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Filed 2/17/26 Marriage of Tran and Ha CA4/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 DIVISION THREE

 In re the Marriage of LINH TU BAO
 TRAN and KRYSTAL BICH
 HUYEN VU HA.

 LINH TU BAO TRAN,
 G064047
 Respondent,
 (Super. Ct. No. 16D000647)
 v.
 OPINION
 KRYSTAL BICH HUYEN VU HA,

 Appellant.

 Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Thomas James Lo, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded with directions.
 Influential Law and Van Nghiem for Appellant.
 Bruce A. Wilson and Bruce A. Wilson for Respondent.
 Appellant Krystal Bich Huyen Vu Ha and respondent Linh Tu
Bao Tran previously were married. After Tran filed a petition for dissolution
of their marriage, they entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA)
and the trial court entered a marital dissolution judgment in 2018. Following
two appeals by Tran, Ha filed a request for order, seeking attorney fees and
costs under the MSA and Family Code section 2030. Ha claimed she was
entitled to attorney fees and costs for Tran's two prior appeals and certain
non-appellate attorney fees and costs. The court denied Ha's request, and Ha
appeals from that denial.
 We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Ha's request
for the appellate attorney fees she sought because the request was untimely
under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(c)(1).1 The court also did not err
in denying Ha's request for the non-appellate attorney fees she sought under
the MSA. We conclude, however, that the court abused its discretion by not
explicitly addressing and making findings regarding whether Ha should be
awarded the non-appellate attorney fees she sought under Family Code
section 2030. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings and to determine whether and to what extent
Ha should be awarded the non-appellate attorney fees and costs she sought
under Family Code section 2030.

 1
 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of
Court.

 2
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 In 2016, Tran filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage
to Ha. The petition listed the date of marriage as June 9, 2014, but Ha's
response to the petition listed the date of marriage as February 1, 2002.
 In 2018, Tran and Ha entered into the MSA and the trial court
entered a marital dissolution judgment that incorporated the MSA and
reserved certain specified issues for future adjudication. The MSA stated,
among other things, the parties agreed they were married on August 1, 2004,
and separated on January 12, 2016. The MSA noted the court previously had
ordered Tran to pay Ha $1,500 per month in spousal support, and "[t]he
[p]arties agree that the court shall reserve jurisdiction over the issue of
spousal support and the current [s]pousal [s]upport [o]rder and [e]arnings
[a]ssignment [o]rder remain in full force and effect." The MSA also stated Ha
may have a community interest in Tran's retirement plans and "[t]he court
shall reserve jurisdiction over the division of community property including
but not limited to the above-mentioned retirement plans."
 The MSA included a section entitled, "costs of enforcement"
(capitalizations, boldface, and underscoring omitted), which provided as
follows: "In the event that either of the parties shall be required to bring any
action or proceeding to enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement or any
court order made after merger of any provision of this Agreement in the
dissolution judgment, the party prevailing in such action or proceeding shall
be entitled to recover all costs of such enforcement proceeding, including
reasonable attorney fees as set by the court. No such liability shall accrue
unless ten (10) days prior notice of the claimed default has been given to the
alleged defaulting party, and such party may cure the default within that ten
(10) day period without liability for the other party's costs or fees."

 3
 In 2019, Tran filed two requests for order seeking to end spousal
support and set aside portions of the judgment. Tran asserted, among other
things, the MSA incorrectly stated the date of marriage as August 1, 2004,
and he actually married Ha on June 9, 2014—which is the date reflected on
their license and certificate of marriage—not August 1, 2004. Ha opposed
both requests for order. The trial court (Judge Donald F. Gaffney) denied
both requests for order.
 In November 2019, Ha filed a request for order seeking division
of Tran's retirement accounts and requesting $3,000 in attorney fees. In July
2020, Tran filed a request for order to correct a clerical error and set aside
the judgment, again arguing the correct date of marriage was June 9, 2014.
Tran noted that, if his date of marriage to Ha was August 1, 2004, it would be
a void marriage because he was not divorced from his previous wife until
September 2011. Both parties filed additional papers related to these
motions, including a request by Ha for additional attorney fees.
 On December 5, 2020, the trial court entered findings and order
after hearing regarding Tran's motion. It found "there is no clerical error
within the [j]udgment and there are no equity arguments that persuade the
court that any modification to the [j]udgment is necessary," and it awarded
$2,789 in attorney fees to Ha's counsel "based on the prevailing party
provision of the [MSA]." Also on December 5, 2020, the court entered
judgment on reserved issues. That judgment stated Ha shall receive one-half
of the community property interest in Tran's two retirement plans; attorney
Richard Muir (who was neither Tran's nor Ha's counsel) shall prepare the
qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs); the date of marriage is August
1, 2004, and the date of separation is January 12, 2016, for purposes of
drafting the QDROs; and "[e]ach side is to pay one-half of the legal

