CourtListener opinion 151319

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FOR PUBLICATION
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOAN R. MACK, as Trustee of the 
Palace Jewelry & Loan Co., Inc.
401 (k) Profit Sharing Plan and
Trust,
 Plaintiff-Appellee,
 v.
RANDAL S. KUCKENMEISTER, CPA,
MST, as Administrator of the No. 09-15290
 
Estate of Charla Marie Mack, D.C. No.
Deceased, 3:08-cv-00370-ECR-
 Defendant-Appellee, RAM

DARREN ROY MACK, an individual,
 Defendant-Appellant,
 and
JOHN DOES, 1 through 50,
inclusive,
 Defendant.
 

 10565
 10566 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER

JOAN R. MACK, as Trustee of the 
Palace Jewelry & Loan Co., Inc.
401 (k) Profit Sharing Plan and
Trust,
 Plaintiff-Appellant,
 v.
 No. 09-15291
RANDAL S. KUCKENMEISTER, CPA,
 D.C. No.
MST, as Administrator of the
Estate of Charla Marie Mack,  3:08-cv-00370-ECR-
 RAM
Deceased; DARREN ROY MACK, an
individual, OPINION
 Defendants-Appellees,
 and
JOHN DOES, 1 through 50,
inclusive,
 Defendant.
 
 Appeals from the United States District Court
 for the District of Nevada
 Edward C. Reed, District Judge, Presiding

 Submitted April 16, 2010*
 San Francisco, California

 Filed July 22, 2010

 Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Sidney R. Thomas,
 Circuit Judges, and William Stafford,
 Senior District Judge.**

 *The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
 **The Honorable William Stafford, Senior United States District Judge
for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10567
Opinion by Judge Thomas
 10570 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER

 COUNSEL

Mark Wray, Law Offices of Mark Wray, Reno, Nevada, for
defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Darren Roy Mack.

Todd A. Bader, Bader & Ryan Ltd., Reno, Nevada, for
plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant Joan R. Mack.

Ryan W. Herrick and Ann Morgan, Jones Vargas, Reno,
Nevada, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellee Randal S.
Kuckenmeister.

 OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

 Darren Mack murdered his wife, Charla Mack, and shot the
state court judge overseeing their divorce proceedings before
a final written divorce decree could be filed. Believing Darren
Mack and Charla Mack had agreed to the terms of their
divorce before Charla Mack's murder, the Estate of Charla
Mack filed a motion in state court for the divorce decree to
be memorialized in an order dated nunc pro tunc to a time
before her death. The Nevada district court entered a domestic
relations order ("order" or "DRO") over Darren Mack's
objection. Among other things, the DRO decreed that a Quali-
fied Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO") should issue. Dar-
ren Mack appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which
affirmed the judgment.

 These appeals require us to determine whether state courts
have subject matter jurisdiction to decide that a state court
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10571
issued domestic relations order is a QDRO as defined by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et
seq. We conclude that they do and thus that the Nevada
Supreme Court's QDRO determination in Mack v. Estate of
Mack, 206 P.3d 98 (Nev. 2009), is entitled to full faith and
credit. We reverse and remand with instructions for the dis-
trict court to direct Joan Mack to deposit the contested funds
with the court, if she has not already done so, and to award
the funds to Randal Kuckenmeister, administrator of Charla
Mack's Estate.1

 I

 Darren Mack and Charla Mack were engaged in divorce
proceedings throughout 2005 and into the early part of 2006.
As part of the divorce, Darren Mack agreed that the court
would execute an order that would name Charla as the alter-
nate payee of a 401(k) plan. The state court tasked Charla
Mack's attorney with writing an order to that effect for the
court's signature. Prior to the signing of the order, however,
Darren Mack murdered Charla and shot the state court judge
who was presiding over the divorce.2 No written order was
entered by the state court before Charla's death.

