CourtListener opinion 11295372

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
 COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

 22-741

NOEL W. YATES

VERSUS

LISA J. YATES

 **********

 APPEAL FROM THE
 THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 98,623
 HONORABLE C. ANTHONY EAVES, DISTRICT JUDGE

 **********

 SHANNON J. GREMILLION
 JUDGE

 **********

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Van H. Kyzar, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

 AFFIRMED IN PART AS AMENDED;
 REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
 Elvin C. Fontenot, Jr.
Attorney at Law
110 East Texas Street
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-2684
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
 Noel W. Yates

E. Grey Burnes Talley
Talley & Talley LLP
711 Washington Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 442-5231
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
 Lisa J. Yates
 GREMILLION, Judge.

 Lisa J. Yates appeals the trial court's judgment that partitioned the

community property existing between her and her former spouse, Noel W. Yates.

For the following reasons, we affirm in part as amended, reverse in part, and

remand with instructions.

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Lisa and Noel married in June 1989, and separated in early July 2019. Noel

filed a Petition for Divorce Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 102 on February 27, 2020.

On February 24, 2021, Noel filed a "Rule to Show Cause for Separation of

Property Pursuant to La. Civ. C. Art. 2374(C)." On that same day, he filed a

second supplemental and amending petition seeking the eviction of Lisa from the

family home and granting him exclusive use if he was appointed domiciliary

parent. Alternatively, Noel sought "reimbursement from defendant for the rental

value associated with defendant's exclusive use and occupancy of the residence."

 On April 19, 2021, Noel filed a motion for judgment of final divorce and

fault hearing. Following a May 20, 2021 hearing, the trial court granted a

Judgment of Divorce that was signed on June 23, 2021. The Judgment of Divorce

terminated the community property regime retroactive to February 27, 2020. The

judgment ordered that all other orders would be unaffected, and Noel was to

continue paying the monthly amount for "household expenses and maintenance."

Following a May 25, 2021 hearing, a judgment rendered on July 14, 2021, awarded

Lisa use of the former matrimonial home and "interim spousal support in the

amount of $900.00, per month, beginning March 17, 2020, which shall terminate

on May 31, 2021." It denied Lisa's request for permanent periodic support and

deferred Noel's request for rental reimbursement to the partition of the community

property along with both parties' requests for attorney fees.
 Noel filed a Petition for Judicial Partition of Community Property on August

3, 2021. He filed his first sworn detailed descriptive list on September 14, 2021.1

Lisa filed her first sworn detailed descriptive list on November 10, 2021. Noel

filed a motion for a court-appointed appraiser on December 17, 2021. On January

24, 2022, Noel filed an amended sworn detailed descriptive list of community

property.2 On February 24, 2022, the trial court signed an order ordering Lisa and

Noel each to pay one-half of the $500.00 for the appraisal prepared by Charest

Thibodeaux. Lisa filed her traversal on March 31, 2022. Noel filed an amended

sworn detailed descriptive list of community property on May 17, 2022. 3 A

 1
 Noel's claims for reimbursement were:
 1. Home insurance premiums Included in the mortgage
 2. Property taxes on home 1748.00
 3. 2019 Federal and state income taxes 820.00
 4. Deposit made to joint bank account since separation $36,277.00
 5. Health, vision and dental insurance $12,920.08
 6. Rental Reimbursement $13,500.00
 Total Payments by Noel W. Yates $65,265.08
 2. LESS: One-half $32,632.54
 TOTAL CLAIM FOR REIMBURSEMENT $32,632.54
 2
 Noel's claims for reimbursement were:
 1. Rental reimbursement on barn for horse stabling $TBD
 2. Home insurance premiums Included in the mortgage
 3. Property taxes on home 2607.34
 4. 2019 Federal and state income taxes 820.00
 5. Deposit made to joint bank account since separation $36,277.00
 6. Health, vision and dental insurance $12,920.08
 7. Rental reimbursement $41,400.00
 8. Personal Items destroyed by fire 2,500.00
 9. VPSO Items destroyed by fire 500.00
 10. House note to Rocket Mortgage 5,800.00
 11. Yates Estate TBD.00
 Total Payments by Noel W. Yates $101,954.08
 2. LESS: One-half $50,982.54
 TOTAL CLAIM FOR REIMBURSEMENT $50,982.54
 3
 Noel's claims for reimbursement were:
 1. Rental reimbursement on barn for horse stabling $10,200.00
 2. Home insurance premiums (Included in the mortgage) TBD.00
 3. Property taxes on home 2607.34
 4. 2019 Federal and state income taxes 820.00
 5. Deposit made to joint bank account since separation $36,277.00
 6. Health, vision and dental insurance $12,920.08
 7. Rental reimbursement $41,400.00
 8. Personal Items destroyed by fire 2,500.00
 9. VPSO Items destroyed by fire 500.00
 10. House note to Rocket Mortgage 7975.00
 2
 partition hearing was held on May 24, 2022. The trial court rendered its oral ruling

on the partition at a hearing on June 1, 2022.4 A judgment of partition was signed

on July 13, 2022.5 Lisa timely appealed.6 7 8

 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

 Lisa assigns as error:

 1. It was error for the Trial Court to find the Barksdale checking and
 savings accounts in Noel's name were his separate property.
 11. Yates Estate TBD.00
 12. Withdrawal from Northern Trust Company (separate funds of Noel to contribute to
 building of new home) $16,510.57
 Total Payments by Noel W. Yates $131,709.99
 2. LESS: One-half $65,855.00
 TOTAL CLAIM FOR REIMBURSEMENT $65,855.00
 4
 At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court stated that all objections would be
deferred to the end. At the conclusion, Lisa objected as follows:

 Okay, for the record, I need to voice an objection to the award of rental, or
 stabling fees. And, then an objection to all of the reimbursement claims of Noel
 Yates, which were not proven by anything other than his testimony. You know, if
 he just stated what it was, and didn't have a receipt or a canceled check or
 anything of that nature.
 5
 The trial court's judgment regarding Noel's reimbursements states:

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that NOEL W. YATES
shall receive the total of $158,298.82 as reimbursements, to wit:

 1. $2,030.02 for payment on children's insurance premiums;
 2. $15,500.00 for attorney fees;
 3. $250.00 for appraisal;
 4. $77.00 for transcript;
 5. $12920.08 for health and vision insurance premiums;
 6. $7,975.00 for payments to Rocket Mortgage;
 7. $41,400.00 for rental reimbursement;
 8. $2,607.34 for payment of property taxes;
 9. $39,262.38 for Yates estate; and
 10. $36,277.00 for payments into joint account.
 6
 We note that Lisa's brief exceeds the page limit and does not address the assignments of
error set forth in sections or any other cohesive manner. Instead, it is just one long document
with no headings or delineation between assignments.
 7
 We additionally note that Noel's six-page brief states: "Appellee has attempted to
coordinate the exhibits filed by parties with the testimony on the subject matters at issue;
however, the original exhibits were transferred to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal and were not
available for my review and to insure the accuracy of the exhibits correspond to specific
testimony."
 8
 According to Lisa's counsel, the judgment was prepared by Noel's counsel. Lisa's
counsel requested additional time to review the judgment because she had to attend an out-of-
state funeral, but the request was denied.
 3
 2. It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel half of Lisa's
 MidAmerica Premium retirement, while awarding Noel all of his
 Social Security retirement and Lisa all of hers.

 3. It was error for the Trial Court to find the alleged $2,000.00
 Schamerhorn bill to be a community debt without any
 corroborating/documentary or testimonial evidence whatsoever.

 4. It was error for the Trial Court to sign a Judgment which does not
 conform to its ruling.

 5. It was error for the Trial Court to grant Noel a reimbursement
 claim for payments on the children's insurance premiums.

 6. It was error for the Trial Court to grant Noel a reimbursement
 claim for $250.00 for the appraisal of the former matrimonial
 domicile, without granting Lisa the same.

 7. It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel a reimbursement
 claim of $12,920.09 for payment of health and vision insurance,
 when it was ordered as spousal support.

 8. It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel a reimbursement
 claim of $7,975.00 for payments to Rocket Mortgage when he did
 not prove he made payments in that amount.

 9. It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel a reimbursement
 claim for rental of the former matrimonial domicile.

 10. It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel a reimbursement
 claim for payment of property taxes without any documentary
 evidence (or even clear testimony) that he paid that amount of
 property taxes on the former matrimonial domicile.

 11.It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel a reimbursement
 claim for the Yates estate.

 12.It was error for the Trial Court to award Noel a reimbursement
 claim for deposits into the joint account.

 When the parties cannot agree on a partition, La.R.S. 9:2801 sets forth the

procedure a trial court must follow when partitioning the former spouses' property:

 A. When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of
 community property or on the settlement of the claims between the
 spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-
 ownership of former community property following termination of the
 matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that
 would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon
 termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a
 proceeding, which shall be conducted in accordance with the
 following rules:
 4
 ....

 (4) The court shall then partition the community in
accordance with the following rules:

 (a) The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the
merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the
parties.

 (b) The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities
so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.

 (c) The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses
all of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and
liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or
unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The
court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the
economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that
the court deems relevant. As between the spouses, the allocation of a
liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability.
The allocation in no way affects the rights of creditors.

 (d) In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities
results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment
of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or
unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct.
The court may order the execution of notes, mortgages, or other
documents as it deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien
on either community or separate property, movable or immovable, as
security.

 (e) In the event that the allocation of an asset, in whole or in
part, would be inequitable to a party, the court may order the parties to
draw lots for the asset or may order the private sale of the asset on
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper, including the
minimum price, the terms of sale, the execution of realtor listing
agreements, and the period of time during which the asset shall be
offered for private sale.

 (f) Only in the event that an asset cannot be allocated to a party,
assigned by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale, shall the court
order a partition thereof by licitation. The court may fix the minimum
bids and other terms and conditions upon which the property is
offered at public sale. In the event of a partition by licitation, the court
shall expressly state the reasons why the asset cannot be allocated,
assigned by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale.

 B. Those provisions of a domestic relations order or other
judgment which partitions retirement or other deferred work benefits
between former spouses shall be considered interlocutory until the
domestic relations order has been granted "qualified" status from the
 5
 plan administrator and/or until the judgment has been approved by the
 appropriate federal or state authority as being in compliance with
 applicable laws. Amendments to this interlocutory judgment to
 conform to the provisions of the plan shall be made with the consent
 of the parties or following a contradictory hearing by the court which
 granted the interlocutory judgment. The court issuing the domestic
 relations order or judgment shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over
 the subject matter and the parties until final resolution.

 Louisiana Civil Code Article 2338 defines community property:

 The community property comprises: property acquired during
 the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry
 of either spouse; property acquired with community things or with
 community and separate things, unless classified as separate property
 under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural
 and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded for loss or
 injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property
 not classified by law as separate property.

 Appellate review of a trial court's factual determinations relating to the

partition of community property is as follows:

 The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the manifest
 error/clearly wrong standard of review. David [v. David, 12-1051,
 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/10/13],117 So.3d 148, [writ denied, 131541 (La.
 10/4/13), 122 So.3d 1023]. However, the trial court is accorded
 broad discretion in resolving community property disputes.
 Williams v. Williams, 07-541 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d
 1234.