 4
 fees/expenses pertaining to the drafting of the QDROs."2 It also noted the
issue of attorney fees was reserved for further hearing. Tran appealed from
the December 5, 2020 judgment and order (G059864 or first appeal).
 Both parties continued to file additional papers in the trial court
regarding Ha's request for attorney fees. In June 2021, Tran also moved in
the trial court to stay the order regarding the QDROs pending his appeal,
which Ha opposed.
 In an October 1, 2021 minute order, the trial court denied Tran's
June 2021 motion, indicating it would award Ha $3,384 in attorney fees and
costs (which is the amount Ha requested in connection with opposing Tran's
motion), and award Ha an additional $29,165 in attorney fees and costs
(which was an additional amount Ha requested). The findings in that minute
order were reflected in two findings and order after hearing entered by the
court on November 12, 2021. In one of the orders, the court denied Tran's
June 2021 motion to stay the order regarding the QDROs pending appeal and
ordered Tran to pay Ha's counsel $3,384 in attorney fees "pursuant to the
prevailing party provision of the [MSA] and . . . Family Code [s]ection 2030."
In the other order, the court ordered Tran to pay Ha's counsel $29,165 in
attorney fees "pursuant to the prevailing party provision of the [MSA]
and . . . Family Code [s]ection 2030."
 On January 11, 2022, Tran appealed from an order dated
November 12, 2021 (G061031 or second appeal).3 On January 31, 2022, this

 2
 The trial court previously issued minute orders regarding the
findings in the December 5, 2020 judgment and findings and order after
hearing.

 3
 Tran's notice of appeal did not specify which of the two
November 12, 2021 orders he was appealing.

 5
 court dismissed Tran's second appeal (G061031) for failing to timely deposit
costs for preparation of the record on appeal, and on April 4, 2022, the
remittitur issued.
 In October 2022, a panel of this court issued its opinion in Tran's
first appeal (G059864), which had challenged "(1) the trial court's order
denying his 2020 motion to set aside the 2018 judgment, and (2) the court's
2020 judgment awarding Ha rights to Tran's retirement benefits." (Tran v.
Ha (Oct. 5, 2022, G059864) [nonpub. opn.].) The panel of this court affirmed
the challenged order and judgment. (Ibid.) On December 7, 2022, the
remittitur issued.
 On July 10, 2023, Ha filed a request for order, seeking $45,000 in
attorney fees and costs. Ha asserted these attorney fees and costs were
"incurred by [her] after the billing period that was already covered by the
[November 12, 2021] order." (Capitalizations omitted.)4 Ha said the request
was "made pursuant to the prevailing party provision of the [MSA] which
was part of the [d]ivorce [j]udgment and Family Code [s]ection 2030." The
hearing on Ha's request for order originally was scheduled for August 16,
2023, but it was continued to October 13, 2023.
 On September 28, 2023, Tran filed his opposition. Tran argued
Ha's request for order was defective and she had failed to file required
information. On September 29, 2023, Ha requested to reschedule the hearing.
The trial court continued the hearing to December 15, 2023.

 4
 In February 2022, Ha obtained two writs of execution, one for a
principal amount of $3,384 and one for a principal amount of $29,165. In her
request for order, Ha asserted Tran had filed for bankruptcy in the beginning
of 2022 and received a discharge of about $34,000 in attorney fees he
previously owed.

