CourtListener opinion 11263584

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 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

JETT M. MILLION, )
 ) Supreme Court No. S-19094
 Appellant, )
 ) Superior Court No. 3KO-22-00198 CI
 v. )
 ) OPINION
DIANE L. HUBERT, )
 ) No. 7802 – February 20, 2026
 Appellee. )
 )

 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
 Judicial District, Kodiak, Stephen B. Wallace, Judge.

 Appearances: Jett M. Million, pro se, Kodiak, Appellant.
 Diane L. Hubert, pro se, Kodiak, Appellee.

 Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson,
 Pate, and Oravec, Justices.

 PATE, Justice.

 INTRODUCTION
 State courts can generally treat military retirement as marital property by
dividing it in a divorce or dissolution. But federal law bars state courts from treating
military disability as marital property; thus, military disability generally cannot be
divided in a dissolution. This case asks whether a dissolution decree, which was
incorporated into a settlement agreement, that divided veterans' disability and Combat-
 Related Special Compensation (CRSC) pay can be collaterally attacked more than a
year after it was issued.
 A veteran, acting as his own lawyer in dissolution proceedings,
represented to the superior court that he had agreed to equally divide his military
benefits with his spouse. The veteran informed the court that the monthly payments he
received from the government were "retirement benefits," when in fact the benefits
were CRSC. Both the veteran and his spouse explained their understanding of the terms
of the agreement and expressly consented to those terms. The court accepted the
agreement and incorporated it into a decree for the dissolution of marriage.
 The veteran was aware, either at the time of the dissolution or shortly
thereafter, that the benefits were CRSC. Over a year after the court issued the decree,
the veteran learned from military officials that under federal law his benefit payments
should not have been divisible in the dissolution. The veteran subsequently filed several
motions with the superior court, arguing that the division of his military disability was
unenforceable as a matter of federal law. The court rejected the arguments, finding that
he had consented to the division. And it held in the alternative that the veteran had
waited too long to seek relief from the decree, federal law notwithstanding.
 The veteran appeals, raising some of the same arguments he made to the
superior court, as well as several new ones. Additionally, he challenges the court's
handling of an ancillary dispute over a mortgage on the former marital home.
 We affirm the judgment of the superior court.
 FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 A. Dissolution And Custody Proceedings
 Jett Mitchell Million was active duty in the United States Coast Guard
when he married Diane Lynn Hubert in 2009. Their child was born the next year. They
later purchased a home. Million retired from the Coast Guard in 2019.
 In 2022 Million and Hubert petitioned for dissolution of their marriage.
They reached a property division agreement which was set out in writing in the petition.

 -2- 7802
 Although both Hubert and Million consulted an attorney during negotiation of the
agreement, both parties appeared without attorneys at the dissolution hearing.
 At the time of the dissolution Million was receiving monthly payments of
$637 from the Coast Guard, which were clearly identified as "retirement benefits" in
the petition. The petition represented that the parties had attached an agreement "about
the distribution of retirement or military pension benefits." Although there was no
attachment, the petition form included a box that the parties could check if they did not
plan to divide the retirement benefits listed in the petition. The box was not checked.
Million and Hubert also agreed to the division of their other assets, with Hubert
receiving the marital home.1 The petition also included a child custody and support
agreement for their child.
 A superior court master held a hearing on the petition in August. At the
hearing the master asked the parties under oath whether the dissolution petition
constituted their entire agreement, and they confirmed that it was the entire agreement.
The master also asked whether the agreement was made "freely and voluntarily," to
which Million answered, "Yes." The master explained that he could preside over the
hearing only if there were "no points of dispute." Neither party indicated there were
any points of dispute.
 When asked whether the parties planned to obtain a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO)2 for Million's Coast Guard retirement benefits, Hubert
responded that they did not have plans to get a QDRO and that Million "agreed to pay
[Hubert] half of his retirement" through a mobile payment service at the beginning of

 1
 The parties valued the home at $440,000. There was an outstanding
mortgage of the same amount on the home when Million and Hubert filed the petition.
 2
 A QDRO "simply enforces a court order calling for division of retirement
benefits." Thomson v. Thomson, 394 P.3d 604, 608 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Zito v. Zito,
969 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Alaska 1998)).

 -3- 7802
 each month. Million did not disagree with Hubert's characterization of the benefits or
her description of the manner in which payments would be made.
 As the hearing wrapped up, the master confirmed that each party
"[believed] that the division of the marital estate [was] fair," and Million said, "Yes."
The master then confirmed that Million's ongoing financial obligations would include
"monthly child support" and "half the Coast Guard retirement."
 The master prepared a report for the superior court that accurately
reflected the agreement, including a statement that Million would "directly pay" Hubert
"half of his monthly coast guard retirement, which is $318.50." The report
recommended a determination that the agreement "fairly allocate[d] the economic
effect of dissolution." The master also found that Million and Hubert had made all
agreements required by statute, that "their written agreements constitute the entire
agreement between them," that "each spouse entered the agreements voluntarily and
free from the coercion of another person," and that "both petitioners fully [understood]
the nature and consequences of the action." The superior court signed the dissolution
decree incorporating the parties' agreement for division of the marital estate and issued
its final judgment on August 15, 2022.
 Million subsequently made child support and "retirement" payments to
Hubert through the remainder of 2022 and into 2023. A few months after the dissolution
hearing, Million began labeling his payments to Hubert as both "retirement" and
"disability pay." For example, he labeled payment summaries from October and
December 2022 as "Disability Pay." Million labeled most of the payments as disability
through October 2023.
 In February 2023 Million moved to modify child custody, support, and
visitation. At an evidentiary hearing held to resolve the child custody motion and
another pending motion, Million stated his belief that the military benefits he was
sharing with Hubert were "spousal maintenance," and he suggested that because Hubert
had since remarried, she might no longer be entitled to the payments.