Keenan v. Keenan, 15-828 p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/16), 186 So.3d 289, 295–96,

writ denied, 16-418 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.3d 590. Legal errors are always

reviewed de novo. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). "[A]n appeal lies

from the judgment itself, not the reasons for judgment." La.Code Civ.P. art. 2083;

Bezou v. Bezou, 15-1879 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/16/16), 203 So.3d 488, writ denied, 16-

1869 (La. 12/5/16), 210 So.3d 814. "Where the trial court's reasons for judgment

are flawed, but the judgment is correct, the judgment controls. Reasons for

judgment set forth the basis for the court's holding and are not binding." Id. at 498

(citing Premier Games, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., Video Gaming

Div., 99-624 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/12/00), 761 So.2d 707).
 6
 Assignment of Error One/Community Property Checking and Savings
Accounts

 In this assignment, Lisa argues that the trial court erred in finding that the

Barksdale checking and savings accounts were Noel's separate property because

they were established during the marriage and are subject to the presumption that

they were community property, and the deposit of separate funds into the accounts

did not convert them into separate property.

 When separate and community funds are deposited into one
 bank account, this fact does not convert the entire account into
 community property. "Only when separate funds are commingled
 with community funds indiscriminately so that the separate funds
 cannot be identified or differentiated from the community funds are
 all of the funds characterized as community funds." Fulco v. Fulco,
 50,256 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 183 So.3d 573; citing Curtis v.
 Curtis, 403 So.2d 56 (La. 1981).

Bulloch v. Bulloch, 51,146, p. 24 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/18/17), 214 So.3d 930, 944,

writ denied, 17-348 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So.3d 629.

 Noel's own testimony proves that the checking and savings accounts

contained community funds before he comingled his separate funds from his

inheritance into the accounts. Noel testified the accounts were established during

the marriage and had community funds in them before he deposited inheritance

funds. Noel said (emphasis added):

 Q. Okay. So really your - - the assets in your possession, the
 [incorporeal] assets in your possession should have this $1,480.01,
 that was already in the checking account. And, it should also have the
 $3,405.26, that was already in your savings account.

 A. Correct.

 The trial court's judgment does not mention ownership of the two accounts.

But at the June 1, 2022 hearing, the following exchange occurred:

 MRS. TALLEY:

 I think that is correct, Judge. There is something that has came
 [sic] up with regard of [sic] reimbursement claims. And that is Noel
 7
 Yates has an account with Barskdale that he used checks from, and
then – but he had not listed it. So, he did give testimony about – about
the existence of that account at the time he filed his petition.

BY THE COURT:

 Right.

MRS. TALLEY:

 And, in the record there is a statement that includes the balance
on the date that he filed the petition.

BY THE COURT:

 Right.

MRS. TALLEY:

 So, you'll be awarding that to Noel Yates at whatever –
whatever the value was on November, I mean, February 27, 2020?

BY THE COURT:

 Correct, but that's going to be his separate property. I think
testimony was that was from his dad's estate, you know.

MR. FONTENOT:

 Correct.

MRS. TALLEY:

 Well, but, Judge, it did – it did have that in there, but number
one, he's made a reimbursement claim. And that's his dad's separate
property, and it went into a separate account. So, how can he make a
reimbursement claim for it, if it never touched community. And,
secondly, there was other money in there, and he testified that there
was several thousand dollars in both the checking and savings and it's
on some of the exhibits that we had.

[MR. FONTENOT]

 Well, I thought you were ruling on the case. I'm not prepared
to add or refute anything you said, because I thought all the evidence
was in. So, I don't know what Ms. Talley is referring to, but I thought
we went through all of that when we were here the other day, so –

BY THE COURT:

 8
 So, I'm going to find, just for the record, that is Mr. Yates's
 separate property. There was some testimony, "Well, did you put a
 check in there". I think was about the only thing was, and I think he
 said "yes", actually to that. But, there was never a value established
 as to what check was put in there, and how much was in there. I think
 the clear majority from the testimony, because there was evidence
 indicated that this was from this source from an Edward Jones or from
 a life insurance. I think maybe even a burial policy was put in there
 from his dad, if my memory was correct. So, of course, in the
 community debt part of it, of course, Mr. Yates is going to have to,
 and we'll get to that in a second, but while I'm off track here, might as
 well, of course, the value of the – appraised value of the home and the
 acreage there was $590,000.00[.]

 We find the trial court manifestly erred in determining that the Barksdale

checking and savings account were Noel's separate property without taking into

account the funds existing when the community was still intact. Noel clearly

testified that the funds in the account were community property prior to the deposit

of the funds he received as part of his inheritance. Noel admits same in brief:

 It is undisputed that the checking account had a balance of $1,480.00
 before the Columbia Financial Check, which were proceeds from his
 deceased father in the amount of $7,267.94, was deposited. The
 savings account already had a community funds balance of $3,405.26
 when the Edward D. Jones check, which he inherited from his father
 in the amount of $8,701.00, was deposited. Appellee has no dispute
 with the fact that those two accounts were community accounts. The
 court did rule that those accounts were Noel's separate property.
 Appellee does not believe that that is what the court intended but
 intended that the proceeds deposited in those accounts be recognized
 as being Noel's separate property. However, all of this was rectified
 by the Trial Court later on when the court recognized that the funds,
 although deposited in a community account were not so comingled
 with the community funds in that account to destroy the separate
 nature of those funds. Also, later on the court ruled that Noel Yates
 was entitled to one-half the proceeds from that money as a
 reimbursement claim when those funds were used to make
 improvements to the barn and apartment to house Noel's father before
 he died.

 Lisa does not dispute the fact that the two deposits from Noel's inheritance

were his separate property. Nevertheless, the existing community funds prior to

the two inheritance deposits were community funds that were not properly

 9
 allocated between the parties under community assets.9 Thus, Lisa is entitled to

reimbursement for one-half of the community funds existing at that time which

amounts to $2,442.63.

Assignment of Error Two/Retirement Accounts

 Lisa argues the trial court erred because it did not treat her MidAmerica

retirement account like a federal Social Security account because it is a Social

Security alternative. Lisa's argument on appeal relating to the MidAmerica

account is reprinted in its entirety (footnote omitted):

 It guarantees an interest rate. This feature shows it is a defined
 contribution retirement plan, not subject to division by Sims.

 Since this is a Social Security alternative account, it and Lisa's
 Social Security earned before her present employment should be
 treated the same. If Noel gets all of his Social Security account, Lisa
 should have received all of her Social Security and Social Security
 alternative accounts.

We note that Lisa provides no law in support of her claim that a retirement

program that is a Social Security alternative should be treated the same as a federal

Social Security account. We further find no support for this claim. In Blanchard v.

Blanchard, 96-1031 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/28/97), 697 So.2d 275, aff'd, 97-2305 (La.

1/20/99), 731 So.2d 175, the appellate court undertook an in-depth analysis of the

various means of partitioning retirement/pension plans including T.L. James & Co.,

v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La.1976) (matured defined contribution

plandetermined based on the contributions the employee made during the

community), Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978) (defined benefit plandivided

the amount of time in the plan during the community by the total number of work

years to determine a percentage earned during the community), and Hare v.

Hodges, 586 So.2d 118 (La.1991) (Sims is not exclusive means of apportioning

 9
 We note that this account remained a community account until the partition judgment
was rendered as will be discussed more fully in assignment of error twelve.
 10
 retirement benefitspresent value method can be applicable in some circumstances).

The Blanchard court noted there are many factors in determining whether to award

a present-day value of the retirement plan or a deferred interest, emphasizing the

trial court's discretion in analyzing the particular facts of the case:

 Thus, under La. R.S. 9:2801 and the variations added to the
 Sims approach by Hare, the trial court, in considering a community
 property partition involving pension rights, has the discretion to make
 an equitable determination on a case by case basis, provided that
 each spouse receives property of an equal net value, considering the
 nature and source of the asset. La. R.S. 9:2801(4)(b) & (c). In other
 words, the Sims fixed percentage formula is no longer the only
 acceptable method for apportioning pension rights between spouses.
 In the appropriate case, where the calculation of the present value of
 benefits is not too speculative, where the pension rights can be valued
 accurately and where the marital estate includes sufficient equivalent
 property to satisfy the claim of the non-employee spouse without
 undue hardship to the employee spouse, the present value method
 could be used.

Blanchard, 697 So.2d at 278–79 (emphasis added).

 The trial court did not address Social Security benefits in the judgment, nor

specifically at the partition hearing, but did state the following at the June 1, 2022

hearing: "And Social Security Retirement, each are going to be entitled to their

own Social Security[.]" It is unknown what that value is for Noel. Lisa, on the

other hand, submitted her Social Security statement into evidence which shows a

payment of $965.00 if she were to retire at age sixty-five.10 Relating to retirement

accounts, the trial court's judgment awarded Lisa:

 10
 We note that the trial court can consider the value of Social Security benefits in
apportioning community property but did not do so here. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.1
provides:

 When federal law or the provisions of a statutory pension or retirement
 plan, state or federal, preempt or preclude community classification of property
 that would have been classified as community property under the principles of the
 Civil Code, the spouse of the person entitled to such property shall be allocated or
 assigned the ownership of community property equal in value to such property
 prior to the division of the rest of the community property. Nevertheless, if such
 property consists of a spouse's right to receive social security benefits or the
 benefits themselves, then the court in its discretion may allocate or assign other
 community property equal in value to the other spouse.
 11
 "81. One-Half of MidAmerica Premier Plan Social Security
 Alternative Retirement Plan (also known as FICA alternative plan,
 defined contribution retirement plan) in the name of Lisa Yates,
 account type 31 21 [sic] 457(b)[1.];

 Lisa was also awarded the:

 77. Edward Jones I.R.A. account in the name of Noel Yates ending
 #9811 [$726.00.]

It awarded Noel:

 "3. One-Half of MidAmerica Premier [Plan] Social Security
 Alternative Retirement Plan (also known as 3121 FICA alternative
 plan, defined contribution retirement plan) in the name of Lisa Yates,
 account type 31 21 [sic] 457(b).

The trial court ordered that the retirement/pension accounts of Noel with

Schlumberger and the Vernon Parish Sheriff's Office shall be divided by Qualified

Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).

 The trial court, in an exchange with Lisa, referred to the MidAmerica plan as

a defined contribution plan after discussing the differences between defined benefit

and defined contribution plans. He noted regarding Noel's Vernon Parish

retirement plan and Lisa's MidAmerica plan, "The moneyappears [sic] from my

testimony would be about the same."

 Noel argues the MidAmerica plan is a defined contribution retirement plan,

for which the Sims formula was intended to partition the parties' interests. We

agree. Although not discussed by the trial court, one hundred percent of Lisa's

MidAmerica retirement plan was earned during the existence of the community.

Noel's Vernon Parish retirement was approximately $70,000.00 while Lisa's

MidAmerica was around $62,000.00 at the time of the partition trial. To classify

the MidAmerica account in the same way a federal Social Security account is

treated would result in an inequitable distribution of the community-earned

retirement funds. The trial court allowed each party to keep their Social Security

 12
 benefits and split the remaining retirement accounts in an equitable fashion. We

find no error in the trial court's allocation of one-half of the MidAmerica account

to each spouse. This assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Three/Community Debt

 In this assignment of error, Lisa argues the trial court erred in finding that

the community owed Chris Schamerhorn $2,000.00 "without any

corroborating/documentary or testimonial evidence whatsoever." In her brief, Lisa

states (footnote omitted):

 The Trial Court found it to be a community debt and awarded it to
 Noel. This claim should be denied.

 The Trial Court's Judgment did not assign the Schamerhorn
 debt to anyone. But undersigned counsel felt it should be addressed,
 if only as an explanation of the deviation between the ruling and the
 Judgment.