 6
 On November 30, 2023, Tran filed another response, again
asserting that Ha's request for order was defective and she had failed to file
required information. Tran also asserted Ha and her counsel should be
sanctioned.
 On December 5, 2023, Ha filed a brief and other documents in
support of her pending request for order seeking attorney fees and costs. Ha
asserted she had not previously requested attorney fees for any legal services
by her counsel after the October 1, 2021 hearing and the current request was
for attorney fees that were incurred after that hearing. Ha claimed the total
amount of fees and costs she was seeking was $92,544. On December 7, 2023,
Tran filed what he called omnibus legal objections to Ha's late brief. On
December 14, 2023, Ha filed a response to Tran's objections. On December 15,
2023, the trial court continued the hearing to February 6, 2024, and
permitted Tran to file a reply brief by December 22, 2023.
 On December 21, 2023, Tran filed another brief and supporting
documents. On January 29 and 31, 2024, Ha filed further papers, in which
she asserted the total amount of fees and costs she was now seeking was
$105,361. On February 1, 2024, Tran filed an objection to Ha's January 29
and 31, 2024 filings.
 On February 20, 2024, the trial court (Judge Thomas James Lo)
denied Ha's motion for attorney fees and costs.5 Regarding the request for
appellate attorney fees, the court found the motion was untimely under rule
3.1702(c) because it was filed more than 40 days after the remittiturs were

 5
 There does not appear to have been a hearing conducted on
February 6, 2024; instead, the court's minute order stated both counsel were
advised appearances were not required and the court would take the motion
under submission.

 7
 issued on the first appeal (December 7, 2022) and on the second appeal (April
4, 2022). Additionally, the court stated Ha sought attorney fees and costs
associated with enforcement of the QDRO, enforcement of the judgment, and
her attorney fees motion under the enforcement provision of the MSA. The
court, however, found Ha "ha[d] offered no credible evidence she was the
prevailing party on any enforcement litigation" and, additionally, had not
"provide[d] proof of any ten-day notice to allow the defaulting-party to cure
any default." The court further stated, "[a]ny other relief intermingled with
[Ha's] two trial briefs, totaling 292 pages," was denied.6 Ha appeals from the
order.
 DISCUSSION
 I.
 LEGAL PRINCIPLES
 "‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.'" (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "‘This means that an appellant
must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search
the record and the law books to test his claim. The appellant must present an
adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to
relevant portions of the record. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Accordingly, the
California Rules of Court expressly require appellate briefs to ‘[s]tate each

 6
 The trial court stated it "has not considered [Ha's] 26-page
supplemental brief filed on [January 31, 2024] and her 29-page reply brief
filed [January 29, 2024], as those filings were untimely, unauthorized[,] and
exceeded page-limit requirements." The court also denied Tran's request for
attorney fees and sanctions.

 8
 point . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of
authority' and to ‘[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a
citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.'" (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620; see also
Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co., Inc. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 284,
304 ["failure to support a contention with citations to authority and reasoned
argument is grounds for deeming the argument waived"].)
 "Although attorney fee awards are typically reviewed for abuse of
discretion, ‘"‘a determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo.'"'" (Reyes v. Beneficial State Bank
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 596, 604.) "‘"[I]ssues of statutory construction and
contract interpretation that do not turn on extrinsic evidence are subject to
independent review."'" (Ibid.) Additionally, "[w]e independently review
interpretations of the California Rules of Court, applying the usual rules of
statutory construction." (In re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 573, 583.)
 II.
 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON PRIOR APPEALS
 On appeal, Ha claims she is entitled to attorney fees of $51,443
for Tran's first appeal and $430 for Tran's second appeal. We conclude the
trial court did not err in finding Ha's request for attorney fees and costs
associated with Tran's prior appeals was untimely under rule 3.1702(c)(1).
 Under rule 3.1702(c)(1), "[a] notice of motion to claim attorney's
fees on appeal—other than the attorney's fees on appeal claimed under (b)—
under a statute or contract requiring the court to determine entitlement to
the fees, the amount of the fees, or both, must be served and filed within the
time for serving and filing the memorandum of costs under rule 8.278(c)(1) in

 9
 an unlimited civil case or under rule 8.891(c)(1) in a limited civil case."7 Rule
8.278(c)(1) provides, "[w]ithin 40 days after issuance of the remittitur, a party
claiming costs awarded by a reviewing court must serve and file in the
superior court a verified memorandum of costs under rule 3.1700."8 Thus,
because Ha's motion was filed more than 40 days after the remittitur was
issued in the two appeals (April 4 and December 7, 2022), the trial court
found the motion to be untimely.9
 On appeal, Ha argues rule 3.1702(c)(1) does not apply here
because it purportedly "contains an explicit exception where it reads,
‘other than the attorney's fees on appeal claimed under (b)—under a
statute or contract requiring the court to determine entitlement to the
fees, the amount of the fees, or both . . . .'" Ha says this case "falls under
the exception of ‘other than'" (boldface omitted) because her claim for
appellate fees is brought under a contract and statute—i.e., the MSA and
Family Code section 2030. We disagree with Ha's interpretation of the rule.
Ha interprets the "other than" language as an exception applying not only to
attorney fees claimed under subdivision (b), but also any attorney fees

 7
 Rule 3.1702(b) applies to a motion for attorney fees "for services
up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including
attorney's fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial
court."

