CourtListener opinion 11268520

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CLERK'S OFFICE 
 U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT ROANOKE, VA 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA FILED 
 ROANOKE DIVISION February 26, 2026 
 LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK 
ADEIRA CELEENE WRIGHT, ) BY: s/ S. Neily, Deputy Clerk 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 7:26-CV-00048 
 ) 
v. ) 
 ) 
ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF ) By: Hon. Robert S. Ballou 
SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., ) United States District Judge 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Plaintiff Adeira Celeene Wright, proceeding pro se, claims that Defendants unlawfully 
removed her biological children from her care and unlawfully enforced protective orders barring 
contact with several other of her biological children. Wright previously filed suit in this Court 
requesting that four of her minor children, who are apparently in the custody of their adoptive 
parents, be removed from their homes and placed with her due to allegations of abuse. See 
Complaint at 1, Wright v. Virginia Department of Social Services, et al., No. 7:25-cv-00898 
(W.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2025), Dkt. 3. This Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over Wright's 
case. Wright I, Dkt. 14. In October 2025, several additional children were removed from her 
home, and in January 2026, the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court issued 
protective orders barring Wright from contact with the four minors currently in the adoptive 
parents' custody. Wright now brings a federal complaint in this court against Roanoke City 
Department of Social Services, Franklin County Department of Social Services!, John/Jane Doe 

' Roanoke City Department of Social Services and Franklin County Department of Social 
Services are branches of the Virginia Department of Social Services and are collectively referred 
to as "DSS." 

DSS Supervisors 1-10, Rick Boyer, in his official capacity as Guardian ad Litem, and John/Jane 
Doe Clerks, Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging unlawful seizure and deprivation of familial association, retaliation for protected 
activity, and ongoing constitutional violations. Dkt. 2 at 1, 5–6. Wright filed several additional 
motions seeking temporary restraining orders (Dkts. 1, 15) and to proceed in forma pauperis 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (Dkt. 7), supplemental authority (Dkts. 9, 10, 12) and several 
declarations (Dkts. 11, Sealed Declaration, 12, 13, 14). Because Wright again asks the court to 
intervene in a child custody dispute and relitigate ongoing state court proceedings, this Court will 
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case. Insofar as Wright alleges retaliation against 
these defendants separately from the merits of her child custody case, she fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
 I. Background 
 Wright brings her claims under § 1983 for "Unlawful Seizure and Deprivation of Familial 
Association," retaliation, and, vaguely, other constitutional violations. Dkt. 2 at 5–6. In her 
federal complaint2, Wright first alleges that Defendants seized her children without a warrant and 

"deprived her of familial association without due process of law" in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Id. ¶ 24–25. Next, she alleges 
that Defendants retaliated against her, in violation of the First Amendment, "for mandated 
reporting and federal litigation by continuing separation through proxy enforcement." Id. ¶ 26. 

2 Courts in the Fourth Circuit frequently consider facts alleged by pro se plaintiffs in response to 
a motion to dismiss, even if they are improperly asserted outside of the complaint. Holley v. 
Combs, 134 F.4th 142, 144 (4th Cir. 2025); see also, Goines v. Valley Community Services Board, 
822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that courts may consider documents explicitly 
incorporated by reference or otherwise integral to the complaint). Therefore, I have liberally 
construed Wright's complaint to include facts contained in both motions for a temporary 
restraining order, associated affidavits, and supplemental authority. Dkts. 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12–15. 
Finally, she alleges ongoing constitutional violations because "Defendants continue to enforce 
separation without jurisdiction." Id. ¶ 27. Specifically, she alleges that "subject-matter 
jurisdiction never validly attached" and "the Circuit Court that entered the termination of 
parental rights and adoption orders formally acknowledged that it no longer retained 
jurisdiction." Dkt. 10 at 2–4. 

