CourtListener opinion 4070475

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

ACCEPTED
 03-15-00008-CV
 6111882
 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
 AUSTIN, TEXAS
 7/17/2015 11:06:21 AM
 JEFFREY D. KYLE
 CLERK
 No. 03-15-00008-CV

 FILED IN
 3rd COURT OF APPEALS
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
 FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 7/20/2015 8:17:21 AM
 JEFFREY D. KYLE
 Clerk

 PAUL D. SIMMONS,
 Appellant

 V.

 TERESA A. SIMMONS,
 Appellee

 ON APPEAL FROM THE 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
 OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, TEXAS
 CAUSE NO. B-13-0232-F

 BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Melvin Gray
State Bar Number 08328000
Gray & Brigman, PLLC
206 W. College Ave.
San Angelo, Texas 76903
Tel: (325) 653-4594
Fax: (325) 657-0039
Email: sgreen@grayandbrigman.com

Attorney on Appeal
for Appellant

 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
 No. 03-15-00008-CV

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 PAUL D. SIMMONS,
 Appellant

 V.

 TERESA A. SIMMONS,
 Appellee

 ON APPEAL FROM THE 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
 OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, TEXAS
 CAUSE NO. B-13-0232-F

 BRIEF OF APPELLANT

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

 Appellant Paul D. Simmons respectfully files this Brief.

 ii
 Identity of Parties and Counsel

 The following is a complete list of all parties, as well as the names and

addresses, and emails (if known) of all counsel.

 Petitioner/Appellee: Teresa A. Simmons

 Respondent/Appellant: Paul D. Simmons

 Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
 at Trial and on Appeal: Kirk Hawkins
 Attorney at Law
 224 West Beauregard
 Ste. 303
 San Angelo, Texas 76903

 Counsel for Respondent/
 Appellant at Trial and
 on Appeal: Melvin Gray
 Gray & Brigman, PLLC
 206 W. College Ave.
 San Angelo, Texas 76903
 sgreen@grayandbrigman.com

 Trial Court: The Honorable Ben Woodward
 119th Judicial District Court
 Tom Green County, Texas

 iii
 Record References

 The Clerk's Record includes all of the relevant pleadings and orders filed with

the trial court and clerk. The Clerk's Record contains one volume. References in this

Brief to the Clerk's Record are by volume and page number, indicated as "CR 1:__."

 The Reporter's Record includes the transcript of the bench trial held on July

22, 2014. The Reporter's Record contains three volumes. References to the

Reporter's Record are by volume and page number, indicated as "RR __:__."

 The Reporter's Record also includes all of the parties' exhibits submitted to the

trial court and admitted into evidence during the bench trial. Copies of all such

exhibits are included in Volume 3 of the Reporter's Record; therefore, references to

the parties' exhibits are indicated as "RR 3:PX#__" or "RR 3:RX#__."

 References to the trial court's Findings of Fact are indicated as "FF#__."

References to the trial court's Conclusions of Law are indicated as "CL#__."

 Party References

 Paul D. Simmons, Appellant, shall be referred to as "Paul." Teresa A.

Simmons, Appellee, shall be referred to as "Teresa."

 Request for Oral Argument

 Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 39, Simmons hereby requests oral argument.

 iv
 Table of Contents

Identity of the Parties and Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Record References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Party References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Request for Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Issue Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

 Issue No. 1: Teresa's enforcement action was subject to the
 applicable statute of limitations. Paul properly
 raised this defense in his pleadings and during the
 bench trial. Did the trial court abuse its discretion
 by enforcing the parties' 1987 divorce decree and
 awarding Teresa $51,635.60 when her enforcement
 action was barred by this affirmative defense?

Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 M The Parties' Marital History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 M The Parties' Settlement Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
 M The Division of Paul's Retirement Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
 M Conoco's Payment of Paul's Retirement Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 M Teresa's Enforcement Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Standards of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 v
 M Findings of Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 ! Legal Sufficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 ! Factual Sufficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 M Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 M (Disputed) Trial Court's Findings of Fact and
 Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 ! (Disputed) Findings of Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 ! (Disputed) Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 M Abuse of Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Argument and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Issues No. 1 Re-Stated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 M Two-Year Statute of Limitations:
 TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.003(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 M Discovery Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 ! Inherently Undiscoverable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 ! Pleading Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 ! Burden of Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 ! Reasonable Diligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 M Accrual of Teresa's Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
 M Inapplicability of Discovery Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 ! Waiver of Discovery Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
 ! No Inherently Undiscoverable Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 • No Reasonable Diligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
 • Teresa's Specialized Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 vi
 Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

 1. Judgement dated September 15, 2014.

 2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 22, 2014.

 3. Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and Child Custody, Support
 and Property Settlement Agreement file-stamped June 1, 1987

 vii
 Index of Authorities

Cases

Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lofters, No. 03-14-00071-CV;
 2015 TEX. APP. LEXIS 3115 (Tex. App.–Austin, Apr. 1, 2015,
 pet. filed) (mem. op.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17

BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) . . . . . 12

Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006) . . . . . . . . 15

Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 14 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App.–Amarillo
 2000, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985),
 cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986) . . . 14

HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Heritage Resources, Inc. v. Hill, 104 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2003,
 no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

Hitzelberger v. Samedon Oil Corp., 948 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997,
 writ denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

 viii
 In re Am. Nat'l Cnty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.–Austin
 2012, original proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

In the Estate of Melchior, 365 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2012,
 pet. denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

In the Interest of M.W., 959 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1997,
 writ denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Leibman v. Grand, 981 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.) . . . . 10-11

Mayorga v. Mayorga, No. 03-13-00787-CV; 2015 TEX. APP. LEXIS 4713
 (Tex. App.–Austin, May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Murray v. Murray, 276 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2008,
 pet. dism'd) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1992,
 writ denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20

Plas-Tex., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1987) . . . . . . . . . 10

Proctor v. White, 172 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . 18

Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2003) . . . . 16

Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Texas Health Presbyterian Hosp. Dallas v. Burch, No. 05-14-00665-CV,
 2015 TEX. APP. LEXIS 625 (Tex., Jan. 22, 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Tipton v. Brock, 431 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2014, pet. denied) . . . . . 19

 ix
 Treuil v. Treuil, 311 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2010,
 no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-18,19-20,23

Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998),
 cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040, 119 S.Ct. 1336, 143 L.Ed.2d 500 (1999) . . . 10

Urbanczyk v. Urbanczyk, No. 07-07-0077-CV; 2009 TEX. APP. LEXIS 587
 (Tex. App.–Amarillo, Jan. 29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Wagner & Brown, Ltd v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2001) . . . . 16-17,19,27

Westech Eng'g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190
 (Tex. App.–Austin 1992, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10

Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1988) . . . . . . . . 18-21

Statutes

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.003(b) (LEXIS 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Rules

TEX. R. APP. P. 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

 x
 Statement of the Case

Nature of the Case: This family law suit arose out of an enforcement action
 filed by Teresa seeking to enforce the parties' property
 division from a 1987 divorce. (CR 1:7-22,35-37).

Course of Proceedings: On or about March 28, 2013, Teresa registered the parties'
 1987 New Mexico divorce decree in Texas. (CR 1:7-22).
 On April 4, 2013, Teresa provided notice to Paul of the
 registration of a foreign decree. (CR 1:23-24). On or
 about April 22, 2013, Paul filed a response in which he
 contested such registration, asserted various affirmative
 defenses, and requested a hearing. (CR 1:25-26). On or
 about April 3, 2014, Teresa filed a Motion for Enforcement
 of Order seeking to enforce a specific provision of the
 parties' divorce decree pertaining to the division of Paul's
 retirement pension. (CR 1:35-37).

 A bench trial was held on July 22, 2014. (RR 1: 1). At the
 conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court took the matter
 under consideration. (RR 2:30). On or about August 20,
 2014, the trial court issued a letter ruling, and on
 September 15, 2014, the trial court entered a written
 judgment denying all of Paul's affirmative defenses,
 granting Teresa's request to enforce the specific property
 provision pertaining to Paul's retirement benefits, and
 awarding Teresa a total money judgment of $51,635.60.
 (CR 1:41,44-45) (Appendix 1).

 On or about October 3, 2014, Paul timely requested that the
 trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
 (CR 1:51-52). On or about October 22, 2014, the trial
 court entered its written findings and conclusions. (CR
 1:52-53) (Appendix 2). On or about December 12, 2014,
 Paul timely filed his Notice of Appeal. (CR 1:57-58).

 xi
 Trial Court: The Honorable Ben Woodward, 119th Judicial District
 Court, Tom Green County, Texas.

Trial Court Disposition: Judgment dated September 15, 2014. (CR 1:44-45)
 (Appendix 1). The trial court's judgment awarded Teresa
 $48,757.60 in actual damages, $278.00 in court costs, and
 $2,600.00 in attorney's fees. (Id.).

Parties: Petitioner/Appellee: Teresa A. Simmons
 Respondent/Appellant: Paul D. Simmons

 xii
 Issue Presented

Issue No. 1: Teresa's enforcement action was subject to the applicable
 statute of limitations. Paul properly raised this defense in
 his pleadings and during the bench trial. Did the trial court
 abuse its discretion by enforcing the parties' 1987 divorce
 decree and awarding Teresa $51,635.60 when her
 enforcement action was barred by this affirmative defense?

 xiii
 Statement of Facts

M The Parties' Marital History.

 Paul and Teresa were married on August 22, 1969. (RR 2:16). They were both

nineteen years old when they got married. (RR 3:PX#5). During the course of their

marriage, they had two children–a son and a daughter. (RR 2:18; 3:PX#5). After

being married for approximately eighteen years, the couple decided to get divorced.

(RR 2:16).

 Paul and Teresa's divorce was final on June 1, 1987, and a written Decree of

Dissolution of Marriage, (the "Divorce Decree"), was entered on that same day in

Eddy County, New Mexico. (CR 1:8-10; RR 2:16; 3:PX#4; FF#1) (Appendices 2-3).

At the time of the parties' divorce, their son was approximately fourteen or fifteen

years old and their daughter was approximately nine or ten years old. (RR 2:18).

M The Parties' Settlement Agreement.

 Paul and Teresa resolved all issues pertaining to their divorce through the

execution of a Child Custody, Support and Property Settlement Agreement, (the

"Settlement Agreement"). (CR 1:11-21; RR 2:16-17; 3:PX#5) (Appendix 3). The

Settlement Agreement was approved by the New Mexico trial court and properly

incorporated into the Divorce Decree. (CR 1:8-10; RR 3:PX#4) (Appendix 3). Under

the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Paul retained primary custody of the two

 1
 children during the school year, and Teresa had custody of the children during their

summer vacation. (CR 1:12; RR 2:18; 3:PX#5) (Appendix 3).

 As to child support, Paul agreed to pay Teresa $100.00 per month for every

thirty days she had physical custody of the children. (CR 1:13; RR 3:PX#5)

(Appendix 3). The parties also agreed that Teresa would not be required to pay any

child support while she attended law school. (Id.). Additionally, the parties agreed

that the New Mexico trial court would retain jurisdiction to modify the custody or

child support provisions included in the Settlement Agreement once Teresa graduated

from law school. (Id.).

 It appears the parties never petitioned the trial court to modify these custody

or child support provisions. Paul testified Teresa never paid him any child support

and that he had provided the total support for the two children. (RR 2:11). In

contrast, Teresa testified that their daughter came to live with her at around the age

of fifteen years. (RR 2:20). She further testified that during the time the child was

living with her, Paul maintained insurance on their daughter but provided no other

financial support for the child during this time period. (Id.). It was undisputed that

by the day of trial, both of the children were over twenty-one years of age. (RR 2:11).

 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Paul was also required to pay

$100.00 each month towards Teresa's credit card purchases for gas and automobile

 2
 maintenance for a period of eighteen months, that is, until December 31, 1988. (Id.).