 8
 Rule 8.891(c)(1) provides, "[w]ithin 30 days after the clerk sends
notice of issuance of the remittitur, a party claiming costs awarded by the
appellate division must serve and file in the trial court a verified
memorandum of costs under rule 3.1700(a)(1)."

 9
 Rule 3.1702(d) permits the trial court to extend the time to file a
motion for attorney fees for good cause. On appeal, Ha does not argue the
court erred by not extending the time for filing under that rule.

 10
 claimed under a statute or contract. The plain language of the rule, however,
makes clear that the "other than" language applies only to a claim for
attorney fees on appeal under rule 3.1702(b), not generally any claim for
attorney fees under a statute or contract. Ha's argument disregards that the
clause "other than the attorney's fees on appeal claimed under (b)" is
specifically separated from the remainder of the language in rule 3.1702(c)(1).
 Ha also contends "the time limit under [r]ules 8.278(c)(1) and
8.891(c)(1) is prescribed for ‘a [sic] unlimited civil case' and ‘a limited civil
case' respectively, not a family law case" (boldface and italics omitted), and
thus, Ha says the rules do not apply here. Ha appears to be arguing that rule
3.1702 does not apply to a marriage dissolution action under the Family
Code. Ha's argument is unavailing because rule 3.1702(c)(1) can apply to an
action under the Family Code. (See In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 1, 4, 9 (Freeman) [applying former rule 870.2, which is the
predecessor to rule 3.1702, to a motion for fees under Family Code section
271 in a marital dissolution action and noting "it has been recognized that
[former] rule 870.2 applies generally to all applications for attorney fees
incurred on postjudgment appeals"].)10
 Moreover, Ha cites no case for the proposition that rule 3.1702
does not apply to a marriage dissolution action, and we are not persuaded it
does not. Rule 3.1702(a) states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute, this rule applies in civil cases to claims for statutory attorney's fees

 10
 Ha asserts Freeman is inapplicable because it involved a claim
for attorney fees under Family Code section 271. (Freeman, supra, 132
Cal.App.4th at p. 5.) Although Freeman involved a claim for attorney fees
under Family Code section 271, the case still is instructive here because it
applies former rule 870.2 (the predecessor to rule 3.1702) in a marriage
dissolution action. (Freeman, at pp. 4, 7–9.)

 11
 and claims for attorney's fees provided for in a contract."11 Moreover, "[t]he
Civil Rules apply to all civil cases in the superior courts, including general
civil, family, juvenile, and probate cases, unless otherwise provided by a
statute or rule in the California Rules of Court." (Rule 3.10, italics added; see
also Fam. Code, § 210 ["Except to the extent that any other statute or rules
adopted by the Judicial Council provide applicable rules, the rules of practice
and procedure applicable to civil actions generally, including the provisions of
Title 3a (commencing with [s]ection 391) of Part 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, apply to, and constitute the rules of practice and procedure in,
proceedings under this code"].) Additionally, under rule 5.2(d), "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in these rules, all provisions of law applicable to civil
actions generally apply to a proceeding under the Family Code if they would
otherwise apply to such proceeding without reference to this rule," and "[t]o
the extent that these rules conflict with provisions in other statutes or rules,
these rules prevail." Ha points to no rule applicable to marriage dissolution
actions that conflicts with rule 3.1702.
 In sum, we reject Ha's argument that rule 3.1702 is generally
inapplicable to an action under the Family Code.
 III.
 NON-APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
 Besides attorney fees and costs for the prior appeals, Ha also
seeks certain non-appellate attorney fees and costs she contends she incurred
after the October 1, 2021 hearing on Tran's motion to stay the order

 11
 "‘Civil case' means a case prosecuted by one party against
another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right or the
redress or prevention of a wrong. Civil cases include all cases except criminal
cases and petitions for habeas corpus." (Rule 1.6(3).)