 In explaining her claim, Wright recites facts regarding removal of several of her minor 
children from her custody. It appears Wright had custody of some of her biological children until 
October 2025. On or around October 12, 2025, Wright reported one of her daughters as a 
runaway. Dkt. 4 ¶ 2. She located her child and contacted law enforcement. Id. ¶ 3. The police 
picked up the child and took her to the police department. Id. ¶ 4. The police did not return the 
child to Wright. Subsequently, DSS directed that all children be removed from the home "based 
on [Wright's] alleged extensive history, including matters connected to a stalker." Id. ¶ 6. On 
October 14, 2025, law enforcement removed one additional child from Wright's home. Id. ¶¶ 9–
11. Pursuant to additional emergency removal orders dated October 14, 2025, two additional 

children were removed from her home on October 20, 2025. Id. ¶¶ 12–14. 
 Wright alleges that the removal of her children in October 2025 occurred in violation of 
due process and without judicial authorization. Dkt. 2 ¶ 10. Specifically, she alleges that 
"[e]mergency removal orders dated October 14 were obtained for three children despite only two 
being in state custody" and "[t]hose same orders were later used to seize additional children days 
later, resulting in staggered removals based on reused affidavits." Id. ¶¶ 12–13. She also alleges 
that the removal orders were "stale." Dkt. 4 ¶ 15. Further, Wright alleges that Defendants acted 
unlawfully and without jurisdiction because "the state circuit court entered an order 
acknowledging it no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction over the adoption and termination 
proceedings arising from these events." Dkt. 2 ¶ 15. 
 Despite recitation of these facts, Wright's requests for relief arise out of her custody 
dispute for her other four biological children. Based on a review of the record, it appears that 
Wright lost custody of four of her biological children well before October 2025.3 See Dkt. 2, 

Sealed Exh. B; Sealed Exh. C. At some point after losing custody, Wright resumed contact with 
these children, who are in the custody of their adoptive parents. See Dkt. 2, Sealed Exh. C at 7. 
DSS declined to reopen these cases and confirmed that the investigation was "compliant with 
CPS policy." Id. According to the adoptive mother's state court affidavit, attached as an exhibit 
to Wright's complaint, Wright continually contacted several of the children and reported the 
adoptive parents to DSS for abuse. Id. Child Protective Services investigated the adoptive 
parents and ultimately closed the case, concluding that there was no evidence of abuse. Id. at 8; 
Dkt. 9-1 at 2 ("the investigation was determined to be compliant with CPS policy . . .. VDSS will 
not be reopening or reviewing the full history of the foster care and adoption cases involving 

your children"). Wright also posted on social media about the children, continually informed 
them that she was coming to get them, and revealed to one child that he was adopted. Dkt. 2, 
Sealed Exh. C at 7–8. Wright also apparently threatened her biological children's adoptive 
parents. Id. at 7. 
 Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court issued preliminary child 
protective orders on January 13, 2026, ordering Wright to refrain from contacting any of these 
four children. Dkt. 2, Sealed Exh. B. Wright filed a Motion to Dissolve for Lack of Subject 

3 It appears that Wright lost custody several years ago, as her nine-year-old biological child was 
apparently adopted at birth by his current adoptive parents. See Dkt. 2, Sealed Exh. C at 9. 
Matter Jurisdiction in Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on January 22, 
2026. Dkt. 13 at 3. A hearing on this motion is scheduled for March 10, 2026. Dkt. 15-1 at 4–5. 
Wright argues that, because the Roanoke City Circuit Court disclaimed jurisdiction of the child 
custody dispute, these protective orders were issued absent lawful jurisdiction and are therefore 
unconstitutional. See Dkt. 2, Sealed Exh. A. Wright also argues that the protective orders were 

retaliatory because they "followed [her] protected reporting activity, DSS's withdrawal, and the 
jurisdictional collapse." Dkt. 11, Sealed Declaration at 4. 
 On January 23, 2026, Wright filed a state habeas petition alleging unconstitutional 
restraint imposed by the protective orders. Dkt. 12-2. The Franklin County Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court Clerk's Office informed her that the petition should not have been 
placed on the docket, and her filing fee would be refunded. Dkt. 12 ¶ 6. In an additional 
declaration, Wright again alleges that DSS and the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court acted without authority and deprived her of state remedies. Dkt. 13 at 4. 
Specifically, she alleges that there are no written orders appointing a Guardian ad Litem, 

