CourtListener opinion 2728792

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Clean opinion text

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

 NO. COA13-1133

 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

 Filed: 15 April 2014

JENESS J. CAMPBELL,
 Plaintiff,

 v. Wake County
 No. 09 CVD 17335
MELVIN E. CAMPBELL,
 Defendant.

 Appeal by defendant from order entered 3 May 2013 by Judge

Lori G. Christian in Wake County District Court. Heard in the

Court of Appeals 19 February 2014.

 Kurtz & Blum, PLLC, by Lynn A. Prather, and Sandlin Family
 Law Group, by Debra A. Griffiths, for plaintiff-appellee.

 Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Michelle D. Connell, for
 defendant-appellant.

 BRYANT, Judge.

 The District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

claims for equitable distribution and alimony, and can

incorporate those claims into a judgment for absolute divorce by

the consent of both parties. A separation agreement, once
 -2-
incorporated by the trial court into a divorce judgment, can be

enforced through the contempt powers of the court.

 On 31 August 2009, plaintiff Jeness J. Campbell filed for

absolute divorce from defendant Melvin E. Campbell. That same

day, plaintiff filed a separate action for a qualified domestic

relations order ("QDRO").1 On 15 October 2009, defendant

answered and filed a pro se answer and counterclaim for

equitable distribution, alimony and attorneys' fees. Although

defendant captioned his answer and counterclaim in response to

plaintiff's complaint for absolute divorce, he listed on his

response the file number as being 09 CVD 173334, which does not

match the file number for either the divorce action (09 CVD

17335) or the QDRO action (09 CVS 17334).

 On 30 November 2009, plaintiff filed motions to dismiss, to

strike, and for Rule 11 sanctions, alleging that defendant's

counterclaim was an insufficient defense to absolute divorce and

contained irrelevant material meant to harass plaintiff, and

that defendant's counterclaim was meritless because defendant

had already agreed to a mediated settlement agreement resolving

1
 Plaintiff's QDRO action, 09 CVD 17334, sought an order
regarding a $25,000.00 lump sum distribution to defendant from
plaintiff's Duke University retirement plan. On 19 February
2010, the trial court issued an order granting plaintiff's QDRO
action.
 -3-
all issues. On 3 December 2009, plaintiff filed an affidavit of

judicial assignment and notice of hearing requesting an

expedited hearing date for her motions to dismiss, to strike,

and for Rule 11 sanctions.

 On 3 February 2010, a memorandum of mediated settlement

agreement was filed. The settlement agreement contained

provisions for the sale of the marital home in Brier Creek and a

property in Kentucky; the division of bank, credit card, and

retirement accounts; custody and visitation rights for the

parties' dog, Bella; and plaintiff's alimony payments and

distributive award to defendant. That same day, the trial court

entered a judgment for absolute divorce which incorporated the

memorandum of settlement agreement and noted that with the

exception of the pending QDRO, "[a]ll other outstanding issues

between the parties have been resolved pursuant to the mediated

agreement." On 15 March 2010, the trial court entered an order

dismissing all of plaintiff's motions and defendant's

counterclaims.

 On 26 March 2012, plaintiff filed a motion to modify

alimony and for an order to show cause. Plaintiff alleged that

defendant had: relinquished his rights to the family dog, Bella;

failed to abide by the trial court's order regarding the sale of
 -4-
the Kentucky property; experienced an improvement in his

financial situation requiring a change in plaintiff's alimony

payments; and that defendant "has been frustrating the sale of

the marital residence so that he can remain living there rent-

free with Plaintiff paying the entire mortgage, taxes, home

owners association fees and social country club dues."

Plaintiff thereafter dismissed her motion to modify alimony. An

amended and supplemental motion for an order to show cause was

filed by plaintiff on 11 January 2013, and again on 22 January,

alleging defendant had committed many acts that obstructed the

sale of the marital home.

 In the meantime, on 10 January 2013, defendant filed

motions to modify alimony and to show cause for contempt,

alleging that plaintiff had refused to sign listing contracts

with realtors, failed to reimburse defendant for repairs to the

marital home, and had violated defendant's visitation rights

with the family dog. Defendant further alleged that because

plaintiff's financial situation had improved while defendant's

financial situation simultaneously declined, defendant was

entitled to an increase in alimony.

 On 5 February 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for Rule 11

sanctions against defendant, alleging that defendant's motions
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were meritless and filed to harass her. Defendant filed motions

to compel and for sanctions on 12 February. On 14 February,

plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant's motions to

compel and for sanctions and a motion for Rule 37 sanctions,

again alleging that defendant's motions to compel and for

sanctions were frivolous and made solely for the purpose of

harassing her.

 On 18 March 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on

all motions filed by plaintiff and defendant. The trial court

issued a contempt order on 2 May, holding defendant in civil

contempt of the 3 February 2010 order2; denying plaintiff's

motions for Rule 11 and Rule 37 sanctions; and dismissing

defendant's motions to compel, modify alimony and for sanctions.

Defendant appeals.

 __________________________

2
 In holding defendant in civil contempt of the 3 February 2010
order, the trial court made findings of fact that defendant
willfully refused to sell the marital home by: failing to place
the home on the market with a reputable real estate agent;
listing the home at an unrealistic sale price; refusing to place
"for sale" signs in the yard or a lock box on the door; making
unreasonable demands and conditions on realtors wishing to show
the home to potential buyers; and failing to keep the home in a
saleable condition by not making required repairs, maintaining
the yard, and keeping the home's temperature at a comfortable
level. The trial court then noted that "[i]t is clear that
Defendant is willfully blocking the sale of the marital house"
and that "Defendant's actions are willful and calculated to
ensure that the house will never sell."
 -6-
 On appeal, defendant argues that: (I) the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's claims for

alimony and equitable distribution; (II) the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to incorporate the memorandum of

mediated settlement agreement into the divorce complaint; and

(III) defendant cannot be held in contempt of a void order.

 I.

 Defendant first argues that the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over his claims for alimony and equitable

distribution. We disagree.

 \[W]hether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is