 After Charla's death, her estate was granted permission to
substitute for Charla in the remainder of the divorce proceed-
ings. The estate moved for entry of an order nunc pro tunc
that would memorialize what the estate saw as oral orders
entered by the original divorce judge before Charla was
 1
 We take judicial notice of Mack and related filings. See Robinson Ran-
cheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.1992) (court
"may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without
the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to
matters at issue").
 2
 Darren Mack has been convicted of Charla's murder and of attempting
to murder the state district court judge. See Mack, 206 P.3d at 104.
 10572 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
killed. The motion was granted, and on June 20, 2007, the
state court entered an order, nunc pro tunc as of January 9,
2006—a date when Charla was still alive—stating that "a
QDRO will be executed which will transfer to Mrs. Mack the
sum of five hundred thousand dollars with any appreciation
that is distributed to that five hundred thousand dollars." Dar-
ren Mack appealed the order to the Nevada Supreme Court,
where he argued, inter alia, that the order contravened federal
law relating to retirement accounts.

 While his state appeal was pending, Darren Mack threat-
ened suit against the trustee of the 401(k) plan—his mother,
Joan Mack—should she pay the benefit to Charla Mack's
Estate. Joan Mack filed a complaint in federal court seeking
to interplead the $500,000 in retirement money.3

 Darren Mack answered the complaint and filed a cross-
claim against the Administrator of Charla Mack's Estate,
Randal Kuckenmeister, claiming the right to the $500,000.4
 3
 Joan Mack's pleadings request declaratory judgment as to "the rights
and obligations of the parties with respect to the retirement benefits."
However, the complaint, which she labels "Complaint for Interpleader,"
citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(1), also asks that "the Defendants be required
to . . . settle between themselves their right to the retirement benefits" and
requests that she "be discharged from any . . . further liability." At no
point does she assert that the plan is not liable to pay the benefits to any-
one, or seek adjudication of any dispute other than the dispute over the
funds that she has sought to deposit with the court. Nor has a claimant to
the stake asserted a counterclaim against her. She, the other litigants, and
the district court have treated this as an interpleader case throughout the
proceedings. Therefore, we consider her to be a disinterested stakeholder
and construe her request for a declaration as to "the rights and obligations
of the parties" as a request that she be declared discharged from further
liability upon deposit of the interpleaded funds with the court.
 4
 Darren Mack argues that what he labeled as a cross-claim was only an
answer to Joan Mack's complaint and is not subject to dismissal. Darren
Mack's filing in the district court is clearly labeled as both an answer and
a cross-claim, clearly structured as such, and clearly includes the factual
basis for his legal claim to the interpleaded funds. If his claim of entitle-
ment is precluded by the Nevada court ruling, and we hold that it is, it is
subject to dismissal no matter what it is called.
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10573
Kuckenmeister filed a motion to dismiss Joan Mack's com-
plaint, and a second motion to dismiss Darren Mack's cross-
claim. In both, he argued that the issue of who has the right
to the pension funds mentioned in the state court order had
already been resolved by the state court and that relitigation
was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Joan Mack
and Darren Mack argued that Joan Mack's complaint was not
estopped because she had not participated in the Nevada court
proceedings and was not in privity with Darren Mack. They
also argued that while the state court did purport to determine
who would be entitled to the retirement fund under state law,
the issue before the federal court was whether that order was
a QDRO under federal law.

 The district court agreed with Kuckenmeister that "the
issue to be decided in this case" was "the rights of the various
parties with respect to th[e] retirement funds," which "is the
same issue that was decided in the prior state court action."
It found that because Joan Mack "as trustee of the retirement
plan . . . has no independent interest as to which party . . .
receives the retirement funds," her "interests were represented
in the state court proceeding when the state court determined
to execute the QDRO in favor of Charla." It therefore dis-
missed Joan Mack's complaint and Darren Mack's cross-
claim as precluded by collateral estoppel. Darren Mack has
appealed the dismissal of the complaint and the dismissal of
his cross-claim. Joan Mack filed a cross-appeal regarding the
dismissal of her complaint.

 While the federal appeals were pending, the Nevada
Supreme Court issued an opinion in the state court appeal.
The opinion not only decided the validity of a nunc pro tunc
domestic relations order under state law, but determined that
the order was in fact a QDRO under federal law. See Mack,
206 P.3d at 109-10.

 This appeal was briefed after the Nevada Supreme Court
published its opinion. Darren Mack and Joan Mack maintain
 10574 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
that a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine
whether an order issued in a domestic relations case is a
QDRO, and therefore that its determination cannot be binding
in a federal case. Even if a state court can have jurisdiction,
they argue that the plan administrator must be given the first
opportunity to evaluate an order and determine if it is a
QDRO. They continue to argue that Joan Mack was not in
privity with any party that participated in the state court pro-
ceeding, and thus that the state court decisions are not binding
on her.