authorizing DSS participation, extending restraint, or ruling on her motion to dissolve for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 2. Wright has requested the Franklin County Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court Clerk's Office provide her ADA Title II accommodations to access the 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Docket. Id. at 4. 
 On February 10, 2026, Wright filed a notice of urgent Rule 65 motion and a motion for a 
second temporary restraining order in this Court. Dkts. 14, 15. These filings reiterate allegations 
that the preliminary protective orders were issued without an adversarial hearing, written 
findings, or adjudication of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 14 ¶ 3; Dkt. 15 ¶¶ 6–8. Specifically, 
Wright argues that ex parte appointment of a Guardian ad Litem deprives her sufficient due 
process. Dkt. 15 ¶¶ 9–10. Wright further restates that compliance with the preliminary protective 
orders is impossible because she may encounter her biological children at daily school drop off 
and pickup, and that she lacks adequate state remedies. Dkt. 14 ¶¶ 5–7; Dkt. 15 ¶¶ 27–33. Wright 
also reiterates her retaliation claim, arguing that "[t]he temporal proximity between Plaintiff's 
jurisdictional challenge, the immediate expansion of restraints, and subsequent unauthorized 

state-actor contact establishes retaliatory escalation, not lawful continuation of emergency 
authority." Dkt. 15 ¶ 23. 
 Wright also brings a new claim in the second motion for a temporary restraining order. 
She alleges that the state court violated Title II and denied her access to the courts by failing to 
provide adequate ADA accommodation. Id. ¶¶ 18–20.4 
 Also included in her second motion for temporary restraining order, Wright attached 
correspondence with the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Clerk's Office. 
Dkt. 15-1. Although Wright alleges that she has not received written notification of the 
preliminary protective orders, the Clerk's Office asserted that the orders were served on Wright 

in person on January 22, 2026. Id. at 5. The Clerk's Office provided the written order appointing 
a Guardian ad Litem, and asserted that standard procedure includes DSS involvement in child 
protective orders. Id. at 5–6, 8. The Clerk's Office also provided copies of the state court case 
docket, including the statutory basis for preliminary child protective orders. Id. at 10. 

4 Because Wright does not include allegations that the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court violated the Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in her Complaint, nor 
request relief related to that alleged violation, any claimed violation of Title II is not addressed 
by this opinion. Insofar as the Complaint is construed liberally, she fails to state a claim for relief 
because she does not identify any specific statutory violations or any Defendants personally 
involved in the alleged deprivation. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that 
a complaint fails to state a claim if it recites only "labels and conclusion" or a "formulaic 
recitation of a cause of action"). 
 To remedy these alleged constitutional violations, Wright requests that this court declare 
Defendants' actions unconstitutional, enjoin Defendants from reliance on and enforcement of the 
third-party protective orders that direct separation of Plaintiff from her children, and grant 
temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief. Dkt. 2 at 6. Wright's first motion for a 
temporary restraining order requests similar relief. Wright's second motion for a temporary 

restraining order reiterates theses requests for relief, but also asks that this Court "prohibit[] 
arrest, criminal referral, or enforcement actions absent a docketed adjudication of subject-matter 
jurisdiction." Dkt. 15 at 10. Wright does not assert a claim for monetary damages, but, in the first 
motion for a temporary restraining order, "expressly reserves all claims for compensatory 
damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 
to be pursued upon resolution of the request for injunctive relief." Dkt. 1 at 5. However, Wright's 
complaint does not request monetary damages, so her case is addressed only as seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 II. Discussion 

 As a pro se litigant, Wright's pleadings are afforded liberal construction and held to a less 
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by counsel. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 
94 (2007). Liberal construction is particularly important when pro se complaints allege civil 
rights violations. Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009). However, even a pro se filing 
"must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A pro se plaintiff still must allege facts that state a cause of action." 
Scarborough v. Frederick Cnty. Sch. Bd., 517 F. Supp. 3d 569, 575 (W.D. Va. 2021) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 Although the Court will construe pro se pleadings liberally, it remains imperative that a 
federal court establish subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of litigation. "Without jurisdiction 
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it 
ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 
dismissing the cause." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) 

