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CourtListener opinion 11240637
Date unknown · US
- Extracted case name
- pending
- Extracted reporter citation
- 571 U.S. 415
- Docket / number
- pending
Machine-draft headnote
Machine-draft public headnote: CourtListener opinion 11240637 is included in the LexyCorpus QDRO sample set as a public CourtListener opinion with relevance to pension / defined benefit issues. The current annotation is conservative: it identifies source provenance, relevance signals, and evidence quotes for attorney/agent retrieval. It is not a Willie-approved legal headnote yet.
Retrieval annotation
Draft retrieval summary: this opinion has QDRO relevance score 5/5, retirement-division score 5/5, and family-law score 5/5. Use the quoted text and full opinion below before relying on the case.
Category: pension / defined benefit issues
Evidence quotes
QDRO“Fenstermaker's account with the New York State and Local Retirement System? 5. Assuming, as the parties seem to agree, that there was no qualified domestic relations order (or anything similar) in effect as of the petition date, does the absence of a QDRO affect the answers to questions 3 and 4 above and, if so, how? 6. Do (i) specific plan documents creating or governing the New York City Employees' Retirement System and/or (ii) nonbankruptcy law applicable to that system impose a restriction on the transfer of beneficial interests? 7. Do (i) specific plan documents creating or governing the New Yor”
pension“d. These circumstances are not akin to those in decisions relied upon by Ms. Fenstermaker that were unfavorable to debtors. Thus, for the above reasons, the objection to Mr. Fenstermaker's exemption of the life insurance policy is overruled. Retirement/Pension Accounts On his second amended schedule A/B, Mr. Fenstermaker disclosed interests in two additional retirement or pension accounts—"New York City Employees' Retirement" and "New York State Employees' Retirement"—and indicated that these assets were related to his divorce, which remains pending. On amended schedule C, he claimed exemptions under federal”
Source and provenance
- Source type
- courtlistener_qdro_opinion_full_text
- Permissions posture
- public
- Generated status
- machine draft public v0
- Review status
- gold label pending
- Jurisdiction metadata
- US
- Deterministic extraction
- reporter: 571 U.S. 415
- Generated at
- May 14, 2026
Related public corpus pages
Deterministic links based on shared title/citation terms and QDRO / retirement / family-law retrieval scores.
Clean opinion text
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
In re: Chapter 7
Case No. 24-10108
Scott L. Fenstermaker,
Debtor
ORDER OVERRULING, IN PART, OBJECTIONS TO EXEMPTIONS
Scott L. Fenstermaker began this bankruptcy case in May 2024, filing his petition,
schedules, and other required forms [Dkt. No. 1]. In June 2024, Mr. Fenstermaker amended his
schedule of assets (schedule A/B) [Dkt. No. 9]. About 10 months later in April 2025, following
an effort by the chapter 7 trustee to liquidate certain assets, Mr. Fenstermaker again amended his
schedule of assets and also amended his schedule of claimed exemptions (schedule C) [Dkt. No.
81]. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a)(1) (permitting debtor to amend schedules, among other
things, "at any time before the case is closed").
Certain amendments to the claimed exemptions drew objections from Mr. Fenstermaker's
estranged spouse, Linda Fenstermaker [Dkt. No. 87].1 Mr. Fenstermaker responded in defense
of the exemptions [Dkt. No. 94]. The Court held a nonevidentiary hearing on the matter and, for
reasons discussed below, now overrules the objections, in part, and provides a further briefing
opportunity on certain limited issues.
1 The chapter 7 trustee joined in those objections, adopting "the reasons and grounds" for the arguments
made by Ms. Fenstermaker, without any modification or elaboration [Dkt. No. 88]. At a hearing on the
objections, discussed below, the trustee declined to make any separate arguments about the objections,
expressing that Ms. Fenstermaker's counsel would be "taking the lead on the objection[s]."