 II

 "Under the federal full faith and credit statute, federal
courts must give state court judgments the preclusive effect
that those judgments would enjoy under the law of the state
in which the judgment was rendered." Far Out Prods., Inc. v.
Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738). Nevada applies "Nevada issue preclusion" to "deter-
mine the issue preclusive effect of a state decision." Bower v.
Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., 215 P.3d 709, 718-19 (Nev. 2009).

 In Nevada, issue preclusion requires that (1) an issue
 be identical, (2) the initial ruling was final and on the
 merits, (3) the party against whom the judgment is
 asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the
 prior case, and (4) the issue was actually and neces-
 sarily litigated.

Id. at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 The preclusive effect of a prior judgment is a question of
law reviewed de novo. See Far Out, 247 F.3d at 993. "The
party seeking to assert a judgment against another has the bur-
den of proving the preclusive effect of the judgment." Bower,
215 P.3d at 718.

 As an initial matter, we reject Darren Mack's contention
that he has raised any issue in federal court that was not
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10575
already litigated in state court. The question of whether the
order was a QDRO was actually and necessarily litigated
before the Nevada Supreme Court, as was the state court's
subject matter jurisdiction to answer that question in the first
instance. See Mack, 206 P.3d at 109 ("Darren [Mack] argues
that in order for there to be a QDRO, the court must issue a
domestic relations order (DRO) and the plan administrator
must then determine if it is qualified."); id. at 109-10 (holding
that "[w]hether a DRO constitutes a valid QDRO under
ERISA is a question of law," which a state court can deter-
mine in the first instance by looking to the statutory require-
ments and underlying order (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. at 109 (reviewing the applicable statute).

 This is not the end of our inquiry, however. Under Nevada
law, a court judgment must be "valid" to have preclusive
effect. Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 465,
473 (Nev. 1998). That is to say, the court must have personal
and subject matter jurisdiction. Infirm judgments are not enti-
tled to full faith and credit in federal courts. See Kremer v.
Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482-83(1982); see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386
(1996) (noting that state court judgments are binding only if
the state court had power to enter the judgment). Judgments
issued without authority are void as a matter of Nevada state
law and, therefore, can have no preclusive effect under 28
U.S.C. § 1738. Landreth v. Malik, 221 P.3d 1265, 1267 (Nev.
2009). We must determine this issue independently. See Shaw
v. Cal. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600,
607 (9th Cir. 1986) (a court must deny preclusive effect to a
prior decision if the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction).

 Therefore, we are called upon to decide whether or not a
state court has jurisdiction to determine that a DRO is a
QDRO, and whether there are any other jurisdictional require-
ments (such as exhaustion before the plan administrator or
joinder of the plan administrator in the state court proceeding,
 10576 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
neither of which occurred in this case) before a state court
may do so.

 III

 A

 [1] ERISA states that "a court of competent jurisdiction"
can determine whether a DRO is a QDRO. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(H)(i). The first question we must answer in this
appeal, therefore, is whether a state court is "a court of com-
petent jurisdiction" for these purposes. Like every court
before us to consider this question, we answer this question
in the affirmative.5