(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). The Fourth Circuit recently expounded 
on this proposition, stating that "it is incumbent on a court to evaluate its jurisdiction at the 
outset, lest it inadvertently breach the ‘bounds of authorized judicial action.'" Hensley v. City of 
Charlotte, 2023 WL 1990298, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023) (quoting Steel Co., 546 U.S. at 94). 
Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that the court dismiss an action if it 
"determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3). 
 Even applying liberal construction, Wright's pleadings must be dismissed. First, the Court 
must abstain from hearing Wrights claims under the Fourth Amendment5, the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for "ongoing constitutional violations." This Court is not the 

proper forum to appeal preliminary child protective orders. This Court lacks authority to oversee 
state agencies, such as DSS, or to direct the outcome of a state child custody case. To overturn 
decisions made by a state court, Wright must seek relief through the state system. State courts, 
specifically juvenile and domestic relations courts, have jurisdiction over child custody disputes 
and the authority and necessary expertise to handle these matters. Second, insofar as Wright 
brings a cognizable claim for retaliation, it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

5 Wright appears to assert Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful seizure on behalf of 
her minor children removed from her home in October 2025. Wright is not an attorney and 
brought this action pro se. She may not, as a non-attorney parent, represent her minor children in 
federal court. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schools, 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005). In some 
instances, a parent or guardian may bring an action on behalf of a minor child as "next friend." 
 A. Abstention 
 Wright seeks to vindicate her rights to familial association, protection from unlawful 
search and seizure, and due process by requesting that this court intervene in her child custody 
dispute and enjoin enforcement of preliminary child protective orders. This court is not the 
proper forum to adjudicate these claims. Precedent, judicial economy, and respect for comity and 

state court expertise dictates that federal courts shall not intervene in purely domestic matters, 
such as child custody, divorce, and alimony decrees. Further, federal district courts do not 
exercise jurisdiction over state court proceedings. Because Wright's due process and Fourth 
Amendment claims seek to appeal state court decisions as to protective orders and custody, this 
Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims. 
 1. Domestic Relations Exception 
 As discussed above, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and "have an 
independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even when no 
party challenges it." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). Although not a constitutional 

rule, long-followed precedent establishes that federal courts lack jurisdiction to interfere in state 
court litigation involving divorce, alimony, or child custody. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 
689, 702 (1992). In child custody cases, the Supreme Court held that "[a]s to the right to the 
control and possession of this child, as it is contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in 
regard to which neither the congress of the United States nor any authority of the United States, 
has any special jurisdiction." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890). Under this "domestic 
relations exception," federal courts lack jurisdiction when the underlying cause of action is 

Wright does not allege that she retains parental rights that may enable her to bring a claim as 
"next friend," nor that her claims seek to do so. Therefore, any claims brought on behalf of her 
children, including the Fourth Amendment claim, must be dismissed. 
brought under diversity jurisdiction. Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir. 
1982). 
 The Fourth Circuit has not expressly held the domestic relations jurisdictional bar 
inapplicable in federal question cases, but it has stated as much in dicta. United States v. 
Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997); see also, Reale v. Wake County Human Services, 

480 F. App'x. 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit has cautioned courts, however, to "be 
alert to preclude what are genuinely divorce, alimony, or child custody cases and support cases 
from creeping around the barrier." Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, 
courts in the Fourth Circuit have abstained from hearing federal question cases that necessarily 
implicate duties arising under family relations law. Doe v. Mast, 741 F. Supp. 3d 409, 438 (W.D. 
Va. 2024); see also Vyas v. Sofinski, No. 7:23-CV-00075, 2023 WL 3562976, at *3 (W.D. Va. 
May 19, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-6561, 2023 WL 6058479 (4th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023). In Doe v. Doe, 
the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over a federal 
habeas claim filed to litigate custody of the plaintiff's minor son, even though the claim raised a 

