CourtListener opinion 11265398

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

FILED
 JULY 28, 2022
 In the Office of the Clerk of Court
 WA State Court of Appeals Division III

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
 DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Marriage of )
 ) No. 37878-1-III
CINDY D. SCINTO, )
 )
 Respondent, )
 )
 and ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 )
JOHN P. SCINTO, )
 )
 Appellant. )

 FEARING, J. (lead opinion) — In this marital separation case, John Scinto appeals

the superior court's property division and the award of spousal maintenance and attorney

fees to his wife, Cindy Scinto. The appeal primarily forces this court to examine the

elasticity of discretion afforded a superior court when awarding property to separating

spouses. John complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it allocated 79.2

percent of the couple's assets to his wife, Cindy. This opinion awkwardly presents the

majority view on affirming the superior court's spousal maintenance award and award of

attorney fees to wife Cindy Scinto, but the minority view on affirming the trial court's

property division. Because of the unique circumstances of this case, including Cindy's

severe medical ailments, her inability for gainful employment, and her need for the
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family residence, I would hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion. The

majority holds otherwise.

 FACTS

 John and Cindy Scinto married in 1982 in New York. They separated for the third

time in June 2017. For reasons underscored later, the parties seek a legal separation, not

a marital dissolution. Trial occurred in September 2019.

 In 1989, when domiciling in Arizona, Cindy and John Scinto bore a son, later

diagnosed to be on the autistic spectrum. The child, now an adult, resides on his own.

 Since their marriage, John Scinto has worked for the United States Postal Service.

Between 1982 and 1988, John labored as a mail carrier, first in North Carolina and then

in New York. In 1988, the couple transplanted to Hereford, Arizona, where John worked

as a distribution window clerk. He served in the same position at Sierra Vista, Arizona

from 1989 to 1991.

 From 1991 to 1996, John Scinto served as a postmaster, first in McNeal and later

in Stanfield, Arizona. Beginning in 1996, John assumed the position of customer service

analyst, a position in which he continues to serve at a higher level. In his first analyst

position, he oversaw five hundred rural delivery routes in Arizona. He scrutinized routes

to create and preserve proper sizing. This analysis demanded following contractual

provisions, handbooks, and manuals and interfacing with rural communities.

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 John and Cindy Scinto moved, with their son, to Spokane in 1998, where John

continued as a customer service analyst. All three have resided in Spokane since. In

2000, John received a promotion to retail delivery analyst, in which position he evaluated

city delivery routes for eastern Washington and Idaho. His tasks included assessing the

amount of time a carrier spent on a route and the amount of time that the carrier should

have spent on the route.

 At some unremembered time, John Scinto received another promotion, this time to

retail fleet leader. John analyzed mail counts and city delivery routes. With assistance

from computer software, John determined the most efficient methods to deliver mail. He

supervised others who walked postal routes and who reported to him numbers that he, in

turn, reviewed.

 In 2006, John Scinto became an operation specialist with the United States Postal

Service, at which time he journeyed to Washington, D.C. on temporary assignment. John

developed policies and programs regarding rural delivery. He updated Postal Service

manuals. Cindy and the couple's son continued to live in Spokane, and John periodically

returned home. John continues employment with the Postal Service today as a rural

delivery specialist working from Spokane.

 At the time of trial, John Scinto accrued a monthly salary of $9,636, paid

biweekly. This salary equates to yearly income of $115,633. The Postal Service monthly

deducts $59 for Medicare and $669 for civil service retirement from John's paycheck.

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He claims his net monthly income is $7,200 after also deducting for income taxes. John

also monthly deducts an amount from his paycheck into a voluntary retirement plan

known as a thrift savings plan.

 Cindy Scinto's physical condition overshadows other factors in this appeal. Cindy

suffers from relentless health problems requiring constant monitoring and resulting in

high medical expenses. The ailments include a heart transplant attended to coronary

artery disease, a pancreas transplant caused by type 1 diabetes, Graves' disease with

labile thyroid levels, osteopenia, recurrent kidney stones, chronic kidney failure and

disease, sleep apnea, recurrent skin carcinoma due to the effects of immunosuppressant

treatment for the transplants, and actinic keratosis.

 Cindy Scinto has endured diabetes since childhood. At a young age, she began

injecting herself with insulin through needles. She developed carpal tunnel syndrome

because the diabetes contributed to numbness and pain in her wrists and fingers. Because

of the diabetes, Cindy encountered a difficult pregnancy with the couple's son, and her

physician placed her in the hospital for the last two months of pregnancy. Cindy needed

six months to recover from continued swelling after childbirth.

 Cindy Scinto's pregnancy resulted in a hormonal imbalance, which increased her

blood sugar imbalance. After the Scintos moved to Spokane, surgeons removed Cindy's

uterus and ovaries. Cindy took estrogen for an unidentified time, which did not assist in

balancing her hormones or blood sugar.

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 To end the practice of injecting herself with needles, Cindy Scinto acquired, at an

unidentified time, an insulin pump. She changes the pump's catheter every three days.

 Grave's disease is an autoimmune disorder that impacts the thyroid. On an

unknown date, a surgeon removed Cindy Scinto's thyroid as a result of the disease.

 Cindy Scinto develops trigger fingers, an immune system response to synovial

tissue in her hands. The infirmity renders her fingers stiff and locked. Some surgeries

have ameliorated this finger ailment, but trigger fingers return on occasion. When a

finger sticks, she struggles to pry open the digit.

 In 2001, son Jonathan and Cindy were jogging for his physical education

instruction. Cindy suddenly developed cramps, pain in her legs, and breathlessness. Her

chest felt crushed by an elephant. Cindy visited her family physician. An

echocardiogram, blood work, and blood pressure showed no abnormality. The physician

sent Cindy home with a diagnosis of acid reflux.

 Three days later Cindy Scinto visited the emergency room at a Spokane Valley

hospital. The hospital immediately conveyed Cindy to Sacred Heart Medical Center in

Spokane. At the medical center emergency room, medical personnel performed a nuclear

treadmill test. A cardiologist diagnosed a large blockage in Cindy's left anterior

descending artery, known as a widow maker. Personnel quickly carted Cindy to the

surgery theater, wherein a surgeon implanted stents.