 Regarding the division of the parties' property, Teresa testified that the only

property she actually got out of the divorce was a car, her clothing, jewelry, and some

patio furniture. (RR 2:19). Teresa testified that she basically "left" Paul all the

property, including her "grandmother's dishes." (Id.). Her trial testimony in this

regard was misleading, if not entirely false.

 A careful review of the terms of the Settlement Agreement reveals Teresa was

awarded a substantial amount of the parties' community property, including but not

limited to, the following: two cars, jewelry, a computer, two beds, two desks, a

stereo, two guns, lamps, a dining table and four chairs, a TV, a microwave, and patio

furniture. (CR 1:14; RR 3:PX#5) (Appendix 3). Additionally, under the terms of the

Settlement Agreement, Teresa was specifically awarded her grandmother's dishes.

(Id.). Teresa was also awarded $9,000.00 which constituted cash monies advanced

for her school expenses and proceeds from her teacher retirement benefits. (Id.).

 Undisputedly, the parties owned a home at the time of their divorce. (RR

1:19). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Teresa was awarded no equity

in this home. (CR 1:14,16; RR 3:PX#5) (Appendix 3). However, it was also

undisputed that under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Paul became solely

responsible for payment of the $82,200.00 mortgage that was attached to the parties'

 3
 home, along with approximately $35,000.00 in miscellaneous debt that the parties had

incurred as of the date of their divorce. (CR 1:16-17; RR 3:PX#5). In contrast,

pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Teresa did not assume

responsibility for payment of any of the $117,000.00 community property debt that

the parties had accumulated during their eighteen year long marriage. (Id.).

 Teresa testified that she left the majority of the furniture in the house because

she did not want "the kids to just feel turned upside-down by everything." (RR 2:19).

Teresa's choice not to take possession of the property she was awarded under the

Divorce Decree for the sake of her children is a far cry from her representation that

she "left" Paul basically all the property in the divorce. Rather, the evidence

introduced at trial reveals the final property division in the parties' 1987 divorce was

more than fair to Teresa.

M The Division of Paul's Retirement Benefits.

 It was also undisputed at trial that under the terms of the Settlement

Agreement, Teresa was awarded a portion of Paul's retirement benefits. (CR 1:14;

RR 2:17; 3:PX#5; FF#1) (Appendices 2-3). Specifically, this provision of the

Settlement Agreement reads as follows:

 (6) Division of Community Property. The parties community
 property shall be divided as follows:

 A. Wife shall have set over to her as her sole and separate property:

 4
 ...

 23. A portion of Husband's retirement, pension, thrift, profit
 sharing and other employee benefits acquired through Husband's
 employment with Conoco, to be paid if, as, and when received by
 Husband. Wife's portion shall be one-half times a fraction (the
 numerator of which shall be the number of years the parties were
 married during Husband's employment with Conoco and the
 denominator of which shall be the number of years Husband or his
 employer, or both, contributed to the plan or benefit) times the amount
 of the benefit received by Husband.

(CR 1:14; RR 3:PX#5; FF#1) (Appendices 2-3). There was no evidence introduced

at trial that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, ("QDRO"), to this effect was ever

entered by any trial court or that Conoco was ever placed on notice of this particular

provision of the Settlement Agreement.

M Conoco's Payment of Paul's Retirement Benefits.

 Paul testified he began working for Conoco on February 12, 1979. (RR 1:6;

FF#2) (Appendix 2). Over the next twenty-six years, Paul continued his employment

with Conoco. (RR 1:8). Paul testified that on March 26, 2004, his employment with

Conoco ended. (RR 1:8; FF#2) (Appendix 2).

 Paul also testified that on November 1, 2004, he cashed out his retirement

benefits from Conoco. (RR 1:7). A copy of a check dated November 1, 2004, from

Arvest Trust Company, NA, the paying agent for ConocoPhillips Retirement

Benefits, was introduced into evidence at trial and reflected that Paul received

 5
 $295,500.61 in retirement benefits from Conoco. (RR 2:8; 3:PX#2; FF#3) (Appendix

2).

 Paul testified he used the money to pay off a "bunch of bills and debt and

everything else."1 (RR 2:8). He further testified that as of the day of trial, these cash

monies were "gone" and he did not have them any more. (Id.). It was undisputed at

trial that Paul did not forward Teresa her share of the money he received when he

cashed out his retirement benefits with Conoco. (Id.).

M Teresa's Enforcement Action.

 Approximately twenty-six years after the parties finalized their divorce, and

approximately eight and a half years after Paul cashed in his retirement benefits with

Conoco, Teresa filed a Petition for Enforcement of Order, ("Petition for

Enforcement"), seeking to enforce the Divorce Decree. (CR 1:35-37; FF#10)

(Appendix 2). Paul asserted various affirmative defenses to Teresa's enforcement

action, including but not limited to, the statute of limitations and laches. (CR 1:25-

26; FF#9) (Appendix 2).

 1
 The trial court found that Paul had utilized some of the retirement benefits he received
on November 1, 2004, to pay off a mortgage on his home in August of 2012. (FF#5). (Appendix
2). However, there was no evidence that Paul actually used these particular retirement benefits
for that purpose. Rather, Paul simply testified that he had paid off his home mortgage in 2012
and did not identify the funds he utilized in paying this debt. (RR 2:13). Accordingly, the trial
court's finding of fact in this regard was incorrect.

 6
 A bench trial was held on July 22, 2014. (RR 1:14). Paul and Teresa were the

only two witnesses at the bench trial. (RR 2:5,15). At the conclusion of the bench

trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement. (RR 2:30).

 On August 20, 2014—approximately twenty-seven years after the parties'

divorce was final—the trial court issued a letter ruling denying all of Paul's

affirmative defenses and awarding Teresa $48,757.60 in actual damages, $2,600.00

in attorney's fees, and costs of court. (CR 1:41; CL#6) (Appendix 2). On September

15, 2014, the trial court entered a written judgment awarding Teresa a total sum of

$51,635.60, with postjudgment interest accruing at the rate of six percent. (CR 1:44-

45; CL#6) (Appendices 1-2). It is from this judgment that Paul now appeals.