federal question. 660 F.2d 101, 105–06 (4th Cir. 1981) ("in this, a purely custodial case between 
private parties . . . the federal courts do not intervene"). Where the substance of the claim 
litigates in essence divorce, alimony, or child custody, abstention is appropriate. Id. at 106. 
 Although Wright brings claims for violation of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, these claims and requests for relief seek 
to relitigate state court proceedings. Wright asks that this court "[e]njoin Defendants from relying 
upon or enforcing third-party protective orders to continue separation absent jurisdiction." Dkt. 2 
at 6.6 Courts in the Fourth Circuit have held that when the substance of litigation is to relitigate 
child custody proceedings, the district court should decline jurisdiction, even if the claim is 
raised under federal question jurisdiction. Cf. Kelser v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 
679 F.2d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that dismissal of § 1983 claims was not proper 
because "a decision now by the district court . . . would not require adjusting family status, 

establishing familial duties, or determining the breach of such duties"); see also, Johnson v. Byrd, 
No. 1:16CV1052, 2016 WL 6839410, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2016), aff'd per curiam, 693 F. 
App'x. 219 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the domestic relations exception bars jurisdiction over 
claims seeking modification of child custody decrees); Vyas, 2023 WL 3562976, at *3–4 
(holding that domestic relations abstention and the Rooker – Feldman doctrine bar litigation of 
child custody claims brought under § 1983). 
 The relief requested belies the true "core" of these claims: to relitigate state court orders 
issued by the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Despite narrow 
construction of the domestic relations exception, courts will decline to exercise jurisdiction when 

the duty at issue arises solely from family relations law. Cole, 633 F.2d at 1088. These claims, 
although couched in federal law, are based entirely on Wright's desire to appeal a state court 
decision as to child custody. Heeding the command that district courts "preclude what are 

6 Wright's claim that the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court acted without 
jurisdiction is factually frivolous. Although the Roanoke City Circuit Court held that it did not 
have jurisdiction over the child custody proceedings, the challenged protective orders were 
issued by the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. See Dkt. 1, Sealed Exhs. 
A–B. Wright has not provided evidence that the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective orders. Further, abdication of 
jurisdiction to promote the principal of finality does not render previously-entered orders void, 
but merely prevents further litigation after a final decision. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1; Nelson v. 
Middlesex Dept. of Soc. Services, 820 S.E.2d 400, 406–07 (Va. App. 2018). Insofar as Wright 
argues that orders terminating her parental rights or ordering custody arrangements are void for 
lack of jurisdiction, the argument is unavailing. 
genuinely . . . child custody cases," this Court abstains from exercising jurisdiction over Wright's 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
 2. Rooker – Feldman Abstention 
 The Rooker – Feldman doctrine also counsels that this Court abstain from litigating 
Wright's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Wright claims denial of her due process 

rights by DSS, DSS officials, Rick Boyer, Guardian ad Litem, and Franklin County Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations Court clerks. She requests declaratory and injunctive relief that would render 
the state court judgment ineffectual. Therefore, the Court must abstain. 
 The Rooker – Feldman doctrine of abstention deprives a district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction when the party who did not prevail in state court complains of injuries caused by a 
state court judgment and seeks rejection of the judgment. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
Rooker – Feldman abstention applies when "(1) the party raising the claim lost in state court; (2) 
the party's injuries were caused by the state court judgment; (3) the party's claims invite the 

district court to review and reject the state court judgment; and, (4) the state court judgment was 
rendered before . . . federal proceedings commenced." Marshall v. Marshall, 523 F. Supp. 3d 
802, 831 (E.D. Va. 2021) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 
284 (2005)). The jurisdictional bar may apply even if a plaintiff frames her claim under § 1983. 
See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Singer, 
No. 4:13CV7, 2014 WL 12598862, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2014) ("a plaintiff may not ‘seek 
reversal of a state court judgment simply by recasting his complaint in the form of a civil rights 
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" (internal citations omitted)). To preserve the Supreme 
Court's exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the validity of state court judgments, the Rooker – 
Feldman doctrine prevents a losing party "from seeking what in substance would be appellate 
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim 
that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Skillings v. Knott, 251 F. Supp. 
3d 998, 1003 (E.D. Va. 2017) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 287). 
 Rooker – Feldman abstention extends to ancillary issues that are "inextricably 