 -4- 7802
 The superior court resolved both motions in a written order. In part, the
court explained that the military benefits Million agreed to share were not spousal
maintenance and that a "divisible marital property interest exist[ed] in [Million's]
United States Coast Guard retirement earned during the 10 year marriage," and
"[Hubert was] entitled to her 1/2 share of the martial interest in the retirement to be paid
with the entry of a [QDRO]." The court ordered Million to submit a QDRO by
November 1.
 B. The Coast Guard Benefits
 Million contacted the Coast Guard in late 2023 seeking a QDRO. In
November a Coast Guard official notified Million that the entirety of his military
retirement was offset with benefits from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
"Consequently, there is no Coast Guard retired pay to divide," the official wrote.
Further, the official noted that Million's benefits included CRSC, "which is not
divisible in a divorce."3 In a subsequent email, the official confirmed that the Coast
Guard could not issue a QDRO for CRSC payments to Hubert.
 In December Million filed a motion asking the superior court to credit all
of his past military benefit payments to Hubert against his outstanding child support
obligations. He asserted that the payments he received from the Coast Guard were not
retirement benefits and that none of the benefits he received were divisible as marital

 3
 The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA) and
United States Supreme Court precedent prohibit state courts from dividing military
disability and CRSC pay in a divorce or dissolution action. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408;
Randolph v. Sheehy, 882 S.E.2d 19, 25 (Va. App. 2023) (noting that federal law
"preempts a state court from ordering a retired veteran to compensate a former spouse
for [CRSC payments]"); Colafrancesco v. Colafrancesco, 359 So. 3d 1137, 1143 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2022) (holding that "CRSC benefits cannot be . . . subject to division as a
marital asset"); see also Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 220 (2017) (noting that
"federal law completely pre-empts the States from treating waived military retirement
pay as divisible community property" (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95
(1989))).

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 property. On January 31, 2024, the superior court issued an order denying Million's
motion. The court found that Million had signed the dissolution petition voluntarily
and that the court was obligated to enforce the property division agreement in the
petition as a contract between the parties. In the alternative, the court held that Million's
request for relief from judgment of the dissolution decree was untimely under Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b) because it had been more than a year since the decree was entered.
 Million did not timely seek reconsideration of this order. Instead, in
March he again challenged the enforceability of the agreement. Soon afterward Hubert
sought to enforce the order. In his opposition Million again claimed that federal law
prohibited Hubert from receiving any of his military benefits.
 On April 4 the superior court granted Hubert's request to enforce the
division of Million's military benefits. The court reiterated that Million had voluntarily
entered the property division agreement — a contract — and had agreed to give Hubert
half of his Coast Guard benefits. The court noted that "even if the divorce decree was
erroneous as a matter of federal law," Million had waived this argument by failing to
seek reconsideration or appeal of the January 31 order.
 Despite the court's repeated rulings, Million continued to challenge his
payment obligations through April and May. Million also adopted new arguments
during this period.4 The superior court declined to revisit the issue and directed Million

 4
 For example, he alleged that he had agreed to split his military benefits
with Hubert during the dissolution because he was aware that she would not qualify for
any of his retirement given that there was not a ten-year overlap of the marriage and his
Coast Guard service. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) (prohibiting retirement payments if
spouse "was not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during which
the member performed at least 10 years of service"). Million further claimed that he
"never saw" the version of the petition that was filed with the court. He also implied
that an attorney separately retained by Hubert had fraudulently doctored the petition
after he signed it.

 -6- 7802
 to its prior orders upholding the enforceability of the parties' property division
agreement.
 C. The Mortgage Dispute
 As the dispute over Million's benefits unfolded, so too did a disagreement
over the mortgage on the former marital home. The property division agreement
provided that Hubert would receive the marital home and that Million would execute a
quitclaim deed to Hubert. At the dissolution hearing, Hubert noted that both parties'
names were on the mortgage, and she acknowledged that Million's name would need
to be removed. However, as the superior court later explained, the parties' agreement
did not specify any deadlines or obligations for executing the documents necessary to
remove Million's name from the mortgage. Million executed a quitclaim deed
conveying his interest in the property to Hubert in July 2023. A year after the
dissolution hearing, Million's name remained on the mortgage.
 Million explained that the delay was impacting his ability to purchase a
home. In September the court noted that Hubert was "currently undertaking the
refinancing of the home," and it ordered her to "expeditiously complete the refinancing
process."
 At a hearing in December, Hubert asserted that she could not qualify to
independently assume the mortgage because Million had not been making timely child
support payments. Hubert explained that because she could not qualify, her current
husband would need to assume the mortgage. Hubert said that they were working
toward the assumption, but it was contingent on the sale of another home owned by her
husband, which was then under contract. In addressing the dispute, the court observed
that neither party had provided enough information about the late payments or the
assumption process to allow it to fashion an order to expedite the process. It also noted
that based on the normal timelines for real estate sales and mortgage refinancing, the
assumption should be complete by March 2024. But it declined to issue an order setting
a hard deadline.