Life Insurance Policy 7273
On his original schedules, Mr. Fenstermaker did not disclose an interest in any life
insurance policy, although he did list life insurance among his monthly expenses. Twenty-six
days later, when first amending schedule A/B, he disclosed an interest in "life insurance on wife"
with a surrender or refund value of $0.00. The disclosure was made ten days before the date
scheduled for the first meeting of creditors in this case. At that point, he did not amend
schedule C to claim any exemption in the disclosed interest.2
Several months later, in connection with a proposed settlement, the chapter 7 trustee
sought authority to sell or transfer the estate's interest in the life insurance policy (among other
things) to Ms. Fenstermaker. Mr. Fenstermaker objected. And, soon after a hearing on the
trustee's requests, Mr. Fenstermaker amended schedules A/B and C. On this second amended
schedule A/B, Mr. Fenstermaker more specifically described the life insurance policy—"USAA
Life Insurance on Wife's life"—listing himself as the beneficiary and maintaining the $0.00
value. On amended schedule C, he claimed an exemption under state law in "USAA Life
Insurance Account ending 7273"—referencing the life insurance policy on Ms. Fenstermaker's
life. Ms. Fenstermaker objected to this exemption on multiple grounds. At the hearing on the
matter, however, she narrowed her arguments down to one: concealment of the asset.
All parties agree that Mr. Fenstermaker owned the policy (a term life insurance policy)
when he filed his bankruptcy petition. In paragraph 14 of her objection, Ms. Fenstermaker
contends that Mr. Fenstermaker "initially claimed that [she] was the owner of the policy" and
then "submitted outdated information" in support of that claim. As recounted by Ms.
2 At the time, Mr. Fenstermaker was represented by counsel. Counsel was permitted to withdraw about
two months later in August 2024, and Mr. Fenstermaker has represented himself since then.
Fenstermaker's counsel at the hearing, Mr. Fenstermaker acknowledged that he owned the policy
only after "a considerable amount of back and forth between [Mr. Fenstermaker], Ms.
Fenstermaker, and the trustee," and after being presented with proof obtained by Ms.
Fenstermaker from the issuer of the policy. Ms. Fenstermaker's counsel maintained that,
although the claimed exemption seems to apply to the policy, Mr. Fenstermaker should not be
permitted to claim any such exemption because he did not disclose the policy on his original
schedule A/B and belatedly acknowledged that he owned the policy.
Mr. Fenstermaker generally disputes that he attempted to conceal his interest in the
policy. He denies having ever said that Ms. Fenstermaker owned the policy. And he suggests
that a different life insurance policy (on his own life) may have led to confusion for Ms.
Fenstermaker and the trustee.
No party has requested an evidentiary hearing on the objection to exempting the life
insurance policy. In any event, given how the analysis unfolds below, the Court concludes that
no evidentiary hearing would be warranted.
A debtor's bad-faith concealment of an asset can lead to adverse consequences. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (including "knowing[] and fraudulent[] . . . false oath or account"
as basis for denial of discharge). For more than a decade, however, some courts have been
disinclined to deprive debtors of exemptions as a consequence of their bad-faith conduct. E.g.,
Mateer v. Ostrander (In re Mateer), 525 B.R. 559, 565-67 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2015) (discussing
impact of certain dicta in Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 423-25 (2014)).3 Even if such conduct
3 In support of her argument that the concealment of an asset provides a basis for the denial of an
exemption, Ms. Fenstermaker cites cases that were all decided before Law v. Siegel.
could provide a basis for disallowing a claimed exemption, the suboptimal circumstances
summarized above would be insufficient to persuade the Court to take such action.
Assuming (but not finding) that Mr. Fenstermaker provided incorrect information about
the policy's ownership and then waited until proof was presented before acknowledging that he
owned the policy, one cannot reasonably infer from those and other details here that Mr.