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 On numerous later occasions, surgeons installed stents in arteries surrounding

Cindy Scinto's heart. Cindy received eleven stents. Additional blockage soon followed

the placement of each of the stents. Cindy underwent an angioplasty with the addition of

each stent. Recovery from each surgery required three days in the hospital. Cindy had a

pacemaker implanted in her heart.

 Despite receiving the various heart surgeries, doctors determined that Cindy

Scinto needed a heart transplant, and she was placed on the transplant list. One does not

receive a transplant unless close to death. A cardiologist told Cindy she was near death,

although seventy individuals possessed higher priority on the transplant list. On July 14,

2005, a Seattle donor died, but no heart surgeon wanted to relocate the donor's heart

because the donor suffered a viral cancer called cytomegalovirus from drug use. The

donor also smoked tobacco. Surgeons questioned whether the heart would benefit

anyone. Being near death, Cindy asked for the donor's heart. A Leer jet flew the heart

from Seattle to Spokane. The transplant lasted six hours. Cindy remained in intensive

care for two weeks. Her recovery lasted one year. Her breathing improved from the

transplant, however.

 An organ transplant cultivates new ailments. The transplant patient must medicate

with anti-rejection drugs. Because of the diseased substitute heart donated to Cindy

Scinto, cancer manifested itself in four months after the transplant. Cindy underwent

chemotherapy.

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 Cindy Scinto also developed skin cancer on her nose. Prednisone taken for the

heart transplant had thinned her skin. A surgeon removed one side of Cindy's nose and

removed the cancerous cells before regrafting the nose skin. Cindy thereafter underwent

chemotherapy on her face for the skin cancer. Cindy developed skin cancer in other areas

of her body. Skin cancer on her shinbone area demanded the removal of a chunk of flesh

and forty stitches.

 After heart surgery, Cindy Scinto encountered difficulty measuring her blood

sugar level. Medications for the heart transplant prevented her body from absorbing

insulin. Also, insulin did little to balance Cindy's blood sugar level.

 One day in 2011, Cindy Scinto became delusional and went into shock. Because

of complications with diabetes resulting from the heart transplant, Cindy then needed a

pancreas transplant. She went to the Mayo Clinic for assistance, but the clinic refused to

operate because of her earlier heart transplant. Cindy returned to Spokane. She later

learned that European surgeons travel to the University of Illinois in Chicago and

perform risky surgeries. Cindy went to Chicago for a pancreas transplant. European

surgeons drive a hard bargain. Before the surgery, Cindy signed a release stating she

faced a zero percent chance of survival. She remained in downtown Chicago until the

availability of a pancreas donation. She recovered in Chicago for a month after the

transplant.

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 Two years after the pancreas transplant, Spokane practitioners refused to provide

follow-up care for Cindy's pancreas. Seattle physicians also refused to administer

checkups. Cindy then traveled to Tucson for checkups. Years later the pancreas treating

physician moved from Tucson to Tampa, where Cindy now travels.

 Cindy Scinto boasts that she is the first person in the world to receive both a heart

and a pancreas transplant. The two transplants have further compromised Cindy's

immune system. She must avoid areas contaminated with viruses and bacteria. She has

contracted pneumonia since the last transplant. The pneumonia landed Cindy in a

hospitalization isolation ward. The ailment required frequent removal of fluid from the

lungs and intravenous medications.

 Cindy Scinto submits to follow-up examinations of her heart every three months.

Each year she undergoes angioplasty. She has had bypass surgeries since the transplant.

During one surgery, the surgery team broke Cindy's sternum. She later needed additional

surgery to rewire the sternum.

 On an unidentified day in December 2013, Cindy Scinto felt movement in her

shoulder. The pacemaker, which had not been removed during the heart transplant, had

become dislodged and moved toward Cindy's lungs. The Scintos then lived separately,

so Cindy drove herself to the emergency room. A surgeon removed the pacemaker on the

following day.

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 In addition to taking anti-rejection medications for both transplants, Cindy Scinto

uses medications to improve her immune system. The latter drugs bring side effects,

such as sweating, shakes, and nausea. The medications damage Cindy's kidneys. Cindy

gathers kidney stones too large to pass on her own. Because of Cindy's surrogate

pancreas, physicians employ unique procedures to remove the stones.

 At the time of trial, Cindy Scinto experienced forty percent blockage in her heart's

main artery. Surgeons cannot fix the blockage such that her life span may be short.

 At trial, Cindy Scinto had needed new glasses for one year, but lacked funds to

purchase them. She requires complicated lenses, which raise the price of glasses to as

high as $250.

 Cindy weekly visits a counselor for anxiety and depression.

 Because of the use of steroids, Cindy Scinto's teeth crack. She needed braces. In

2018-19, she paid $2,607 for braces. At trial, Cindy needed a new tooth and bridges, at a

cost of $10,000.

 Through employment with the United States Postal Service, John Scinto provides

medical insurance with Blue Cross Blue Shield for Cindy and the couple's son. Still,

Cindy must pay copays for medications and doctor visits. She pays $5,000 in copays

each year. After a family member incurs $5,000 for in-network care, the Blue Cross Blue

Shield policy pays for all later expenses in the policy year. Cindy reaches this

catastrophic amount each year.

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 The Blue Cross Blue Shield policy affords limited dental and eye coverage.

Cindy's dentist submitted the cost of braces to the medical insurance company, and the

company denied coverage. Cindy lacks coverage for much of her dental treatment. The

medical insurance company initially refused to pay for her counseling.

 One or more of her physicians directed Cindy to obtain a gym membership for

needed exercise. She monthly pays for a gym membership. John Scinto allowed a

family gym membership to lapse after Cindy's filing of the legal separation petition.

 In December 2018, Cindy Scinto lacked money to pay for medications. John

would not pay. She raised $1,400 by Facebook for the medications.

