CourtListener opinion 4287825

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FILED
 Jun 25 2018, 8:55 am

 CLERK
 Indiana Supreme Court
 Court of Appeals
 and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy Logan David W. Stone IV
Benson, Pantello, Morris, James & Stone Law Office & Legal Research
Logan, LLP Anderson, Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana Joanne M. Kolbe
 Law Offices of Joanne M. Kolbe
 Warsaw, Indiana

 IN THE
 COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Linda Sanders, June 25, 2018
Appellant/Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
 18A-DR-326
 v. Appeal from the Marshall Circuit
 Court
Jerad Sanders, The Honorable Robert O. Bowen,
Appellee/Respondent. Special Judge
 Trial Court Cause No.
 50C01-1404-DR-90

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 1 of 14
 Case Summary
[1] Linda Sanders ("Wife") and Jerad Sanders ("Husband") married in 1998, and,

 in 2014, Wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. At a final hearing in January

 of 2017, the terms of a property settlement ("the Agreement") were read into

 the record, after which both parties agreed to them. The trial court granted

 Wife's dissolution petition that day and directed the preparation of a dissolution

 order that incorporated the terms of the Agreement. Approximately one month

 later, Wife moved to repudiate the settlement, which motion the trial court

 denied. Wife moved to correct error and for relief from judgment. Wife's

 motion to correct error was ultimately deemed denied by operation of rule, and

 the trial court did not grant her relief from judgment. Wife challenges both the

 denial of the motion to correct error and the failure to grant relief from

 judgment, contending that the Agreement was invalid because it was not

 submitted in writing or signed before the trial court's approval, that she timely

 repudiated it, and the trial court failed to explicitly find that the Agreement was

 just and reasonable. Finding no merit in Wife's contentions, we affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 25, 2014, Wife petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Husband, to

 whom she had been married since 1998. On January 9, 2017, a final hearing

 was held, at which the terms of the Agreement were read in open court:

 [Wife's counsel]: Well, yes. Essentially, um, the parties
 are going to keep all property present in their possession. The

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 2 of 14
 real estate is going to be the property of the husband. The
 husband is going to transfer, I think, by way of QDRO or
 transference $30,000 from an IRA into my client's name. Ah,
 he's going to give her $5,000 cash—and when is that payable—
 when can you get that?
 [Husband's counsel]: He had asked for six (6) months.
 [Wife's counsel]: Okay. Six (6) months. Okay. Ah, the
 parties are going to be responsible for the debt in their individual
 name. I don't believe there's any joint debt.
 [Husband's counsel]: Is the mortgage just in your name?
 [Husband]: Yeah.
 [Wife's counsel]: Okay. The mortgage—maybe—
 [Husband's counsel]: I think you're right.
 [Wife's counsel]: —we can recite that out in the decree. I
 think we know what the debts are. We can just put that—
 [Husband's counsel]: Yes.
 [Wife's counsel]: —in the decree.
 [Husband's counsel]: But I think that's correct.
 [Wife's counsel]: Okay. Ah, essentially then—in terms of
 personal property, there's still a number of items that are still at
 the house that my client would like to retrieve. Those are the
 items that she owned prior to the parties' marriage. I think
 there's like cast iron tub, her personal effects, some Christmas
 decorations, that type of thing, bed, dresser, that sort of stuff.
 She'd like to go ahead and keep all that. I think the parties know
 what's what or what's—whose is whose and so I don't think
 there's going to be any issue with that. It's just a matter of you
 being able to get some kind of truck to get over there and get it
 out. Right?
 [Wife]: Uh-huh and some help.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 4–5.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 3 of 14
 [3] The following discussion also occurred:

 THE COURT: You heard Mr. Black recite what is the
 purported agreement between you and Jerad concerning the
 disposition of all assets and debts? Is that correct?
 [Wife]: Correct.
 THE COURT: And is that what you agreed to?
 [Wife]: Yes.
 THE COURT: Do you feel that is fair and equitable to
 both of you?
 [Wife]: Um—
 THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is it—is it fair
 enough to get the mar—the divorce granted today?
 [Wife]: Yes.
 Tr. Vol. II p. 8. The trial court stated,

 THE COURT: Okay. If there's nothing else, then I'm going to
 grant the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. Each of you are
 restored to the status of unmarried persons effective immediately.
 All property and debts are divided in accordance with the
 agreement and your prior name is restored. In other words, the
 divorce is granted today. It's just a matter of—[Wife's counsel],
 you're going to prepare the decree?[1]
 Tr. Vol. II p. 9.