intertwined" with the state court issue. An issue is "inextricably intertwined" if the relief sought 
requires a federal court to "determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or 
must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual." Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202 (quoting 
Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997)). When the plaintiff seeks to 
overturn the result of a state court proceeding, the nature of that complaint is an appeal from the 
state court judgment. Leonard v. Suthard, 927 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1991); see Stratton v. 
Mecklenburg Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 521 F. App'x. 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the Rooker – Feldman doctrine barred adjudication of Plaintiff's claims because "it is clear that 
any due process claim is a mere pretext for the real focus of the Complaint, which challenges the 

validity of records and proceedings of the North Carolina Courts that resulted in termination of 
the Strattons' parental rights"). 
 Courts in the Fourth Circuit have held that the Rooker – Feldman doctrine prevents 
federal courts from assessing the merits of a protective order. Bey ex rel. Graves-Bey v. Jacobs, 
No. 3:14-CV-511, 2014 WL 3871348, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2014); cf. Marshall, 523 F. Supp. 
3d at 834 (holding that while a federal court should abstain from appeals of preliminary child 
protective orders under Rooker – Feldman, the abstention doctrine does not apply to non-final 
eviction orders issued by state magistrate judges). 
 Wright's only specific prayer for relief directly requests that this court overturn or 
otherwise enjoin the protective orders issued by the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court. She asks that this court "declare Defendants' conduct unconstitutional" and 
"enjoin Defendants from relying upon or enforcing third-party protective orders." Dkt. 2 at 6. 
 This request for relief falls squarely within the Rooker – Feldman doctrine. First, Wright 

lost in state court given that the court entered protective orders against her. Second, she claims 
injuries caused by the state court protective orders, as Wright alleges that she "suffers ongoing 
irreparable harm including deprivation of familial association and chilling of constitutional 
rights." Dkt. 2 ¶ 28. Third, Wright directly requests that this Court reject the state court 
judgment, as she asks that the protective order and officials' conduct be declared 
unconstitutional, and that this Court halt enforcement of the protective order. Id. at 6. The request 
to halt the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court proceedings by enjoining 
DSS, Rick Boyer (Guardian ad Litem), and the court clerks necessarily asks that this Court 
declare that the state court protective orders were wrongly issued. See Johnson, 2016 WL 

6839410 at *7 (holding that plaintiff's request that the Court enjoin a state court's allegedly 
unconstitutional proceedings in child custody cases was "inextricably intertwined" with the state 
court proceedings and therefore barred under Rooker – Feldman). Finally, the state court 
judgment was issued on January 13, 2026, one week before this lawsuit commenced. In 
Marshall, the Eastern District of Virginia held that preliminary child protective orders issued 
under Va. Code § 16.1-253 (the applicable statute in this case) are final orders under Rooker – 
Feldman. 523 F. Supp. 3d at 833–34. As this case falls squarely within the Rooker – Feldman 
doctrine, the Court abstains from exercising jurisdiction. 
 Even construing Wright's due process claims broadly to include factual assertions about 
unconstitutional seizure of her other children in October 2025, the Rooker – Feldman doctrine 
counsels that abstention is appropriate. Wright claims that removal of the minor children in her 
custody before October 2025 was unconstitutional, as the children "were seized during the early 
morning hours without a warrant, without exigent circumstances, and without contemporaneous 

judicial authorization" and "[r]emoval paperwork was completed hours after the seizure, service 
fields were left blank, and no 72-hour hearing was held." Dkt. 2 ¶¶ 10–11. She also alleges that 
her runaway child was removed without a removal order. Id. ¶ 14. These claims are inextricably 
intertwined with her state court proceedings. See Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202. The Roanoke City 
Circuit Court issued an Order declining to reopen Wright's child custody proceedings.7 Dkt. 2, 
Sealed Exh. 3. By requesting that this court "[d]eclare Defendants' actions unconstitutional," 
Wright seeks to appeal this denial. Courts in this district have refused to hear custody removal 
appeals. See Smolinski v. Hamlett, No. 4:22-CV-16, 2022 WL 822108, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 17, 
2022); Bell v. McGowan, No. 3:16CV00050, 2016 WL 4275847, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2016). 

