CourtListener opinion 11291534

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
 COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

 14-1282

REGINA BETH ANN GILLEY AST

VERSUS

DAVID LEE AST, JR.

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 APPEAL FROM THE
 ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 60,398
 HONORABLE STEPHEN BRUCE BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

 **********

 JOHN E. CONERY
 JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell,
and John E. Conery, Judges.

 AFFIRMED.

William D. Dyess
The Dyess Law Firm
870 West Main Street
Many, Louisiana 71449-0420
(318) 256-5667
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
 David Lee Ast, Jr.
 David C. Hesser
Hesser & Flynn, A Limited Liability Partnership
2820 Jackson Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 542-4102
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
 Regina Beth Ann Gilley
 CONERY, Judge.

 This appeal involves issues based on a community property judgment

rendered pursuant to a stipulation between former husband and wife as to

allocation of the husband's military benefits. The appellant argues that the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to partition military disability benefits as

part of the community. The appellant/husband further contends that the stipulation

between the parties read on the record and the subsequent judgment rendered are

inconsistent such that the judgment should be corrected to reflect the true intent of

the parties as reflected in the stipulation. The trial judge held that the court had

jurisdiction to enforce its ruling based on the husband's personal appearance and

the judgment signed by the husband's attorney. The trial court ruled that the

change sought in the wording of the judgment was a substantial change and could

not be corrected after it had become final. For the following reasons, we affirm.

 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 David Ast sued Regina Gilley for a divorce in Sabine Parish, and a judgment

of divorce was signed on August 18, 2008. On November 12, 2008, Ms. Gilley

filed a motion claiming entitlement to an alleged forty-nine percent community

interest in Mr. Ast's military retirement under the Sims formula as part of the

community of acquets and gains.1 At a hearing on February 5, 2009, a stipulation

of the parties was read into the record providing that Ms. Gilley would receive a

forty-nine percent interest in Mr. Ast's military retirement benefits. A final

judgment was signed on March 24, 2009, after having been approved as to form

 1
 In Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978), the supreme court established a formula to be
used in calculating community interests in retirement plan benefits which had not yet matured at
the time of the community partition.
 and content and signed by counsel for Mr. Ast. No motion for new trial or appeal

was filed by Mr. Ast, and the judgment became final in June 2009.

 Over three years later, in January 2013, Ms. Gilley filed a rule for contempt,

rule to enforce judgment, and a motion to appoint a curator for absentee defendant

against Mr. Ast, who was living out of state. Ms. Gilley sought to enforce the

February 2009 judgment against Mr. Ast, claiming that he failed to pay Ms. Gilley

her forty-nine percent interest in his military benefits or its equivalent. Mr. Ast

appeared through counsel and responded by filing a peremptory exception of no

cause of action, a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and a

rule for partition of property. Mr. Ast claimed that he had suffered a second heart

attack in 2010 and was then declared 100% disabled by the United States

Department of Veterans Affairs. Mr. Ast further claimed that since 2010, he had

been receiving Combat Related Special Compensation (CRSC) military benefits

due to his disability status, instead of his military retirement. Mr. Ast asserted that

because he was declared 100% disabled and was no longer receiving military

retirement, but CRSC instead, his military benefits were no longer classified as

community property and could not be partitioned.2 Thus, Mr. Ast asserted that the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to divide his military benefits and

could not enforce the February 2009 judgment. After a contradictory hearing the

trial court denied Mr. Ast's exceptions for written reasons assigned.

 2
 Judge Beaseley noted in a footnote in his written reasons that:

 Mr. Ast describes, in the subjective voice, that his military retirement
 benefits were converted to disability benefits, suggesting it was by unilateral
 action by the government. The law concerning waiver of military retired pay in
 exchange for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation
 allows a retiree to elect an amount of tax-free disability compensation only if he
 gives up the same amount of retired pay. 38 U.S.C. 5304-5305. As the US Code
 defines this as waiver, it is an election expressly chosen by the veteran.