[4] The hearing then moved to the matter of the parties' tax obligations for 2015

 and 2016, with Husband requesting that the parties refile jointly for those years

 to save money. Wife initially objected, expressing concern that refiling might

 1
 After a brief discussion, it was in fact determined that Husband's attorney would prepare the decree.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 4 of 14
 delay her taking possession of the marital home. When it was pointed out by

 Wife's counsel that she already had possession of the house and that Husband

 would be responsible for all of the taxes in any event, Wife's counsel asked her

 if she was "okay" with refiling, to which she responded, "I guess." Tr. Vol. II

 p. 14. The trial court asked Wife, "Is that agreeable[,] Mrs. Sanders?", to which

 she replied, "Sure." Tr. Vol. II p. 15. An entry for January 9, 2017, in the

 chronological case summary ("CCS") indicated as follows: "AGREEMENT

 RECITED - COURT GRANTS DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE THIS

 DATE [Husband's counsel] TO PREPARE DECREE ORDER TO BE

 DATED 01/09/2017[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 4.

[5] On February 10, 2017, Wife sent a handwritten letter to the trial court,

 requesting that it reconsider the Agreement. The trial court, presumably

 because Wife was represented by counsel, forwarded the correspondence to the

 parties and attorneys but took no further action. The CCS indicates that on

 February 15, 2017, the trial court issued the dissolution decree, which,

 consistent with the prior CCS entry, was dated and stamped as filed as of

 January 9, 2017. The decree reflected the terms of the Agreement discussed

 and agreed upon at the final hearing. A CCS entry on February 16, 2017,

 indicates that on February 15, 2017, Wife moved to withdraw the Agreement,

 and her counsel moved to withdraw his appearance.

[6] On March 13, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Wife's motion to

 withdraw the Agreement. Wife testified, claiming that at the January 9 hearing

 (1) she could not hear hers or Husband's counsels, (2) the court reporter could

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 5 of 14
 not hear her, and (3) she did not voice her objections more forcefully because

 she was "crying a lot" and had "several polyps[,]" which had to be removed

 after the hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Also on March 13, 2017, the trial court

 denied Wife's motion to withdraw the Agreement. On April 6, 2017, Wife filed

 a verified motion to correct error and/or for relief from judgment. On

 December 11, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on Wife's motions;

 Wife's motion to correct error was ultimately deemed denied, and her motion

 for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) has neither been

 adjudicated nor deemed denied.

 Discussion and Decision
 I. Standards of Review
 A. Motion to Correct Error
[7] Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to

 correct error. We review denial of a motion to correct error for abuse of

 discretion. Shane v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. Ct.

 App. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is against

 the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the

 reasonable inferences therefrom. Id.

 B. Motion for Relief from Judgment
[8] Wife also contends that the trial court should have granted her motion for relief

 from judgment, seemingly filed pursuant to several grounds listed in Indiana

 Rule of Trial Procedure 60(B).
 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 6 of 14
 We review the denial of a motion for relief from judgment under
 Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) only for an abuse of discretion because
 such a motion is addressed to the equitable discretion of the trial
 court. V.C. Tank Lines, Inc. v. Faison, 754 N.E.2d 1061, 1064
 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). An abuse of discretion will be found only
 when the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. Id. A trial
 court's action is clearly erroneous when it is against the logic and
 effect of the facts before it and the inferences which may be
 drawn therefrom. Id. In ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion, the
 trial court is required to "balance the alleged injustice suffered by
 the party moving for relief against the interests of the winning
 party and society in general in the finality of litigation." Id.
 (quoting Chelovich v. Ruff & Silvian Agency, 551 N.E.2d 890, 892
 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)).
 Goldsmith v. Jones, 761 N.E.2d 471, 473–74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

 II. Validity of Agreement
[9] At the heart of both of Wife's claims is her contention that the trial court's

 adoption of the oral Agreement into its dissolution decree was erroneous

 because (1) the Agreement was not reduced to writing before approval by the

 trial court, (2) the Agreement was not signed by the parties before approval by

 the trial court, (3) she timely repudiated it in any event, and (4) the trial court

 was required to explicitly find that the Agreement was fair and reasonable

 before approving it but failed to do so. If Wife cannot convince us of the merits

 of at least one of these contentions, it follows that she has failed to establish that

 the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to correct error or in

 not granting her relief from judgment.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 7 of 14
 A. Whether the Agreement was Required to Be in Writing
 Before Approval by the Trial Court
[10] Indiana Code section 31-15-2-17(a) provides, in part, that "[t]o promote the

 amicable settlements of disputes that have arisen or may arise between the

 parties to a marriage attendant upon the dissolution of their marriage, the

 parties may agree in writing to provisions for […] the disposition of any

 property owned by either or both of the parties[.]" Wife contends that this

 language and related case law require that any such agreement must be reduced

 to writing before it can be properly accepted by the trial court. Husband

 contends that recitation of the terms of an agreement into the record is sufficient

 to satisfy section 31-15-2-17(a)'s writing requirement.