Therefore, even construing Wright's complaint broadly to include a claim for denial of due 
process in the removal of her minor children, this Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction 
under the Rooker – Feldman doctrine. 
 B. Failure to State a Claim 
 Construing Wright's pleadings liberally, she alleges a claim for retaliation separate from 
the merits of her state court case. Specifically, Wright alleges "Defendants retaliated against 
Plaintiff for mandated reporting and federal litigation by continuing separation through proxy 

7 It is not entirely clear what child custody proceedings are governed by this Order. However, the 
Order lists seven case numbers, which appear to correspond to custody proceedings for each of 
Wright's seven children. Dkt. 2, Sealed Exh. C. 
enforcement." Dkt. 2 ¶ 26. Although the Court need not abstain from hearing this action, it must 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Wright fails to state personal involvement by a 
person subject to liability under § 1983. 
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss a case filed in forma 
pauperis if "at any time [ ] the court determines that ... the action or appeal: (i) is frivolous or 

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief." An action is frivolous "where it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or in fact." Netizke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 925 (1989). A claim 
lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" and 
lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Guynup v. 
Cullen, 2022 WL 3359367, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2022) (quoting Netizke, 490 U.S. at 327–
28). 
 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both (1) "the violation of a right 
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" and (2) "that the alleged deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 
634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). 
 Wright claims her children's adoptive parents sought protective orders in retaliation for 
her mandated abuse reports and federal civil rights litigation. Dkt. 1 at 4; see also Dkt. 2 ¶ 22–23 
("Plaintiff engaged in protected activity . . . Defendants' coordination and enforcement of third-
party protective orders . . . constitutes retaliation that would chill a person of ordinary firmness"); 
Dkt. 3 at 2 ("The immediate pivot to proxy enforcement after jurisdiction terminated would chill 
a person of ordinary firmness from reporting abuse"); Dkt. 10 at 6–7 ("The temporal proximity 
between the jurisdictional collapse and the civil filings supports Plaintiff's retaliation claim"). 
Although she alleges that other defendants relied upon or enforced those protective orders, she 
fails to explain how such reliance and enforcement is retaliatory. Bare allegations are insufficient 
to state a claim. See Scarborough, 517 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
 Wright argues that the protective orders are "state action by proxy" used as a 
"jurisdictional hook to accomplish continued separation after losing lawful authority" and 

therefore "constitutes state action under color of law." Dkt. 2 ¶¶ 19–21. A private party acts 
under color of law only when he is a "willful participant[] in joint activity with state officials." 
Worthington v. Rose Palmer, Esq., No. 3:15CV410, 2015 WL 7571822, *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 
2015) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). Importantly, "private 
misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the state." Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). However, the "procedural scheme" created 
by the statute is a product of state action. Id. 
 Wright's retaliation claim fails to state a claim. First, the adoptive parents are not named 
defendants in this action, and Wright does not provide any facts to suggest that any named 

defendants acted "in concert" with them. Second, even assuming the adoptive parents sought 
protective orders in retaliation for Wright's reporting activities, they did not act under color of 
law. Although the "procedural scheme" of the statute is a product of state action, Wright 
challenges the scheme only to allege that the relevant Courts acted without jurisdiction. As 
discussed above, this allegation is meritless. Therefore, because Wright neither identifies any 
named defendant who retaliated against her, nor any person acting under color of law who took 
retaliatory action, her retaliation claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
 III. Conclusion 
 Wright seeks to vindicate important interests: due process, protection of familial 
association, and freedom from unlawful seizure. This Court appreciates her commitment to 
reuniting with her children. However, to appeal child custody and domestic relations orders 
issued by the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and Roanoke City Circuit 
Court, Wright must litigate in those courts. Further, insofar as Wright states a claim for 

retaliation unconnected with the child custody dispute, she fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. This Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction, so Wright's Fourteenth 
Amendment due process and Fourth Amendment claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 
Because Wright's First Amendment retaliation claim fails to state a claim for relief, this claim is 
DISMISSED without prejudice. Wright's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 7) is 
GRANTED. Wright's motions for temporary restraining order (Dkts. 1, 15) are DENIED as 
moot. 
 An appropriate Order shall follow. 
 It is so ORDERED. 

 Entered: February 26, 2026 

 Robert S. Ballou 
 Robert S. Ballou 
 United States District Judge