Noel's second and third Amended Sworn Detailed Descriptive List of Community

Property listed the $2,000.00 debt to Chris Schamerhorn under "Community

Property Liabilities." Noel testified: "We owe Chris Schamerhorn $2,000.00 for

work done in January - - December of 19. We've never paid him." Additionally,

the following testimony was elicited from Noel at the trial on cross-examination:

 Q. . . . . And tell me again Chris Schamerhorn, what did he do?

 A. We purchased rick [sic] for the driveway, the house and the barn.

 Q. Okay. Let me come up there so I can hear what you're saying.
 Okay you purchased –

 A. Loads of rocks –

 Q. Okay.

 A. Driveway covering for the driveway to the house and to the barn.

 Q. Okay. And when did y'all buy that?

 A. It was in late 2019.

 13
 Q. It was delivered at that time?

 A. Yes, ma'am.

 Q. Okay. And how was he paid?

 A. He wasn't.

 Q. He wasn't paid? You still owe that?

 A. Yes, ma'am.

Noel testified that Schamerhorn was owed $2,000.00 for the payment of rocks used

at the residence. Lisa was not questioned about the rock purchase. The trial court

found Noel's testimony credible regarding the debt incurred for rocks, and we

cannot say it erred as there was no testimony to suggest otherwise. In this regard,

Lisa's assignment of error is without merit. Although not mentioned in the

judgment, the trial court did orally state it was a community debt and assigned the

debt to Noel at the partition hearing 11 While we normally would not address

matters not included in the trial court's judgment, we will do so here to prevent any

further errors on remand. Accordingly, because there was no manifest error in the

trial court's finding that this was a community debt, the judgment is amended to

include the $2,000.00 community debt assigned to Noel.

Assignment of Error Four/Non-Conforming Judgment

 In this assignment, Lisa argues the trial court erred in signing a judgment

that does not conform to its ruling. Although it is difficult to discern from the brief

since Lisa did not use a traditional brief format but instead discussed the issues

under the headings of assets/liabilities/reimbursement, this assignment seems to

encompasses a number of claims spread throughout the brief. Most of these claims

are related to mathematical errors. We will address the non-reimbursement-related

 11
 The only community debts referenced in the judgment are assigned to Lisa and include
balances on a credit card and Lisa's car note.
 14
 claim (appraisal value of the home) and the mathematical-error reimbursement

claims here. One claimed error relating to reimbursement of court costs will be

addressed in the subheading below.

Matrimonial Home Appraisal Value

 Lisa claims:

 1.The trial court erred in assessing the value of the former
 matrimonial home at $590,000 because "there is no evidence in the
 Record that the value of the former matrimonial domicile (IP-1) is
 anything other than the $606,530.00 shown on the appraisal entered
 into evidence." (footnote omitted.)

 At the partition hearing, the trial court stated regarding the former

matrimonial domicile: "[I]t's been established at $590,000.00 by Mr. Charest

Thibodeaux. That's just a feedback from that there. And, so, that's going to be the

value." Likewise, the trial court's judgment established the value at $590,000.00.

 The documentary evidence in the record regarding valuation of the former

matrimonial domicile includes Noel's Sworn Detailed Descriptive List listing the

value at $590,000.00, NoelYates1, which is his preapproval letter from a credit

union with a listed purchase price of $590,000.00, and Lisa's Traversal which lists

the value at $590,000.00 in both the "his" and "her" columns. The other

documentary evidence in the record is NoelYates 12-a Comparable Market

Analysis offered by Vicki M. Perkins, a Century21 realtor, which valued the

property at $606,530.00. Perkins also offered a rental value for the home that the

trial court considered in assessing rental value. The following exchange regarding

the home valuation occurred:

 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 Judge, the – one of the exhibits that Noel offered was
 something called a comparative – comparable market analysis. It is
 different than what we were given. One of these has a rental amount
 and other [sic] doesn't. What I don't know is if the one that was
 admitted into evidence has the fair market value of the house itself.
 15
 BY THE COURT:

 It does.

 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 What does it show it to be?

 BY THE COURT:

 Pretty close to the appraisal acutally. I'm getting there. It's –
 wait the appraisal is $590,000.00 right?

 BY MR. FONTENOT:

 Yes.

 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 $590,00[0].00 is what Mr. Charest –

 BY THE COURT:

 $606,000.00

 BY MRS.TALLEY:

 $606,000.00?

 BY THE COURT:

 So, they were $16,000.00 off. Let the offering be received, the
 Rocket Mortgage.

 There is no other documentary or testimonial evidence setting the value at

$590,000.00, such as an appraisal from Thibodeaux or testimony from the

appraiser. Nevertheless, Thibodeaux did indeed conduct an appraisal since

Thibodeaux is referred to in the record several times even by Lisa. For example,

she refers in brief to the appraisal fee charged by him in assignment of error six.

Further, in her Traversal describing community property, her very first item is the

"former matrimonial domicile on land more particularly described as [,] " listing

Noel's appraisal value at $590,000.00 and her appraisal value at $590,000.00. Her

 16
 traversal comments state: "11/13/21 appraisal by George Thibodeaux[.]" Noel

was even questioned about the appraisal by Lisa's attorney:

 Alright. Now, your attorney and I had a discussion with regard to Mr.
 Thibodeaux's appraisal, because Lisa had already hired him to do the
 appraisal, and he had already done the appraisal and was paid $500.00.
 And then there was an order signed by the Judge probably not
 knowing that we had already hired him and already had it done. But,
 for him to do it and take some more pictures. We discussed whether
 we will be able to discuss this with Mr. Thibodeaux and whatever he
 says is due that the two if [sic] you will pay half of all of it. Are you
 agreeable to that?

 While it is certainly odd that the appraisal was not submitted into evidence,

we find no manifest error in the valuation of the former matrimonial domicile at

$590,000.00 based on the above. This assignment is without merit.

Lisa's Reimbursement Claim for State Farm Premium Payments (Allegation of
Mathematical Error)

 Lisa claims:

 2.The amount awarded to Lisa for her State Farm premium payments
 in the ruling was the amount of the Traversal ($8,541.00) plus
 payments for April and May (about $900.00) for a total of $9,441.00.
 The judgment only awarded $9,224.26, which was $216.74 too little.

 In the trial court's judgment, Lisa was awarded $9,224.26 in reimbursement

for State Farm insurance premiums she paid with her separate funds. At the

hearing of the court's ruling, the trial court stated Lisa would be entitled to "LR.4"

and that all of those values are going to be found by the Court, and she be

reimbursed." Exhibit LR.4 relating to the State Farm Insurance payments made by

Lisa shows a total due of $11,369.00. However, her traversal lists $8,541.00 as the

amount due through March 2022. In a footnote in her brief, Lisa states the

insurance dollar amount comes from "Traversal . . . and regular payments out of

Lisa's Capital One account (exhibit Lisa Capital One) (about $450.00 / month x 2

months, for April and May)(Emphasis added). The LR.4 exhibit lists varying

amounts ranging from $415.00 to $475.00 monthly. Lisa points to nothing in the
 17
 record setting forth with specificity the amount of the April and May awards and in

fact gives an estimate of "about $450.00 per month." Lisa cites "Exhibit Lisa

Capital One," an exhibit of bank statements from February 2020 through April

2022. The April 2022 bank statement shows two withdrawals from Lisa's account

by State Farm in the amount of $266.26 and $185.16 for a total of $451.42

($8,541.00 + $451.42 = $8,992.42). Using Lisa's estimate of $450.00 for the May

payment would result in a total reimbursement of $9,442.42. However, there is no

proof in the record of that final payment. Accordingly, we are unable to find

manifest error on the part of the trial court in awarding $9,224.26. This assignment

is without merit.

Lisa's Reimbursement Claim for Car Loan Payments (Allegation of Mathematical
Error)

 Lisa claims:

 3.The amount awarded to Lisa from her Bayou Federal loan payments
 in the ruling was the amount on the Traversal ($16,250.00) plus
 payments for April and May ($1,300.62) for a total of $17,550.62.
 The Judgment awarded Lisa $17,793.20. She received $242.58 too
 much.

 The judgment awarded Lisa $17,793.00 for payments to Bayou Federal

Credit Union for BMW payments. Lisa complains she was awarded too much.

The Traversal lists the amount as $16,250.00. Exhibit "LR.16," with payments

through April 2022, lists a total of $16,908.00. In this instance it appears her

exhibit of reimbursement was accurate though April 2022, with one more more

payment needed to be included ($16,908.00 + $650.31=$17,558.31). In her brief

in a footnote, Lisa's states her calculations as: "The Bayou Federal dollar amount

came from Traversal ($16,250.00) [. . .] and last regular payment out of Lisa's

Capital One account (Exhibit Lisa Capital One.) ($650.31 / month x 2 months for

April and May)." This calculation equals $17,550.62 ($16,250.00 plus two

 18
 payments of $650.31). Lisa does not explain the $7.69 variation from the total

reached when using Exhibit LR.16 plus one payment of $650.31 versus the

Traversal plus two more payments. We find the trial court manifestly erred in

awarding Lisa $17,793.00 in reimbursement for car loan payments. The award is

amended to $17,550.62.

Reimbursement Awarded to Lisa for the Montana Tractor

 Lisa claims:

 4.The Judgment granted a reimbursement claim of $4,500.00 for the
 Montana tractor. Undersigned counsel has no idea where that award
 came from. It should be reversed.

 In this assignment, Lisa argues she was erroneously awarded $4,500.00 in

reimbursement for a tractor. We disagree. The Montana tractor was discussed at

trial and in the descriptive lists and the Traversal. Noel's Detailed Descriptive List

assigns a value of the Montana tractor at $8,000.00. Lisa's Traversal assigns a

value of the Montana tractor at "10-14,000." Noel testified "the Montana tractor is

in my position [sic] now. It was allowed me [sic] by the court in May of 21. I paid,

financed $10,000.00 brand new for it in like 2006, 2007. I would like to have that

back." Noel testified the Montana tractor was community property. Lisa asked,

"What's the deal on the tractor?" The trial court replied: "Nothing, I got confused.

It's community property and I established the value at $9,000.00. I was wanting to

make sure I didn't make a mistake." The tractor was allocated to Noel.

 The trial court determined the value of this tractor as follows: "He did –I

established—you [Noel's attorney] said it was $8,000.00 in your Detail

Descriptive List, and Ms. Yates provided a range on her's, [sic] and I established

the value at $9,000.[00]." The trial court's judgment assigned the Montana tractor

to Noel and assigned Lisa a $4,500.00 reimbursement claim for the Montana

tractor. We are perplexed as to why Lisa would claim this as an assignment of
 19
 error, and we find no manifest error in the trial court's award of $4,500.00 in

reimbursement to Lisa. This assignment is without merit.

Lisa's Reimbursement for Credit Card Payments (Allegation of Mathematical
Error)

 Lisa claims:

 5.The Judgment granted Lisa a reimbursement of "$13,000.00 for her
 payments to Barksdale Federal Credit Union credit card account
 ending 0509." This was Lisa's reimbursement claim L – R.15 for
 $8,376.00 (the balance on the account at termination.) It was denied.

 The trial court's exact language at the June 1, 2022 hearing relating to items

Lisa would be reimbursed for:

 She's going to be entitled to LR.1, LR.3., LR.4., LR.5., 6., 7., 8., 9.,
 all established in her column and all those values are going to be
 found by the Court, and she be reimbursed. LR.10., 11., 12., 13., 14.,
 15., 16., 17. and 18. 18. Is $4,057.00 though, and I'm going to allow
 those reimbursement claims there. But, Ms. Yates, especially on the
 credit card, it's going to be her responsibility for that debt.