 During John Scinto's rise in the United States Postal Service structure, Cindy

worked as homemaker and caregiver for the couple's son. She homeschooled the autistic

son. In the last decade, Cindy has worked part time performing computer graphics with a

ministry in Coeur d'Alene and Post Falls and penning articles. Cindy accrues only

nominal income. Cindy Scinto cannot gain employment because of her medical

condition and unending medical appointments. She formerly wrote on a freelance basis

but can no longer do so because of the condition of her hands.

 In his spare time, John plays the guitar in a band. He earns a small amount of

income for music performances, but his expenses always exceed the income. John owns

numerous pieces of musical and sound equipment.

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 Since the filing of the separation petition, Cindy Scinto has resided in the family

residence. She wishes to continue to live in the home for financial, physical, and

emotional reasons. A realtor estimates the value of the home to be $285,000. The couple

owes no debt against the residence. John now lives in an apartment above a garage and

pays monthly rent in the amount of $1,475.

 Under Postal Service employment rules, the service pays the employee for

accumulated leave time at the time of separation from employment. At the time of trial,

John Scinto had accumulated leave valued at $34,880.

 PROCEDURE

 This appeal arises from the third filing between the parties. John Scinto filed for

marital dissolution in 2013. John filed for dissolution again in 2017. Both cases were

dismissed. Cindy filed this proceeding as a legal separation in 2017.

 Under a 2018 temporary order, John Scinto paid Cindy $2,500 per month in

spousal maintenance pending trial. The order did not require that John pay any medical

expenses.

 John Scinto procured a restraining order against Cindy because of her publishing

defamatory comments online and interfering with John's business relations. Cindy sent a

message to one of John's fellow band members that suggested the band expel John. She

wrote that John turned her life into a nightmare. On her Facebook page, Cindy expressed

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outrage toward John. The restraining order prevented Cindy from referencing John on

social media or in any publication and from attending his musical performances.

 After entry of the restraining order and after a mediation of the proceeding, Cindy

Scinto wrote to a nephew of John:

 Your uncle and I went to mediation yesterday. He would not meet
 me half way. What he offered was leave me penniless and with no where
 [sic] to live. . . .
 ....
 . . . Your uncle insisted on a divorce but he's holding it up with lies
 and by not submitting paperwork. I'm broke. Will run out of money for
 my anti rejection medication. This is shortening my life. It's not fair to
 Jonathan either to lose his mom.
 Doesn't anyone in this family care?

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 182-83. In a second e-mail to the nephew, Cindy wrote:

 All I wanted was my half of the assets and alimony to live on. Just
 what I'm supposed to get. But he refuses. And he has plenty of money.
 I'm sitting in my living room with gloves on because I have the
 temperature down to 62.

CP at 182.

 At trial, John Scinto argued that the message to the nephew violated the restraining

order and a confidentiality provision in the mediation agreement. John asked that the

restraining order continue after entry of the order of legal separation. Cindy denied the

need for a continuing order and argued that she would not engage in similar messages in

the future. She explained that the message arose from her experiencing posttraumatic

stress disorder. At trial, she was under care for the disorder.

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 At the opening of the trial, Cindy Scinto requested leave of the trial court to amend

the request for legal separation to a prayer for marital dissolution. The court denied the

amendment because of the lack of a formal motion. John testified that he had agreed to a

legal separation so that Cindy could maintain health insurance.

 During the trial, the parties announced an agreement that John would share fifty

percent of the community portion of his retirement pension with Cindy. Cindy also asked

the court to divide John's income until he retires.

 During the trial testimony of Cindy Scinto, the superior court asked counsel about

the parties' respective wishes for disposing of the family residence. Cindy's counsel

requested possession of the residence and a nominal payment of $4,534 to John for his

share in the home. John's counsel bade the court to split the equity in half. The superior

court then requested the attorneys to ponder and later address the legality and possibility

of awarding Cindy a life estate with John retaining ownership of a one-half interest in the

abode. The court remarked:

 I don't even know what the legality of that is. Neither party
 requested that and so perhaps my hands are tied without a motion from a
 party, but—perhaps it's not, though. It could be that I have wide enough
 discretion to consider that in deliberations, but I'm putting it out there so
 it's not hidden from the parties, and I'd like some discussion of it in this
 trial.

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 198.

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 During closing argument, the following colloquy transpired between the superior

court and Cindy Scinto's counsel regarding the court's earlier inquiry about a life estate

for Cindy in the residence:

 So to answer the Court's question in short, I do think you have the
 legal authority to issue a life estate. I think that that may create more
 problems when you do that to the resolution of this case.

RP at 423.

 THE COURT: . . . tell me again your specific concern if the Court
 were to hypothetically grant a life estate with reversion back to Mr. Scinto
 in the event that Ms. Scinto preceded him in death.
 MR. HUGHES [Cindy's counsel]: Certainly. There's a couple of
 issues. I think that we would have to figure out what portion of her
 property to be distributed to her estate, and what portion is his property to
 be distributed to his estate.
 THE COURT: What if the Court's hypothetical is simply to grant
 her a life estate with a 100 percent reversion back to Mr. Scinto at the end
 of her life, and if Mr. Scinto doesn't survive her, then it would revert to
 her?
 MR. HUGHES: I think that in the event that she predeceased him
 that the value of the home . . . is double what Mr. Scinto is requesting in
 equalization. So in that scenario he would have received essentially double
 the equalization and would be a windfall. The reverse scenario I think
 would be something of windfall to Ms. Scinto[,] if she were to predecease
 [him,] she would have a zero amount that would be paid to him. That
 would be closer to a 73 percent distribution of assets to her should he
 predecease. So I would think that if you granted a life estate with an offset
 of equality of the total value, we would have to say if either party
 predeceased X amount would be reverted to each estate of the other party. I
 think that analysis would in the end be similar to the analysis of trying to
 sort of figure out what the payment would be and Ms. Scinto's position
 having heard the Court's question and talking through that if the Court
 finds that evidence would be 4,000, 50,000, 80,000 or 120,000, if you find
 a number that's an equalization payment, I believe that the law gives this
 Court authority to say she will pay back his interest X amount a month and

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 this is how it would be secured. I think that would make clear the issue as
 to what Mr. Scinto's interest is and what her interest is and then that
 amount can be—can be otherwise accommodated.
 If the Court was to think it creates potential issues between the
 estates of both parties and likely between parties that are not party to this
 case that are then going to take issue relative to this Court's judgment here
 in the form of an estate because Ms. Scinto's estate would probably have
 issue with that, I'm assuming Mr. Scinto would like to have issue with that
 should he be deceased.