 7
 Summary of the Argument

 Teresa waited approximately twenty-six years to seek enforcement of the

Divorce Decree's provisions awarding her a portion of Paul's retirement benefits.

Paul properly asserted that the statue of limitations barred Teresa's enforcement

action. Teresa's cause of action accrued on November 1, 2004 and was barred after

November 1, 2006.

 Teresa failed to specifically plead the applicability of the discovery rule prior

to trial. She also failed to prove her injury in this case was inherently undiscoverable,

notwithstanding reasonable diligence. The trial court thus erred in concluding the

discovery rule tolled the applicable two-year statute of limitations found in TEX. FAM.

CODE § 9.003(b). Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in enforcing the

provision of the Divorce Decree in regards to the division of Paul's retirement

benefits.

 8
 Standards of Review

M Findings of Fact.

 A trial court's findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury's

verdict. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). An

appellate court reviews a trial court's findings of fact under the same legal and factual

sufficiency standard used to support a jury's verdict. Id. In an appeal from a bench

trial, an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence must be directed at specific findings

of fact, rather than at the judgment as a whole. In the Interest of M.W., 959 S.W.2d

661, 664 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1997, writ denied). "Generally, a finding of fact not

challenged in a point of error on appeal is binding on the appellate court." Id.

 ! Legal Sufficiency.

 If a party challenges the legal sufficiency on an issue which he did not have the

burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports the adverse

ruling. Westech Eng'g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 196

(Tex. App.–Austin 1992, no writ). When findings are challenged for legal

sufficiency, an appellate court should "view the evidence in a light that tends to

support the finding of the disputed fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to

the contrary." Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003).

In other words, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable

 9
 to the challenged finding under a legal sufficiency review. Point Lookout West, Inc.

v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. 1987).

 A legal sufficiency challenge will be sustained when:

 (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital
 fact;
 (2) the court is barred by rules of law or rules of evidence from
 giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact;
 (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
 scintilla; or
 (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.

Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998), cert.

denied, 526 U.S. 1040, 119 S.Ct. 1336, 143 L.Ed.2d 500 (1999). "If more than a

scintilla of evidence exists to support the questioned finding, the ‘no evidence' point

fails." Leibman v. Grand, 981 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).

 ! Factual Sufficiency.

 When a party without the burden of proof challenges the factual sufficiency of

the evidence to support an adverse finding, the party must demonstrate that there is

insufficient evidence to support the adverse finding. Westech, 835 S.W.2d at 196.

Under a factual sufficiency review, an appellate considers both the evidence that

supports the finding and the evidence that is contrary to the finding. Plas-Tex., Inc.

v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989). "In reviewing a factual

sufficiency point, the court of appeals must weigh all of the evidence in the record."

 10
 Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). Such evidence includes "both the

evidence which tends to prove the existence of a vital fact as well as evidence which

tends to disprove its existence." Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 429.

 The finding should be sustained if there is some probative evidence to support

it and provided it is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Id.; Ortiz, 917 S.W.2d at 772. An appellate court should reverse the judgment and

order a new trial if the trial court's fact finding was so contrary to the overwhelming

weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d

175, 176 (Tex. 1986). A finding which "shocks the conscience" or that is "manifestly

unjust" will be overturned on appeal. Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 429.

M Conclusions of Law.

 Conclusions are reviewed de novo, and an appellate court is free to draw its

own legal conclusions. City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 778 (Tex.

2012). The legal conclusions of the trial court are therefore not binding upon an

appellate court. Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 441, 422 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, no

pet.).

 The standard of review for legal conclusions is whether they are correct.

Heritage Resources, Inc. v. Hill, 104 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2003, no

 11
 pet.). In other words, an appellate court independently evaluates conclusions of law

to determine their correctness when they are attacked as a matter of law. Id.

 An appellate court should follow a trial court's conclusion of law unless it is

erroneous as a matter of law. Hitzelberger v. Samedon Oil Corp., 948 S.W.2d 497,

503 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied). If, however, the reviewing court

determines that a conclusion of law is erroneous, but the trial court rendered the

proper judgment, the erroneous conclusion of law does not require reversal. BMC

Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).

M (Disputed) Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

 In the case at bar, Paul timely requested the trial court to enter findings of fact

and conclusions of law. (CR 1:50-51). In response to this request, the trial court

entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 22, 2014. (CR

1:52-53) (Appendix 2). On appeal, the following factual findings and legal

conclusions are specifically disputed:

 ! (Disputed) Findings of Fact.

 FF#4 Defendant used the retirement distribution to pay
 bills, including a debt payable to Wells Fargo that
 was secured by a lien on Defendant's homestead.
 (CR 1:52) (Appendix 2.

 FF#12 Plaintiff's share of the retirement account is
 $48,757.60 based on the formula in the Decree (½

 12
 times (Feb. 1979 to June 1, 1987 i.e. 8 years 3
 months) divided by 25 years with the Company (300
 months). (CR 1:53) (Appendix 2).

 ! (Disputed) Conclusions of Law.

 CL#3 The Statute of Limitations began to run after August
 2012 (Id.) (Appendix 2).

 CL#6 The Court awards Plaintiff a Judgment for
 $48,757.60, plus $2,600.00 attorney fees, all costs of
 Court and interest as allowed by law. (Id.)
 (Appendix 2).

M Abuse of Discretion.

 An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for enforcement

for an abuse of discretion. Mayorga v. Mayorga, No. 03-13-00787-CV; 2015 TEX.

APP. LEXIS 4713, *11 (Tex. App.–Austin, May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Murray

v. Murray, 276 S.W.3d 128, 143 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd). The trial

court abuses its discretion if it:

 (1) it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference
 to any guiding rules or principles; or
 (2) erroneously exercises its power by making a choice outside the
 range of choices permitted by law.

Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2004); Mayorga, 2015 TEX. APP.

LEXIS 4713 at *11; Murray, 276 S.W.3d at 143.

 The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary

authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does
 13
 not demonstrate an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer v. Aquamarine

Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106

S. Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Thus, when reviewing matters committed to a

trial court's discretion, an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that

of the trial court. In re Am. Nat'l Cnty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex.