 ERISA has a spendthrift provision that forbids a benefi-
ciary from assigning or alienating his rights to pension plan
benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). The statute also preempts
state laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). In the early days of ERISA litigation, courts
were faced with the question of whether state court DROs that
purported to transfer rights to ERISA pension funds to a plan
 5
 See Geiger v. Foley Hoag LLP Ret. Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir.
2008); Scales v. Gen. Motors Corp. Pension Adm'r, 275 F. Supp. 2d 871,
876 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Jones v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1224,
1232 (D. Wyo. 1999); Bd. of Trs. of Laborers Pension Trust Fund for N.
Cal. v. Levingston, 816 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 (N.D. Cal. 1993); In re Mar-
riage of Oddino, 939 P.2d 1266, 1275 (Cal. 1997); Robson v. Elec. Con-
tractors Ass'n Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi., Pension Plan
No. 5, 727 N.E.2d 692, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Eller v. Bolton, 895 A.2d
382, 393 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Langston v. Wilson McShane
Corp., 776 N.W.2d 684, 693 (Minn. 2009); see also Hawkins v. CIR, 86
F.3d 982, 987 (10th Cir. 1996) (assuming without deciding that a state
court could have decided whether an agreement satisfied the statutory def-
inition of a QDRO); Ronald J. Cooke, 2 ERISA Practice and Procedure
§ 2:23 (2d ed. 2003), at 2-157-2-158 ("In seeking enforcement of these
orders, . . . a state court has concurrent jurisdiction to review a pension
plan administrator's determination of whether a state court order is a qual-
ified domestic relations order.").
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10577
participant's ex-spouse or children violated ERISA's spend-
thrift clause or fell victim to the statute's preemption provi-
sion. Some courts held that the orders were unenforceable,
while others read an exception into the two provisions of the
statute and enforced the orders. See Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of
Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415,
419 (9th Cir. 2000). Responding to this confusion, Congress
enacted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA"), Pub. L.
No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426, which amended ERISA to permit
state court ordered assignments of plan benefits to former
spouses and dependents. See S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 19,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2565.

 [2] As amended, ERISA now explicitly exempts from its
anti-alienation and preemption provisions a subset of DROs.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(A), 1144(b)(7). To be exempt, such
orders must be judgments, decrees, or orders "made pursuant
to State domestic relations law" that "create[ ] or recognize[ ]
the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assign[ ] to
an alternate payee the right to, receive all or part of the bene-
fits payable with respect to a participant under a[n ERISA]
plan." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(A), 1056(d)(3)(B). The REA
also lists the few parties to whom a DRO may assign benefits,
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(I)(ii), the type and amount of ben-
efits it may assign, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D), and specific
information that it must contain, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C).
Assuming a state court issues a DRO that substantially con-
forms to these requirements, it has issued a QDRO that
creates enforceable interests in the proceeds of an ERISA
plan. Tise, 234 F.3d at 420; Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co.
Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000).

 It is clear from this description that state family law, not
ERISA, has created, recognized, or assigned the alternate
payee's right to plan benefits. As we have explained in prior
litigation, ERISA merely describes which state law created
interests are enforceable in court. See Tise, 234 F.3d at 421
("[A] QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing
 10578 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
interest . . . ."). ERISA's QDRO provision does not somehow
create a right to plan benefits or create a right to enforce a
state law order.

 [3] The source and form of an alternate payee's state law
interest in pension benefits is critical to determining whether
state courts can ever have jurisdiction to determine that a
DRO is a QDRO. This is so because ERISA grants federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over most ERISA cases, includ-
ing those where the plaintiff requests equitable relief to
enforce provisions of ERISA or enjoin violations of the stat-
ute, while providing state courts with concurrent jurisdiction
over cases brought "to recover benefits" or "to enforce . . . or
to clarify" rights under the terms of the plan itself. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3), 1132(e)(1). Because a DRO
creates or describes a beneficiary's right to benefits under an
ERISA plan, a party named alternate payee in a DRO wishing
to enforce, clarify, or collect on those rights first requires a
determination that the rights are enforceable. Therefore, in the
course of proceedings to enforce, clarify, or collect, a court
may be called upon to determine whether or not the DRO is
a QDRO. Because a state court has concurrent jurisdiction
over these proceedings under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), see
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496,
1500 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1984), it follows that it has jurisdiction
to decide the intermediate question of whether or not the DRO
is a QDRO.

 Joan Mack argues that the question of enforceability actu-
ally relates more closely to the actions for equitable relief and
enforcement of statutory rights described in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3), over which federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction. We can imagine the case where the qualified status of
a DRO must be litigated during the course of proceedings to
enjoin a violation of ERISA or otherwise enforce the statute.
Just because the question could arise in a case where the fed-
eral courts have exclusive jurisdiction, however, does not
mean that a state court could not have concurrent jurisdiction
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10579
when it arises in a different context. Cf. Carmona v. Car-
mona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Although the
present suit, as pleaded, arises under the exclusive jurisdiction
of federal courts, when the parties proceeded initially, the
state court had concurrent jurisdiction to hear the ERISA
claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).").6