 12
 regarding the QDROs pending appeal and on Ha's request for attorney fees.
On appeal, Ha contends the non-appellate attorney fees she seeks fall into
one of the following categories: fees for the collection process; fees to finalize
the QDROs; fees for drafting documents at Ha's request so Tran could
dismiss a prior appeal and his counsel; and fees for the current motion. We
conclude the trial court did not err in denying the request for the non-
appellate attorney fees Ha sought under the MSA, but the court abused its
discretion in not explicitly addressing and making findings regarding
whether Ha should be awarded some or all of those non-appellate attorney
fees under Family Code section 2030.12
A. The MSA
 The trial court denied Ha's request for non-appellate attorney
fees and costs under the MSA on two grounds. First, the court found Ha had
"offered no credible evidence she was the prevailing party on any enforcement
litigation." Second, the court found Ha had not "provide[d] proof of any ten-
day notice to allow the defaulting-party to cure any default." We conclude the
trial court did not err.
 Ha argues the trial court acted improperly by denying her motion
on grounds not raised by Tran. Ha says the court went "off tangent" when it
found Ha had not shown she was the prevailing party in an enforcement
litigation and had also failed to demonstrate she gave 10-day notice and an

 12
 On appeal, Ha does not assert an argument regarding costs
that is separate from her arguments for attorney fees. Instead, Ha argues
that "[i]f the court decides that [she] is entitled to the requested attorney's
fees, she should also be awarded legal costs." (Boldface and capitalizations
omitted.) On remand, the trial court may also consider whether Ha is entitled
to any costs associated with the requested non-appellate attorney fees under
Family Code section 2030.

 13
 opportunity to cure any default. According to Ha, these arguments were
never raised by Tran, and "[b]y improperly acting as [Tran's] counsel,
advocating and litigating for him by raising new arguments to justify the
final [r]uling, Judge L[o] robbed [Ha] of equal opportunities to prosecute her
case," "severely violated her rights to due process, and caused her substantial
prejudice."
 Ha has failed to present a developed argument that her rights
were somehow violated by the trial court addressing these two grounds, and
she therefore has forfeited this argument. (See Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic
Operating Co., Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 304, 306.) Ha cites no case
supporting this argument. Nor does she address the fact that, as the moving
party, the burden was on her to show she was entitled to fees under the
terms of the MSA. (See Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [noting, in the context of a special motion to strike,
"[a]s the moving party, the prevailing defendant seeking fees and costs
‘"bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting
the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates"'"].) In any event, the trial
court did not act improperly by addressing those issues, and the court was
not "acting as [Tran's] counsel, advocating and litigating for him" by doing so.
As discussed, Ha was the moving party and had the burden to show she was
entitled to fees under the terms of the MSA. (See ibid.) Even if Tran did not

 14
 raise these issues,13 the court was well within its rights to consider whether
Ha had met her burden.
 Ha also argues the trial court erred on the merits in determining
she had not presented evidence that she prevailed in an enforcement
litigation. According to Ha, she prevailed on her 2019 motion to divide Tran's
retirement benefits, and she also prevailed in obtaining attorney fee awards
and opposing Tran's motion to stay the order regarding the QDROs in 2021.
Ha contends "the moment Judge [Gaffney] ordered the QDRO process to
continue and granted [Ha] a total of $32,549.00 in fees per her request, by
default, it is automatically settled that not only is she entitled to all the fees
that she had incurred and was granted but also all the fees that she is
expected and will incur to enforce the terms of said [o]rders to the end." Ha
argues that, from the moment Judge Gaffney made those orders, "by default,
the subsequent fees connected to the additional legal work needed to make
good those orders are guaranteed to [Ha]."
 Ha has not cited any legal support for her assertion that "by
default" she is "automatically" entitled to any subsequent fees she incurs. We
disagree that simply because Ha previously was awarded attorney fees under
the MSA (and Family Code section 2030) she is necessarily entitled to any
subsequent fees she incurs. The MSA specifies the requirements that must be
met for fees to be awarded. Ha had the burden in the trial court to show those

 13
 Tran argued in the trial court that Ha's claims for non-
appellate attorney fees were not in an action or proceeding to enforce the
judgment; he therefore sufficiently raised the issue of whether Ha was not
entitled to attorney fees under the MSA because she was not a prevailing
party in an enforcement action. Indeed, in her appellate brief, Ha concedes
that Tran did argue in the trial court her "claims for fees do not constitute
‘enforcement litigation' warranting attorney's fees under the MSA."