There was a lot of testimony about the community credit card that Lisa continued

to use even after the divorce was granted. Following the termination of the

community, Lisa used the card for community purposes such as replacement of a

3-ton HVAC System-Outdoor & Indoor in the former community home (Lisa was

awarded reimbursement claims for the various AC expenses in the judgment). She

also used the card for other community expenses for which she supplied receipts.

Additionally, she used the card for her own personal expenses. The trial court was

very concerned with the fact that she continued to use the card even after the

community terminated. In discussion about the credit card debt, the following

exchange occurred:

 BY MR. FONTENOT:

 Judge, sometimes people talk and they talk to different things.
 First of all, she's claiming she paid $8,300.00 and something dollars.
 All we're asking for – what I think the Court is trying to say, "Well,
 show me where you paid the money." But how are you going to show
 20
 that when you continue to charge on the same card, and you continue
 to mount up a balance on this card. She hasn't proved what she has
 paid off. Just because that statement shows, that doesn't prove that
 she paid the initial claim that she's asking reimbursement for. That is
 her burden to carry not the Court's to decipher how it was done, and
 how I'm going to find a way to give credit. She has the burden to
 prove here. Here's the check, I wrote it. Here's five checks, I wrote.
 It totals [$8,300.00] or whatever the amount was that she claiming [sic]
 reimbursement. And she hasn't–that ‘s my objection. I can't get
 anything unless I can prove to you that I acutally paid it. Me getting
 up here saying, "Hey, I paid it off." isn't prove when it's disputed.

 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 If that's the case, Judge, then it hasn't been paid off, and it is a
 community debt and will have to be added in under community
 obligations and both parties owe half.

 BY THE COURT:

 I just – so regardless if it's - - because I haven't looked through
 all those Capital One statements to know whether or not $8,376.00
 has been paid by your client on that credit card bill. The real problem
 here is let's say I do give her and she has paid that. There's still
 $13,000.00 in debt that this man's name is potentially - - you know, it
 could be - - that he would still potentially be liable for, and can result
 in further litigation to say no that's not mine. I'm divorced this day.
 You can't come after me, but it doesn't seem to resolve everything by
 doing the way that you want to do it, Mrs. Talley. The best way is
 just to resolve it so this is over with for somebody whatever it is. But,
 hey, whatever[.]

 We are unsure of how the judgment arrived at a reimbursement award of

$13,000.00 for the credit card in Lisa's favor. Based on the above testimony it

seems the $13,000.00 figure was erroneous. We find the record reasonably

supports an award of $8,376.00, the amount owed on the credit card at the time of

the termination of the community and that Lisa requested reimbursement for in her

Detailed Descriptive List. Noel was questioned on cross-examination regarding

the credit card: "Q. Lisa has paid it really. So it's not a current debt?" and he

responded, "That's correct." Thus, both Lisa and Noel testified that the credit card

balance had been paid by Lisa. Moreover, the language in the judgment indicates

that Lisa would be responsible for whatever debt remained on the card rather than
 21
 a denial of her reimbursement claim. The judgment specifically provides that Lisa

would be responsible for the payment of the community debt relating to Barksdale

Federal Credit Union credit card ending in 0509. Accordingly, the trial court's

judgment is amended to award Lisa $8,376.00 in reimbursement for her payment

on the credit card ending in 0509.

 REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS

 Assignments of error six through twelve all relate to reimbursement claims.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365 applies to reimbursement claims:

 If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the
 existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a
 community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for
 one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was
 used.

 If the community obligation was incurred to acquire ownership
 or use of a community corporeal movable required by law to be
 registered, and separate property of a spouse has been used after
 termination to satisfy that obligation, the reimbursement claim shall
 be reduced in proportion to the value of the claimant's use after
 termination of the community property regime. The value of that use
 and the amount of the claim for reimbursement accrued during the use
 are presumed to be equal.

 The liability of a spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to
 the value of his share of all community property after deduction of all
 community obligations. Nevertheless, if the community obligation
 was incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage,
 or for the support, maintenance, or education of children of either
 spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the spouses, the
 spouse is entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse regardless
 of the value of that spouse's share of all community property.

"[A] paying party is entitled to reimbursement for post-termination, pre-partition

use of separate funds for the payment of a community debt. . . . However, the

burden of proof is on the party claiming reimbursement." Hardy v. Hardy, 18-487,

pp. 9–10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 273 So.3d 448, 456–57; See also McElwee v.

McElwee, 93-1010 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/17/94), 649 So.2d 975, Arterburn v.

Arterburn, 15-22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/15), 176 So.3d 1163. Thus, for each claim
 22
 of reimbursement we must determine whether 1) Noel proved that he used his

separate property, and 2) whether the separate property was used to pay a

community debt.

 At the June 1, 2022 hearing, the trial court stated the following about Noel's

reimbursement claims (emphasis added):

 I'm going to give Mr. Yates rental reimbursement claim of
 $2,000.00 per month. The realtor said $1,800.00 to $2,200.00. I'm
 going to establish the rental value at $2,000.00, and that credit. Also
 give Mr. Yates credit for – I think it's $7,975.00, paid to Rocket
 Mortgage. It was apparent that Ms. Yates, and I'll give Ms. Yates
 credit for her's [sic], and I'll get to her's [sic] in a second. She was
 paying the mortgage and he was paying half mortgage. So, like,
 almost a mortgage in [sic] a half was getting paid from the documents
 that I read. When you acutally look at the statements, she was
 sending in the whole amount and he was sending in half the amount.
 So, I give Mr. Yates his credit on that. The Yates estate, Number 11.,
 that's like $39,262.38 my note indicated was from his dad's separate
 funds. And, so, if that was used towards the community property
 that's a reimbursement claim. The deposits, I believe is, $36,277.00,
 which is funds that Mr. Yates deposited into their joint checking
 account since the date of separation. That's 5., I'm going to give him
 credit for that. I think that is all on that, I believe. Okay.

 In the judgment, Noel was awarded $158,298.82 in reimbursements; Lisa

appealed all of the reimbursement awards except for the $15,500.00 award for

attorney fees. We note that numerous items of reimbursement were discussed very

little at trial and/or little or no documentary evidence was provided to support the

claims, as Lisa points out. However, all of Noel's claims, save the children's

insurance premiums, were listed in his Detailed Descriptive List. Regardless of

whether documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at trial, Lisa had the

opportunity to cross-examine Noel regarding any of the claims he listed in his

Detailed Descriptive List, but did not do so. Lisa cannot now claim there was

absolutely no proof of certain reimbursement claims when she did not avail herself

of the opportunity to cross-examine Noel as to items specifically listed on his

Detailed Descriptive List.
 23
 Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(1)(a) specifically provides that a

party's sworn detailed descriptive list is a judicial determination of the community

assets and liabilities when one spouse fails to file their own detailed descriptive list.

While that is not the case here since Lisa did file her own and a traversal, the same

principle holds true when a party fails to produce any contrary evidence at trial of

the spouse's valuation of reimbursement claims. In Brown v. Brown, 16-31, pp. 5–

6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/21/16), 210 So.3d 297, 299–300 (emphasis added), a panel of

this court addressed the situation where one party does not file a detail descriptive

list or otherwise provide any evidence at trial contesting the other party's assigned

values:

 Recently, in Williams, 968 So.2d 1234, another panel of this
 court, relying on Gauthier, [v. Gauthier, La.App. 3 Cir.
 11/10/04),]886 So.2d 681, and Charles v. Charles, 05-129 (La.App. 1
 Cir. 2/10/06), 923 So.2d 786, reiterated the constraints placed upon
 the party who fails to file its own Detailed Descriptive List timely and
 leaves in place the trial court ruling making the other spouse's List the
 order of the court.

 The law is clear that Gauthier does not require any further
 evidence to establish the nature of the property in question other than
 the judicially accepted detailed descriptive list. Thus, the trial court
 erred in its ruling that Steven failed to prove a prima facie case that
 the immovable property was his separate property. Although Steven
 contends his testimony was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, it
 was not necessary. Once the detailed descriptive list was judicially
 accepted, and Tamara did not challenge this acceptance, she lost her
 ability to traverse the list and contest the classification of the property.
 There is no legal authority for the trial court's implication that a deed
 is required to establish the property in question as Steven's separate
 property. The trial court erred in ignoring the only evidence in the
 record, Steven's judicially accepted Sworn Detailed Descriptive List,
 which established the immovable property was Steven's separate
 property.

 Williams v. Williams, 07-541 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d 1234,

arrived at the same conclusion under circumstances more like those before us. In

Williams, the husband's attorney failed to file his sworn detailed descriptive list

until far after the time it had been due even afer a lengthy extension. The husband
 24
 claimed that the wife "did not meet her burden of proof with regard to her

reimbursement claim because she failed to produce written documentation

establishing the amount that she paid to satisfy the mortgage payments and because

she failed to specifically state that she used her separate funds to pay the mortgage."

Id. at 1236–37. At a hearing, the trial court orally ruled that it was recognizing the

wife's detailed descriptive list but would allow the husband to offer input at the

trial. A panel of this court noted that the husband had the opportunity at trial to

question her about her reimbursement claims:

 She was not questioned about her claim for reimbursement or how she
 arrived at any of the amounts listed on her detailed descriptive list.
 Before setting the amount of reimbursement due, the trial court
 specifically asked [the husband] if there was anything he cared to add
 to the discussion. He again replied in the negative.

Id. at 1238.

 It went on to conclude:

 Thomas Williams was free to challenge the reimbursement claim of
 his former wife at the November 20, 2006 partition trial. He produced
 no countervailing evidence at the trial to dispute Joyce Williams's
 claim that she had paid all the mortgage payments due on the family
 residence, along with all maintenance and upkeep, since the date of
 the divorce. Likewise, his attorney did not cross-examine Joyce
 Williams regarding the source of the funds that she used to pay the
 aforementioned community debts.

 Joyce Williams's burden of proof regarding her claim for
 reimbursement at the partition trial was satisfied by her having
 utilized the procedural vehicle of having her detailed descriptive list
 deemed a judicial determination of the community. Louisiana Revised
 Statutes 9:2801 affords the trial court broad discretion in resolving
 community property disputes. Crais v. Crais, 98–1477 (La.App. 4 Cir.
 1/13/99), 737 So.2d 785, writ denied, 99–763 (La.5/14/99), 741 So.2d
 668. Moreover, the judgment of a trial court is presumed correct,
 absent any record evidence indicating to the contrary. Steinhoff v.
 Steinhoff, 03-24 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/03), 843 So.2d 1290. In view of
 the fact that Thomas Williams failed to file a scintilla of competent
 evidence into the record after his former wife petitioned the trial court
 to judicially partition the community, we cannot say that the trial court
 was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in concluding that the
 evidence was sufficient to support an award of $7,000.00 in favor of
 Joyce Williams on her claim for reimbursement.
 25
 Id. at 1238–39 (emphasis added).

 "It is incumbent upon the parties to present evidence at the partition trial

regarding the value of the assets." McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 17-645, p. 5

(La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/18), 247 So.3d 1105, 1111. Uncontested testimony is

sufficient evidence. Id. Thus, the trial court cannot be manifestly erroneous where

Noel's valuations of his reimbursement claims were uncontested at trial. We

address each of the items of reimbursement assigned as error by Lisa.