 -7- 7802
 The refinancing process moved slowly, and Million and Hubert continued
to blame each other for the delay. Million claimed that Hubert was "dragging out the
process" because she could not qualify for the mortgage on her own, and he maintained
that the delay was impacting his ability to secure another mortgage. Hubert countered
that Million was interfering with the refinancing process, and she provided the court
with copies of emails Million had sent to her lender. In these emails Million represented
to the lender that Hubert had "lied in court" and that "[t]he judge [was] completely done
with her lies" and had "told [Million] to write" a motion to force the sale of the house.
 Million's name was still on the mortgage as of March 2024, and he filed
another motion to force the sale of the home. Hubert opposed, arguing that she was still
unable to qualify for the mortgage on her own because Million was not making his child
support or military benefit payments on time, which affected her income.5 Hubert noted
that the sale of her husband's home was scheduled to close in May, after which he could
assume the mortgage.
 In May the superior court held another hearing on the mortgage dispute.
Hubert told the court that her husband's home had sold and that they were just "waiting
for . . . the closing statement." But Million questioned why the removal of his name
was contingent on selling a different home "that ha[d] nothing to do with" him. The
court made several factual findings, including that both parties bore responsibility for
the delay in the removal of Million's name from the mortgage. The court denied
Million's request to force the sale of the home, but it set a deadline for Hubert to
complete the assumption. Million's name was apparently removed from the mortgage
after this deadline.
 Million filed his notice of appeal on May 3, 2024.

 5
 This assertion was supported by an email from Hubert's lender, explaining
that the lender was "not able to use [Hubert's] income [for assuming the mortgage] due
to the way [Million] ha[d] paid . . . the child support and retirement."

 -8- 7802
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 We review "a trial court's response to a motion to enforce a divorce
decree, as well as most decisions on a request for relief from final judgments, under the
abuse of discretion standard."6 We will find an abuse of discretion when the trial court's
decision "is manifestly unreasonable," or when a "review of the entire record leaves us
with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred."7 "Whether a trial court
applied the correct legal rule in exercising this discretion is a question of law" we review
de novo.8
 We review de novo whether a party may obtain relief from a final
judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(4) "because the validity of a judgment is
strictly a question of law."9 "We apply our independent determination to questions of
statutory and contract interpretation, and adopt the rule of law ‘most persuasive in light
of precedent, reason, and policy.' "10 But the parties' intent when entering a contract is
a question of fact reviewed for clear error.11
 DISCUSSION
 Million challenges the superior court's order enforcing the term in the
dissolution decree that requires him to pay Hubert half of his Coast Guard "retirement"

 6
 Gross v. Wilson, 424 P.3d 390, 394-95 (Alaska 2018) (citing Johnson v.
Johnson, 394 P.3d 598, 600 (Alaska 2017)).
 7
 Sidney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 P.3d 443, 448 (Alaska 2008) (first citing
Bromley v. Mitchell, 902 P.2d 797, 804 (Alaska 1995); and then citing Alderman v.
Iditarod Props., 104 P.3d 136, 140 (Alaska 2004)).
 8
 Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707, 712 (Alaska 2010) (citing Cox v. Cox, 882
P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska 1994)).
 9
 Gross, 424 P.3d at 395 (quoting Blaufuss v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285
(Alaska 2013)).
 10
 Sidney, 187 P.3d at 448 (quoting Progressive Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 953
P.2d 510, 512 (Alaska 1998)).
 11
 Gross, 424 P.3d at 395.

 -9- 7802
 benefits. Million correctly points out that these benefits are not, in fact, retirement
benefits. Million receives VA disability and CRSC payments that federal law prohibits
state courts from dividing as marital property.12 Million also argues that he never
consented to the property division agreement.
 We interpret Million's arguments as requests for relief from judgment
under Civil Rule 60(b) and conclude that the superior court did not err in denying
Million relief from the dissolution decree. Even if the decree is erroneous as a matter
of federal law, that does not automatically entitle Million to relief from the final
judgment. Further, Million's alternative claims of mistake, newly discovered evidence,
fraudulent inducement, and coercion are time-barred, and he has not shown a change in
circumstances or any other factor warranting relief from the decree.
 Finally, Million challenges several discretionary orders from the superior
court related to the removal of his name from the mortgage on the former marital home.
We hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Million's
motions in which he sought to force the sale of the home.
 A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Million
 Relief From The Property Division Agreement Under Rule 60(b).
 Aside from a motion for reconsideration, which is due within ten days of
a court's order, "an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motion provides the only available means
for seeking relief from a final judgment of property division."13 A dissolution decree
that incorporates a property division agreement is a final judgment.14
 Although not styled as such, the motions that Million filed in December
2023 and January 2024 were essentially seeking relief from the dissolution decree under

 12
 See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989).
 13
 Gross, 424 P.3d at 396 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1005
(Alaska 2011)).
 14
 See id. (citing Williams, 252 P.3d at 1005).