 2
 Mr. Ast then filed a motion for a new trial based on his contention that the

stipulation of the parties read on the record in February 2009 did not provide that

Ms. Gilley would receive military disability benefits. Mr. Ast asserted that the

judgment and the record were not consistent and thus, the judgment should be

amended to reflect the stipulation of the parties. After another contradictory

hearing, the trial court again denied Mr. Ast's motion and ruled in favor of Ms.

Gilley. Mr. Ast now timely appeals, the judgment rendered pursuant to that ruling

signed on September 17, 2014, asserting two assignments of error. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

 On appeal, Mr. Ast asserts the following as error:

 I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
 TO DIVIDE UNITED STATES MILITARY DISABILITY BENEFITS
 IN THE 2009 COMMUNITY PROPERTY JUDGMENT AND
 THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT AS IT RELATES TO MILITARY
 DISABILITY BENEFITS IS NULL AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED.

 II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AMENDING THE FEBRUARY
 5, 2009 JUDGMENT TO CORRECTLY RECITE THE TERMS AND
 CONDITION[S] OF THE STIPULATION READ ONTO THE
 RECORD ON FEBRUARY 5, 2009, BECAUSE THE STIPULATION
 READ ONTO THE RECORD CONSTITUTES A BINDING
 COMPROMISE UNDER [La.Civ.Code. art. 3071].

 DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error One

 JURISDICTION

 David Ast filed suit in Sabine Parish seeking a divorce from his wife, Regina

Gilley. The court granted the divorce on August 18, 2008. Ms. Gilley then asked

that Mr. Ast's military retirement pay be declared community property, and that

she be declared to be entitled to one-half of that military retirement pay based on

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 their years living together. The court ruled in favor of Ms. Gilley and signed a

judgment on March 24, 2009. The judgment was approved as to form and content

and signed by the attorney for both parties. Mr. Ast failed to file a motion for new

trial or appeal and the judgment became final. Ms. Gilley, in turn, began receiving

one-half of Mr. Ast's retirement benefits.

 As previously stated, Mr. Ast later had a heart attack and converted his

retirement pay to disability benefits (CRSC) under federal law, 10 U.S.C. §

1413a(g). Under that statute, such benefits are not classified as military retirement

pay, but as disability payments that would not have been considered to be

community property had he been receiving those benefits at the time of the

judgment.

 Mr. Ast, however, was receiving military retirement benefits and he had

already stipulated and agreed to provide Ms. Gilley with one-half of his retirement

benefits or its disability equivalent in the judgment. The trial court had personal

jurisdiction over Mr. Ast, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 6, and ordered him in a

final judgment to pay one-half of the amount received to Ms. Gilley, whether

termed retirement or disability. We approve of the trial judge's reasons on this

issue and quote with approval:

 Given this testimony, Mr. Ast knew that:

 1. The subject judgment declared Ms. Gilley's ownership in his
 military retirement benefits and its later incarnation to Combat
 Related Special Compensation (CRSC) and Veterans'
 Administration (VA) Disability,

 2. Ms. Gilley received only the amount of her share of Mr. Ast's
 pre-conversion military benefits,

 3. The U.S. government stopped paying Ms. Gilley any of his
 benefits after said conversion,

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 4. Mr. Ast was receiving 100% of the Combat Related Special
 Compensation (CRSC) and Veterans' Administration (VA)
 Disability funds due him by the U.S. government as a direct
 result of his efforts to convert his military retirement benefits to
 said disability payments,

 5. Ms. Gilley was no longer receiving or expected to receive any
 funds remotely related to Mr. Ast's military service after said
 conversion.