Reimbursement for Court Costs/Transcript Fee (Under the general assignment of
error four subheading)

Lisa states in brief (footnote omitted):

 Noel offered no evidence whatsoever of the court costs he paid.
 Accordingly, his unproven claims should be denied.

 The Judgment awarded Noel $77.00 for transcripts. It is
 unclear where this award came from. The Trial Court ordered that the
 cost of the transcript of its ruling be shared between the parties. Noel
 paid for the transcript. If this is the cost of the transcript of the Trial
 Court's ruling, Lisa has no objections.

 If (on the other hand) this is the correct amount of Noel's
 reimbursement claim for a transcript of any other matter, Lisa asserts
 that there is no basis in law for an award of a reimbursement claim for
 transcripts.

 Noel's Detailed Descriptive List under the community property liabilities

lists:

 ....

 3. Court Costs paid by Noel W. Yates $2,886.79.
 4. Court costs paid by Lisa J. Yates 658.20

 ....

 7. Transcripts $2144.92

 The trial court's judgment does not mention the award of court costs. It

awarded Noel $77.00 for transcript fees. At the June 1, 2022 hearing, the trial

court stated the following, "The attorney fees, the court cost, the transcript fees,
 26
 and the appraisal fees are all going to be cast as community obligations under the

law, and Mr. Yates is entitled to his reimbursement for those, and I think that is

what's different then what's on your clients, as far as, -- okay – hold on." The trial

court then moved on to a discussion of the tractor issue.

 It is true that the trial court's judgment is at odds with the oral

pronouncement. A trial court has great discretion in awarding court costs and will

not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Noland v. Noland, 16-641

(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/26/17), 218 So.3d 215, writ denied, 17-1162 (La. 9/15/17), 225

So.3d 479. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 provides the general

rule governing court costs: "Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be

paid by the party cast, and may be taxed by a rule to show cause. Except as

otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment for costs, or any part

thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable." We are unable to

determine from the record how the trial court arrived at a $77.00 reimbursement

for a transcript. Nevertheless, Noel's Detailed Descriptive List asserts far more

than $77.00 in transcript costs. Noel was questioned on cross-examination, "Okay,

let's see, and you've paid for transcripts?" to which he answered yes. Apparently,

the trial court found Noel's claim credible, and we cannot say it manifestly erred in

assigning him a reimbursement claim of $77.00, as this amount represents far less

than that claimed, and Lisa did not offer any evidence to refute Noel's claim. This

assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Five/ Insurance premiums

 Lisa claims the trial court erred in awarding Noel a reimbursement claim for

payment of insurance premiums for the children. The judgment awarded Noel

"$2,030.02 for payments on children's insurance premiums." Lisa states

(footnotes omitted):
 27
 The Judgment awarded Noel a reimbursement claim of
 $2,030.02 for payments on children's insurance premiums. The
 undersigned could not locate either the award in the ruling of the Trial
 Court or any testimony or exhibit showing said amounts to be paid.
 Accordingly, it should be deleted as a reimbursement claim for Noel.
 [12]

Noel did not request reimbursement for payment of children's insurance premiums

in his Detailed Descriptive List. Noel testified that he began paying the premiums

on the life insurance policies for the children once the divorce was final.

 At the June 1, 2022 hearing, the trial court stated:

 Cash value, I.6., $986.82 and $1043.20 [sic], and those are
 going to be Mr. Yates, Noel Yates.

 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 Would you tell – would you state those again? $9 - -

 BY THE COURT:

 $986.82, I think the testimony in the documents - - there were
 so many documents I didn't write –

 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 Okay.

 BY THE COURT:

 $986.82 and $1,043.00, those are the two life insurance policies
 for - - on the children who Mr. Yates are the beneficiary of.

 This award is for the cash value of the two insurance policies on the children

rather than premium payments. Noel does not address the assignment of error in

his brief. We find it was error by the trial court to award Noel a reimbursement

claim for the cash value of the life insurance policies. Accordingly, we reverse the

trial court's award for reimbursement of children's insurance premiums.

 12
 Lisa requested reimbursement of $156.00 for payments of $13.02 per month on the
policy from February 2020 through February 2021.
 28
 Assignment of Error Six/Appraisal Fee

 In this assignment, Lisa argues the trial court erred in granting Noel a

reimbursement claim for $250.00 for the appraisal of the former home without

granting Lisa the same. Lisa argues that the trial court ordered Noel and Lisa to

each pay one-half of the cost of the appraisal prepared by Thibodeaux in the

amount of $500.00 and that if Noel is to receive reimbursement without a copy of

this receipt or cancelled check, Lisa should be awarded the same; alternatively, the

claims, which offset each other should be removed from the Judgement. Noel does

not address this assignment in his brief. The trial court obviously concluded that

Noel paid the $500.00 appraisal fee and was due reimbursement for half. Noel did

testify, "The appraisal fee is what I had to pay the Clerk's Office to get the

appraisal." Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court's award of

$250.00 reimbursement to Noel for the payment of the appraisal fee. This

assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Seven/Health, Vision and Dental Insurance

 Lisa argues the trial court erred in awarding Noel reimbursement of

$12,920.09 for payment of health and vision insurance when it was ordered as

spousal support. Lisa's argument in its entirety is (footnote omitted):

 [T]he Trial Court ordered Noel to keep Lisa covered on his
 insurance until after the divorce was granted. This is support of
 persons, a separate debt of the payer. He should have no
 reimbursement claim for that. Additionally, this amount just
 appeared on his last filed sworn detailed descriptive list. Nowhere
 in the testimony did he verify this amount. Neither is there any
 documentary evidence of it. Accordingly the claim should be
 denied.

Lisa cites no law in support of her claims.

 Noel's full response to this assignment of error: "Appellant further contends

that Noel Yates was granted a reimbursement claim for health, vision and dental

 29
 insurance in the amount of $12,920.08. Appellant argues that that was an element

of spousal support but there is absolutely no court order requiring that be paid as an

element of spousal support." We agree.

 Noel testified on cross-examination:

 Q. Okay. Alright. This health, vision and dental insurance, that's
 something that the judge ordered you to pay for her until July 1st. Is
 that correct?

 A. Correct.

 Q. Did you keep it through July 1st?

 A. It was cancelled June 30th.

 The trial court's Interim Order dated June 23, 2020, ordered that "any

insurance coverage maintained by either parent shall remain the same until further

orders of the Court, meaning that no one will be dropped from or reduced in

insurance coverage." Supplemental Interim Orders dated January 6, 2021,

reiterated the same. The Judgment of Divorce dated June 23, 2021, declared that

"all other orders of the Court shall be and they are hereby declared unaffected by

this judgment. Said orders include, but are not limiter [sic] to injunctions, order to

pay a monthly amount for household expenses or maintenance, etc."

 The trial court's "order" was simply to maintain existing community

insurance policies. It was not an element of spousal support pursuant to a consent

judgment. Similar to the payments Lisa made for homeowner's insurance, Noel is

entitled to be reimbursed for separate funds he used to maintain Lisa's health

insurance subsequent to the termination of the community but prior to the partition.

While it is true that Noel provided no documentary evidence or testimony

supporting this amount, it was listed in his detailed descriptive list. Moreover, Lisa

did not challenge the amount at trial, only the characterization of the payment.

Thus, the trial court did not err in finding Noel is entitled to reimbursement for
 30
 $12,920.08. Noel is entitled to one-half of $12,920.08. This assignment of error is

without merit.

Assignment of Error Eight/Mortgage Payments

 Lisa claims the trial court erred in awarding Noel reimbursement of

$7,975.00 for payments to Rocket Mortgage when he did not prove he paid that

much. Lisa claims he only proved $4,862.50. She stated he only submitted a few

checks into evidence and that the notations on them are unclear. Noel states in

brief, "We will defer to all exhibits that were filed into evidence showing the

payments made to Rocket Mortgage, either directly or checks that were given to

Lisa Yates and deposited to her checking account for his one-half of the monthly

payment." Nevertheless, Noel did assert the claim of $7,975.00 for mortgage

reimbursement payments in his Detailed Descriptive List, and the trial court found

Noel's testimony credible. We find no error in that finding. The checks that were

submitted into evidence are listed below:

CHECK # DATE AMOUNT PAYABLE TO NOTATION

1015 4/17/2020 $300.00 Lisa Yates Ref #1012 (1/2 Covid mortgage) Marshall Softball

1018 5/7/20 $562.50 Lisa Yates ½ Covid Mortgage $200 Marshall

1040 10/30/2020 $1000.00 Lisa Yates [sic] + car note

1184 5/28/2021 $725.00 Lisa Yates ½ Mortgage Pay

1185 6/23/2021 $725.00 Noel Yates ½ Mortgage

1194 7/30/2021 $725.00 Rocket Mortgage [Account Number]

1196 8/26/2021 $725.00 Rocket Mortgage Principal Only [Account Number]

1093 12/23/2021 $725.00 Rocket Mortgage [Account Number]

1152 1/24/2022 $725.00 Rocket Mortgage [Account Number]

1155 2/22/2022 $725.00 Rocket Mortgage [Account Number]

 31
 The Rocket Mortgage statement evidence indicates payments in $725.00

increments on the following dates: 8/10/21, 9/2/21, 10/2/21, 11/1/21, 1/08/22,

2/01/22, 3/01/22, and 3/22/22. In addition to the seven payments noted above in

the check evidence, the four payments from September, October, and November

2021, plus the payment dated March 22, 2022 equals Noel's claim of $7,975.00

due in reimbursement. The testimony was clear at trial that, except during a

COVID forbearance period when partial payments were made of $500.00,13 Lisa

paid the full mortgage payment while Noel paid $725.00. Accordingly, we find the

trial court did not manifestly err in awarding Noel $7,975.00 in reimbursement for

mortgage payments. Noel is entitled to one-half of the payments of $7,795.00.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Nine/Rental Payments

 In this assignment of error, Lisa argues the trial court erred in awarding Noel

$2,000.00 per month (for a total of $41,400.00) in rental reimbursements for Lisa's

use of the community home. Lisa argues the trial court legally erred because the

requirements of La.R.S. 9:374 were not met, thus, no reimbursement is due. Lisa

states the trial court's deferral of the matter, without agreement of the parties, was

not authorized by law and renders the rental issue moot. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 9:374(C), as it was applicable in this case, stated (emphasis added):14

 13
 It is unclear from the record how those payments were credited and to whom.
 14
 Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:374 was amended in June 2022, and became effective
August 1, 2022, to specifically authorize a trial court to defer the issue of rental determination
until partition without agreement of the parties (emphasis added):

 C. A spouse who, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection A or B
 of this Section, uses and occupies or is awarded by the court the use and
 occupancy of the family residence, a community immovable occupied as a
 residence, or a community manufactured home as defined in R.S. 9:1149.2
 and occupied as a residence, regardless of whether it has been
 immobilized, shall not be liable to the other spouse for rental for the use
 and occupancy, except as hereafter provided.

 32
 A spouse who, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection A or
 B of this Section, uses and occupies or is awarded by the court the use
 and occupancy of the family residence, a community immovable
 occupied as a residence, or a community manufactured home as
 defined in R.S. 9:1149.2 and occupied as a residence, regardless of
 whether it has been immobilized, shall not be liable to the other
 spouse for rental for the use and occupancy, except as hereafter
 provided. If the court awards use and occupancy to a spouse, it shall
 at that time determine whether to award rental for the use and
 occupancy and, if so, the amount of the rent. The parties may agree
 to defer the rental issue for decision in the partition proceedings. If
 the parties agreed at the time of the award of use and occupancy to
 defer the rental issue, the court may make an award of rental
 retroactive to the date of the award of use and occupancy.

