging the facts postdating the March 2022

 order, father's October 2022 motion sought broader relief than that

 granted in the March 2022 order. The court's March 2022 order

 ruled that the child must be referred to by his full name in all

 official forms, but it specifically declined to determine the name the

 parents were required to use when referring to the child in public.

 True, the court noted in the March 2022 order that the child must

 go by his full name "in the public eye and in the official records,"

 but it did not specify what that meant with respect to what mother

 could or could not say to third parties about how she could refer to

 the child in public settings.

¶ 46 By initially granting father's October 2022 motion with its

 November 2022 order, and then later vacating it, the court

 recognized that new facts had arisen since the "prior order."

 Indeed, it determined it needed to hold a hearing — which it did in

 July 2023 — to resolve the factual disputes regarding the child's

 name.

 25
 ¶ 47 Thus, we turn to the standards for modifying the March 2022

 order.

 c. Modification of the Prior Order

¶ 48 After resolving the factual disputes at the July 2023 hearing,

 the court should have determined whether it was required to retain

 the allocation of decision-making responsibility established by the

 "prior order" (i.e., the March 2022 order which, by then, the parents

 had stipulated to joint decision-making authority) or whether one or

 more of the five circumstances in section 14-10-131(2)(a) through

 (2)(c) were satisfied. The court did not make findings on either

 basis.

¶ 49 Based on the record before us, the only relevant provision to

 warrant modification of the March 2022 order was section 14-10-

 131(2)(c), which provides that "[t]he retention of the allocation of

 decision-making responsibility would endanger the child's physical

 health or significantly impairs the child's emotional development

 and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is

 26
 outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child."3 This is a

 "more stringent [standard] than the best interests of the child

 standard." Humphries, ¶ 20; see also In re Marriage of Schlundt,

 2021 COA 58, ¶ 29 ("The policy behind requiring the more stringent

 endangerment standard" in the modification context "is to recognize

 the disruption such a change causes for the child and to promote

 stability for the child.").

¶ 50 The court presumed that its December 2023 order was simply

 a clarification of the March 2022 order. As noted above, it was not.

 It specifically modified what mother could say about the child's

 name in public and to third parties, essentially restricting her

 freedom of speech, as we address in Part III below. It stated "Javier

 will be enrolled in all programs and activities as Javier Reece

 Teruel," which the court had also said in the March 2022 order.

 But the December 2023 order also ordered that "the staff/providers

 will be told he goes by Javier or Javi. They will not be told he goes

 by ‘Reece' or any other name." And it further provided that, while

 3 This opinion is not intended to restrict the parents or court from

 relying on any other relevant provision of the UDMA as the
 circumstances may warrant on remand.

 27
 mother must register the child in official documents under his full

 legal name, if she "then tell[s] teachers, health-care providers and

 staff that he goes by ‘Reece,'" such actions are "contrary to the plain

 language of the Court's order and contrary to the intent of the

 Court's order."

¶ 51 Although the court may have believed it was only clarifying its

 "prior order," the December 2023 order placed specific, new

 restrictions on how mother could parent the child by telling her that

 she could only call him "Javier" or "Javi" in public settings.

 Therefore, any modification or expansion of the March 2022

 order — when based on new facts not known to the court at the

 time of its "prior order" — must be decided under the standards in

 section 14-10-131(2).

¶ 52 "What constitutes endangerment is a highly individualized

 determination, and we won't disturb the trial court's findings on the

 issue if they are supported by the record." In re Marriage of

 Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26 (citation omitted). Surely, the same is

 true of what constitutes significant impairment of a child's

 emotional development. The court noted in its December 2023

 order that the ongoing name dispute continued "to demonstrate to

 28
 Javi the angst and animosity . . . [m]other h[as] for . . . [f]ather and

 [i]s a day-to-day reminder of the ongoing hostility and conflict

 present in this divorce." But as part of its First Amendment

 analysis, the court likewise said it could not find that the parents'

 disagreement regarding the child's name caused him "substantial

 harm." And even though, at the February 2022 hearing, Dr. Fyfe

 recommended that the child go by "Javi," he also testified that the

 name dispute was "most likely not" causing the child trauma. Dr.

 Fyfe further said that "[p]eople respond to different names," noting

 that he himself had a nickname as a child.

¶ 53 We agree that the court addressed the new facts alleged in

 father's October 2022 motion involving mother's alleged conduct of

 manipulating teachers and doctors to refer to the child as "Reece."