 -10- 7802
 Rule 60(b). The superior court denied relief in January 2024. Million did not file a
timely motion for reconsideration. Instead, he filed motions in March and April seeking
relief on the grounds that the property division agreement was obtained through
coercion. The superior court denied these motions as untimely under Alaska Civil Rule
77(k) and reaffirmed its January order. The court also rejected Million's claim that he
was coerced into consenting to the property division, noting that the record "squarely
contradict[ed] his position." Million does not address the timeliness of his motions,15
but he asserts that the superior court's reaffirmance of its denial of relief under
Rule 60(b) was erroneous.
 When reviewing the denial of a motion for reconsideration, we "do[] not
focus on the merits of the underlying decision, but only on the propriety of the denial
of reconsideration."16 However, when a self-represented litigant's motion for
reconsideration is denied both for timeliness and on the merits, we have granted review
of the underlying ruling.17 Here, the superior court was correct to rule that Million's
motions were untimely.18 But because the court reaffirmed its denial of relief under
Rule 60(b) on the merits and we "generally apply a more lenient standard for" self-
represented litigants,19 we will consider Million's Rule 60(b) arguments.

 15
 Million claimed in his motion to supplement his points on appeal that he
"ha[d] been appealing the disability pay since [Hubert] remarried in July 2023," but he
fails to explain that assertion in his brief. This issue is waived. Wright v. Anding, 390
P.3d 1162, 1175 (Alaska 2017) (holding self-represented litigant waived arguments
raised in points on appeal but not referenced in briefing).
 16
 Buchholdt v. Nelson, 534 P.3d 91, 93 (Alaska 2023).
 17
 Williams, 252 P.3d at 1005.
 18
 Million had ten days to seek reconsideration of the January 2024 order,
but he did not raise the issue again with the superior court until March. Alaska R. Civ.
P. 77(k).
 19
 Pieper v. Musarra, 956 P.2d 444, 446 (Alaska 1998).

 -11- 7802
 Civil Rule 60(b) provides relief from a final judgment on six grounds,
including mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void judgment, or "any other
reason justifying relief." These grounds, however, are "not a substitute for a party
failing to file a timely appeal; nor [do they] allow relitigation of issues that have been
resolved by the judgment."20
 Million seeks relief from the dissolution decree on several grounds. First,
Million argues that the property division agreement violates federal law, either because
it divides VA disability and CRSC pay or because Hubert would not qualify for his
benefits under those statutes. Second, Million asserts that some defect — either
mistake, fraudulent inducement, or coercion — affected the formation of the
agreement. And third, Million argues that Hubert's remarriage constitutes a changed
circumstance warranting relief from the agreement.
 1. Million's claims related to the formation of the property
 division agreement are time-barred under Rule 60(b)(1), (2),
 and (3).
 Civil Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) provide for relief from a final judgment
on the grounds of mistake, newly discovered evidence, and fraud or other misconduct,
respectively. Claims brought under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) "shall be made . . . not
more than one year after the date of notice of the judgment or orders."
 Million argues on appeal that the property division agreement was
fraudulently altered after he signed it. He points to "new evidence" — what appears to
be a portion of an unsigned version of the dissolution petition — that he says supports
his claim of fraud. Million extends this argument to suggest that the dissolution decree
was "not supported by evidence." These arguments differ from those Million advanced
before the superior court. There, Million initially argued that the parties simply mistook

 20
 Burrell v. Burrell, 696 P.2d 157, 163 (Alaska 1984) (citing 11 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2863,
§ 2864 (3d ed. 1973)).

 -12- 7802
 his benefits for retirement when they were actually disability and CRSC pay. Later,
Million argued that Hubert "coerced" him into signing the agreement using threats of a
lawsuit.
 Million's new claims related to fraud were raised on the same day he filed
his notice of appeal in this court; thus, they are untimely.21 However, regardless of
whether Million claims fraud, mistake, or coercion, his arguments related to the
formation of the property division agreement are time-barred under Rule 60(b).22 More
than a year passed between August 15, 2022, when the dissolution decree was issued,
and December 11, 2023, when Million sought relief from the decree in superior court.
 The superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Million relief
under Civil Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3).
 2. Million is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because the
 divorce decree is not void.
 The United States Supreme Court has held that the USFSPA divests state
courts of "the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay
that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits."23 In Mansell v. Mansell,
the Supreme Court invalidated a state court order enforcing a divorce settlement
provision that divided a veteran's "total military retirement pay," which included a
portion that the veteran had waived so that he could get disability benefits.24 The Court

 21
 See Williams, 252 P.3d at 1005 (denying review of issues raised in self-
represented litigant's motions that post-dated judgment identified in notice); Alaska R.
App. P. 204(b) (requiring parties to specify final order or judgment appealed from).
 22
 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b); cf. Red Hook Constr., LLC v. Bishop, 556 P.3d
1188, 1193-94 (Alaska 2024) (reversing lower court's tolling of deadline because "the
superior court ‘do[es] not have the power to enlarge the one-year time limit for motions
brought under Civil Rule 60(b)(1)-(3)' " (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v.
Johnson, 394 P.3d 598, 602 (Alaska 2017))).
 23
 Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989).
 24
 Id. at 585-95.