[11] We have noted that there are "strong policy reasons supporting the requirement

 that agreements be in writing, including: (1) ensuring the enforceability of

 agreements; (2) facilitating agreements that result from mutual assent; (3)

 achieving complete resolution of disputes; and (4) producing clear

 understandings that the parties are less likely to dispute or challenge." Akers v.

 Akers, 849 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Stolberg v. Stolberg, 538

 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), we concluded that the writing requirement was

 satisfied where

 [t]he substance of the agreement was testified to by [husband]
 and orally accepted by [wife]. The trial court interrogated both
 parties on the content of the agreement and their understanding
 thereof. Upon questioning, [wife] affirmed her request for
 approval of the settlement as stated by [husband].
 Unquestionably, both [husband and wife] intentionally, with full
 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 8 of 14
 knowledge of the eventual outcome, entered into a joint
 agreement.
 Id. at 4. The Stolberg court also rejected wife's claim that "the agreement signed

 by the trial judge was merely ‘written evidence of an oral agreement[,]'" stating

 that "[w]e fail to see any real distinction between a written agreement and

 written evidence of an oral agreement. The distinction is one of semantics

 rather than substance. It was the written agreement contemplated by the

 statute." Id. We, too, fail to see any real distinction between a written

 agreement and written evidence of an oral agreement, as either can satisfy the

 policy concerns raised by the Akers court.

[12] Indeed, the Akers court reiterated Stolberg's interpretation of the writing

 requirement:

 We believe that the writing requirement of Indiana Code § 31-15-
 2-17 can be satisfied in two ways. First, and most obviously, the
 parties can produce and sign a written document containing the
 terms of their agreement. The second way was suggested by
 Judge Sullivan, writing in concurrence in [McClure v. McClure,
 459 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)]. He wrote: "While the
 agreement may not have been reduced to writing in a separate
 document and signed by the parties as well as by counsel, the
 agreement became binding upon the parties when it was
 stipulated into the record." McClure, 459 N.E.2d at 401
 (Sullivan, J., concurring). We agree with Judge Sullivan that the
 writing requirement of Indiana Code § 31-15-2-17 can be satisfied
 by orally stipulating the terms of the settlement agreement into
 the court record. The parties themselves, their attorneys, or the
 trial court can recite the terms of the agreement in open court,
 and the parties can then acknowledge, under oath, their assent to
 those terms. Placing the agreement on the trial court record by

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 9 of 14
 way of a voice recording and/or the court reporters' transcript is
 tantamount to composing a written settlement document in that
 both procedures produce tangible proof of the terms of the
 agreement.
 Akers, 849 N.E.2d at 775–76.

[13] After the terms of the Agreement were read in open court, Wife acknowledged

 her assent under oath. What Wife characterizes as her equivocation about the

 Agreement is more fairly described as clearing up her apparent confusion

 regarding the effect of refiling tax returns for 2015 and 2016. Whatever

 concerns Wife may have had about the taxes, they were satisfactorily

 addressed, as she ultimately agreed in open court to the provisions of the

 Agreement, including Husband's proposal that he refile his tax returns for 2015

 and 2016. We conclude that the trial court's recitation of the Agreement's

 terms followed by Wife's assent to them satisfies section 31-15-2-17(a)'s writing

 requirement.

 B. Whether the Agreement Must Have Been Signed
[14] Wife also asserts that the writing must also have been signed by both parties

 before the trial court could approve it, citing to Indiana Code sections 31-15-2-

 17 and 31-15-2-13 for this proposition. Section 31-15-2-17 does contain the

 already-discussed writing requirement, but there is no signing requirement.

 Moreover, while section 31-15-2-13(a) does require the filing of verified

 pleadings "signed by both parties[,]" it only applies in cases where the trial

 court seeks to enter a "summary disposition decree without holding a final

 hearing[,]" which is not what occurred here. The authority cited by Wife does

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 10 of 14
 not support her contention, and our research has uncovered none that does.