 Notwithstanding Ms. Gilley's undeniable forty-nine percent
 (49%) ownership of his later-converted retirement pay, as ordered by
 this court, Mr. Ast was determined not to pay it knowing he was not
 receiving one hundred percent (100%) of the disability payments. In
 the four years since the conversion, Mr. Ast failed to redirect any part
 of Ms. Gilley's share of those monthly payments with the clear
 understanding that it was in contravention to the subject judgment.
 The court finds Mr. Ast's explanation for non-payment, because he
 assumed he [had] no further obligation to do so, is dubious at best. He
 clearly placed his own assumption above the rule of law as well as his
 own assessment of the law as he perceived it to be. Further, his
 silence and inaction since 2009, and then only when prompted by Ms.
 Gilley's contempt proceeding, bespeaks he had no intention to honor
 the subject judgment. There is no justification for his willful and
 silent withholding of Ms. Gilley's ownership in his monthly disability
 payments and as such, he is in constructive contempt of court within
 the meaning of La.Code Civ.P. art. 224.

 Additionally, this court put its imprimatur on the subject
 consent judgment at the bequest of the parties in their pursuit to
 resolve their dispute. Mr. Ast unilaterally disregarded that imprimatur
 and quietly rationalized it as error while he sat comfortably nestled
 over 1,100 miles away from this court. Such smugness falls within
 the ambit of prohibited acts of La.Code Civ.P. art. 221.

 As explained at length in this court's order of April 24, 2014,
 notwithstanding the federal pre-emption of military disability
 payments under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B), under La.R.S. 9:2801.1,
 Ms. Gilley is entitled to be compensated for any loss she suffers
 created by such military retirement benefit conversion.

 We agree with the trial court, but note that the trial judge could not have

directly applied La.R.S. 9:2801.1, which states:

 When federal law or the provisions of a statutory pension or
 retirement plan, state or federal, preempt or preclude community
 classification of property that would have been classified as
 community property under the principles of the Civil Code, the spouse

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 of the person entitled to such property shall be allocated or assigned
 the ownership of community property equal in value to such property
 prior to the division of the rest of the community property.
 Nevertheless, if such property consists of a spouse's right to receive
 social security benefits or the benefits themselves, then the court in its
 discretion may allocate or assign other community property equal in
 value to the other spouse.

 The cases interpreting La.R.S. 9:2801.1 have only dealt with the portion of

the statute referencing social security benefits. Social security benefits cannot be

classified as community property by federal preemption. In cases which involve

the allocation of social security benefits, the statute grants the trial court the

discretion to decide whether or not to award additional community assets.

 In Comeaux v. Comeaux, 08-1330 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09), 7 So. 3d 110, the

trial court choose to exercise its discretion and allocate additional community

assets based on social security benefits not classified as community assets under

federal law. In Williams v. Williams, 12-732 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/12), 104 So.3d

760, the trial court chose not to exercise its discretion under the statute. Both cases

were affirmed on appeal. This court based its affirmation of both cases on the

discretion granted to the trial court in the second portion of La.R.S. 9:2801.1,

applicable only to social security benefits.

 This case involves a military retirement benefit, now converted into a 100%

military disability benefit, which would have been subject to a federal preemption

had the disability benefit been in effect at the time of the initial trial court judgment

on March 24, 2009. The trial court was subject to the mandatory "shall" language

of La.R.S. 9:2801.1 at the last hearing held on June 20, 2014 requiring that it shall

allocate or assign, "the ownership of the community property equal in value," to

the pension or plan, prior to the division of the total community.

 6
 But, because the community had already been resolved in March 2009, there

were no longer any assets that the district court could have allocated to Ms. Gilley

pursuant to the statute. The deposition testimony of Ms. Gilley introduced at the

hearing indicated there was nothing left to divide. Therefore, we find that the

district court was legally correct in enforcing the final judgment, which provided

that if military retirement benefits were converted to military disability benefits,

that those benefits should be allocated one-half to Ms. Gilley.