 -13- 7802
 rejected the former spouse's argument that the prohibition only precluded the direct
payment of disability benefits from the federal government, holding that such an
interpretation "would thwart the obvious purposes of the [USFSPA]."25 We have since
observed that military disability benefits "should not, either in form or substance, be
treated as marital property subject to division upon the dissolution of marriage."26
Federal law similarly provides that CRSC pay is "not retired pay,"27 which other
jurisdictions have interpreted as precluding state courts from dividing CRSC pay in a
divorce.28
 Million asserts that because he receives disability and CRSC rather than
retirement benefits, the portion of the dissolution decree dividing those benefits "is
invalid" under federal law. Million also argues that Hubert "does not qualify" for a
portion of his benefits because there was not a ten-year overlap in Million's military
service and the marriage, which is a prerequisite to a former spouse receiving payments
directly from the federal government.29 Million does not specify an applicable ground
for relief under Rule 60(b) for his federal claims, but we have analyzed similar
challenges to dissolution decrees under Rule 60(b)(4).30

 25
 Id. at 592.
 26
 Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1264 (Alaska 1992).
 27
 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(g).
 28
 See, e.g., Randolph v. Sheehy, 882 S.E.2d 19, 25 (Va. App. 2023) (noting
that federal law "preempts a state court from ordering a retired veteran to compensate
a former spouse for [CRSC payments]"); Colafrancesco v. Colafrancesco, 359 So. 3d
1137, 1143 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (holding that "CRSC benefits cannot be . . . subject
to division as a marital asset").
 29
 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2).
 30
 See Gross v. Wilson, 424 P.3d 390, 396-98 (Alaska 2018) (analyzing
challenge to property division as violating federal law under Rule 60(b)(4)); Cline v.
Cline, 90 P.3d 147, 151-54 (Alaska 2004) (holding Rule 60(b)(4) "applies to attempts

 -14- 7802
 Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from a final judgment that is void. A final
judgment is void only where the issuing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or
violated due process.31 "Void judgments may be attacked at any time," but
Rule 60(b)(4) "is not a substitute for a party failing to file a timely appeal; nor does it
allow relitigation of issues that have been resolved by the judgment."32 In other words,
"[a] judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous."33
 In Gross v. Wilson, we considered a challenge to a division of military
disability benefits that contended that the division was illegal under federal law.34 In
denying relief under Rule 60(b)(4), we observed that the USFSPA and Supreme Court
jurisprudence concerning state courts' ability to divide military disability involved "a
rule of substantive federal law, and not a jurisdictional matter."35 Thus, "even if the
divorce decree was erroneous as a matter of federal law," it would not warrant relief
under Rule 60(b)(4) "absent a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a violation of due
process."36
 Here, we conclude that although the dissolution decree divided assets
contrary to federal law, Million is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4). The
superior court has original jurisdiction in all civil matters, including in actions for

to retroactively modify past arrearages where the underlying judgment . . . conflicts
with federal law and is, to that extent, void"), abrogated by Gross, 424 P.3d at 397 n.34;
Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C., 307 P.3d 879, 890-92 (Alaska 2013) (analyzing
challenge to arbitration award as violating Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act under
Rule 60(b)(4)).
 31
 Gross, 424 P.3d at 397.
 32
 Id. (quoting Blaufuss v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285 (Alaska 2013)).
 33
 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Blaufuss, 305 P.3d at 286).
 34
 Id. at 395-96.
 35
 Id. at 397 n.34.
 36
 Id. at 397.

 -15- 7802
 divorce.37 Further, Million had notice, an opportunity to be heard, and was afforded the
chance to represent his interests at the dissolution hearing, where his voluntary
acceptance of the property division agreement was clear and unequivocal. There is
accordingly no evidence that Million's right to due process was violated. 38 Just as in
Gross, Million has not alleged a jurisdictional or due process deficiency that could
render the superior court's judgment void.39
 Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's finding that Million is not
entitled to relief from the dissolution decree under Rule 60(b)(4).
 While we do not observe reversible error, military benefit rules are
especially important to the large number of service personnel in Alaska. As noted, the
USFSPA prohibits the superior court from dividing disability pay and CRSC as marital
property in a divorce.40 However, allocation of these benefits at divorce becomes
legally permissible when a service member agrees to divide them as part of a valid
contract — such as the settlement agreement here between Million and Hubert.41

 37
 See AS 22.10.020 (providing that superior court has "original jurisdiction
in all civil" matters); AS 22.10.025 (listing superior court's powers in divorce
proceedings); AS 25.24.210(b) (providing that dissolution petition "shall be filed with
the superior court").
 38
 See State, Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 96 P.3d 1056, 1064
(Alaska 2004) (noting that core of due process is opportunity for hearing and right to
defend one's interests).
 39
 See 424 P.3d at 397. Million's claims related to the formation of the
property division agreement similarly do not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because
mistake, newly discovered evidence, and fraud do not implicate the superior court's
jurisdiction or Million's right to due process. See Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes,
P.C., 307 P.3d 879, 890-92 (Alaska 2013) (discussing requirements of Rule 60(b)(4)).
 40
 Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989).
 41
 Gross, 424 P.3d at 401; Jones v. Jones, 505 P.3d 224, 226 (Alaska 2022)
("Federal law does not preclude enforcing one spouse's promise to pay another a sum
of money each month even if the source of the money is military disability pay.");

