CourtListener opinion 3209199

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2016 IL App (3d) 140990

 Opinion filed May 3, 2016
 _____________________________________________________________________________

 IN THE

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

 THIRD DISTRICT

 2016

 In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
 KAREN K. LABUZ, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
 ) Peoria County, Illinois,
 Petitioner-Appellee, )
 )
 and ) Appeal No. 3-14-0990
 ) Circuit No. 13-D-85
 )
 JEFFREY P. LABUZ, ) Honorable
 ) Katherine Gorman,
 ) Judge, Presiding.
 Respondent-Appellant. )

 ____________________________________________________________________________

 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
 Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 Justice Wright specially concurred, with opinion.
 ____________________________________________________________________________

 OPINION

¶1 The circuit court of Peoria County entered a final judgment for dissolution of marriage

 which dissolved the parties' marriage and ordered respondent Jeffrey Labuz (Jeffrey) to pay

 maintenance and child support. A postnuptial agreement signed by the parties was incorporated

 into the judgment. Jeffrey did not contest the entry of the judgment at the time it was entered.

 However, approximately five months later, Jeffrey filed a motion to vacate the judgment for
 dissolution of marriage pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735

 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), arguing that the parties' postnuptial agreement was

 unconscionable. Jeffrey subsequently filed an amended motion to vacate the judgment which

 raised essentially the same arguments. Karen filed a motion for summary judgment. After

 conducting an evidentiary hearing on Jeffrey's motion, the circuit court denied the motion.

 Jeffrey filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied.

¶2 This appeal followed.

¶3 FACTS

¶4 Jeffrey and petitioner-appellee Karen K. Reding (f/k/a/ Karen Labuz) (Karen) were

 initially married in 1991 and divorced in 2010. Their marriage produced one child, Emily, who

 was 14 years old at the time of the trial in this matter. During the parties' first marriage, which

 lasted approximately 18 years, Jeffrey paid 100% of Emily's day care, child care, school, and

 extra-curricular activity expenses.

¶5 The parties' 2010 divorce was memorialized in a "Consent Judgment of Divorce" filed on

 June 10, 2010 in the State of Michigan (the Michigan Consent Judgment). Both parties were

 represented by counsel during the Michigan divorce proceedings. In the Michigan Consent

 Judgment, Michael agreed to: (1) pay base child support of $441 every two weeks plus the gross

 amount of any bonuses he received from his employment as additional child support; (2) provide

 and pay for health insurance for both Karen and Emily; (3) pay 86% of Emily's medical, dental,

 hospital, orthodontic, prescription, psychological, psychiatric, or other reasonable and necessary

 uninsured health care expenses, as well as 86% of Emily's child care and extracurricular activity

 expenses; (4) pay for Emily's entire cell phone bill each month; (5) pay one-half of Emily's

 college tuition; (6) pay spousal support to Karen in a base amount plus 30% of any gross bonuses

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 Jeffrey earned over and above his base income continuing until Karen's death; (7) maintain life

 insurance on his life in an amount sufficient to pay Jeffrey's child support obligation through

 Emily's minority and Jeffrey's spousal support obligation to Karen. Moreover, although Jeffrey

 shouldered the lion's share of the child support obligations, he agreed in the Michigan Consent

 Judgment that Karen would be allowed to claim Emily as a tax deduction each year. During his

 evidence deposition in this case, Jeffrey agreed that he entered into the Michigan Consent

 Judgment voluntarily.

¶6 On September 22, 2012, Jeffrey and Karen remarried. Within one month of their

 remarriage, problems developed in their relationship. On December 6, 2012, Jeffrey and Karen

 began attending marriage counseling. During their second counseling session, the marriage

 counselor suggested that Jeffrey write up a postnuptial agreement in order to give Karen a sense

 of security and of Jeffrey's commitment to the relationship. In early December 2012, Jeffrey

 wrote and signed a document wherein he agreed to give Karen and Emily "100%" of his income,

 salary and commissions in the event that the couple divorced, as well the family house and its

 contents and Jeffrey's car. Jeffrey also agreed that Karen and Emily would remain beneficiaries

 on his insurance.

¶7 The parties separated on December 15, 2012. Twelve days later, Jeffrey wrote another

 document by hand which he, Karen, and Emily signed. The documents stated that "[i]f we get

 divorced I will do the following for Emily and Karen." It then listed several terms, including the

 following: (1) "[a]ll money made by Salary, Auto Reimbursement, and Commissions would be

 split by Jeffrey, Karen, and Emily, at a percentage to be determined by Jeffrey and Karen."; (2)

 "[p]ayments to Karen would last until she gets remarried"; and (3) "[p]ayments to Emily would

 end when Jeff dies."

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 ¶8 On January 8, 2013, Karen met with attorneys at the law firm of Murphy & Dunn, P.C.

 On January 23, 2013, Karen signed a contract with Murphy & Dunn retaining their services as

 attorneys. Jeffrey was not a party to the contract. Two days later, attorneys at Murphy & Dunn

 produced a draft of a postnuptial agreement for Karen's review. Karen reviewed the draft

 agreement and she and Jeffrey discussed changes that they wanted to make to the document.

 Thereafter, Karen asked Murphy & Dunn to produce a modified draft, which it did on January

 30, 2013. The modified draft contained various changes from the initial draft, including a

 change in the division of the house sale proceeds between the parties (from 60/40 in favor of

 Karen, to a 50/50 split). Karen and Jeffrey each reviewed the modified draft, and each made

 handwritten notes and proposed changes on the document.

¶9 On or around February 1, 2013, Jeffrey and Karen met at the offices of Murphy and Dunn

 where they reviewed a second modified version of the postnuptial agreement as well as a joint

 parenting agreement (JPA) with a paralegal. Jeffrey and Karen signed and notarized both

 documents. The first page of the postnuptial agreement stated that the agreement was to "resolve

 any future matters that would occur should either party choose to file a petition for dissolution of

 marriage." The agreement stated that "[t]he terms of the JPA and this Postnuptial Agreement

 shall be binding on both parties and incorporated into any Final Judgment for Dissolution of

 Marriage entered by the Court." In addition, the agreement provided that: (1) it was a fully

 negotiated agreement; (2) both parties understood that a court could resolve the issues differently

 and both parties had the right to litigate these issues if they wished; (3) Karen was represented by

 G. Edward Murphy and the law firm of Murphy and Dunn, P.C.; and (4) Jeffrey was representing

 himself and understood that he was acting as an unrepresented party in the matter.

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 ¶ 10 On February 13, 2013, Karen filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Although the

 parties had already signed the third draft of the postnuptial agreement, they continued to

 negotiate changes to the agreement after Karen filed her dissolution petition. For example,

 Jeffrey told Karen that the agreement should be changed to reflect that Jeffrey's maintenance

 payments to Karen would terminate upon Karen's remarriage, rather than her death (as the third

 draft had provided). This proposed change was incorporated into a fourth and final version of

 the postnuptial agreement, which Jeffrey and Karen signed on March 5, 2013. The agreement

 was notarized that same day.

¶ 11 On March 18, 2013, Karen filed with the circuit court a document signed by Jeffrey

 entitled "Formal Notice-Unrepresented Party." The document, which was prepared by Karen's

 divorce attorneys, provided:

 "This Notice has been prepared by Murphy & Dunn, P.C., attorneys for

 Petitioner, Karen Kyle Labuz, who advised and informed Respondent, Jeffrey

 Paul Labuz[,] that they have acted as counsel solely for Petitioner and do not

 advise or represent Respondent in this legal action. Murphy & Dunn, P.C. have

 advised Respondent that he should secure counsel to represent him in this matter,

 but Respondent has refused to do so. Respondent has carefully read this notice,

 fully understands its terms and willingly signs it."

¶ 12 Also on March 18, 2013, Jeffrey filed with the circuit court an "Entry of Appearance and

 Waiver" which Jeffrey had signed and notarized on March 5, 2013. This document provided that

 Jeffrey was entering his appearance in the divorce action and that Jeffrey "consent[ed] that any

 and all orders may be entered" in the action," "including an order of default or a Final Judgment

 for Dissolution of Marriage" without any further notice to Jeffrey as provided by statute. Despite

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 the filing of this formal waiver of notice, a notice of hearing was sent to Jeffrey on March 18

 advising him that a hearing on Karen's petition would take place on March 21, 2013.

¶ 13 On March 21, 2013, the circuit court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage

 which incorporated the final versions of the parties' postnuptial agreement and the JPA. In the

 final postnuptial agreement, Jeffrey agreed to: (1) pay base child support plus the gross amount

 of any bonuses he received from his employment as additional child support; (2) provide health

 insurance for both Karen and Emily; (3) pay 86% of Emily's medical, dental, hospital,

 orthodontic, prescription, psychological, psychiatric, or other reasonable and necessary

 uninsured health care expenses, as well as 86% of Emily's child care and extracurricular activity

 expenses; (4) pay for Emily's entire cell phone; (5) pay one-half of Emily's college expenses; (5)

 pay spousal support to Karen in a base amount plus 30% of any gross bonuses Jeffrey earned

 over and above his base income continuing until Karen's death or remarriage; (6) maintain life

 insurance on his life in an amount sufficient to pay Jeffrey's child support obligation through

 Emily's minority and Jeffrey's spousal support obligation to Karen. Jeffrey also agreed that

 Karen would be allowed to claim Emily as a tax deduction each year.

¶ 14 On May 8, 2013, Jeffrey signed a qualified domestic relations order which was entered by

 the circuit court on May 21, 2013. The qualified domestic relations order divided the "marital

 share" of Jeffrey's retirement account equally between Jeffrey and Karen and confirmed that

 Jeffrey and Karen were still in agreement with the terms of the settlement that had been

 incorporated into the final judgment order.

¶ 15 On August 19, 2013, Jeffrey filed a motion to vacate the judgment for dissolution of

 marriage pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). Jeffrey

 argued that the postnuptial agreement that had been incorporated into the judgment was

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 unconscionable in that it was "unfair, inequitable and totally one-sided and oppressive to

 [Jeffrey]." Jeffrey maintained that the postnuptial agreement is one which "no man in his senses,

 not under delusion [sic], would make, on the one hand, and no fair and honest man would accept,

 on the other." In addition, Jeffrey contended that he had entered into the postnuptial agreement

 under duress because the agreement was negotiated while the parties were in the midst of a

 marital dispute, and Karen told Jeffrey that she needed him to sign the agreement in order to

 make her feel \safe\" in continuing their marriage. Jeffrey argued that these circumstances put