 On appeal, Mr. Ast further cites Brouillette v. Brouillette, 10-357 (La.App. 3

Cir. 11/24/10), 51 So.3d 898, and continues to argue the proposition that "it is clear

under Louisiana jurisprudence that recipients of military disability benefits own the

sole interest in those benefits." Id. at 901. While that holding may still be valid

under some circumstances, here Mr. Ast voluntarily agreed to do otherwise in a

final judgment. In Poullard v. Poullard, 00-1121 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 780

So.2d 498, writ denied, 01-569 (La. 4/20/01), 790 So.2d 641, this court held,

"Nothing in either the state or federal law prevents a person from agreeing to give

a part of his disability benefit to another." Id. at 500. We affirm the trial judge on

this issue and find that Mr. Ast's first assignment of error has no merit.

Assignment of Error Two

 In his second assignment of error, Mr. Ast alleges that the stipulation

between the parties that was read into the record differs from that of the actual

judgment. Thus, Mr. Ast contends that the trial court erred in not "reforming" or

"amending" the judgment to reflect the intent of the parties expressed in the

stipulation. The stipulation can be found in the record, as follows:

 The Court: It's my understanding y'all reached an agreement in the
 matter. Who would like to recite it?

 7
 Ms. Nelson: Your Honor, I can. Just for the record, we have an
 agreement in this matter and we're going to recognize Ms. Gilley's
 interest in and to his military retirement and I believe that percentage
 is forty-nine percent based on the years of service. We put all that
 language in the judgment the military requires. In addition, although it
 was not at issue today, Ms. Gilley has a retirement of her own. It's an
 NAF retirement and we believe that his interest in the retirement
 would have accrued from December of 2001 till August of 2008.
 Clearly, he's entitled to fifty percent of the accrued value of that.
 We're going to contact them and get the value and I'm going to
 prepare a QDRO that we will take care of all that. And I believe this
 will fully satisfy the community between these parties.

The judgment, however, reads in pertinent part:

 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court does
 recognize that REGINA GILLEY, is entitled to a FORTY-NINE
 PERCENT (49%) share in DAVID LEE AST, JR.'s Military
 Retirement Benefits or equivalent and/or offset retirement pay
 beginning February 5, 2009, including cost of living expenses, CRSC
 or CRDP, or any other retirement system in which his military service
 was a significant part of the retirement.

 Mr. Ast is correct in noting that the stipulation between the parties did not

include the wording, "or equivalent and/or offset retirement pay beginning

February 5, 2009, including cost of living expenses, CRSC or CRDP, or any other

retirement system in which his military service was a significant part of the

retirement." He then argues that the judgment signed by the trial court did not

reflect the intent of the parties expressed in the stipulation and must now be

amended or changed, even though final. He cites La.Code. Civ.P. art. 1951, which

provides:

 On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be
 amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not
 its substance, or to correct errors of calculation. The judgment may be
 amended only after a hearing with notice to all parties, except that a
 hearing is not required if all parties consent or if the court or the party
 submitting the amended judgment certifies that it was provided to all
 parties at least five days before the amendment and that no opposition
 has been received.

 8
 It is well settled that a final judgment may be amended only when the

amended part takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. See

Tunstall v. Stierwald, 01-1765 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 916; Sanderford v. Mason,

12-1881 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/13), 135 So.3d 745; Thompson v. Falgout, 09-1026

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/10), 33 So.3d 410. Thus, the trial courts do not have the

authority to substantively amend a judgment. See also Krieg v. Krieg Bros.

Terrazzo Co., Inc., 93-1065 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/28/94), 645 So.2d 661, writ denied,

95-0152 (La. 3/30/95), 651 So.2d 837.

 Pursuant to Reon v. Reon, 07-1277 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08), 982 So.2d 210,

open court recitations, by which the parties in divorce proceedings agree to

stipulations offered by their respective attorneys, constitute a binding compromise

or agreement on the partition of their community property under La.Civ.Code art.

3071. Citing Reon, Mr. Ast argues that any portion of the judgment that does not

reflect the intent of the parties does "not constitute part of the agreement between

[the parties] and must be removed to reflect the parties' intent." Reon, 982 So.2d at

212.