 15
 requirements were met and now has the burden on appeal to show the trial
court erred, which she has not done.
 Ha also asserts the 10-day notice requirement was inapplicable
because she had already prevailed in enforcement litigations. Ha again points
to Judge Gaffney's prior orders and contends "the issue of the 10-days prior
notice is irrelevant and moot since said notice is supposed to precede the
filing of [her] motions on [November 19, 2019]—an enforcement litigation."
Ha asserts "[t]he time to raise the notice issue was when [Tran] was served
with [her] previous actions," and "it is too late to raise the 10-days prior
notice argument." (Boldface omitted.) Ha's argument is unavailing because it
too proceeds from the faulty premise that any subsequent attorney fees are
necessarily part of prior enforcement proceedings under the MSA.
B. Family Code Section 2030
 Family Code section 2030, subdivision (a)(1) provides that "[i]n a
proceeding for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation
of the parties, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related
judgment, the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal
representation, including access early in the proceedings, to preserve each
party's rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs
assessments, one party, except a governmental entity, to pay to the other
party, or to the other party's attorney, whatever amount is reasonably
necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the
proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding." (Ibid.)
 Additionally, subdivision (a)(2) of Family Code section 2030
provides: "When a request for attorney's fees and costs is made, the court
shall make findings on whether an award of attorney's fees and costs under
this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to

 16
 retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation
of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to
pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney's fees and costs. . . ."
(Ibid., italics added.)14
 On appeal, Ha argues that, even if she is not entitled to fees
under the MSA, she is entitled to all of her requested attorney fees under
Family Code section 2030.15 Ha asserts she satisfied the requirements under
Family Code section 2030 and Tran makes "almost [seven] times more than
her according to their" 2023 income and expense declarations. (Boldface
omitted.) Ha contends the trial court was required to examine whether she
was entitled to fees under Family Code section 2030, but the court failed to
do so and its ruling did not discuss that section.

 14
 Family Code section 2032, subdivision (a), provides: "The court
may make an award of attorney's fees and costs under [s]ection 2030 or 2031
where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and
reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties." (Ibid.)
Subdivision (b) of Family Code section 2032 provides: "In determining what is
just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take
into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent
practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case
adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the
circumstances of the respective parties described in [s]ection 4320. The fact
that the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs has resources
from which the party could pay the party's own attorney's fees and costs is
not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and
costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to
consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation
equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances." (Ibid.)

 15
 As discussed above, Ha is not entitled to attorney fees she
incurred in connection with the two prior appeals.

 17
 We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by not making
explicit findings regarding whether Ha was entitled to any of the non-
appellate attorney fees she sought under Family Code section 2030. As to
findings regarding the request for attorney fees under Family Code section
2030, the court's order does not expressly mention Family Code section 2030;
it stated the court was denying "[a]ny other relief intermingled with [Ha's]
two trial briefs, totaling 292 pages." Because Ha's request for order identified
Family Code section 2030 as one of the bases for her request, the court erred
by not making findings regarding the request for attorney fees under that
statute.16 (See In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1030
["we conclude a trial court must make explicit findings on the issues listed in
subdivision (a)(2) of [Family Code] section 2030"]; In re Marriage of Shimkus
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1279–1280 [concluding "attorney's mere
addition of these findings to the original minute order by checking boxes on a
form does not satisfy the [Family Code] section 2030 requirement that the
court make findings" and reversing and remanding "for the court to make
findings as to the request for attorney fees and costs"].) We also conclude the
court's failure to make these findings was prejudicial. (See In re Marriage of
Morton, at p. 1051 [noting the trial court's error in failing to make explicit
findings must be prejudicial, and an error is prejudicial when there is "‘a

 16
 On appeal, Tran erroneously asserts Ha's request for order did
not seek fees under Family Code section 2030. In fact, Ha's request for order
stated it was "made pursuant to the prevailing party provision of the [MSA]
which was part of the [d]ivorce [j]udgment and Family Code [s]ection 2030."
(Italics added.) Ha's December 5, 2023 brief also asserted she was entitled to
attorney fees under Family Code section 2030. Indeed, Tran's December 21,
2023 brief in the trial court argued that the court should not award attorney
fees and costs under Family Code section 2030.