App.–Austin 2012, original proceeding).

 14
 Argument and Authorities

Issue No. 1 Re-Stated: Teresa's enforcement action was subject to the applicable
 statute of limitations. Paul properly raised this defense in
 his pleadings and during the bench trial. Did the trial court
 abuse its discretion by enforcing the parties' 1987 divorce
 decree and awarding Teresa $51,635.60 when her
 enforcement action was barred by this affirmative defense?

M Two-Year Statute of Limitations: TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.003(b).

 The trial court held that the two year statute of limitations found in Section

9.003(b) of the TEXAS FAMILY CODE was applicable to the Petition for Enforcement.2

(CR 1:41; CL#1) (Appendix 2). TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.003(b) reads as follows:

 § 9.003. Filing Deadlines

 ...

 (b) A suit to enforce the division of future property not in existence
 at the time of the original decree must be filed before the second
 anniversary of the date the right to the property matures or
 accrues or the decree becomes final, whichever date is later, or the
 suit is barred.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.003(b) (LEXIS 2015).

 2
 The Settlement Agreement included a choice of law provision stating that the law of the
State of New Mexico governed the enforcement of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (CR
1:10; RR 3:PX#5) (Appendix 3). However, neither Paul nor Teresa argued to the trial court that
this enforcement action should governed by New Mexico law; therefore, the trial court applied
Texas law in this case based on the consent of both parties. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar
Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 695 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that choice of law issues can be
waived unless the complaining party objects to the law being applied, requests application of
another state's law, and requests judicial notice of the law of the other state).

 15
 Generally, when a cause of action accrues is a question of law. Provident Life

& Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003). A cause of action

accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when facts come into existence

that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy. Id. In most cases, a cause of action

accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury regardless of when the plaintiff

learns of that injury or if all the resulting damages have yet to occur. Id. However,

an exception may defer accrual of a claim—the discovery rule. Id.

M Discovery Rule.

 Statutes of limitations are intended to compel plaintiffs to assert their claims

"within a reasonable period while the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and

witnesses." Wagner & Brown, Ltd v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex. 2001).

The public policy behind statutes of limitations is that it "is in society's best interest

to grant repose by requiring that disputes be settled or barred within a reasonable

time." Id.

 The discovery rule exception operates to defer accrual of a cause of action until

the plaintiff knows or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should know of the facts

giving rise to the claim. Id.; Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lofters, No. 03-14-00071-

CV; 2015 TEX. APP. LEXIS 3115, *10 (Tex. App.–Austin, Apr. 1, 2015, pet. filed)

(mem. op.).

 16
 The discovery rule is a "very limited exception to statutes of limitations."

Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 918

S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)). The rule should be restricted to exceptional cases to

avoid defeating the purposes behind the limitation statutes. Treuil v. Treuil, 311

S.W.3d 114, 118 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2010, no pet.)(citing S.V. v. R.V., 933

S.W.2d 1, 25 (Tex. 1996)). Thus, the discovery rule is only used when the plaintiff's

injury is both "inherently undiscoverable" and "objectively verifiable." Id. at 119;

Lofters, 2015 TEX. APP. LEXIS 3115, *10; Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734.

 ! Inherently Undiscoverable.

 "An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is, by its nature, unlikely to be

discovered within the prescribed limitations period, despite due diligence."

Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734-35. "Inherently undiscoverable" does not mean that a

particular plaintiff did not discover his or her particular injury within the applicable

limitations period. Id. Rather, the determination of whether an injury is "inherently

undiscoverable" is made on a categorical basis. Id.

 Accordingly, a court's focus is on the type of injury, not the particular injury

itself. Id. "Discovery rule cases focus on categorical ‘types of injury, not causes of

action.'" Texas Health Presbyterian Hosp. Dallas v. Burch, No. 05-14-00665-CV,

2015 TEX. APP. LEXIS 625, *7 (Tex., Jan. 22, 2015).

 17
 ! Pleading Requirement.

 The discovery rule is also a plea in confession and avoidance. Woods v.

William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988). Consequently, a party

seeking to avail himself of the discovery rule must plead the rule, either in his original

petition or in an amended or supplemental petition in response to a defendant's

assertion of a statute of limitations defense as a matter of law. Id.

 "A matter in avoidance of the statute of limitations that is not raised

affirmatively by the pleadings will, therefore, be deemed waived." Id. at 518;

Proctor v. White, 172 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2005, no pet.) (same);

also see Treuil, 311 S.W.3d at 114 (ex-wife amended original petition and asserted

discovery rule after ex-husband asserted statute of limitations barred her claim to

portion of his retirement benefits); In the Estate of Melchior, 365 S.W.3d 794, 799

(Tex. App.–San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (discovery rule held not applicable

because Estate did not specifically plead it).

 ! Burden of Proof.

 Additionally, the party seeking to benefit from the discovery rule also bears the

burden of proving that his injury was both "inherently undiscoverable" and

"objectively verifiable." Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 518. A party asserting the discovery

rule at trial to avoid a statute of limitations bar must prove all elements of the rule.

 18
 Tipton v. Brock, 431 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2014, pet. denied); also

see Treuil, 311 S.W.3d at 119 (because ex-wife sought to benefit from discovery rule,

she had burden to prove the nature of her injury–ex-husband's failure to pay her

under divorce decree–was inherently undiscoverable).

 ! Reasonable Diligence.

 Finally, the discovery rule does not excuse a party from exercising reasonable

diligence in protecting his own interests. Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 510

(Tex. App.–San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank,

14 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (finding secured parties must

take some responsibility to ascertain status of their collateral and holding discovery

rule inapplicable to toll statute of limitations).

 Indeed, parties have an obligation to protect their interests by exercising due

diligence. HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 982 (Tex. 1998) (court

held that because mineral owners have some obligation to protect their interests by

exercising reasonable diligence, their injury was not inherently undiscoverable, and

discovery rule did not apply to their claims). Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 737 (court held

injury was not inherently undiscoverable because royalty owner could discover such

injuries in timely manner by exercising due diligence).