 Wife has failed to establish that the parties were required to sign a written

 Agreement as a prerequisite for approval by the trial court.

 C. Whether Wife Timely Repudiated the Agreement
[15] Wife argues that, even if the writing requirement was satisfied, the trial erred in

 entering a decree that incorporated the Agreement after she timely repudiated

 it. As we noted in McClure, there is a "simple two-step process necessary to

 bring a valid property settlement agreement into existence[,]" namely that (1)

 the parties must come to a valid agreement and (2) the trial court must approve

 it. McClure, 459 N.E.2d at 401. Until a property settlement agreement is

 approved by the trial court, it can be repudiated by a party. See id. ("[O]ur

 decision is grounded solely on error by the trial court in approving an

 agreement that was timely repudiated.").

[16] Here, the terms of the Agreement were read in open court and the parties

 agreed to them, after which the trial court explicitly approved it, stating on the

 record that "[a]ll property and debts are divided in accordance with the

 agreement[.]" Tr. Vol. II p. 9. The trial court also made it abundantly clear

 that its judgment was to be effective immediately, stating that the parties "are

 restored to the status of unmarried persons effective immediately" and, "In

 other words, the divorce is granted today." Tr. Vol. II p. 9. The trial court's

 CCS entry indicating that Husband's counsel was to prepare a dissolution

 decree to be submitted later but dated January 9, 2017—the date of the final

 hearing—further indicates that it considered the matter settled. Wife's
 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 11 of 14
 repudiation came over one month after the trial court approved the Agreement

 at the final hearing, which is too late.

[17] We acknowledge that some of our precedent indicates that the cutoff for

 repudiation is not when the property settlement is approved by the trial court

 but when the dissolution decree is issued. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 399

 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("Hence, a settlement agreement that has

 not been approved by the dissolution court and incorporated and merged into

 the decree has no legal efficacy."). Under the circumstances of this case, at

 least, the actual issuance of the decree was little more than a formality, as the

 trial court made it clear that its judgment was to take effect immediately with a

 decree detailing the judgment to be issued later. Granting relief to Wife on the

 basis that the terms of the Agreement had not yet been incorporated into the

 decree when she objected would elevate form over substance in this case. Wife

 has failed to establish that she timely repudiated the Agreement. 2

 2
 In any event, Wife cannot even establish with certainty that she objected before the issuance of the decree.
 The trial court properly failed to act on Wife's letter to the trial court, as she was represented by counsel at
 the time, and Indiana does not recognize hybrid representation. See, e.g., Miedreich v. Rank, 40 Ind. App. 393,
 397, 82 N.E. 117, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1907) ("[A] party to an action may appear in his own proper person, or
 by attorney, but he cannot do both. If he appears by attorney, he should be heard through him.") (citation
 omitted). As for Wife's motion to withdraw the Agreement, which was filed by counsel, it is not at all clear
 that it was filed before the decree was issued. If anything, the record suggests the opposite, as the CCS entry
 indicating the issuance of the decree appears before the entry indicating Wife's motion to withdraw the
 Agreement.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 12 of 14
 D. Whether the Trial Court Erroneously Failed to Consider
 Whether the Agreement Was Just and Reasonable
[18] Finally, Wife argues that the trial court was required to explicitly determine that

 the Agreement was just and reasonable before approving it. Specifically, Wife

 argues that "the statutes require trial courts to insist upon a written agreement

 or perform an analysis of factors listed at I.C. 31-15-7-5."3 Appellant's Br. p.

 38. Even if we assume, arguendo, that these are, in fact, the only two options

 available to the trial court, we have already determined that the recitation of the

 Agreement's terms into the record, coupled with the parties' assent to them

 under oath, satisfies the writing requirement of Indiana Code section 31-15-2-

 17(a). Wife has failed to establish error in this regard.

 Conclusion

 3
 Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 provides as follows:
 The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties
 is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who
 presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an
 equal division would not be just and reasonable:
 (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of
 whether the contribution was income producing.
 (2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:
 (A) before the marriage; or
 (B) through inheritance or gift.
 (3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the
 property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
 residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court
 considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
 (4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or
 dissipation of their property.
 (5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
 (A) a final division of property; and
 (B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-326 | June 25, 2018 Page 13 of 14
 [19] We conclude that the Agreement was not required to be reduced to writing or

 signed before approval by the trial court, Wife did not timely repudiate the

 Agreement, and the trial court did not err in failing to find that the Agreement

 was just and reasonable. