CourtListener opinion 2797516

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REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

 OF MARYLAND

 No. 2426

 September Term, 2013

 JASON PULLIAM

 v.

 JILL IRENE PULLIAM

 Zarnoch,
 Graeff,
 Leahy,

 JJ.

 Opinion by Leahy, J.

 Filed: April 29, 2015
 Appellant Jason Pulliam is a law enforcement officer employed by the Maryland

Transportation Authority Police Force. During divorce proceedings in the Circuit Court

for Harford County, Appellant and his then-wife, Appellee Jill Irene Pulliam, agreed, as

reflected in the consent judgment entered, that she would receive one half of the marital

share of his Law Enforcement Officers' Pension System ("LEOPS") pension. The parties

dispute whether, pursuant to the agreement and consent judgment, a voluntary Deferred

Retirement Option Program ("DROP") benefit is part of Husband's pension plan and

properly included in Wife's eligible domestic relations order ("EDRO"). The circuit

court concluded that Husband's LEOPS pension plan encompassed the DROP benefits

and entered the EDRO.

 We hold that the parties' consent judgment was unambiguous and that DROP

benefits are part of the LEOPS pension as a matter of law for purposes of the parties'

EDRO. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

 BACKGROUND

 Jason and Jill Pulliam were married on June 4, 2005, and one child was born

during their marriage. On June 19, 2010, the parties separated, and ultimately filed for

divorce in the Circuit Court for Harford County.1 At the uncontested divorce hearing

held on February 7, 2012, the parties, through their counsel, placed the settlement

1
 On January 12, 2011, Appellee filed a complaint for limited divorce in the Circuit
Court for Harford County. Appellant filed a counter-complaint for limited divorce on
February 22, 2011. Thereafter, Appellant filed a supplemental counter-complaint for
absolute divorce on July 21, 2011, and Appellee filed an amended and supplemental
complaint for absolute divorce on August 25, 2011. Appellee filed a second Amended
and Supplemental Complaint for Absolute Divorce on October 19, 2011.

 1
 agreement that they had reached on the record. Of particular relevance to this appeal, the

agreement addressed Husband's membership in the LEOPS, in which he had been

enrolled since November 1, 1997 through his employment at the Maryland

Transportation Authority. The parties announced they had agreed that:

 Each party will retain [his or her] own 401-K retirement savings.

 Mr. Pulliam has a pension through his employer, a law enforcement
 pension. He will assign a portion of that to Mrs. Pulliam equal to one half,
 or 60 months, will be the marital share. She is entitled to one half of that
 portion of service.

 Mrs. Pulliam has, at her option and cost, to opt for survivor benefits
 at the time Mr. Pulliam retires.

Both parties accepted these terms on the record and affirmed their understanding that

neither party could "come back and ask for a marital award or for the Court to adjust

interest in marital property, or for the Court to take any action regarding property, other

than to enforce the terms of this agreement."

 On March 23, 2012, the court entered a judgment of absolute divorce. In its order,

the court recognized that the parties had reached an agreement "as to all issues arising out

of their marriage"; that this agreement had been read into the record; and that the

judgment entered contained its terms. The judgment specifically addressed retirement

benefits as follows:

 ORDERED, that each party shall retain as their sole and separate
 property their respective interest in and to their own 401K Plans; and it is
 further

 ORDERED, that the Defendant shall assign to the Plaintiff an
 interest in the Pension System for Law Enforcement Officers of the State of
 Maryland, as follows: One half of the Marital Share of his entire

 2
 pension benefit. The Marital Share is a fraction, the numerator of which is
 the number of months of the Participant's benefit credited service under the
 Plan during the parties' marriage, which the parties deem to be 60 months,
 and the denominator of which is the total number of months of the
 Participant's benefit credited service under the Plan. Plaintiff shall have the
 right, at her option, to request survivor benefits equal to her marital share
 provided she pays the cost of such benefits, and such benefits are
 available[.]

(Emphasis added).