 19
 Whether reasonable diligence was used is generally a question of fact unless

the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not differ as to its effect. Pitman,

937 S.W.2d at 510. Under these circumstances, the issue of reasonable diligence

become a question of law. Id.

M Accrual of Teresa's Injury.

 In the case at bar, the Settlement Agreement required Paul to remit to Teresa

a portion of his retirement benefits "if, as, and when" they were received by Paul.

(CR 1:4; RR 3:PX#5) (Appendix 3). Teresa's injury therefore occurred on November

1, 2004, when Paul received his retirement funds from Conoco and when upon his

receipt of same, he failed to immediately remit Teresa's portion to her. See Treuil,

311 S.W.3d at 118 (ex-wife's injury occurred on date ex-husband withdrew all funds

from retirement account and upon doing so, then failed to immediately remit ex-

wife's portion to her). Under the two-year statute of limitations found in TEX. FAM.

CODE § 9.003(b), Teresa's enforcement action was barred after November 4, 2006,

unless the discovery rule applies in this case.

M Inapplicability of Discovery Rule.

 ! Waiver of Discovery Rule.

 The trial court abused its discretion in denying Paul's statute of limitations

defense in the case at bar. (CR 1:45-46) (Appendix 1). Paul properly plead this

 20
 affirmative defense upon being placed on notice that Teresa had registered the

Divorce Decree in Texas. (CR 1:25). Additionally, Paul reasserted this affirmative

defense during the bench trial.3 (RR 2:29).

 Because Paul plead properly plead this affirmative defense, Teresa was

required to plead the discovery rule. See Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 517. If Teresa failed

to plead that the discovery rule applied to the case at bar, she waived this exception,

and the trial court could not on its own motion toll the running of the two-year statute

of limitations. See Id. at 518.

 A review of the Petition for Enforcement establishes that Teresa did not

specifically plead the application of the discovery rule. (CR 1:35-37). Teresa did

not amend the Petition for Enforcement prior to trial. The only language in the

Petition for Enforcement which might be construed as alluding to the discovery rule

is a single statement found on the second page of the Petition for Enforcement which

reads as follows: "Petitioner became aware of this [Paul's receipt of Conoco

retirement benefits] in late 2012 or early 2013." (CR 1:36). Such general statement

does not satisfy the specific pleading requirement in regards to the discovery rule as

set forth by the Texas Supreme Court. See Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 517-18.

 3
 Paul's trial attorney actually argued that Teresa's enforcement action was subject to a
four year statute of limitations; therefore her suit was barred as of November 4, 2008. (RR 2:29).
As Teresa filed the Petition for Enforcement on April 3, 2014, her action would still have been
barred if a four-year statute of limitations is applicable to the case at bar. (CR 1:35-37).

 21
 If Teresa was going to raise the application of the discovery rule at trial, she

had a duty to specifically plead this exception in her pleadings. As she failed to

specifically plead the applicability of the discovery rule in the Petition for

Enforcement, Teresa waived this exception at trial. As such, the trial court erred in

concluding that the two-year statute of limitations began to run after August 2012 and

also erred in granting Teresa's request to enforce the Divorce Decree. (CL#3; CL#4)

(Appendix 2). Because the discovery rule did not toll the two-year statute of

limitations in this case as a matter of law, this Court should reverse the trial court's

judgment and hold Teresa take nothing by her enforcement action against Paul.

 If this Court determines Teresa properly pled the applicability
 of the discovery rule in the Petition for Enforcement,
 Paul presents the following argument for the Court's consideration.

 ! No Inherently Undiscoverable Injury.

 The trial court abused its discretion in granting the Petition For Enforcement

because Teresa failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing the applicability of

the discovery rule in the case at bar. Specifically, Teresa failed to prove that her

injury in this case was inherently undiscoverable and therefore justified the tolling of

the two-year statute of limitations until she discovered her injury in August of 2012.

 22
 To the contrary, if Teresa had simply used reasonable diligence in protecting

her interest in Paul's retirement benefits, she would have easily discovered his early

retirement from Conoco and his subsequent withdrawal of all his retirement benefits.4

 • No Reasonable Diligence.

 For example, at the time of the parties' divorce, or any time over the next

nineteen years, Teresa could have requested that a QDRO be entered by a trial court.

Once the QDRO was in place, Teresa could easily have sent a copy of same to

Conoco. Upon receipt of the QDRO, Conoco would have had a duty to notify Teresa

of Paul's withdrawal of his retirement benefits. Conoco would also have had a duty

to segregate out her portion of Paul's retirement benefits prior to making any

disbursements to Paul. However, Teresa introduced no evidence that from June 1,

1987 through November 4, 2006, she made any effort to have a QDRO entered of

record and a copy of same sent to Conoco.

 Likewise, Teresa could have simply sent Conoco a certified copy of the

Divorce Decree and Settlement Agreement immediately after the parties' divorce or

 4
 There appears to be no Texas case specifically holding that an ex-spouse's actions
regarding his or her retirement accounts, as a category, are inherently undiscoverable. See
Trueil, 311 S.W.3d at 119-20 (appellate court side-stepped issue of whether ex-husband's failure
to give ex-wife her portion of his retirement benefits as required under parties' divorce decree
constituted an inherently undiscoverable injury). Such lack of authority is not surprising,
however, as retirement accounts are easily discoverable and thus do not constitute the
exceptional type of categorical injury to which the discovery rule should apply.

 23
 anytime over the next nineteen years. If Teresa had placed Conoco on notice that she

had been awarded a portion of Paul's retirement account in their divorce, Conoco

would have notified her that at Paul's request, it had disbursed all of his retirement

benefits to him on November 1, 2004. However, Teresa introduced no evidence that

from June 1, 1987 through November 4, 2006, she ever sent Conoco a copy of the

Divorce Decree or the Settlement Agreement.