 -16- 7802
 Especially when dealing with self-represented litigants, we encourage the courts to
inquire as to whether the settling parties are aware of the contours of this unique federal
entitlement.42
 3. Million has not shown that a substantial change in
 circumstances warrants relief under Rule 60(b)(5).
 Rule 60(b)(5) provides relief from judgment when "the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, . . . or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." A party seeking relief from a property division
under Rule 60(b)(5) must show a "substantial change in circumstances" that warrants
modifying the judgment.43 And although "the rule should be liberally construed to
achieve substantial justice, final judgments should not be lightly disturbed."44 Rule

BRETT TURNER, 2 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6:6, 51-56 (4th ed. Dec.
2024 update) (post-remand history of Mansell does not preclude division of disability
pay through res judicata and contract law).
 42
 There are factual clues that may assist here. A service member typically
is not eligible for retirement pay until accruing at least 20 years of qualifying service.
10 U.S.C. § 12731(a)(2). Retirement pay is calculated as a flat percentage of active
salary, while medical retirement or separation requires computation of the service
member's disability rating, and may be paid in calculated installments or a lump sum,
respectively. 10 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.; 10 U.S.C. § 1401. A service member may be
receiving indivisible disability pay if they are collecting payments prior to a 20-year
period of service or if calculating the payment requires an administrative process or
consultation with military officials.
 43
 Dewey v. Dewey, 886 P.2d 623, 627 (Alaska 1994); see Burrell v. Burrell,
696 P.2d 157, 166-67 (Alaska 1984); Gross, 424 P.3d at 396. The superior court did
not expressly rule on whether Million was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5), but
"[w]e may affirm the superior court's decision on any basis appearing in the record."
Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997).
 44
 Dewey, 886 P.2d at 627 (quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d
396 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 -17- 7802
 60(b)(5) "was not intended as a mechanism for maintaining divorced parties' equal net
worth."45
 The only changed circumstance that Million cites is Hubert's remarriage
in July 2023. But this ground is insufficient to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(5). We
have recognized that remarriage may constitute a substantial change in circumstances
warranting termination of alimony, but "this rule does not apply where ‘alimony' . . . is
an integral part of a property settlement and thus a property right vested in the dependent
spouse."46 Although Million attempts to style his payment obligation under the
property division agreement as "spousal maintenance," it is not.47 Rather, the division
of Million's military benefits was an integral part of the parties' property division
agreement.
 Hubert's testimony at the dissolution hearing established that division of
Million's military benefits offset the parties' use of Hubert's savings for living expenses
during the period between Hubert's retirement and the start of Million's military
benefits. As Hubert explained at the dissolution hearing, after Million retired from the
Coast Guard in 2019, "it took a couple of years" for Million's retirement payments to
start. Hubert said she was saving money at that time to start a food truck business and
that prior to the start of Million's payments, "every penny that [she] saved for [the] food
truck . . . [the couple] ended up having to use . . . to keep the family going, and the
house paid, and all of [their] bills." So, "when the Coast Guard finally came through,
and the VA came through," Hubert said, "that money was promised by him . . . so that
I could get my food truck, and I could start my business." In other words, it was the

 45
 Burrell, 696 P.2d at 167.
 46
 Voyles v. Voyles, 644 P.2d 847, 849-50 (Alaska 1982).
 47
 Spousal maintenance, or alimony, "is damages, represented by money, to
compensate for the loss of marital support and maintenance." 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce
and Separation § 569 (2025). In contrast, "[t]he purpose of a property division is to
distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties." Id. § 454.

 -18- 7802
 parties' intent at the time of their dissolution that Million would pay half of his benefits
to Hubert to make up for the use of her savings for household expenses.48
 The portion of the military benefits awarded to Hubert was thus "an
integral part of a property settlement and thus a property right vested in" Hubert,49 and
her remarriage does not entitle Million to relief under Rule 60(b)(5).
 4. Million does not show extraordinary circumstances warranting
 relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
 Rule 60(b)(6) provides relief from a final judgment for "any other reason
justifying relief." This rule "is reserved for extraordinary circumstances not covered
by the preceding clauses."50 Accordingly, under the "mutual exclusivity rule,"
"[g]rounds for relief described in the first five subsections of Rule 60(b) cannot be
grounds for relief under the sixth subsection."51
 For example, in Powell v. Powell, we held that several claims for relief
from a divorce decree were "not cognizable" under Rule 60(b)(6) because they were
covered by Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3).52 Specifically, we noted that the party's
argument that she "did not know" the value of her former spouse's retirement account
"amount[ed] to a claim of mistake or inadvertence under subsection (1)"; the argument

 48
 See Herring v. Herring, 373 P.3d 521, 529-30 (Alaska 2016) (finding
testimony at settlement hearing probative of parties' intent at time of settlement); see
also id. at 529 n.16 ("When interpreting contracts, the goal is to ‘give effect to the
reasonable expectations of the parties.' " (quoting Bernard v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,
367 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 2016))).
 49
 Voyles, 644 P.2d at 849-50.
 50
 Gross v. Wilson, 424 P.3d 390, 398 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Johnson v.
Johnson, 394 P.3d 598, 602 (Alaska 2017)). The superior court did not expressly
consider whether Million was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), but we nonetheless
decide this issue. See Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997).
 51
 Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges, 502 P.3d 951, 960
(Alaska 2022).
 52
 194 P.3d 364, 370-71 (Alaska 2008).