RP at 428-29.

 During closing, John Scinto's counsel asked the superior court to award Cindy the

home, but require Cindy to obtain a loan against the home and pay the proceeds of the

loan to John as an equalization payment. Counsel rejected the superior court's suggestion

of a life estate because neither party could access the equity in the home until Cindy's

death. According to John's counsel, Cindy should sell the home and purchase a cheaper

condominium. Cindy could thereby access some of the equity in the home.

 After closing statements by counsel, the superior court recessed the trial for six

weeks before announcing his ruling. The sparse written findings of fact incorporate the

court's oral ruling, so we quote the ruling at length.

 The Court is to put the parties in the financial position they would be
 in if they remained married taking into account a number of factors
 including the community property and both parties' earning potential.
 Again, this is a long-term marriage that makes this Court's task very
 difficult in this case, but nevertheless, the Court did its best to comply with
 the statutes and case law which require this Court to take into account both
 parties' past earning potential, future earning potential, their age, and their
 physical characteristics. In this case, it was particularly complicated
 because [Cindy Scinto], to this Court's satisfaction, it was proven that she

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 really did not have the ability based on her extensive medical conditions
 which are complicated [sic] the ability to earn much income. Historically
 she had not earned much income, and the Court found her testimony
 credible that she doesn't have an ability to earn any significant income due
 to her health concerns going forward in time. Substantial evidence
 persuaded me to this finding.
 I do find that she's disabled for the purposes of earning potential. I
 do find that she's disabled, and although there was testimony that she had
 earned some money here and there, the speaking engagements, being an
 author, or a part-time writer, the Court nevertheless continues to find that
 she's not in a position to be a significant earner for herself due to her
 extensive healthcare concerns.

RP at 449-50.

 The superior court valued the couple's Greenacres residence at $290,000 and

awarded the house to Cindy Scinto. The court awarded personal community property to

Cindy in the amount of $108,853.50 and personal community property to John in the

amount of $105,060.50. Including the real property award, the trial court awarded

$398,853.50 or 79.2 percent of the community property assets to Cindy and $105,060.50

or 20.8 percent to John. The trial court declared:

 The reason for the disproportionate award in this case, this is the
 parties' primary community asset [the residence], is due to the
 circumstances of the nature of their lifestyle during the marriage.
 Essentially, [John Scinto] has been employed by and has had a healthy
 financial career with the U.S. Postal Service. . . . He's had steady
 employment throughout the marriage. [Cindy] essentially was a stay-at-
 home parent for much of the child's life and has not really been in a
 condition to be an income earner. Her earning potential has been
 significantly limited by her extensive medical issues that were articulated in
 the substantive evidence here. She's had a heart transplant. She's had a
 litany of medical conditions which the Court found to be credible and
 proven to this Court's satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence.

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 The Court feels a disproportionate award is necessary in this case
 due to her lack of earning potential as well as the fact that this was a long-
 term marriage, and her own contribution from being a stay-at-home mother
 and homemaker contributed to [John's] ability to advance his career and
 earn income. The Court is tasked with making a fair, just, and equitable
 distribution of property to put the parties in the position they would be in if
 they remained married. Knowing that the request from [Cindy] was the
 Court split the income, I was not inclined to do so in that fashion. So the
 Court is awarding the real property in its entirety on any and all equity.
 There is no debt associated with that real property.

RP at 451-52. The superior court commented about other ways to dispose of the

couple's residence:

 I do want you to know I looked at other options that whether a trust
 could be set up, whether a life estate should be granted. I looked at things
 upside down to try to make sure that both parties were in a fair and just
 position and this what I came up with, this is what I think is the best
 resolution given the fact it's a long-term marriage.

RP at 478.

 The superior court uttered oral findings in favor of a maintenance award:

 I am going to order maintenance in this case, and I'm going to make
 a lifetime maintenance order. The Court rarely does so, but the Court finds
 it appropriate given the long-term nature of the marriage being 35 years.
 The Court also considered all the factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.090.
 That includes the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
 including any separate or community property apportioned to her, as well
 as both parties' abilities to meet their own needs independently.
 The Court also considered the time, any necessary time to acquire
 sufficient education and training to enable the party seeking maintenance to
 find appropriate employment based on her skills, interest, lifestyle, and
 other attendant circumstances. In this case, considering that factor the
 Court finds that it is not practical for [Cindy Scinto] to be an earner for
 herself due to the extensive medical conditions she has. Historically that

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 was also the case, she was never a significant earner during the lifetime of
 the marriage.
 The Court also considered the standard of living that was established
 during the marriage. And, again, the Court tries to do its best with the
 limited resources available to give the parties the ability to live a lifestyle
 that was close to that experienced in the marriage and finds that's fair, just,
 and equitable.
 Again, the Court also considers the late age, the physical and
 emotional conditions of both parties and the financial obligations of the
 wife, who is seeking maintenance; again, noting her lack of ability to earn
 income and his ability to earn income through his both historic and during
 trial his continued stability in his career earning over six figures.
 The Court also considered the ability of [John] in this case to meet
 his own financial obligations as well as meeting those of the spouse who
 was seeking maintenance and her ability to meet her own needs. The Court
 considered all factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.090 and finds that a
 lifetime maintenance award of $2,300 per month going forward is
 appropriate.
 The Court also has concerns regarding her ability to acquire medical
 insurance, so that's another reason why this Court in addition to the factors
 enumerated in .090, the Court also has concerns about that. I think, frankly,
 even with the disproportionate award and even with the lifetime
 maintenance award, she may have difficulty securing the appropriate
 medical insurance or the medical out of pocket and/or medical necessities
 that she may need. However, this Court can't create assets out of nowhere,
 and the Court has to account for [John's] right to live a life that's somewhat
 close in proximity to the life that he lived during the marriage, and so the
 Court finds that $2,300 is sufficient plus the disproportionate award with
 respect to the home is fair, just, and equitable in its totality. And although
 that may not meet every need of [Cindy], the Court nevertheless finds it is
 fair, just, and equitable and is the most this Court would order in terms of
 lifetime maintenance. I find a maintenance above and beyond this, such as
 a splitting of the income would be unfair to [John] and would also deprive
 [John] of having an existence that was close in proximity to the marriage.
 So $2,300 will be the maintenance, lifetime maintenance award.