 Teresa could also have simply picked up the telephone, called Conoco directly,

and asked about the status of Paul's retirement benefits at some point during the

nineteen years after the parties' divorce was finalized. If a telephone call was

unsuccessful, Teresa could have sent Conoco a written letter inquiring about the

status of Paul's retirement benefits. However, Teresa introduced no evidence that

from June 1, 1987 through November 4, 2006, she ever attempted to contact Conoco

directly about Paul's retirement benefits.

 A simple inquiry to Conoco itself anytime between November 4, 2004 through

November 4, 2006, would have brought Paul's withdrawal of his retirement benefits

to light. See Urbanczyk v. Urbanczyk, No. 07-07-0077-CV; 2009 TEX. APP. LEXIS

587, *7 (Tex. App.–Amarillo, Jan. 29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (court held discovery

rule not applicable because plaintiff's injury was not inherently undiscoverable; a

simple request to brokerage firm itself should have brought unauthorized transfer to

 24
 light). All Teresa had to do was contact Conoco and she would have discovered her

injury. She simply chose not to make such contact.

 Additionally, Teresa could have asked her children about the status of Paul's

whereabouts and his current employment. If she had ever asked the children about

their father, she would have learned---at a bare minimum---that Paul had retired from

Conoco and was living in San Angelo, Texas. Yet, Teresa intentionally chose to

never talk to her two children about their father.

 Teresa testified that she never discussed Paul with her children because she did

not want her "children to be drug into any kind of stuff like that." (RR 2:21).

Teresa's reticence in this regard might be considered laudable while the children were

minors. However, Teresa's reluctance to speak to her children about Paul became

unreasonable when one considers that by 2004, both children were full-fledged

adults----with their daughter being twenty-six or twenty-seven years old and their son

being thirty-one or thirty-two years old. (RR 2:18). Simply checking with her two

adult children regarding the status of Paul's employment and his current whereabouts

would not have caused her children any undue consternation.5

 5
 Paul testified that Teresa should have known where he was living and working through
contact with their children. (RR 2:10).

 25
 To the contrary, if Teresa had simply asked one of her children during 2004

where Paul was working and living, her children would have informed her that he had

retired early from Conoco and was living in San Angelo, Texas. Such information

would have spurred Teresa to make further inquiries about the status of Paul's

retirement benefits. As a result of these inquiries, Teresa would have learned of

Paul's early withdrawal of all his retirement benefits.

 Finally, Teresa could have always contacted Paul directly during the nineteen

years after the parties' divorce to determine where he was living and working. Teresa

testified that she had only seen Paul "to talk to him one time" since they were

divorced. (RR 2:24). She further testified that this in-person meeting happened prior

to his retirement from Conoco. (Id.).

 It was unnecessary, however, for Teresa to actually meet with Paul in person

to make her diligent inquiries. She could have simply called him on the telephone,

sent him a letter, or sent him an email. Instead, she failed to make any effort

whatsoever to contact Paul about her portion of his retirement benefits from Conoco

for over twenty-five years.

 The Record reflects Teresa had several sources from which she could have

timely discovered her injury, including Conoco, her two children, and Paul himself.

As such, Teresa's injury in this case was not inherently undiscoverable. See

 26
 Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 737 (holding that when a party can seek information from

several sources to evaluate the propriety of another's action, discovery rule does not

apply).

 • Teresa's Specialized Knowledge.

 The Record in this case establishes that Teresa failed to use reasonable

diligence to discover Paul's early withdrawal of his retirement benefits and his failure

to send her a portion of the cash funds he received from Conoco to which she was

entitled under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Teresa's lack of reasonable

diligence becomes even more apparent when one considers her educational

background and professional expertise.

 Teresa testified that she was licensed as an attorney in the State of Oklahoma

in February of 1990. (RR 2:23). She testified that she was also licensed to practice

law in Texas in November of 1990. (Id.). Over the next twenty years, Teresa

testified she practiced law in both Houston, Texas and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

(Id.). At the trial, Teresa testified she was currently retired and living in Florida--

having surrendered her law license in 2010. (RR 2:20,23). She further testified that

she became disabled after a motor scooter accident in October of 2006 and was

 27
 currently receiving monthly federal disability payments in the amount of $1,400.00.6

(RR 2:20,23-24).

 Teresa graduated from law school, passed two bar exams, and practiced law in

both Texas and Oklahoma for approximately twenty years. (RR 2:23). As such, she

not only had the opportunity to use reasonable diligence to timely discover her injury

in this case, she also had the legal knowledge, expertise, and skill to discover Paul's

actions concerning his Conoco retirement benefits. However, she failed to utilize her

specialized knowledge to protect the property interest in Paul's retirement benefits

which she was awarded under the Divorce Decree.

 Furthermore, Teresa specifically testified she knew that she had been awarded

a portion of Paul's retirement benefits under the Divorce Decree and that this property

right was to accrue at some point in the future. (RR 2:24-25). Yet, when questioned

at trial as to why she waited approximately twenty-five years to take any action to

enforce this property right, Teresa responded "–what would you have me do?" (RR

2:25).

 Texas case law would have Teresa use reasonable diligence to discover her

injury in this case. The discovery rule does not excuse Teresa's failure to use

 6
 As to the nature of Teresa's disability, she testified that she had torn up both her knee
and back during the motor scooter accident. (RR 2:23-24). She also testified that she could no
longer practice law because she was on "morphine and a lot of drugs" and she believed it would
be committing malpractice for her to represent a client. (RR 2:24).

 28
 reasonable diligence to protect her property interests in Paul's retirement benefits.

Teresa had several different means and sources available to her which she could have

utilized and timely discovered Paul's actions in regards to his Conoco retirement

benefits. As a practicing attorney, Teresa also had the specialized knowledge and

legal skills she could have used to timely discover her injury. However, from 1987

until 2012, Teresa intentionally chose not to take any actions at all until she first

learned of Paul's actions and then contacted an attorney regarding the issue of the

retirement benefits. (RR 2:21).

 Teresa's lack of reasonable diligence prevented her from discovering her injury

in this case. Accordingly, Teresa's injury was not inherently undiscoverable as

required for the application of the discovery rule. Because the discovery rule is

inapplicable to the case at bar, Teresa's enforcement action is barred by the two-year

statute of limitations under TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.003(b) as a matter of law.