 On August 21, 2013, Wife filed a motion requesting that the circuit court enter an

EDRO because Husband had refused to sign the order she had prepared, which

specifically addressed the DROP benefits as part of Husband's pension. Accordingly,

Husband filed an opposition on September 11, 2013, asserting that the proposed EDRO

contained a provision directing that DROP payments were to be included in calculating

the marital share, and emphasizing that he was not even eligible to participate in the

DROP at the time. On January 17, 2014, the court issued an order and accompanying

memorandum opinion granting Wife's motion and entering her proposed EDRO. In its

opinion, the court framed the issue as "whether a particular retirement asset known as a

DROP was or should be included in the Defendant's retirement assets." To resolve this

issue, the Court relied on Dennis v. Fire & Police Employees Retirement System, 390 Md.

639 (2006), which the court found to "completely address[]" the issue. The court adopted

the Court of Appeals's conclusion in Dennis, id. at 656, that the DROP payments were to

be considered retirement assets within the meaning of the EDRO.2 The court noted that

2
 In its opinion, the circuit court refers to the requested EDRO as a "qualified
domestic relations order," or a QDRO. Although both EDROs and QDROs serve the
(continued . . . )
 3
 same purpose, EDROs involve benefits from the Maryland State Retirement and Pension
System and are governed by the Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR")
22.01.03.03, whereas QDROs are governed by the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Use of the term "QDRO" in lieu of "EDRO" or other
acronyms for similar orders, though technically inaccurate, has become recurrent:

 [A]lthough the [QDRO] concept and acronym are creatures of ERISA, the
 label "QDRO" may have achieved a broader meaning. As is often the case
 with a living language, the term has sometimes leapt the boundaries of its
 formal meaning to encompass generically orders in divorces that distribute
 retirement plan benefits, much as "xerox copy" became a synonym for
 "photocopy" regardless of the machine used to produce it, and the verb
 "google" has come to mean searching the Internet regardless of the search
 engine being used.

Robinette v. Hunsecker, 439 Md. 243, 247 (2014). The acquired broader meaning of the
QDRO is understandable given its history.
 In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA, which sought to "provide better protection for
beneficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans abounding in the private
workplace." Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 30 (1989). One of the provisions
"preclude[ed] plan participants from assigning or alienating their benefits under pension
plans subject to the Act." The Act provided that this anti-alienation provision, subject to
exceptions, "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan [subject to the ERISA requirements.]" Id. at 31
(internal quotation marks omitted). This prompted uncertainty regarding the validity of
orders entered in State domestic relations proceedings assigning pension benefits to a
person other than the plan beneficiary. Id. at 32. Congress resolved this concern in the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA") by clarifying that the anti-alienation provision
applied to domestic relations orders except where they are deemed to satisfy certain
requirements for QDROs as set out in the REA. Id. at 34-35 (citing REA §§ 104, 204).
 The Court of Appeals recognized the distinction between a QDRO and similar
domestic relations orders in Robinette, 439 Md. at 247. The Court noted that because not
all retirement plans—i.e. government-sponsored plans—are subject to ERISA, courts use
orders "similar to QDROs" to allocate retirement benefits between divorcing spouses. Id.
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) and C. Callahan & T.C. Ries, Fader's Maryland Family
Law (5th ed. 2012), § 12-3[c]). Thus, despite their functional similarity, the difference
between an EDRO and a QDRO is important when determining which order to file. For
example, COMAR 22.01.03.03(b)(11),(12) requires the order to be titled "Eligible
Domestic Relations Order" and that the order not reference QDROs or ERISA.
Nevertheless, an EDRO must comply with federal law governing QDROs for tax
purposes. See COMAR 22.01.03.10(C) ("For the limited purpose of minimum
(continued . . . )
 4
 in the case under consideration, "the intention of the court in incorporating the agreement

of the parties was that all retirement assets be divided pursuant to the formula set by the

parties."

 The signed and filed EDRO provided, inter alia, that the \Alternate Payee's