RP at 453-55.

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 John Scinto's counsel informed the superior court that John's Postal Service

pension would pay between $6,000 and $8,000 per month. Counsel also reminded the

court that the parties had agreed to equally share the monthly pension benefit. In

response, the court remarked:

 I will indicate that if under any contingency that her [Cindy's] share
 of the retirement, once it goes into effect, drops below [$]2,300, he [John]
 will have to at least get her to [$]2,300 in maintenance. That is fair, just,
 and equitable.

RP at 476.

 During its oral ruling, the superior court addressed the possibility that either John

or Cindy Scinto would transform the legal separation proceeding to a marital dissolution

and the effect of a dissolution on Cindy's ability to afford medical care. John represented

that he would not seek a dissolution so that Cindy could retain health insurance. The

court commented:

 It has been represented that [Cindy Scinto] was going to convert this
 to a dissolution, which she has every right to do. The Court took into
 account in the maintenance award that most likely if this turns into a
 dissolution, she may not be able to meet her medical needs with a $2,300
 maintenance award even considering the disproportionate award. However,
 the Court is aware of the equity position that [John Scinto] has indicated
 he's not seeking dissolution for the purposes of her maintaining her medical
 insurance and the Court took that into account to a certain degree. And so
 if she seeks a dissolution that will be granted, that may put her in financial
 strain if she's not able to essentially acquire affordable medical insurance.
 However, that really is her choice to do and it would be unfair for this
 Court to obviously force her to do that. She has every right and public
 policy would support her ability to seek a dissolution once she meets the
 statutory criteria in the 90 days of that one, she files appropriately.

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RP at 477.

 The superior court awarded Cindy Scinto attorney fees to be paid by John:

 The Court has determined that [John Scinto] shall pay $15,000 of
 [Cindy Scinto's] attorney's fees, offset by the amount [John] had to pay to
 obtain the restraining order against [Cindy].
 [John] proved fees related to obtaining a restraining order against
 [Cindy] by providing invoices in the amount of $3,754.50.
 The Court therefore orders [John] to pay [Cindy's] attorney's fees in
 the amount of $11,245.50 payable to Hughes & Nelson, Attorneys at Law,
 PLLC, payable within 30 days of entry of this order or subject to entry of a
 judgment and/or garnishment/collection.

CP at 351. The court added:

 With respect to the attorney fees in this case: the Court was mindful
 of attorney fees request and did apportion for that. I'm going to indicate
 that [John Scinto] in this case will pay 15,000 in attorney fees and that will
 be offset by the precise amount with respect to the restraining order, the
 temporary restraining order, so I don't have an attorney fees calculation for
 that. So the parties are instructed I'm awarding that [John is] to pay 15,000
 in attorney fees to [Cindy] offset by the temporary, the amount to be
 reflected seeking the temporary restraining order. So, Counsel, I guess I'll
 have to see a supplemental on that as to what that amount would be
 precisely, but I find that fair, just, and equitable.
 In looking at this case, I think both parties could have come to a
 resolution. Even though one party has certainly a less earning potential, I
 also think that this case could have been settled so the Court has wide
 discretion to apportion attorney fees, so that's the extent to which I'm
 ordering [John] to assist with attorney fees in this case and her earning
 income.
 ....
 . . . It's based on the total assessment of equities in this case. So I
 think some contribution from [John] to [Cindy] is warranted given his
 earning potential and her lack of earning potential. But I also, again, I've
 offset that by the temporary—whatever attorney fees comprise and were
 needed related to the seeking and obtaining of the temporary restraining

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

 order, and I'm not inclined to award any additional attorney fees above and
 beyond the [$]15,000 based in part on the assessment of all equities to
 include financial discrepancies of the parties in this case and this Court had
 also formed a perception that this case could have been settled out of court.
 Anyway, that's the Court's position on this.
 I actually don't think the Court is required to articulate a reason
 when it distributes attorney fees given the statutes, just gives the Court
 wide discretion in that case, but, nevertheless, the Court considered all
 issues of equity.

RP at 462-63. John did not object to the attorney fee award.

 LAW AND ANALYSIS

 John Scinto assigns three errors to the superior court's rulings. First, the court

erred when ordering spousal maintenance to continue after his retirement. Second, the

court inequitably divided the couple's property. Third, the court erred when awarding

Cindy reasonable attorney fees. I address the assignments in such order. Although this

proceeding entails a legal separation, not a marital dissolution, the same rules with regard

to spousal maintenance, a property division, and attorney fees apply. The Washington

decisions I discuss entail dissolutions, formerly known as divorces.

 Maintenance

 The superior court ordered John Scinto to pay Cindy $2,300 per month until his

retirement. Once John retires, John and Cindy, per agreement, will each receive half the

value of John's United States Postal Service retirement pension income. If Cindy's

receipt of retirement income falls below $2,300 a month, John must pay the difference as

maintenance. On appeal, John argues that any maintenance obligation should end once

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

he retires and Cindy begins receiving 50 percent of the pension payments. John does not

challenge his paying $2,300 per month before his retirement. He does not complain

about Cindy receiving half of his retirement pay. He only complains about paying Cindy

the difference between $2,300 and her share of the retirement pay after he ceases

employment.