 29
 Conclusion

 Because Teresa failed to meet her burden of proof to receive the benefit of the

discovery rule, the trial court erred in concluding the two-year statute of limitations

was tolled and only began running as of August, 2012. The trial court also erred in

concluding the Motion for Enforcement was timely filed as of April, 2014. Based on

these erroneous conclusions of law, the trial court abused its discretion in granting

the Petition for Enforcement and in awarding Teresa a money judgment for the total

sum of $51,635.60.

 This Court should therefore 1) find the discovery rule is inapplicable to this

case and 2) conclude that Teresa' enforcement action was barred by the two-year

statute of limitations found in TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.003(b). Based on this finding and

conclusion, the Court should reverse the trial court's judgment in all respects and

render judgment that Teresa take nothing by her enforcement action against Paul.

 30
 Prayer

 Appellant Paul D. Simmons prays that this Court reverse the trial court's

Judgment dated September 15, 2014 in all respects and render judgment in his favor.

 Alternatively, Appellant Paul D. Simmons prays that this Court reverse the

trial court's Judgment dated September 15, 2014 in all respects and remand this case

to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with its ruling.

 Appellant Paul D. Simmons also requests the Court to grant him any further

relief to which he may be justly entitled.

 Respectfully submitted,

 GRAY & BRIGMAN, PLLC
 206 West College Ave.
 San Angelo, Texas 76903
 Tel: (325) 653-4594
 Fax: (325) 657-0039
 Email: sgreen@grayandbrigman.com

 By: /s/ Melvin Gray
 Melvin Gray
 State Bar No.0832800

 Appellate Counsel for
 Appellant Paul D. Simmons

 31
 Certificate of Compliance

 In accordance with Rules 9.4(e) and (i) of the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE, the undersigned attorney of record certifies that the Brief of Appellant
contains 14-point typeface for the body of the brief, 12-point typeface for footnotes
in the brief, and contains 7,066 words, excluding those words identified as not being
counted in Rule 9.4(i)(1) and was prepared on Word Perfect Version 9.

 /s/ Melvin Gray
 Melvin Gray

 Certificate of Service

 I certify that a copy of the Brief of Appellant was served electronically on this
 th
the 13 day of July, 2015, to the following party and that the electronic transmission
was reported as complete:

Kirk Hawkins
Attorney at Law
224 West Beauregard
Suite 303
San Angelo, Texas 76903

Attorney for Appellee
Teresa A. Simmons

 /s/ Melvin Gray
 Melvin Gray

 32
 APPENDIX

 33
 APPENDIX!
 No. B130232F

TERESA A. SIMMONS ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
 )
v. ) TOM GREEN COUNTY, TEXAS
 )
PAUL D. SIMMONS ) 119m JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 JUDGMENT

 On the 22nd day of July, 2014, the Court heard Petitioner's Petition for Enforcement of Order.

 Petitioner TERESA A. SIMMONS appeared in person and through attorney of record Kirk

Hawkins.

 Respondent PAUL D. SIMMONS appeared in person and through attorney ofrecord Melvin

Gray.

 The making of a record of testimony was made by Lori Dobbins, Official Court Reporter.

 The Court has considered the pleadings and official records on file in this cause and the

evidence and is ofthe opinion that judgment should be rendered for Petitioner.

 The Court specifically finds that a suit to enforce future interest must be brought within two

(2) years of the anniversary of the date the right to the property matures or accrues or the suit is

barred. The Court finds that the earliest Petitioner TERESA A. SIMMONS learned about the

retirement distribution was after August 2012, and therefore the Statute ofLimitations began to run

after August 2012. The Court further finds that Petitioner's suit to enforce the future right was filed

April2014, within two (2) years ofPetitioner's discovery of the distribution.

 Therefore, it is accordingly ADJUDGED that TERESA A. SIMMONS, Petitioner, recover

from PAUL D. SIMMONS, Respondent, judgment for--

 1) $48,757.60 as the principal amount due;

 44
 2) $278.00 costs of court;

 3) $2,600.00 attorney's fees;

 4) $51,635.60 total judgment;

 5) post-judgment interest at the rate of 6% per year on the judgment from the date of

judgment until paid and all costs of court.

 IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner shall have all writs of execution and other process

necessary to enforce this judgment.

 All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

 SIGNEDtbis 44k /~ ~/.V _;;:'
 /_Lk9~4
 JUDGE PRESIDING -

MELVIN GRAY/
Attorney for Respondent

 45
 APPENDIX2
 Cause # B-13-0232-F
TERESA SIMMONS § In the 119th District
 § Court
 vs. § of
PAUL D. SIMMONS § Tom Green County,
 § Texas

 Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law.
 Findings of Fact:
 1. Plaintiff (former wife) and Defendant (former husband) were divorced
 on June 1, 1987 in New Mexico. Plaintiff was awarded a portion of
 Defendant's retirement acquired through Defendant's employment
 with Conoco. Plaintiffs portion was to be paid if, as and when
 received by husband. Wife's portion was defined in the Divorce.
 2. Defendant worked for Conoco for a total of 25 years, from February 12,
 1979 to 2004. In 2004, Targa purchased Conoco-Phillips and
 Defendant continued to work for Targa. While working for Conoco, he
 was married to Plaintiff for 8 years, 3 months (2179 to 6/1/87).
 3. Defendant received $295,500.61 retirement benefits from Conoco
 employment on 11/1/2004.
 4. Defendant used the retirement distribution to pay bills, including a
 debt payable to Wells Fargo that was secured by a lien on Defendant's
 homestead.
 5. Defendant paid Wells Fargo in August, 2012.
 6. Wells Fargo signed a Release of lien on August 29, 2012.
 7. Plaintiff learned of this retirement distribution sometime after August
 2012 when her daughter told her that Defendant was mad at a loan
 company and paid them with proceeds from a retirement distribution.
 8. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Registration of Foreign Decree in Tom Green
 County Texas District Court on April4, 2013 and then gave notice to
 Defendant of the Registration and in a note stated \We've registered