 18
 reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached'"].)
 The parties appear to suggest this court should determine
whether Ha is entitled to her non-appellate attorney fees under Family Code
section 2030. We decline to determine that question in the first instance.
Instead, we remand to the trial court to determine whether and to what
extent Ha should recover the non-appellate attorney fees she sought under
Family Code section 2030.17
 Additionally, Ha asserts the trial court committed reversible
error by not exercising its "equitable powers to protect" Ha's rights.
(Capitalizations omitted.) To the extent Ha is suggesting the court was
required to award her attorney fees under an equitable power separate from
Family Code section 2030, we are not persuaded. The cases cited by Ha do
not concern attorney fees awarded based on some independent equitable
power. (See In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 310 [noting
a "[f]amily court is a court of equity" and addressing valuation of properties];
Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 286, 293,

 17
 In his respondent's brief on appeal, Tran also argues Ha's
"motion is defective as it failed to meet the requirements for an attorney fee
motion, ‘[Ha] failed to file and serve the income and expense declaration
along with the required [In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860]
declaration.'" Tran's only record citation for this point is to one of his own
briefs in the trial court. Tran's argument, however, disregards the fact that
Ha filed additional materials, including a declaration of counsel and income
and expense declaration, on December 5, 2023. Although the trial court
stated it had not considered Ha's January 2024 filings, it did not state it
would not consider Ha's December 2023 filings. On remand, the trial court
may address whether Ha's request under Family Code section 2030 is
insufficient or otherwise should be denied.

 19
 296 [addressing a court's equitable power under Probate Code section 16440,
subdivision (b)].)
 Finally, we address the personal attacks leveled by Ha's counsel
against the trial court.
 It is one thing to argue the court below erred in some respect in
making a ruling. That is entirely appropriate—indeed, expected—when a
party appeals from a trial court order. "An attorney acts well within their
duty as an advocate to raise good-faith arguments challenging rulings, even
when it presents an uphill battle. There is nothing inherently improper about
making allegations of bias or discrimination against a trial court." (N.D. v.
Superior Court (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1292, 1300.)
 It is quite another thing to cross the line from identifying and
demonstrating error to making unsubstantiated personal attacks on the trial
court's integrity. Ha's counsel crossed that line. Counsel accuses the court of
ruling against Ha "due to [the court's] lack of commitment to justice" and to
its "obvious and unexplainable extreme bias toward [Ha] and/or her counsel."
Counsel goes on to accuse the court of "completely ignor[ing]" the law and
"turning a blind eye" to what counsel calls "equitable evidence" that counsel
believed supported Ha's request for a fee award. And counsel makes these
accusations without pointing to a single fact other than counsel's belief that
the court made errors.
 "Like all California lawyers, [Ha's counsel] is duty-bound to
‘maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (b).) [Ha's counsel] must act in a manner that
‘"instill[s] public confidence in the legal system and our judicial system."'"
(N.D. v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1300; see also People v.
Ramirez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 315, 319 [it is "a long-standing rule that an

 20
 appellate brief ‘containing matter manifestly disrespectful toward the trial
judge'" may be deemed contempt of the appellate court].) "‘Disparaging the
trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court. Counsel
better make sure he or she has the facts right before venturing into such
dangerous territory because it is [sanctionable] for an attorney to make the
unsupported assertion that the judge was "act[ing] out of bias toward a
party."'" (N.D. v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1300.) "‘The
mere fact that the trial court issue[s] rulings adverse to [a party] on several
matters in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings were
erroneous, does not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate
actual bias.'" (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 517)
 Counsel's attacks on the trial court fall short of counsel's
professional and ethical obligations. To be sure, as we have found, the court
erred in one respect. But nothing in this record remotely suggests the court
willfully disregarded the law or the facts, ruled as it did because of some bias
or animus against Ha or her counsel, or in any way lacks a commitment to
fair and equal justice.
 Counsel's conduct cannot be justified or excused as "zealous
advocacy." It is (or should be) evident that attorneys can zealously advance
their clients' interests without resorting to unsubstantiated accusations
against the court. We caution counsel in the strongest possible terms that
such conduct must not continue.

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 DISPOSITION
 The postjudgment order is affirmed in part and reversed in part,
and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and to
determine whether and to what extent Ha should be awarded the non-
appellate attorney fees and costs she sought under Family Code section 2030.
In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

 GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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