 A trial court may award maintenance in a legal separation:

 (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or domestic
 partnership, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, or in a proceeding
 for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage or domestic
 partnership by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
 spouse or absent domestic partner, the court may grant a maintenance order
 for either spouse or either domestic partner. The maintenance order shall
 be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just,
 without regard to misconduct, after considering all relevant factors
 including but not limited to:
 (a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
 including separate or community property apportioned to him or her, and
 his or her ability to meet his or her needs independently, including the
 extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party
 includes a sum for that party;
 (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
 enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to
 this or her skill, interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances;
 (c) The standard of living established during the marriage or
 domestic partnership;
 (d) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership;
 (e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial
 obligations of the spouse or domestic partner seeking maintenance; and
 (f) The ability of the spouse or domestic partner from whom
 maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs and financial obligations
 while meeting those of the spouse or domestic partner seeking
 maintenance.

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

RCW 26.09.090.

 An award of maintenance lies within the trial court's discretion. In re Marriage of

Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. 861, 867, 815 P.2d 843 (1991). Washington courts have

approved awards of lifetime maintenance in a reasonable amount when the party seeking

maintenance will not be able to contribute significantly to his or her own livelihood. In

re Marriage of Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116, 124, 853 P.2d 462 (1993).

 In support of his contention that the superior court abused its discretion when

awarding continuous spousal maintenance, John Scinto relies on numerous factual

contentions, some which are irrelevant and some which are mistaken. John contends that

the superior court cannot base spousal maintenance on some unforeseen future event.

Presumably this unforeseen event is his pension payment dipping below a total of $4,600

per month. At the same time, John underscores that no evidence suggests that Cindy will

ever receive less than $2,300 per month. We agree. In fact, John's counsel represented

to the superior court that Cindy will never receive less than $3,000 per month as her share

of Postal Service retirement benefits. John does not explain why he frets about an event

he insists will never occur and appeals a ruling that will never impact his behavior.

 John Scinto emphasizes that he will not receive any income other than his

retirement pay when ending employment. Therefore, assuming both he and Cindy

receive less than $2,300 per month from the Postal Service, Cindy will continue to

receive that amount, while his income falls according to his paying Cindy the shortfall.

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

Again, his counsel claimed this scenario would never occur. Anyway, John fails to note

that he could gain other employment, after retirement from the Postal Service, to

supplement his pension. Cindy cannot probably gain gainful employment.

 John mentions that Cindy will receive $500 per month in Social Security

payments, while he will receive none. He asks this court to rely on these facts when

reviewing the maintenance award. Nevertheless, John failed to cite to the record for the

purported facts. RAP 10.3 governs the content of a brief on appeal. RAP 10.3(a)(5)

demands that any "[r]eference to the record must be included for each factual statement."

This reviewing court need not search the record for applicable portions supporting a

party's arguments. Mills v. Park, 67 Wn.2d 717, 721, 409 P.2d 646 (1966). Therefore,

we do not consider how receipt of Social Security benefits, or the lack of receipt, impacts

the parties' respective welfare.

 John Scinto writes in his brief that he nets $6,572 per month and, after paying rent

of $1,475 per month and his other expenses, he incurs a deficit of $616 a month. The

evidence does not support net income of $6,572 unless John deducts voluntary

contributions to his thrift savings plan and some other unidentified expense. The

evidence shows that John nets $7,200 each month. Like any other separating or

divorcing couple, the parties cannot live as economically comfortable apart as they did

together. Both John and Cindy may need to curtail spending in order to live within their

respective incomes.

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

 The trial court based its decision for spousal maintenance, if not its property

allocation also, in part on future health expenses. John Scinto complains that the court

entered no finding as to the amount of future expenses. Nevertheless, the undisputed

evidence established that Cindy always reached the catastrophic yearly cap such that she

annually paid $5,000 of unreimbursed expenses.

 John Scinto also complains that the superior court erred in considering his

retirement pension when determining the maintenance award. Nevertheless, the parties

stipulated at trial that Cindy Scinto would receive one-half of John's pension income

upon his retirement. John insists that Cindy will not receive less than $2,300 through her

half of the pension payment. John will receive a credit for all of the pension payment

against his $2,300 per month maintenance obligation. Thus, assuming the superior court

relied on the value of the pension when calculating the maintenance sum, the reliance

prejudiced John none. Regardless, the trial court entered no findings relating to the

pension. The record does not reflect that the court considered the pension value or

monthly payments when reaching a decision.

 In the course of its oral ruling, the superior court pondered the potential impact of

Cindy Scinto's ability to obtain health insurance on a later conversion of the proceeding

from legal separation to marital dissolution. Six months following a decree of legal

separation, either party may move the court for a mandatory conversion of the decree of

legal separation to a decree of dissolution. RCW 26.09.150(2)(a). John Scinto

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

challenges the trial court's maintenance and property distribution orders to the extent the

court predicated its ruling on this possible impact.

 We disagree with John Scinto's reading of the superior court's comments with

regard to transforming the legal separation decree to a dissolution. John pledged not to

convert the decree. The trial court remarked that Cindy requested to convert the

proceedings to dissolution at the outset of trial. In turn, the court noted that conversion to

dissolution would jeopardize Cindy's insurance for medical expenses. The trial court

warned that, if Cindy exercises her right to convert the proceeding to a dissolution, she

causes herself financial harm. But the court did not express any intent to increase the

maintenance award or property division in anticipation of such a possibility.

 John Scinto principally relies on In re Marriage of Mathews, 70 Wn. App. 116

(1993), but misstates its holding. In In re Marriage of Mathews, this court found error

when the trial court awarded indefinite maintenance equivalent to one-half of Donald

Mathews' income to his divorcing spouse when a qualified domestic relations order

already operated to transfer one-half of all retirement or disability income. This court

found error when the combination of the two orders would have deprived Mathews of his

half of the retirement income. Mathews does not stand for the proposition that a court is

forbidden from awarding maintenance that extends beyond retirement.