 Joan Mack also argues that any lawsuit that incidentally
requires a court to interpret a provision of ERISA falls within
the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction. She fails to cite a
single case so holding, however, and we have not found one
either. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500 & n.2 ("Congress
granted the federal courts jurisdiction, in part exclusive, in
part concurrent with state courts, over matters falling within
ERISA's explicit provisions or this supplementary federal
common law."). Determining whether or not a DRO falls
within the QDRO exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provi-
sion requires no more interpretation of ERISA than determin-
ing whether a state law cause of action falls to ERISA's
preemption provision, something that state courts are called
on to do regularly. See Paul J. Schneider & Barbara W. Freed-
man, ERISA: A Comprehensive Guide § 8.07 (2d ed. 2003),
at 8-44 n.236 (comparing state and federal court holdings
regarding ERISA preemption); cf. Marin Gen'l Hosp. v.
Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir.
2009) ("[A] defense of conflict preemption under [ERISA]
§ 514(a) does not confer federal question jurisdiction on a
federal district court.").

 Joan Mack also makes an argument based on ERISA's leg-
islative history, citing a Conference Report that predates the
REA and the federal court decisions that led Congress to
 6
 Nor does it mean that a state court determination of the QDRO issue
in a case where the state court had jurisdiction is anything but preclusive
in a subsequent case, such as this one, where the federal courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(e)(1) (state courts
do not have concurrent jurisdiction over suits brought by fiduciaries).
 10580 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
enact the REA. See H.R. Rep. 93-1280, at 68, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107. Because the Conference
Report relates jurisdiction to the structure of the original stat-
ute and tells us nothing of the substantive intent of Congress,
it is not persuasive regarding the amended statute. See Bd. of
Trs. of Laborers Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Levings-
ton, 816 F. Supp. 1496, 1499-1500 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (reject-
ing argument because of the date of the legislative history and
because it "does not mesh with the plain language of
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)"); In re Marriage of Oddino, 939 P.2d 1266,
1272-73 (Cal. 1997) (same, and because, "[w]hile Congress
clearly intended that actions to enforce rights created by
ERISA's title I would be limited to federal courts, rights to
benefits awarded in a QDRO are not derived from ERISA, but
from state law and plan terms").

 B

 [4] Having decided that a state court has jurisdiction to
determine whether or not a DRO is a QDRO, at least if it is
doing so in the course of proceedings to "recover . . . , enforce
. . . , or . . . clarify" benefit rights, we must now decide
whether any other jurisdictional hurdles stand in the way of
affirming the district court judgment. The next question,
therefore, is whether or not the plan administrator needed to
have been given the opportunity to determine if the DRO was
a QDRO before the issue was decided by the state court.
Because ERISA's administrative exhaustion requirement is
prudential rather than jurisdictional, we answer that question
in the negative.

 Generally, before ERISA participants or beneficiaries can
bring suit to recover plan benefits, they must exhaust a plan's
internal claims procedure. See Paul J. Schneider & Barbara
W. Freedman, ERISA: A Comprehensive Guide § 8.03[F] (3d
ed. 2008), at 8-11 & n.52 (listing cases). Exhaustion is
required for a variety of reasons, including "to help reduce the
number of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10581
consistent treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a non-
adversarial method of claims settlement; and to minimize the
costs of claims settlement of all concerned." Amato v. Ber-
nard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980). Because the exhaus-
tion requirement is a creation of the federal courts, however,
and is not written into the statute, it is a prudential rather than
jurisdictional requirement. Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare
Corp. Health Plan, 546 F.3d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 2008).

 The REA explicitly contemplated the possibility of admin-
istrative exhaustion of the QDRO question. It requires pen-
sion plans to "establish reasonable procedures to determine
the qualified status of domestic relations orders and to admin-
ister distributions under such qualified orders." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(G)(ii). Any time that a DRO is "received by a
plan," the plan must promptly notify the participant and alter-
nate payee that it has received the order and of its procedure
for determining the qualified status of the plan. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(I). "[W]ithin a reasonable period" thereaf-
ter, it must actually determine whether the order is a QDRO.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(G)(i)(II).