 While the court focused, in part, on mother's conduct, it also

 seemed particularly concerned with the confusion and frustration of

 third parties who did not know how to refer to the child or who felt

 they were caught in the middle of the parents' dispute. While the

 court noted that the child could discern the parents' continued

 conflict relating to the name dispute, the court made no findings

 that, by February 2023, the child was suffering trauma that

 29
 "endanger[ed] [his] physical health or significantly impair[ed] [his]

 emotional development." § 14-10-131(2)(c).

¶ 54 Therefore, we must vacate the December 2023 order because

 the court did not consider section 14-10-131(2) when entering it.

 We want to make clear that we express no opinion as to whether

 father's October 2022 motion or the resulting facts presented at the

 July 2023 hearing satisfied the heightened standard for

 modification of the March 2022 order under section 14-10-131(2)(c).

 Nor do we imply that section 14-10-131(2)(c) is the only provision in

 section 14-10-131(2) that may apply to the parents' dispute going

 forward. Instead, we simply hold that the court on remand must

 resolve father's October 2022 motion by applying section 14-10-

 131(2).

¶ 55 Our reversal of the December 2023 order and remand

 instructions do not, however, end our inquiry, as we are still left

 with mother's constitutional arguments. That is where we turn

 next.

 30
 III. Any Court Order Must be Narrowly Tailored to Protect the
 Parents' Constitutional Rights

¶ 56 In the December 2023 order, the court said it could not find

 that mother's calling the child by his middle name was so harmful

 to the child "so as to justify a restriction on Mother's free speech

 rights." The court reiterated its ruling from the March 2022 order

 requiring that the child's full name be used in official registrations

 and documents. Although the court ruled that mother could call

 the child whatever name she liked in the privacy of her home,

 teachers and health care professionals were not to be told that the

 child "goes by ‘Reece' or any other name." Mother claims that an

 order specifying what she may or may not tell third parties about

 the child's name implicates her free speech rights. We agree.

¶ 57 "Freedom of speech is protected under the First Amendment to

 the United States Constitution, which provides, in relevant part,

 that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

 speech . . . .'" Newell, 192 P.3d at 535 (quoting U.S. Const. amend.

 I). Mother's First Amendment challenge involves a content-based

 restriction, as the December 2023 order's restriction is "dependent

 solely on the nature of the message being conveyed" (i.e., her

 31
 preferred name for the child). Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461

 (1980). The government may only regulate the content of

 constitutionally protected speech to promote a compelling state

 interest, and any such regulation must be narrowly tailored to

 achieve that end. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.

 115, 126 (1989); see Denv. Publ'g Co. v. City of Aurora, 896 P.2d

 306, 311 (Colo. 1995).

¶ 58 In Colorado, "absent demonstrated harm to the child, the best

 interests of the child standard has been determined to be

 ‘insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling the

 parents' fundamental rights.'" Newell, 192 P.3d at 536 (quoting In

 re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 145 (Colo. 2005)).

¶ 59 A showing that a parent's exercise of their free speech rights

 "threatened the child with physical or emotional harm, or had

 actually caused such harm, would establish a compelling state

 interest sufficient to justify a restriction" on the parent's rights. Id.

 The standard is "demanding," id., as the actual or threatened harm

 to the child "must be ‘substantial'" and "demonstrated in detail," id.

 (quoting McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1216).

 32
 ¶ 60 The Newell division determined that a father's free speech

 rights were violated by a magistrate's order that barred him "from

 voicing his concerns about the child's care or education." Id. at

 535. In concluding that the magistrate's order did not satisfy the

 high standard necessary to justify a restriction on father's speech,

 the division remanded the case for reconsideration of "whether

 restrictions on father's right to communicate with third parties

 regarding the child [we]re warranted" and, if so, to "make additional

 findings regarding the type and degree of harm that the child ha[d]

 suffered or may suffer because of the speech that [wa]s to be

 restricted," with the harm justifying the restriction "demonstrated

 in detail." Id. at 536.

¶ 61 As noted above, the district court could not justify a restriction

 on mother's speech because, though her continued opposition to

 calling the child by his first name might be harmful to the child, the

 court could not specifically articulate such harm in detail.

 Nonetheless, the court's December 2023 order prohibits mother

 from calling the child anything but his first name in public, and she

 cannot tell third parties that she prefers calling him by his middle

 name. At oral argument, the division raised many hypothetical

 33
 scenarios to both parents' counsel as to what, under the December

 2023 order, mother may or may not be allowed to say to third

 parties about the child's name in public. Given the district court's

 near-blanket prohibition on calling the child anything but his first

 name in public, counsel's responses to our hypotheticals

 demonstrated that many circumstances could arise that would,

 under the speech restriction, subject mother to potential contempt

 without prior notice to her.