 John Scinto also relies on Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wn.2d 639, 369 P.2d 516

(1962), wherein the Supreme Court reversed an alimony award based entirely on the

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

conjectural possibility that the wife might face future health problems. The Supreme

Court's ruling does not prevent a trial court from considering a party's existing health

problems when crafting a maintenance award. The Scinto separation court found Cindy

suffered extraordinary physical ailments that prevented her from any gainful

employment. The testimony and exhibits resoundingly supported this finding.

 John Scinto does not provide any law demonstrating that the trial court's

maintenance award constituted reversible error. He does not cite any law that precludes

the superior court from awarding maintenance that results in the supporting spouse

receiving less income than the needy spouse. He does not argue in the abstract that

$2,300 in monthly spousal maintenance is unfair.

 The trial court considered the RCW 26.09.090 factors in crafting the maintenance

award, including the parties' abilities to earn income, standards of living, ages, and

physical conditions. We discern no abuse of discretion.

 Property Division

 John Scinto next challenges the superior court's division of the couple's property

as unfair because Cindy received 79.2 percent of the value of the assets. John

particularly complains that the court awarded Cindy the family residence without any

equalization payment to him. Again, this opinion constitutes the minority view.

 RCW 26.09.080 governs division of property in a legal separation:

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

 In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or domestic
 partnership, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, or in a proceeding
 for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage or the
 domestic partnership by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the
 absent spouse or absent domestic partner or lacked jurisdiction to dispose
 of the property, the court shall, without regard to misconduct, make such
 disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either
 community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering
 all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
 (1) The nature and extent of the community property;
 (2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
 (3) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership; and
 (4) The economic circumstances of each spouse or domestic partner
 at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the
 desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
 reasonable periods to a spouse or domestic partner with whom the children
 reside the majority of the time.

 The listed factors are not exclusive and a court may consider other factors,

including the health and ages of the parties, their prospects for future earnings, their

education and employment histories, their necessities and financial abilities, their

foreseeable future acquisitions and obligations, and whether the property to be divided

should be attributed to the inheritance or efforts of one or both spouses. In re Marriage

of Urbana, 147 Wn. App. 1, 11, 195 P.3d 959 (2008). The court should ponder all the

circumstances of the marriage, both past and present, and evaluate the future needs of

parties. In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996). The

economic circumstances of each spouse on dissolution hold paramount concern. In re

Marriage of DeRuwe, 72 Wn.2d 404, 408, 433 P.2d 209 (1967); In re Marriage of

Urbana, 147 Wn. App. 1, 11 (2008).

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

 An equitable division does not require mathematical precision. In re Marriage of

Zahm, 138 Wn.2d 213, 218-19, 978 P.2d 498 (1999). On the one hand, the superior

court need not divide community property equally as long as the award is fair considering

all circumstances of the marriage. In re Marriage of Doneen, 197 Wn. App. 941, 949,

391 P.3d 594 (2017). On the other hand, if the dissolution decree results in a patent

disparity in the parties' economic circumstances, this court will reverse the decision

because the trial court will have committed a manifest abuse of discretion. In re

Marriage of Urbana, 147 Wn. App. 1, 10 (2008); In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn.

App. 235, 243, 170 P.3d 572 (2007). Importantly, in a long-term marriage of twenty-five

years or more, the trial court should place the parties in roughly equal financial positions

for the rest of their lives. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 243 (2007).

The longer the marriage, the more likely the court will make a disproportionate

distribution of the community property. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at

243. When one spouse is older, semiretired, and dealing with ill health, and the other

spouse is employable, the court does not abuse its discretion in ordering an unequal

division of community property. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 243.

Future earning capacity is a substantial factor to be considered by the trial court in

making a just and equitable property distribution. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wn.2d

236, 248, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

 The relative physical condition of the parties is a material consideration in

rendering a property division. Shay v. Shay, 33 Wn.2d 408, 410, 205 P.2d 901 (1949);

Guarino v. Guarino, 29 Wn.2d 314, 324, 186 P.2d 927 (1947). In Shay v. Shay, the

Supreme Court approved a property allocation, over the objection of the husband,

because of the wife's precarious medical condition that included hypertrophic

cardiovascular disease.

 We will reverse a property division made during the dissolution of a marriage only

on a manifest abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803,

108 P.3d 779 (2005). We afford the superior court "broad discretion" in distributing the

marital property. In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242 (2007). A trial

court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable

grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940

P.2d 1362 (1997).

 John Scinto principally relies on In re Marriage of Urbana, 147 Wn. App. 1

(2008). In Urbana, this court held that the superior court abused its discretion when

awarding the husband twenty percent of the property and the wife eighty percent.

Nevertheless, we ruled that the abuse of discretion arose from the superior court's failure

to state the basis for the property division, not that the division was necessarily unfair.

We remanded for the trial court to enter findings. In re Marriage of Urbana, 147 Wn.

App. 1, 13 (2008).

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In re Marriage of Scinto

 Each dissolution must be decided on its unique facts. In In re Marriage of

Davison, 112 Wn. App. 251, 258-59, 48 P.3d 358 (2002), this court affirmed the superior

court's property allocation. Although the husband received half of the parties' total

assets, he complained that he only received twenty-five percent of the community

property. In In re Marriage of Tower, 55 Wn. App. 697, 701, 780 P.2d 863 (1989), this

court affirmed the grant to one spouse of sixty-three percent of the property because of

the unique circumstances.

 I must agree with John Scinto that the superior court divided the marital property

disproportionately. I may even agree that the superior court's allocation reaches the outer

boundary of a court's discretion. Nevertheless, the division stayed within the border of

reasoned discretion because of the remorseless physical infirmities that beset Cindy, her

inability to work, her annual unreimbursed medical expenses, and the benefit resulting

from her continued occupation of the marital residence. The property division may best

permit the respective spouses to continue with a standard of living enjoyed before the

separation.

 No decision presents a mathematical formula for deciding a fair and equitable

property division. No decision declares that the court may not award one spouse a

percentage of property beyond a maximum figure. No case holds that an eighty percent

allocation to one spouse necessarily exceeds the superior court's authority.