 In Reon, the parties orally stipulated in open court as to the partition of their

community property. The judgment, however, contained provisions not contained

in the transcript of the stipulation between the parties. A panel of this court

concluded that the judgment did not accurately reflect the intent of the parties, and

thus, the conflicting language had to be removed. The court affirmed the judgment

of the trial court, but vacated six paragraphs that did not constitute the intent of the

parties.

 However, in Reon, after noticing that the judgment did not conform to the

stipulation, Ms. Reon timely filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. She

 9
 then filed a timely appeal. In this case, the judgment was signed and approved by

the attorney for David Ast on March 24, 2009. The judgment became final in June

2009, as no motion for new trial was filed and no appeal lodged. Over one year

following Mrs. Ast's rule for contempt filed on January 28, 2013, Mr. Ast finally

filed an exception to the trial court's jurisdiction and peremptory exception of lack

of jurisdiction as to the issue of division of military disability pay on March 27,

2014. He did not file his motion for new trial or motion to amend judgment based

on his motion to "change the phraseology" of the judgment until May 1, 2014,

some five years after the judgment became final.

 Again, Judge Beaseley thoughtfully considered Mr. Ast's argument and

held:

 The subject judgment is final pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841 as
 it settled all issues of the subject dispute, post-divorce partition of
 each party's retirement, pursuant to the specific rule to show cause
 filed November 13, 2008, entitled "Petition for Recognition of
 Military Retirement Benefits." To strike the offending language as
 Mr. Ast requests would be a change of substance rather than
 correction of phraseology or typology. Such an amendment would
 wholly eliminate as well as terminate Ms. Gilley's share in Mr. Ast's
 retirement benefits as described therein because Mr. Ast converted his
 military retirement benefits, without warning or notice to Ms. Gilley,
 to CRSC (Combat Related Special Compensation), a disability based
 form of payment that is federally pre-empted from state community
 property adjudication. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) The kind of
 amendment allowed by Art.1951 is one that "takes nothing from or
 adds nothing to the original judgment." Villaume v. Villaume, 363
 So.2d 448[, 450] (La.1978); [see also] Thomas v. Williams, [48,003
 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 115 So.3d 715]. It is undoubtedly clear that
 to amend the judgment as requested would render the judgment
 henceforth meaningless, e.g., establishing Ms. Gilley's rightful
 ownership in all retirement benefits of Mr. Ast she earned during their
 twenty-three year marriage. Since this change would be substantive,
 Mr. Ast was confined to two options: (1) to timely file for appeal or
 (2) timely file for a new trial. The record shows he did neither.

 ....

 10
 Here, the subject judgment Mr. Ast seeks to be "reformed" was
 signed and made an order of court on March 24, 2009. Further, it was
 approved as to form and content by all counsel at the time. Mr. Ast
 had until April 2, 2009, to move for a new trial, until May 2, 2009, to
 move for suspensive appeal, and until June 2, 2009, to move for
 devolutive appeal. La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1974, 2123, 2087. The court
 notes that Mr. Ast had seventy days—from March 24 to June 1—in
 which to read the subject consent judgment and utilize the slowly
 evaporating procedural remedies available to him. In addition, any
 fault rests solely with Mr. Ast for not only failing to read the judgment
 and jump into action, but also for allowing his attorney to sign it in
 approval as to form and content before it was submitted to the court
 for signature. Given the years of silence and Mr. Ast's approval via
 his counsel's signature, the court is at a loss to discern a more
 presumptively accurate consent judgment. As found in Crawford
 [49,059 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So.3d 1113], this court is
 similarly without authority to supply procedural steps that Mr. Ast
 failed to take.

We again agree with the trial judge's well-reasoned decision.

 DISPOSITION

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all

respects. The costs of this appeal are assessed to David Ast.

 AFFIRMED.

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