Fenstermaker necessarily attempted in bad faith to conceal the asset. Of note, on his original
schedules, Mr. Fenstermaker disclosed a sizeable monthly life insurance expense ($400) and thus
did not obscure all indications that he might have an interest in a life insurance policy. This
expense disclosure alone could have suggested to the trustee and creditors that an undisclosed
potential interest in a life insurance policy would be something to inquire about at the meeting of
creditors. Further, whether a mistake, misunderstanding, or something else led to the initial
nondisclosure, Mr. Fenstermaker rectified the inaccuracy by amending schedule A/B relatively
quickly—and before any meeting of creditors was held. These circumstances are not akin to
those in decisions relied upon by Ms. Fenstermaker that were unfavorable to debtors.
Thus, for the above reasons, the objection to Mr. Fenstermaker's exemption of the life
insurance policy is overruled.
Retirement/Pension Accounts
On his second amended schedule A/B, Mr. Fenstermaker disclosed interests in two
additional retirement or pension accounts—"New York City Employees' Retirement" and "New
York State Employees' Retirement"—and indicated that these assets were related to his divorce,
which remains pending. On amended schedule C, he claimed exemptions under federal and
state law in each of the accounts, and Ms. Fenstermaker objected to those exemptions. Noting
that the accounts originated from her employment, she contends that any interest of Mr.
Fenstermaker's in the accounts would not qualify for the claimed exemptions. Among the
arguments in his response, Mr. Fenstermaker asserts that his interests in the accounts are not
property of the bankruptcy estate, which, if correct, would avoid the need to resolve whether the
claimed exemptions apply. In support, Mr. Fenstermaker focuses on 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
In her written objection to the exemptions, Ms. Fenstermaker had focused on the
statutory bases for the exemptions themselves. She did not address (nor would there necessarily
have been any reason for her to address) the import, if any, of section 541(c)(2). At the hearing
on the objections, during a discussion of the accounts, she expressed a desire to have an
opportunity to provide the Court with further briefing. As a result, Ms. Fenstermaker may file a
supplemental legal memorandum to address the following issues:
1. Whether the New York City Employees' Retirement System is a trust in which the
members hold beneficial interests.
2. Whether the New York State and Local Retirement System is a trust in which the
members hold beneficial interests.
3. When he filed his bankruptcy petition on May 23, 2024 ("the petition date"), did Mr.
Fenstermaker have any beneficial interest in Ms. Fenstermaker's account with the
New York City Employees' Retirement System?
4. On the petition date, did Mr. Fenstermaker have any beneficial interest in Ms.
Fenstermaker's account with the New York State and Local Retirement System?
5. Assuming, as the parties seem to agree, that there was no qualified domestic relations
order (or anything similar) in effect as of the petition date, does the absence of a
QDRO affect the answers to questions 3 and 4 above and, if so, how?
6. Do (i) specific plan documents creating or governing the New York City Employees'
Retirement System and/or (ii) nonbankruptcy law applicable to that system impose a
restriction on the transfer of beneficial interests?
7. Do (i) specific plan documents creating or governing the New York State and Local
Retirement System and/or (ii) nonbankruptcy law applicable to that system impose a
restriction on the transfer of beneficial interests?
8. Ifrestrictions on the transfer of beneficial interests are imposed as to either system
(see questions 6 and 7 above), are those restrictions enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law?
Such a memorandum must not exceed 30 pages and must be filed no later than February 24,
2026.4 After the timely filing of any such memorandum, the Court will issue a separate order
giving Mr. Fenstermaker an opportunity to respond.
Dated: January 13, 2026 Lh dbayL Kips
Michael A. Fagone
United States Bankruptcy Judge
District of Maine
* Because he joined in Ms. Fenstermaker's objections, the chapter 7 trustee may also file a supplemental
legal memorandum on the same questions and under the same limitations as Ms. Fenstermaker. Further,
as to the trustee's still-pending Motion to Sell Property [Dkt. No. 63] and Motion to Approve
Compromise |[Dkt. No. 64], the Court will continue to defer additional action on those motions until after
a complete resolution of the objections to exemptions, as the motions involve some of the same property
that is at issue in the objections.