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

 John Scinto highlights that Cindy need not pay a mortgage. Nevertheless, she will

pay home insurance, property taxes, and maintenance on the residence. John will always

garner more than Cindy's $2,300 per month spousal maintenance, which will permit him

to pay rent or purchase a modest home.

 The superior court may have possessed discretion to order that Cindy Scinto own

one-half of the real property in fee simple and the other half as a life estate to return to

John or his heirs on Cindy's death. The court asked the parties to comment on this

possible division. Nevertheless, John did not ask for a life estate, but rather argued

against the device. I observe that the couple's son is the only natural heir of both parties

and will likely benefit from the home no matter who dies first. When neither party asks

for a life estate and both parties argue against a life estate, a trial court does not abuse its

discretion when denying the ownership vehicle.

 John Scinto, in addition to and related to his contention that the superior court

abused its discretion, maintains that the trial court entered insufficient findings of fact to

facilitate appellate review of the property division. He requests remand for more specific

findings by the trial court. A trial court's findings of fact must declare the ultimate facts

that justify its conclusions. In re Marriage of Tulleners, 11 Wn. App. 2d 358, 369, 453

P.3d 996 (2019). The trial court found that Cindy Scinto faced a litany of health

problems and would be unable to obtain income by her own efforts, but did not attempt to

assign monetary values to these circumstances. These articulated findings indicate that

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

the trial court based the property division on permissible factors. John does not provide

law suggesting that the trial court was required to submit findings with greater specificity.

 Although John Scinto assigned error to the superior court's property allocation as

fair, John assigned no error to underlying findings of fact lying within the court's oral

ruling. We encourage counsel to draft numbered written findings that echo the superior

court's oral ruling for more efficient review for this court. Nevertheless, we know of no

reason to disregard findings emanating from an oral ruling. An appellate court may

utilize the trial court's oral opinion to clarify formal findings. In re Marriage of Yates, 17

Wn. App. 772, 773, 565 P.2d 825 (1977). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on

appeal. Rush v. Blackburn, 190 Wn. App. 945, 956, 361 P.3d 217 (2015).

 A majority of this panel encourages, but does not require, the trial court to amend

the property award so it is less disproportionate. Along these lines, the majority

repeatedly writes that the superior court "could have" ordered otherwise. But the

majority never writes that the superior court "should have" ruled differently. If this court

does not direct the superior court to amend its property division, this court concludes that

the division may be fair. If the division may be fair, the superior court did not abuse its

discretion.

 Attorney Fees

 John Scinto argues that the superior court erred in awarding Cindy Scinto $15,000

in attorney fees, offset by the fees incurred by John in obtaining a restraining order

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

against Cindy for publicizing malicious statements about John. After the deduction, the

court awarded Cindy the sum of $11,245.50.

 The American Rule generally denies attorney fees to a party unless a contractual,

statutory, or recognized equitable exception applies. Dalton M, LLC v. North Cascade

Trustee Services, Inc., 20 Wn. App. 2d 914, 941, 504 P.3d 834 (2022). RCW 26.09.140

authorizes the superior court to award a party fees in a legal separation proceeding.

RCW 26.09.140 declares:

 The court from time to time after considering the financial resources
 of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to
 the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this
 chapter and for reasonable attorneys' fees or other professional fees in
 connection therewith, including sums for legal services rendered and costs
 incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or enforcement or
 modification proceedings after entry of judgment.

 Under RCW 26.09.140, the court should consider the need of the party requesting

the fees, the ability to pay the fees, and the general equity of the fee given the disposition

of the marital property. In re Marriage of Van Camp, 82 Wn. App. 339, 342, 918 P.2d

509 (1996). In determining fees, a court should also consider (1) the factual and legal

questions at issue, (2) the amount of time spent preparing the case, and (3) the value of

the property involved. In re Marriage of Foley, 84 Wn. App. 839, 846-47, 930 P.2d 929

(1997).

 If the trial court makes an award, the court must state on the record the method it

used to calculate the award. In re Marriage of Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. 462, 473, 38 P.3d

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

1033 (2002); In re Marriage of Knight, 75 Wn. App. 721, 729, 880 P.2d 71 (1994); In re

Marriage of Sanborn, 55 Wn. App. 124, 130, 777 P.2d 4 (1989). Although this rule

mentions only the calculation of the award and not the basis underlying the award, we

conclude the same rule should apply in the context of the basis of the award. Under other

circumstances, the trial court must furnish a record of its reasons for a decision in order to

accommodate appellate review of the decision. State v. Williams, 87 Wn.2d 916, 920,

557 P.2d 1311 (1976); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Wn. App. 683, 686, 20 P.3d 972

(2001).

 The superior court followed the language of RCW 26.09.140 by considering the

financial resources of the parties. In its oral ruling the court noted John Scinto's earning

potential and Cindy Scinto's lack of earning potential. The court did not grant all of

Cindy's incurred fees, because it deemed the case should have settled and because Cindy

caused John fees by her defamatory statements. We recognize that the court did not cite

to the statute and suggested it need not articulate a reason for the award. Nevertheless, no

rule requires a citation to the statute as long as the court relies on the substance of the

statute. The court articulated its reasons for the award and the amount.

 Attorney Fees on Appeal

 In the final sentence of her brief, Cindy Scinto requests attorney fees on appeal

under RPC 18.1. We assume Cindy references RAP 18.1, which permits a party to

request fees or expenses if applicable law grants the right to recover attorney fees or

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 No. 37878-1-III
In re Marriage of Scinto

expenses. RAP 18.1(a). Cindy fails to devote a section of her brief to the request for fees

or expenses as required by RAP 18.1(b). Therefore, we deny the request for attorney fees

on appeal. Dalton M, LLC v. North Cascade Trustee Services, Inc., 20 Wn. App. 2d 914,

963 (2022).

 CONCLUSION

 We affirm the superior court's maintenance award and award of reasonable

attorney fees to Cindy Scinto. We reverse the property division and remand to the

superior court for further review of the property allocation. We deny Cindy an award of

fees on appeal.

 A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

 _________________________________
 Fearing, J.

 36