 [5] Based on this language, we have assumed that a plan
administrator should have the first opportunity to determine
whether or not a DRO is a QDRO. See Tise, 234 F.3d at 421
("Whether a state court's order meets the statutory require-
ments to be a QDRO, and therefore is enforceable against the
pension plan, is a matter determined in the first instance by
the pension plan administrator, and, if necessary, by a court
of competent jurisdiction."); see also Eller v. Bolton, 895
A.2d 382, 393 n. 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Langston v.
Wilson McShane Corp., 776 N.W.2d 684, 693 (Minn. 2009).
This assumption is supported by the text of the statute, as well
as our holdings with regard to ERISA administrative exhaus-
tion generally.

 [6] We have no reason to believe that this exhaustion
requirement is jurisdictional where the others are prudential,
 10582 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
however. Nowhere do the REA amendments require exhaus-
tion by their language. To the contrary, they merely require
the plan administrator to take certain steps so that he will be
prepared to evaluate DROs, and certain other steps if a DRO
is actually "received." This is not to say that a state court
should not consider whether and why a litigant has failed to
present a DRO to the plan administrator before filing suit. It
should.7 We hold only that its failure to do so will not defeat
a claim of issue preclusion in subsequent litigation.

 C

 Having decided that a state court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether a DRO is a QDRO during the course of a civil
action filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that
administrative exhaustion is a prudential rather than jurisdic-
tional requirement, we must now decide whether the state
court here had jurisdiction. In this case, the QDRO determina-
tion was made by a state appellate court during the direct
appeal of a family court order, wherein the plan participant
raised ERISA's preemption provisions as a defense on the
merits to entry of the order. We hold that the state court had
jurisdiction in this context.

 [7] State courts have jurisdiction to interpret and apply
ERISA in certain cases other than "civil action[s]" filed under
 7
 We recognize that the Nevada Supreme Court may have decided that
exhaustion was not required in this case. See Vaught, 546 F.3d at 626-27
("[T]here are occasions when a court is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction
and is guilty of an abuse of discretion if it does not, the most familiar
examples perhaps being when resort to the administrative route is futile or
the remedy inadequate."). The interwoven legal questions relating to nunc
pro tunc domestic relations orders and ERISA are arguably more suitable
for determination by a court of law than an administrator of pension bene-
fits plan. Moreover, it could well have been futile for the Estate to go first
to the plan administrator, who happens to be the participant's mother.
Nonetheless, it would have been preferable for the Nevada courts to have
conducted this analysis explicitly.
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10583
the statute. Of importance to our analysis here are conflict
preemption cases. Section 1144(a) explains that certain sub-
chapters of ERISA "supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a). Where § 1144(a) is raised as a defense in a case
that does not otherwise arise under ERISA, state courts retain
jurisdiction over the case and over the preemption question.
Moreover, the cases are not removable to federal court, even
under the rule announced in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58 (1987), that certain cases implicating ERISA are
removable under an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule. See Marin Gen'l Hosp., 581 F.3d at 944 (distinguishing
removable complete preemption cases from non-removable
conflict preemption cases).

 This is not the first time a court has been asked to address
the question of state court jurisdiction in a case that does not
fit comfortably in the § 1132(a)(1)(B) mold. In Scales v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. Pension Adm'r, 275 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D.
Mich. 2003), for example, after a plan administrator deter-
mined that a DRO was not a QDRO, the alternate payee
named in the DRO filed a motion in her divorce case seeking
an order to show cause why her former husband and the
administrator of the pension plan should not be held in con-
tempt for failing to comply with the DRO. Id. at 873. The
administrator attempted to remove the case to federal court,
arguing that the order to show cause was really a
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) "claim." Id. at 874. The federal district court
held that the state court proceedings were not removable to
federal court because ERISA was being invoked only "as a
defense on the grounds that the [DROs] do not meet the
requirements of a QDRO"; and that the state court had juris-
diction to determine whether a DRO was a QDRO even
though the case was not a "civil action" as described in
§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Id. at 876-77.

 The posture of this case is quite similar. Darren Mack
raised the preemption provisions of ERISA as an affirmative
 10584 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
defense against the Estate's claim for a written, nunc pro tunc
DRO. Darren Mack argued that the nunc pro tunc order was
invalid because it was not a QDRO, and could never be per-
fected to become one, because ERISA does not permit pen-
sion benefits to be awarded to a deceased (as opposed to
divorced) spouse. He also took issue with the use of Nevada's
slayer statute to justify issuing a nunc pro tunc order, which
Nevada family courts generally would not have the authority
to do, arguing that such a construction of the slayer statute is
preempted by ERISA.