 -19- 7802
 that her former spouse "misled her" about the value of his retirement account
"amount[ed] to a claim of misconduct under subsection (3) or newly discovered
evidence under subsection (2)"; and the argument that "she was pressured and
threatened into accepting the property division" was "essentially a claim of duress under
subsection (3)."53
 The various iterations of Million's claims related to the formation of the
property division agreement closely mirror those we rejected in Powell. For example,
Million initially argued that he and Hubert "thought" Million was receiving retirement
rather than disability or CRSC pay. In other words, Million was arguing that the parties
were mutually mistaken about the type of benefits he was receiving.54 Million's
allegations evolved; he later alleged that he "did not willingly" enter the agreement
because he "was threatened and coerced into signing the divorce paperwork." In
essence, Million was arguing duress.55 As we noted in Powell, relief is available for
claims of mistake, misrepresentation, and duress under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3).56
Because relief is available under other subsections of Rule 60(b), we will not consider
them under Rule 60(b)(6).
 Million's only remaining claims are that the agreement to divide his
benefits violates federal law and that Hubert's remarriage warrants relief from the
decree. Neither of these is convincing.
 We have recognized four factors in the divorce context that may indicate
extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6): "(1) the fundamental, underlying

 53
 Id.
 54
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 152 (A. L. I. 1981).
 55
 See id. § 175 cmt. b.
 56
 194 P.3d at 370-71; Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(3); see also Lowe v. Lowe,
817 P.2d 453, 457 (Alaska 1991) (declining to consider former spouse's claims under
Rule 60(b)(6) that she was unaware of entitlement to portion of husband's retirement
benefits and benefits' value, and that husband lied about benefits in court).

 -20- 7802
 assumption of the dissolution agreement has been destroyed; (2) the parties' property
division was poorly thought out; (3) the property division was reached without the
benefit of counsel; and (4) the property in dispute was the parties' principal asset." 57 In
applying these factors, "we balance the interest in the finality of judgments against the
interest in granting relief from a judgment when justice so requires."58
 Under the first factor, a review of our precedent shows that a fundamental
assumption underlying a property division agreement is destroyed when a term
contemplated by the parties is incapable of completion; but such an assumption is not
destroyed when the parties are unaware of how federal law treats the assets that they
otherwise agreed to divide. For example, in Guerrero v. Guerrero, we found the
underlying assumption of an agreement to divide military benefits was destroyed when
a former spouse was denied a portion of military disability because of federal
restrictions.59 We noted that both parties assumed the wife would receive some of the
benefits; the husband, although he "disputed the total amount of his benefits" his wife
should receive, "consistently recognized [she] should receive some portion of his
military benefits."60 When the parties learned the husband received disability, "this
destroyed the parties' expectation that [the wife] would receive some portion of [the
husband's] military benefits."61

 57
 Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432, 444 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Cook v.
Cook, 249 P.3d 1070, 1084 (Alaska 2011)). These factors "are not strictly necessary
conditions"; they are "particular instantiations of the equitable factors" that justify relief
from a final judgment. Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Alaska 1992).
 58
 Clauson, 831 P.3d at 1261 (quoting Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha,
Ltd., 761 P.2d 713, 717 (Alaska 1988)).
 59
 362 P.3d at 444-45.
 60
 Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
 61
 Id.; cf. Lowe, 817 P.2d at 458-59 (finding fundamental assumption that
wife would forgo portion of husband's retirement in return for husband taking primary

 -21- 7802
 Conversely, we have rejected a Rule 60(b)(6) motion made by a former
spouse who forwent a portion of her husband's military retirement because she "did not
know that she was entitled to a portion of the retirement benefits and that she did not
know what they were worth."62 Her assertions "amount[ed] to a claim of mistake or
inadvertence under [Rule 60(b)(1)], and [were] barred by the one year time limit."63
 Despite Million's claims to the contrary, both he and Hubert clearly and
consistently expressed their shared assumption that Hubert would receive a portion of
Million's military benefits. As Hubert explained at the dissolution hearing: "[Million]
agreed to pay half of his retirement . . . once a month, first of the month when he gets
it; half goes [through] Venmo to me." Million confirmed that he was receiving $637 in
monthly benefits.
 There is no question that Million consented to divide his benefits.64 When
the superior court master asked the parties why they chose to handle the benefit
payments directly rather than through a QDRO, Hubert said the parties thought it would
be more convenient — and equally enforceable — to incorporate the term into the

custody of children destroyed when husband did not do so); Williams v. Crawford, 982
P.2d 250, 255-56 (Alaska 1999) (finding fundamental assumption destroyed when wife
was subsequently found ineligible for survivorship benefits of civil service pension);
Juelfs v. Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 597 (Alaska 2002) (fundamental assumption that parties
would cooperate as required for shared custody of dog was destroyed when cooperation
"proved not to exist, requiring judicial intervention").
 62
 Lowe, 817 P.2d at 457.
 63
 Id.
 64
 We also doubt Million's claim before the superior court that he was
unaware that he was receiving disability pay rather than retired pay. Just one month
after the dissolution hearing, Million's own records reveal that he was labeling his
payments to Hubert as "disability pay," a trend which continued through October 2023.
It is difficult to reconcile Million's own descriptions of his payments to Hubert as
"disability" with his subsequent assertion that he was, in fact, unaware that those
payments were disability.