¶ 62 For example, under the existing December 2023 order, could

 mother say, "I must tell you by court order that my son must be

 called by his first name, but I prefer calling him by his middle name

 and you will hear me calling him by that name"? Or could mother

 say, "While my son is around me, I will call him by his first name

 but if we are alone in a parent-teacher conference, I will refer to him

 by his middle name because that is my preference"? In short, the

 December 2023 order is not narrowly tailored to the extent that it

 restricts what mother may call the child in public or what she might

 say to third parties in public about what she prefers to call the

 child.

 34
 ¶ 63 On remand, before the court can restrict (or compel) either

 parent's speech in public as to the child's name, it must point to

 evidentiary support that the "demanding" standard is met by

 showing that the harm to the child is "substantial," and it must

 support that finding of harm "in detail." Id. (quoting McSoud, 131

 P.3d at 1216). The court's restriction of either parent's speech

 about the child's name, in public or private, is a content-based

 restriction that cannot simply be subject to the best interests of the

 child standard without meeting the other heightened constitutional

 standards.

¶ 64 If the court finds that the record supports a restriction (or

 specific requirement) on either parent's speech related to the child's

 name, the court must then consider whether the content-based

 restriction or requirement is narrowly tailored to justify it.

¶ 65 As guidance, we turn to how courts in other jurisdictions have

 analyzed "non-disparagement" clauses in domestic relations orders.

 We recognize that non-disparagement clauses are not directly on

 point, but we view the free speech analyses concerning these

 provisions to be analogous to the free speech considerations

 concerning the parents' name issue. We do not opine as to the

 35
 constitutionality of a non-disparagement order generally but look at

 cases in which the court held the order was unconstitutionally

 overbroad. In the event the court justifies one parent using in

 public settings a court-ordered name for the child to which the

 parent objects, we provide this guidance to assist in ensuring that

 any restriction is narrowly tailored to prevent the "substantial"

 harm that the court "demonstrate[s] in detail." Id. (quoting McSoud,

 131 P.3d at 1216).

¶ 66 For example, in Israel v. Israel, 189 N.E.3d 170, 180 (Ind. Ct.

 App. 2022), the court generally upheld a non-disparagement clause

 but determined it went too far because it prohibited the father from

 making any disparaging comments to "anyone," even when the child

 was not present. The appellate court held that the non-

 disparagement clause had to be modified to omit language

 prohibiting the father from making disparaging comments to

 "friends, family members, doctors, teachers, associated parties, co-

 workers, employers, the parenting coordinator, media, the press, or

 anyone." Id.

¶ 67 In determining whether a non-disparagement clause

 constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, other

 36
 state courts have also looked at the breadth of the provision's

 language, including whether it prohibits statements outside the

 child's presence and whether it is too vague for a party to comply.

 See, e.g., Shak v. Shak, 144 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Mass. 2020)

 (concluding that a non-disparagement clause was an

 unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because neither father

 nor mother showed evidence that disparaging comments had been

 made around the child; that the toddler would even have

 understood such comments, assuming they were being made; and

 that any future harm to the child was anything other than

 "speculative"); D'Ambrosio v. D'Ambrosio, 610 S.E.2d 876, 886 (Va.

 Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that an order prohibiting husband from

 making any "defamatory comments" about his ex-wife to any "third

 parties" was too vague and overly broad for the husband to know

 what statements might subject him to contempt).

¶ 68 These cases illustrate the manner by which prior restraint on

 a parent's free speech rights must be narrowly tailored to withstand

 37
 First Amendment constitutional scrutiny.4 To the extent the court's

 order limits what a parent may call the child in public or what the

 parent may or may not say to third parties about the child's name,

 the court must narrowly tailor any such restriction by considering,

 for example, whether (1) the parent's speech will be uttered in front

 of the child; (2) the parent's speech substantially harms the child,

 as opposed to whether there is harm or confusion to third parties;

 or (3) the restrictions are so vague so as to place the parent subject

 to the restrictions in a position that the parent's speech may be

 subject to contempt without notice.

 IV. Conclusion

¶ 69 We reverse the court's December 2023 order and remand the

 case to the district court to conduct further proceedings consistent

 with this opinion.

 4 Given that the court did not resolve the name dispute under

 section 14-10-131(2)(c), we decline to address mother's arguments
 regarding her right to parent under the Fourteenth Amendment's
 Due Process Clause. Because, on remand, the court may be
 presented with evidence sufficient to prove endangerment, it is not
 clear to us how the Fourteenth Amendment right to parent claim
 will be framed under the court's allocation of decision-making
 responsibility determination if the section 14-10-131 standard is
 satisfied.

 38
 JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

 39