 [8] The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Darren Mack's
first ERISA argument after determining that the initial oral
order for the execution of a QDRO "created a recognized
existence in Charla, the right to receive a portion of Darren's
ERISA pension plan," during her lifetime. Mack, 206 P.3d at
109-10. It rejected his second ERISA argument as well, quot-
ing a Second Circuit opinion that " ‘laws of general
application' "—such as the slayer statute—" ‘whose effect on
ERISA plans is incidental' " are not preempted by ERISA. Id.
at 110 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142,
146 (2d Cir. 1989)). The Nevada Supreme Court might have
been able to address these arguments without actually deter-
mining that the DRO was a QDRO. Darren Mack does not
argue that the state court determination was dicta and not enti-
tled to full faith and credit, however, and Darren Mack is the
one who argued that the order was not a QDRO, inviting the
Nevada Supreme Court to decide otherwise.8 We are not pre-
 8
 In Oddino, a case similar to Scales, Mary, the alternate payee, first
presented the DRO to the plan administrator, who determined that the
DRO was a QDRO, but that it awarded a smaller portion of the benefits
than Mary believed she was entitled to receive. Mary then returned to fam-
ily court and sought an order requiring the plan to calculate the benefits
as she had. The administrator objected, arguing that the state court did not
have jurisdiction since Mary was, in effect, asking the court to enforce a
provision of ERISA, which only a federal court may do. 929 P.3d at 1269.
The California Supreme Court determined that the state court had jurisdic-
tion to hear Mary's motion, which "is properly considered an action by a
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10585
pared to say that the court exceeded the scope of its appellate
jurisdiction when it reached this issue.

 [9] Therefore, we hold that the Nevada courts had jurisdic-
tion to determine that the DRO was a QDRO.

 IV

 In a ruling that was final and on the merits, the Nevada
Supreme Court determined that the DRO was a QDRO, the
exact issue that Darren Mack litigated there and wishes to
relitigate here. That ruling is clearly binding against Darren
Mack. We must also decide, however, whether it is binding
on Joan Mack, and if not, what the proper course of action is
to resolve Joan Mack's cross-appeal.

 [10] Under Nevada state law, a party can only be barred
from litigating an issue decided in a suit to which he was not
party if he is "in privity with a party in the prior litigation."
Bower, 215 P.3d at 718. "To be in privity, the person must
have acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the
judgment through . . . one of the parties, as by inheritance,
succession, or purchase." Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (omission in original). Joan Mack is Darren Mack's
mother and the trustee of his ERISA pension plan, but she has
not somehow acquired his interest in his benefits, and thus she
is not in privity with him under Nevada law.

 The District Court erred when it held that "Plaintiff's inter-
ests were sufficiently represented in the state court proceed-

beneficiary to recover, enforce rights to, or clarify future benefits under
the terms of a plan, within the meaning of section 1132(a)(1)(B)." Id. at
1271. While we agree with the court's sentiment—that it had jurisdiction,
and that the case was more like a § 1132(a)(1)(B) action than a
§ 1132(a)(3) action—possible complications regarding federal court juris-
diction and removal counsel us to take this extra step to distinguish QDRO
determinations made in the course of family law proceedings from those
made in separate civil actions.
 10586 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
ings," reasoning that she, "as trustee, has no independent
interest as to which party — Charla Mack or Darren Mack —
receives the retirement fund." As the Nevada Supreme Court
clarified in Bower, while this case was on appeal, this is an
incorrect understanding of Nevada law. Nevada law does not
permit estoppel by representation, but actually requires a type
of privity that goes far beyond the relationship of a trustee and
beneficiary.