 Lisa cites numerous cases for the proposition that no reimbursement claim

can lie when the trial court did not contemporaneously order a rental value or the

parties did not agree to defer the rental value issue, relying on the law set forth in

McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96-2700 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1280, as cited by the

second circuit in Mason v. Mason, 40,804, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/19/06), 927 So.2d

1235, 1239, writ denied, 06-1524 (La. 10/13/06), 939 So.2d 366:

 In McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96–2700 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1280,
 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that rental payments may not be
 retroactively assessed under La. R.S. 9:374(C) unless otherwise
 agreed by the spouses or ordered by the court. The court reasoned that
 the use and management of a thing held in indivision is determined by
 agreement of all the co-owners. A co-owner is entitled to use the thing
 held in indivision according to its destination, but he cannot prevent
 another co-owner from making such use of it. Nevertheless, it is well
 established that a co-owner need not pay rent to another co-owner for
 his exclusive use of the co-owned property. The assessment of rent
 under La. R.S. 9:374(C) requires an agreement between the spouses or
 a court order for rent contemporaneous with the award of occupancy.
 McCarroll v. McCarroll, supra. When there is no evidence of court
 ordered rent or an agreement between the parties, the occupying

 D. In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, a spouse may move for an
 award of rent at any time. After a contradictory hearing, the court may
 award rent to be paid by a spouse exercising exclusive use and occupancy
 of a residence whether by judgment or in fact. The award shall be
 retroactive to the date of filing of the motion, but rent shall be awarded
 only for the period of exclusive occupancy. The adjudication of the issue
 of rent and the amount thereof may be deferred to a later date by the court
 or by agreement of the parties. It shall not be a prerequisite to the award of
 rent that the spouse against whom the award is made shall have requested
 use and occupancy of the residence.

 33
 spouse is not liable for rent. Gay v. Gay, 31,974 (La.App. 2 Cir.
 6/16/99), 741 So.2d 149.

 In Bulloch, 214 So.3d 930, the appellate court noted McCarroll, but went on

to find that rental reimbursement was due even though the parties had not agreed to

defer the rent issue to the partition hearing and the trial court did not

contemporaneously award rent. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's

award of fair rental value to the ex-husband, stating:

 We find no legal error in the trial court's ruling. La. R.S.
 9:374(B) states, in pertinent part, that "either spouse may petition for,
 and a court may award to one of the spouses, after a contradictory
 hearing, the use and occupancy of the family residence ... pending
 further order of the court." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, R.S.
 9:374(C), upon which Lydia relies, expressly states that its provisions
 apply to the awards of use and occupancy pending divorce or partition
 of the community property made "in accordance with the provisions
 of R.S. 9:374(A) and R.S. 9:374(B)," which, as noted above, require a
 contradictory hearing. Although the court awarded Lydia use and
 occupancy of the family home "on an interim basis" at the October 30,
 2013, hearing concerning the misappropriated funds, the record is
 clear that there was no contradictory hearing on the issue of use and
 occupancy and whether Brian was entitled to rental value. Brian
 properly demanded rental value of the home in his answer and
 reconventional demand along with a contradictory hearing on the
 matter to which he was entitled under La. R.S. 9:374(B).

Id. at 934–35 (second emphasis added).

 In Hight v Hight, 17-566, pp. 11-12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/13/17), 234 So.3d

1143, 1150, the appellate court reiterated the trial court's discretion in deferring a

determination of rental value:

 In this matter, the trial court decided to continue the rule for
 rental reimbursement and the valuation issue to be addressed at the
 community partition trial. It is well established that a trial judge has
 vast discretion in conducting a trial, "and it is only upon a showing of
 a gross abuse of discretion that appellate courts have intervened."
 Further, "[a] final judgment is one that determines the merits in whole
 or in part and is identified as such by appropriate language." An
 interlocutory judgment does not determine the merits but only the
 preliminary matters in the course of a trial. In the case sub judice, this
 Court does not find that the trial court abused its discretion in
 continuing the rule and the valuation to the community partition trial.

 34
 In this case, a hearing was held on May 25, 2021, at which time the trial

court reviewed some issues that were no longer before the court such as the

granting of divorce. There is no transcript of this hearing in the record, however

Noel attached a two-page transcript from the May 25, 2021 hearing that only has a

statement by the trial court copied in part here (emphasis added):

 So those are the issues before the court today, or that haven't been
 dealt with previously. So we'll start off with – we'll start off with the
 issue of – the issue of the rental value and that claim of – and Ms.
 Talley just cites a lot of Code Articles, but no specific ones just in an
 abroad [sic] category. I'm going to defer that to the – whenever they
 deal with the community property. There's nobody seeking to
 partition as far as in the sense of filing the necessary documents to –
 to do that.

 The two-page document evidences no objections by either party. It only

contains what the trial court stated. The minutes of court from that day state:

 Case taken up and evidence adduced.
 Fontenot continued with cross Lisa Yates.
 Objections made and ruled on by the Court.
 Both parties rest.
 The Court for oral reasons-rental value deferred to property
 settlement[.]

 Lisa's brief and reply brief point to her objections during the partition

hearing that the rental value determination based on the appraisal being hearsay.

She did not submit any evidence indicating her objection to the deferral at or

following the May 25, 2021 hearing. Accordingly, we find no gross abuse of

discretion when the trial court announced its intention to defer the rental valuation

issue, without contemporaneous objection. Lisa acquiesced to the determination

of the rental value at a later date at the hearing on May 25, 2021. We find no

manifest error of the rental valuation at $2,000.00 per month. Thus, Noel is

entitled to reimbursement for one half of the value of rental reimbursement of

$41,400.00. See Averill v. Averill, 18-299 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/18), __ So.3d __;

 35
 Thomas v. Thomas, 22-141 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/28/22), 356 So.3d 548, writ denied,

23-124 (La. 4/4/23), 358 So.3d 868.

Assignment of Error Ten/Property Taxes

 Lisa argues the trial court erred in awarding Noel $2,607.34 for payment of

property taxes. We agree. Noel plainly stated he only paid one payment of

$850.00, otherwise the previous payments were split. Noel testified on direct

examination:

 Q. Okay. And – did you have – who paid the property taxes
 since the termination of the community?

 A. I paid the full amount last year for last year's taxes.

 Q. Alight. [sic]

 A. $800.00 something for last year. And we've split the
 difference on the two previous years.

 Q. Alright. We'll [sic] you have property taxes on a home you
 listed $2607.34.

 A. Correct.

 Q. Was that [the] total amount of the property taxes that you've
 paid?

 A. That's what we've turned in. Yes, that's correct.

 On cross-examination, Noel testified:

 Q. Okay. Alright. And them [sic] property taxes on the home,
 $2,601.34. Do you have the receipts for that? Cancelled checks for it?

 A. I do. There's a discrepancy on that. We split the first two.
 It–so for the sake of agreement $450.00 a piece [sic]. The last one I
 paid completely $850.00. There was [sic] other fees that we had paid
 going through the secretary running the list of receipts over that is
 going to be in there. I think that is going to be acutally a payment for
 income tax that we paid jointly and 19.

 ....

 A. Again, it may – it may simply just be a typo. I'm trying to
 figure – whenever I was asked that a while ago it was $450., $450.00,
 $850.00. That's what we pay.
 36
 Q. Okay. So you think maybe $850.00 might be the right
 number instead of $2,607.34. Is that right?

 A. Ma'am?

 Q. So, do you think that $850.00 might be the correct number
 instead of $2,607.00?

 A. If I remember correctly and I do have the receipts $854.00
 something is what I paid this time.

 Q. Okay.

 A. The two years previously we have [sic] split it, which comes
 out to around $450.00.

 Q. Okay. So, if the Judge says those are a wash, you'd still
 have $850.00.

 A. Sure, yes.

Noel submitted check #1059 evidencing his payment of $859.34 to the Vernon

Parish Tax Collector. The trial court manifestly erred in awarding Noel

reimbursement of $2,607.34 for the payment of property taxes. Noel is entitled to

reimbursement for one-half of $859.34 which equals $429.67.

Assignment of Error Eleven/Yates estate

 Lisa argues the trial court erred in awarding Noel a reimbursement claim for

the "Yates Estate." We agree. Noel was awarded $39,262.38 for "Yates Estate."

At the partition hearing, 15 the trial court stated:

 15
 The minutes from the hearing state:

 Trial – Community Property

 ....

 Case taken up and evidence adduced.
 On motion of Fontenot, the Court grants motion to take Judicial Notice of
 Appraisal taken by Century 21 previously filed into the record.
 On motion of Fontenot, the Court grants motion to take Judicial Notice of
 the Affidavit of Small Succession previously filed into the record, no
 objection by Talley.

 Oral argument between Fontenot and Talley.
 37
 The Yates estate, Number 11., that's like $39,262.38 my note
 indicates was from his dad's separate funds. And, so, if that was used
 towards the community property that's a reimbursement claim.

 Noel's response to this argument in brief is reprinted in full (emphasis

added):

 Appellant later on in her brief raises the issue of the $39,262.38
 of funds that Noel deposited into an account as money he received
 from the succession of his father. Noel furthermore testified that he
 used that money to make improvements to the former community
 property, which included the apartment that he renovated to care for
 his father before he died. . . . Appellant's argument [is] that this
 money is not reimbursable because they [sic] were received during the
 community property regime. That is not accurate. They [sic] were
 [sic] received but they were clearly traceable and delineated as being
 the separate property of Noel Yates, which he inherited from his
 father.

In Bulloch, 214 So.3d at 944, the court stated:

 If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the
 existence of the community or thereafter to satisfy a community
 obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the
 amount or value the property had at the time it was used. La. C.C. art.
 2365; Bodenheimer v. Freitag, 94-2573 (La. 1/6/95), 651 So.2d 251.
 The burden of proof is on the party claiming reimbursement to show
 that separate funds existed and were used to satisfy the community
 obligation. Tippen v. Carroll, 47,415 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/20/12), 105
 So.3d 100. Where separate funds can be traced with sufficient
 certainty to establish the separate ownership of the property paid for
 with those funds, the separate status of such property will be upheld.
 Curtis v. Curtis, [403 So.2d 56 (La.1981)].

 "Things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of

community of acquets and gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse

may prove that they are separate property." La.Civ.Code art. 2340. We find that

Noel proved he received inheritance funds totaling $15,969.79. However, the fact

 Court takes Judicial Notice of Ms. Perkins' analysis.
 Defense stipulates separate property; Mr. Yates may retrieve those items if
 he wishes.
 Objections made and ruled on by the Court.
 Case submitted. For oral reasons and evidence adduced, the Court fixed
 ruling for June 1, 2022 at 10:00AM.
 Court adjoined.

 38
 that Noel received an inheritance does not entitle him to automatic reimbursement.

Noel must prove he is owed reimbursement for expending his separate property for

a community purpose.

 Noel's claim that he used his inheritance to improve the community home is

completely contrary to the evidence he presented. Noel's last Detailed Descriptive

List filed May 27, 2022, lists "Yates Estate" as "TBD." The documentary evidence

indicates the receipt by Noel in November 2019, of $15,969.79 ($8,701.85 Edward

Jones and Columbia Financial Group statement of $7,267.94) in inheritance funds,

which totals $15,969.79, as discussed in the first assignment of error.) Noel

specifically testified about the $15,969.79 in inheritance deposits, but offered no

testimony about the remaining $23,292.59 that is completely unaccounted for in

testimony or documentary evidence. Although inherited money is usually easily

distinguished as separate property of a spouse through documentation, one must

still prove that the separate property was used for a community purpose.