 -22- 7802
 superior court's dissolution order. Million agreed, stating: "Yeah, I'm going to pay it.
Yeah." Later, when asked to confirm what financial obligations remained to be
completed, Million responded: "The retirement." Further, Million testified that he had
agreed to the property settlement freely and voluntarily, and he believed the division of
assets was fair.
 The property division agreement ensures that Hubert will receive a portion
of those benefits, which is what Million and Hubert intended. Neither Hubert's
subsequent remarriage nor the fact that the decree may be erroneous as a matter of
federal law destroys that assumption.
 Similarly, the fact that Hubert will continue to receive a portion of
Million's benefits weighs against finding the property division was "poorly thought
out."65 In Guerrero, we found the property division was poorly thought out because
the parties, "[d]espite knowing that [the husband] was seriously injured," failed to
consider the possibility that he would receive military disability and instead "operat[ed]
under the assumption that [the wife] would be able to receive [the husband's] military
benefits."66 Here, even if the parties were mistaken as to what types of benefits Million
received or if they were simply unaware that disability is treated differently than
retirement under federal law, neither mistake foiled their intended goal — Hubert would
receive half of Million's military benefits in exchange for her expenditures during the
marriage.
 Further, Million does not suggest he entered the agreement without the
benefit of counsel. In fact, Hubert represented that both parties "met together and
separately with [attorney] Andrew Ott for advice putting our Dissolution Petition

 65
 See Powell v. Powell, 194 P.3d 364, 372 (Alaska 2008). Million does not
argue that the property division agreement was poorly thought out, but we nonetheless
address this factor.
 66
 362 P.3d at 445.

 -23- 7802
 together." Even assuming that Hubert did "threaten[] and coerce[]" Million into signing
the agreement, Million told the superior court that Hubert threatened him with litigation
before he executed the dissolution petition. Million "thus accepted the risks of not
having a lawyer in exchange for the benefit of not paying attorney's fees." 67 Finally,
Million offers no argument on whether the disability and CRSC pay was the parties'
principal asset. But even if we assume that it was, "this factor alone [is] insufficient to
justify relief based on Rule 60(b)(6)."68
 In sum, Million is not entitled to relief from the divorce decree under Rule
60(b)(6) or any other provision of the rule.
 B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Declining To
 Force The Sale Of The Former Marital Home.
 Million argues that the property division was "not allocated equally for
both parties" because he "was forced to wait for almost two years for [his] name to be
removed" from the mortgage on the former marital home. We interpret this argument
as challenging the superior court's denial of Million's multiple motions to force the sale
of the home in order to expedite the removal of his name from the mortgage. We
conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Million's
motions.69
 Million devotes large portions of his briefing to events that occurred in
June and July 2024. The notice for this appeal was filed on May 3, 2024, and documents
filed in the trial court after that date are not part of the record on appeal.70 Million did

 67
 Powell, 194 P.3d at 372 (finding absence of counsel did not favor relief
from property division under Rule 60(b)(6) because party engaged in negotiating
agreement after receiving threats of litigation from former spouse).
 68
 Id.
 69
 We review a superior court's order permitting the sale of property for
abuse of discretion. Guerrero, 362 P.3d at 438.
 70
 See Alaska R. App. P. 210(a).

 -24- 7802
 not file a request to supplement the record. Accordingly, the post-notice hearings,
motions, and events that Million references are not properly before us, and we do not
consider them.
 Million claims that the superior court ordered Hubert to remove his name
from the mortgage by March 17, 2024, but failed to enforce the order when Hubert did
not meet the deadline. This is incorrect. At a December 2023 hearing, the superior
court noted that it could enter an order requiring Hubert to execute all necessary
documents by March 18 if both parties agreed to it. But Hubert did not agree, and the
court declined to issue the order.
 More importantly, though, the superior court noted that the parties'
dissolution agreement did not include any deadlines for either party's obligations
related to the mortgage. The court also explained that both Million and Hubert, while
accusing each other of obstruction and delay, had failed to provide the court with
adequate information to afford either party a remedy. Further, the superior court found
that both parties were to blame for the delay. Hubert presented the superior court with
evidence that Million had interfered with the refinancing process by contacting her
lender and accusing her of lying in court. Hubert also presented an email from her
lender stating that she could not qualify for an assumption of the mortgage because of
Million's failure to make timely child support payments.
 Given the lack of enforceable terms in the dissolution petition and
Million's own conduct contributing to delay, we cannot say that the superior court
abused its discretion by declining to force the sale of the home.
 CONCLUSION
 The superior court's order is AFFIRMED.

 -25- 7802