 It makes sense that Joan Mack would be permitted to liti-
gate these issues anew. As trustee of the 401(k) Plan, Joan
Mack owes a fiduciary duty not only to Darren Mack, but to
the other plan participants. And she has a duty under ERISA
to qualify domestic relations orders. If Joan Mack were to
have filed an action for declaratory judgment, she would have
been permitted to proceed notwithstanding a state court order
regarding the same facts and issues that she wished to raise
in federal court. See Carmona, 544 F.3d at 997. But she did
not. She filed an action in interpleader, meaning that she has
"effectively disclaim[ed] any position as to which of the
claimants is entitled to the fund." Tise, 234 F.3d at 426; see
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415, 417 (6th
Cir. 1997) (ERISA fiduciary dismissed from interpleader suit
as soon as it deposited the contested funds with the court).

 [11] Even though Joan Mack will be unable to challenge
the state court's QDRO determination in any way, it was still
error for the district court to dismiss the interpleader com-
plaint, and certainly error for it to do so because of collateral
estoppel.

 Issue preclusion "applies to prevent relitigation of only a
specific issue that was decided in a previous suit between the
parties." Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 194 P.3d 709, 714
(Nev. 2008). The requirement of privity is meant "to restrict
the application of issue preclusion to parties whose due pro-
cess rights have been met." Bower, 215 P.3d at 717. The mere
fact that a party's substantive rights are not implicated by
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10587
applying the doctrine does not mean it is appropriate to apply
it where the party has not yet been afforded the process due
it by the courts.

 [12] Nor could the district court have dismissed her com-
plaint in interpleader on the grounds that there was no true
conflict over the pension funds. A stakeholder may file an
interpleader action to protect itself against "potential, as well
as actual, claims." Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174
F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Darren Mack has not
actually disclaimed his right to the funds—and, to the con-
trary, asserted a right in both federal and state court—Joan
Mack's interpleader action is proper.

 As the Fifth Circuit explained succinctly in Rhoades v.
Casey, 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1999):

 An interpleader action typically involves two stages.
 In the first stage, the district court decides whether
 the requirements for rule or statutory interpleader
 action have been met by determining if there is a sin-
 gle fund at issue and whether there are adverse
 claimants to that fund. Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed-
 eral Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 1714 (1986). If
 the district court finds that the interpleader action has
 been properly brought the district court will then
 make a determination of the respective rights of the
 claimants. Id.

Rhoades, 196 F.3d at 600. To hold at this stage that there is
only one potential claim for the fund, this court first would
need to understand "potential . . . claim[ ]" to mean a claim
that a court will determine is not precluded by a prior court
judgment. The purpose of interpleader is for the stakeholder
to "protect itself against the problems posed by multiple
claimants to a single fund." Ensley, 174 F.3d at 980. This
includes protecting against the possibility of court-imposed
liability to a second claimant where the stakeholder has
 10588 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER
already voluntarily paid a first claimant. But it also includes
limiting litigation expenses, which is not dependent on the
merits of adverse claims, only their existence. See Tise, 234
F.3d at 426 ("Interpleader is a valuable procedural device for
ERISA plans who are confronted with conflicting multiple
claims upon the proceeds of an individual's benefit plan . . .
[and who thus] risk[ ] defending against multiple lawsuits
brought by the adverse claimants.").

 For interpleader to be held improper based on the merits of
the claims being asserted against the fund or stakeholder,
courts would be required to address the merits of the claims
before propriety of the interpleader. This is backwards of the
usual order, and would defeat the resource-conservation pur-
poses of interpleader. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Kraft, 200 F.2d 952, 954 (2d Cir.1953) (interpleader is not
dependent on the merit of the defendants' claims).

 V

 Because the Nevada Supreme Court opinion does not pre-
clude Joan Mack from arguing that there are multiple poten-
tial claimants to the fund, her complaint in interpleader should
not have been dismissed. Rather, she should have been per-
mitted to deposit the $500,000 with the court and then dis-
missed from the case, no longer having a legal interest in who
had a right to the funds. At that point, Kuckenmeister's
motion to dismiss Darren Mack's cross-claim could properly
have been granted, leaving Kuckenmeister the sole claimant
to the funds.

 Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand with instructions that Joan Mack be directed to
deposit the contested funds with the court, if she has not
already done so. Thereupon, the district court will dismiss
Joan Mack from the case, dismiss Darren Mack's cross-claim,
and enter judgment in favor of Kuckenmeister.
 MACK v. KUCKENMEISTER 10589
 Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal and cross-
appeal.

 REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUC-
TIONS.