 There was significant testimony at the trial regarding the "barn apartment"

that Noel "improved" and whether it was for his benefit or his father's benefit. We

find this distinction irrelevant. Noel testified numerous times that he did not use

his separate property to improve the barn apartment.

 Noel was questioned on direct (emphasis added):

 Q. Okay. And did you expend any of your funds that you
 inherited from your father to improve any of the property located that
 was community property between you and Mrs. Yates?

 A. Not any of my funds. Dad past [sic] in September, and the
 succession was done in January. She was pushing me to get the
 divorce filed, get it filed, get it filed, . . . .

 ....

 Q. Okay. When you were building this apartment, did you
 expend any of the money that you inherited from your father?

 39
 A. No.

 Q. Did you expend any of the money that you yourself had that
 was your separate property?

 A. In building it?

 Q. Yes.

 A. I mean, we were – by 2018 I was no longer using the – our
 joint checking account anymore.

 Q. Alright.

 A. I mean, I didn't have a debt [sic] card anymore, nothing. So,
 it was all –yeah – money.

 [MRS. TALLEY:]

 I'm not sure I understood that answer.

 Q. Can you repeat that response you just gave?

 A. If I understand – I'm going to repeat the question as I
 understood it. Did I spend any of my money building the apartment?
 Well, the answer would be yes, because we were still together when it
 was initially built. To finish it off, right around the time of daddy's
 death, succession, trying to figure out what to do with him until he
 passed. It was mainly his money that was spent to finish off things
 and maintain his property. The items that we spent money on
 between my sister and I on daddy's stuff is still the same stuff that's at
 the house that we have never had excess [sic] to [.] . . .

 Q. Okay. So after your father died, did you spend any money
 that was your separate money on improving any of the buildings or
 structures on the property?

 A. No.

Noel was even questioned by the trial court:

 BY MR. YATES:
 Number 12, the Yates estate, there is receipts, that is what Mr.
 Fontenot and I spoke about first. That is moneys that was spent on the
 nonmovable of the property solely off of dad[']s money before he
 passed.

 BY THE COURT:

 Okay.

 40
 BY MR. YATES:

 In preparation for moving him there at some point.

 BY THE COURT:

 And that was improving to the value of the property.

 BY MR. YATES:

 Correct. And that number if I'm not mistaken was right at
 $4,700.00.

However, Noel was later questioned on direct:

 Q. . . .I'm going to show you these documents here, and there's
 23 of them and I want you to go through each one and look at them
 and tell us if – my question is are those sums of money expended to
 improve the property that you and Ms. Yates owned? Particularly the
 barn property that's in connection with the apartment you built for
 your father.

 A. Yes, this is the complete list to include my hand written note.
 When I turned it in, not only the apartment, but like I say the
 equipment still maintain [sic] on the property that came from the
 succession.

 Q. And, what was the source of the money that was used to pay
 that?

 A. Dad.

 Q. Money you inherited from him? Is that correct?

 A. Correct.

 However, on cross-examination regarding the apartment portion of the barn,

Noel testified:

 Q. Okay. Alright. Now, one of the exhibits that you entered
 into evidence is Noel Yates 11, was a number of receipts and – If I
 understand this right, you – well the date of this receipt is 5/27/19. So
 May of 19.

 A. Yes.

 Q. There's another May of 19, July, August, September all in
 through there. At that time, your dad was still living. Is that correct?

 A. He had his first surgery in April.
 41
 Q. Okay. What was the date of your dad's death?

 A. September of 19.

 Q. Okay. Now, did he live in this area? In the Leesville area?

 A. Yes, ma'am.

 Q. Was he in good health before he died?

 A. No, ma'am.

 Q. What would you say his physical limitations were?

 A. He couldn't walk or stand.

 Q. Couldn't walk –

 A. Walk or stand.

 Q. Walk or stand – excuse me, I'm sorry.

 A. Mentally, he was gone.

 Q. Okay, how long was he in that condition?

 A. From the time I found him – he deteriorated fast. I found
 him in late October of 18 in bad shape. I maintained him at his
 residence until [he] broke his back in April.

 Noel Yates 11, one of the exhibits offered by Noel, is comprised of many

receipts for charges related to the apartment. All of the receipts that use the

account number bearing the last four digits of 7477 also have a handwritten note

stating "DAD" directly under the 7477. There was no evidence that the account

"7477" was Noel's personal account that held separate funds. Rather, it was his

father's debit card that was being used to purchase items for the barn apartment.

Some of these receipts (from places that print out invoices) are even in the father's

name. There are over twenty receipts all of which evidence purchases made

between May 2019 and August 2019. The last chronological receipt was dated

September 14, 2019, which was before his father died. Noel also submitted a

 42
 handwritten sheet created by him that states, "Receipts Dad paid for this" that lists

twenty-five receipts dated before his father's death.16

 The receipts prove that the purchases were made before his father's death on

September 22, 2019, and long before he received his inheritance checks that were

issued on November 5, 2019 ($7,267.94) and the other around November 22, 2019

($8,701.85). The evidence is clear that money spent on the barn apartment was

from Noel's father's debit card while the father was still alive and during the

existence of the community. Thus, according to La.Civ.Code art. 2340, these

funds were presumed to be community.

 Louisiana jurisprudence has firmly established that the only
 issue with respect to gifts of this nature is whether the donor intended
 her donation as a gift to the individual or to the community. In
 answering that question, the intention of the donor controls the
 identity of the donee or donees. Allbritton v. Allbritton, 561 So.2d 125
 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writs denied, 565 So.2d 445, 454 (La.1990). As
 stated earlier, the burden of overcoming the presumption of
 community property set out in LSA–C.C. Art. 2340 rests upon the
 party who asserts that the property is separate. Id.

Hebert v. Hebert, 94-864, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/15/95), 650 So.2d 436, 439.

 Because the father's donative intent cannot be established since he is

deceased, and the only other evidence relating to the father's intent was Noel's

own testimony that "[m]entally [his father] was gone[,]" the money spent on the

barn apartment was community funds, and Noel has no reimbursement claim for

these expenditures. Even if he had proven the funds were his separate funds and

that they were used for a community purpose, that would only amount to about

$5,000.00, far less than the $15,969.79 Noel proved that he inherited or the

$39,268.38 he was awarded for "Yates estate." The trial court manifestly erred in

finding that Noel met his burden of proving he had any claims for reimbursement

 16
 Some of these receipts in the handwritten list are duplicative of the photocopied
receipts.
 43
 for separate inheritance funds expended for a community purpose. Thus, Noel is

not due any reimbursement for "Yates estate." It was manifest error to award a

reimbursement claim for "Yates estate" in the amount of $39,262.38. Accordingly,

we reverse the trial court's award of $39,262.38 for "Yates estate."

Assignment of Error Twelve/Deposits Into Joint Account

 In her final assignment of error, Lisa argues the trial court erred in awarding

Noel a reimbursement claim for deposits of $36,277.00 into the joint account.

Noel's detailed descriptive list asserts $36,277.00 due in reimbursement for

"[d]eposit made to joint bank account since separation[.]" In this assignment, Lisa

states (footnotes omitted):

 Noel claimed he deposited $36,277.00 into the joint banking
 account after separation. First the parties separated sometime
 during the summer of 2019; but he did not file his divorce petition
 until February 27, 2020. Only deposits made after that date are
 presumed to be use [sic] of his separate funds.

 Next, Noel offered no documentary evidence of that amount
 being deposited by him into the joint account. He said the amount
 did not include the $2,000.00 / month they first agreed on, the
 $1,000 / month they agreed on at the first hearing, or the $900.00 /
 month the Trial Court awarded for interim spousal support between
 March 17, 2020 and May 31, 2020. Some of the few checks he
 produced were credited elsewhere, such as for payment of the
 mortgage. One was to give Lisa ½ of the tax refund, for example.
 To allow a credit in more than one place is double-dipping and
 should be reversed.

 ....

 Further, Noel's deposits should have been reduced by his
 payment of $900.00 / month in between March 7, 2020, and May
 31, 2021 (for a total of $13,275.00) interim spousal support to Lisa,
 pursuant to, orders of the Trial Court, and credit sign applied
 elsewhere.

Noel's brief does not address this assignment of error.

 At the June oral hearing on the judgment, the trial court stated: "The

deposits, I believe is [sic], $36,277.00, which is funds that Mr. Yates deposited into

 44
 their joint checking account since the date of separation. That's 5., I'm going to

give him credit for that."

 Noel's counsel identified the accurate time period in question regarding the

validity of payments made from separate property early on in questioning:

 Q. Okay, well let's go - - go through each one, and tell us what
 you expended, and how much you expended of the money you just
 identified as your dad's money.

 A. From November until February.

 Q. And November

 A. 19 until February of - -

 Q. 19 until February of - -

 A. 20.

 Q. 20.

 A. I'm still there. I'm still spending money there. I'm still
 sending money into the joint account. We're paying bills out of that
 money. We're - - it's normal everyday living expenses. I'm
 maintaining – I'm still there maintaining the property. That is money
 that goes direct into the account.

 Q. Okay. And, so, do you have any documentation to show
 specifically what that money was used to pay for?

 A. I have the cancelled checks where I was sending her
 $2,000.00 per month. I have –

 Q. Out of that account?

 A. Yes. I have – yes.

 On this subject, Noel testified (emphasis added):

 A. In February [the mortgage payments were] coming out of
 the joint account. Our joint Capital One account. My direct
 deposits ended in February. I continued to pay her $2,000.00 per
 month. Is [sic] something we agreed on verbally, until which time
 we had the first zoom hearing and at that point in time we agreed to
 $1,000.00 that I continued to pay until May of 21. The order on
 that was to pay $1,000.00 per month for expenses is the way it was
 written in the order. But, at that point in time from April until

 45
 October, April of 20, until of October of 20, I had placed the house
in forbearance because she wasn't employed at the time.

At the partition trial, Noel was questioned by the trial court:

BY THE COURT:

 So, what I have to make sure, Mr. Yates is one, if you inherited
money from your family, that's separate property. Post separation
money is your separate property. And, so, did separate money go for
community property? That's what I have to consider – like there's
some reimbursement claims, okay, for stuff paid. And did you use the
money you inherited from your father or did you use your personal
money post separation to pay things then there is some reimbursement
claims because it's your separate property. It was not a community
thing at that point. Especially, inheritance you know, if somebody
inherited $5,000.00 and you went to pay the house note, well you're
entitled – that's – what was yours not y'all's money.

BY MR. YATES:

 Maybe I'm not answering correctly. When dad passed and
succession was done there was a significant amount of succession
money put into the accounts that I opened prior to us filing for
divorce. We were still married. So, those moneys are deposited
into that account literally a month before filing. This is the same
two accounts that I moved direct deposits too [sic]. These are the
same accounts that I have paid along the way everything to her, to
include the $2,000.00 per month until we actually had court and
had a judgment.

BY THE COURT:

 So you did expend separate property funds you got from
your father – your inheritance from your father to pay community
debts. And so legally you want that your entitled to back in those.

BY MR. YATES:

 Yes.

BY THE COURT:

 And I'll let Mr. Fontenot and Mrs. Talley go into grader [sic]
detail. I'm just trying to understand everything. You know, how
much money is in there, that's your business. Okay. Unless it was
a community thing, and then that becomes our business. You
know, but if you used your money same thing with Ms. Yates, if
she got money that she inherited or somebody gave her then we
have to calculate all that. So we have to know, I guess what to ask
and not to ask. . . .
 46
 ....

BY THE COURT:

 Now I will ask a question before I turn the lawyers back
loose. That moneys from those two Barksdale accounts is that, that
you expended, because only your [sic] going to have the
knowledge and there will be a paper trail. Is that reflective, Mr.
Yates in this reimbursement part that you've laid out here?

BY MR. YATES:

 There - - in the reimbursement- -

 ....

BY MR. YATES:

 I – I hope so. That is the accounts I've had – all moneys [sic]
I had in a check form goes into that account. Everything I pay go
goes out. Essentially, I'm paying the bills there - -

BY THE COURT:

 But, did it go out through one through 12 on that page five
[Noel's reimbursement claims on his detailed descriptive list]?

 .....

BY THE COURT:

 Did you use money from Barksdale, one and two I'll call it that
is your separate property from your dad – did that go – is that
reflective [sic] in one through 12 on page five? Or do we need to be
looking somewhere else for that moneys?

BY MR. YATES:

 All of that moneys [sic] went to the same place. I mean, that's
the only way I know how to answer that. Everything I'm paying for
and have paid for, paying rent during all this, the expenses that during
the time that she wasn't working, the money I was sending her that's
all from that account.

BY THE COURT:

 And that is reflective one through 12? Or is that reflective –

BY MR. YATES:

 47
 Well, yes. It is deposits made into the account since separation,
 $36,277.00.

 BY THE COURT:

 Okay. So now we know that you've put that much money from
 your separate funds into deposit number five. Is [sic] correct?

 BY MR. YATES:

 Correct.

 BY THE COURT:

 Okay. Well, that gives a number to work with. You know, if
 you expend $36,000 of your separate money into community debts,
 that's number five on page five, Mrs. Talley and Mr. Fontenot.
 According to Mr. Yates, that's where some of it is reflective.

 Noel testified that the sources of the inheritance from his father's estate were

"an insurance policy, it was a bank account, and an Edward Jones Account." As

previously noted, Noel only testified, and the evidence in the record only

established, that he received $15,969.79 in inheritance money that was deposited

into his Barksdale account.

 Later in the record, he was asked on cross-examination:

 Q. Okay. Alright. And then Number five, deposit made into
 joint bank account since separation. Now, does this include the
 alimony checks that you wrote, or deposited there or whatever?

 A. The $1,000.00 per month? The ordered $2,000.00 per month?

 Q. Yes, Sir.

 A. No ma'am.

 Q. Okay. What kind of evidence do you have that supports that?

 A. It is in the direct deposits in the bank – in the bank
 statements.

Cross-examination continued:

 Q. Now, but what should be on here, on your last list but, hasn't
 been on the list would be that account at Barksdale Federal Credit

 48
 Union that has account number 2202 and 2201. The second one being
savings. Those should be on here. Correct?

 A. And they are.

 Q. That's an account that you had established while y'all were
married.

 A. Correct.

 Q. And you put your pay roll check in there.

 A. Only after the divorce filling [sic]. Yes.

 Q. Okay. Well you continued [sic] to use it now though. You
continued [sic] to use that same account now?

 A. Yes, it's the same accounts I had since then.

 Q. Alright. Are you saying that everything that went into that
account before you file your petition for divorce was your dad's
money?

 A. Pretty close. I put some overtime checks, or some detailed
[sic] checks along the way. I was paying for Tanner.

 Q. Okay, but it was overtime you earned while you were
married. Correct?

 A. Yes, details, yes.

Noel then testified about the community funds addressed in assignment one.

Lisa testified:

 He - - paid - - he - - up until we filed for divorce at the end of
February he paid $2,000.00 per month toward expenses. And then
once we filed for divorce in March, I think he paid $2,000.00. And
then in April you told him to pay $1,000.00, and he started paying
$1,000.00 towards expenses.

Noel was questioned by the trial court near the end of the trial:

BY THE COURT:

 Mr. Yates, I've got a question while they're doing that.
[XXXX]1011, there is about $39,262.38 worth of what I would call
money that you got from your dad that you show deposits into an
account from your accounts that you opened up from your dad's estate.
Is that approximately correct? That would be Number 11 on your
reimbursement claim.
 49
 BY MR. YATES:

 Yes.

BY THE COURT:

 Okay. And then Number 5 says deposits you made to the joint
account since separation, which is $36,277.00. Is that a different
account and where did that money come from? Your salary from the
sheriff or money from that – since you separated. So is that $39 plus
the $36 that you've put towards that you're asking reimbursement for?

BY MR. YATES:

 My salary was direct deposited into the Capital One that I
didn't have access to.

BY THE COURT:

 And that's the one where all the bank payments were coming
out of that Ms. Yates had control over.

BY MR. YATES:

 That's correct, that's correct.

[NOEL YATES]:

 And then I continued to pay after I pulled my direct deposit,
which was after filing, I continued to pay her us agreeing $2,000.00
per month until the court ordered $1,000.00 per month.

BY THE COURT:

 Okay. And, so, that would have been from February, I think
you filed about February 27th–

BY MR. YATES:

 That's correct.

BY THE COURT:

 And when was the $1,000.00? I don't have that.

BY MR. YATES:

 It would've started in April of 20.

BY THE COURT:
 50
 2020?

BY MR. YATES:

 April of 20.

BY THE COURT:

 Okay. So you've paid March and April. So you've paid
$2,000.00 for two months. This $36,277.00, where did that come
from? What is that? Is that the $1,000.00 per month you put in that
account?

BY MR. YATES:

 And the direct deposit from separation.

BY THE COURT:

 Right. The $2,000.00 then the $1,000.00, so you're counting
every month you put $1,000.00 or $2,000.00 in there?

BY MR. YATES:

 That's correct.

BY THE COURT:

 Okay. I'm just trying to understand where – was that a – it's a
fairly lengthy, you'll probably know or Mrs. Talley or Mr. Fontenot
will know. The $1,000.00 that wasn't spousal support or child
support? That was just paying the bills?

BY MR. YATES:

 In the order, it said expenses and bills.

BY THE COURT:

 Okay. Is that correct, Mrs. Talley.

BY MRS. TALLEY:

 I'm sorry.

BY THE COURT:

 Expenses and bills, the $1,000.00 in the Court order was for
him to continue to pay expenses and bills till whatever –

 51
 BY MRS. TALLEY:

 Yes, yes.

 Noel testified that his separate funds were used to satisfy community debts,

"everyday living expenses." While Noel testified that he had cancelled checks as

proof of the payments he made, he did not submit any cancelled checks or bank

statements into the record except for one page of a November 30, 2019 statement

showing one of the deposits he received from his inheritance totaling $7,267.94,

and two pages of a statement that shows an electronic transfer of $1,000.00 to the

joint Capital One account in February 2020. Nevertheless, based on his testimony,

we find the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Noel used his separate

inheritance money from November 2019 through February 2020 to pay the

$2,000.00 per month to Lisa for ordinary expenses. While the Barksdale accounts

were joint accounts, it appears uncontested that once Noel deposited his

inheritance funds in those accounts, no other community funds were deposited.

 A judgment of divorce terminates the community of acquets and gains

retroactively to the date of the filing of the divorce petition. La.Civ.Code art. 159.

Again, La.Civ.Code art. 2365 allows reimbursement when "separate property of a

spouse has been used either during the existence of the community property regime

or thereafter to satisfy a community obligation[.]"

 We cannot say how the trial court arrived at a reimbursement of $36,277.00

based on payments of $2,000.00 and $1,000.00. Nothing in the record accounts for

the $277.00. We note that the "date of separation" is referred to frequently in the

record, but prior to the retroactive date of termination of the community, February

27, 2020, the only funds Noel would be entitled to are those he proved to be his

separate property. Noel is not entitled to reimbursement for the payments made

from June 2019, until he received his inheritance in November 2019, as the funds
 52
 used to make those payments were community property. Thus, we find the trial

court manifestly erred in awarding Noel payments from the date of separation

equaling $10,000.00 (five months at $2,000.00 per month) until the date he

received his inheritance. The trial court did not err in attributing the $2,000.00

payments from November 2019, through February 2020, as Noel's separate

property. Therefore, Noel is entitled to $8,000.00 in reimbursement for the

payments he made into the joint account in November 2019, December 2019,

January 2020, and February 2020.

 Regarding the payments made subsequent to termination, Noel provided no

documentary evidence to support the claims, but the testimony was clear from both

parties that he paid the $2,000.00 and $1,000.00. Therefore, Noel is entitled to

reimbursement for the remaining payments from termination until partition which

amounts to $2,000.00 per month for March 2020 and April 2020, and $1,000.00

per month for May 2020 thru July 2021 (15 months for a total of $15,000.00 +

$4,000.00 = $19,000.00). Accordingly, we amend the trial court's award of

$36,277.00 to $27,000.00. Noel is therefore entitled to one-half of that amount in

reimbursement, $13,500.00.

 Finally, despite significant effort on our part, we are unable to reconcile the

math in the trial court's written judgment with the math in the hearing partitioning

the property. One such example is that Noel requested $65,800.00 in

reimbursement but was awarded $158,298.82. According to Lisa, the judgment

was prepared by Noel's counsel without her input. Of notable concern is the

possibility that the reimbursement claims were not properly halved. In Carmichael

v. Brooks, 16-93 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/22/16), 194 So.3d 832, writs denied, 16-1396,

16-1501 (La. 11/7/16), 209 So.3d 100, the appellate court was faced with similar

issues and remanded for recalculation in light of its rulings. Similarly, we feel a
 53
 remand is necessary in order to recalculate assets, liabilities, and reimbursements

with attention given to halving as required by law, taking into consideration the

findings above and with the input of both Lisa and Noel's counsel.

 CONCLUSION

 We affirm the trial court's rulings relating to Lisa's MidAmerica retirement

plan; the home appraisal value of $590,000.00; the reimbursement award to Lisa

for insurance premium payments in the amount of $9,224.26; the reimbursement

award to Lisa for the Montana tractor in the amount of $4,500.00; the award of

$77.00 in reimbursement to Noel for transcript costs; the award of $250.00 in

reimbursement for the appraisal fee; the reimbursement award of $12,920.08 to

Noel for health, vision, and dental insurance payments; the reimbursement award

to Noel for $7,795.00 in mortgage payments; and the reimbursement to Noel of

$41,400.00 for rental reimbursement.

 We find the trial court manifestly erred in the following awards and amend

as follows: the reimbursement award to Lisa for car loan payments is amended to

$17,550.62; for credit card payments to $8,376.00; the award to Noel for property

taxes is amended to $429.67; the award to Noel for "deposits into joint account" to

$27,000.00.

 We find no manifest error in the trial court's ruling relating to the

Schamerhorn debt but order the trial court to amend the judgment to reflect same.

 We amend the trial court's ruling to reflect that Lisa is entitled to one half of

the community funds existing in the former joint accounts at the time of

termination, in the amount of $2,442.63.

 We reverse the reimbursement award of $2,030.02 for payments on

children's "insurance premiums," and the award for "Yates estate" in the amount

of $39,262.38. This case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 54
 Costs of this appeal are assessed equally between the parties, Noel W. Yates and

Lisa J. Yates.

 AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REVERSED IN PART;
 AND REMANDED.

 55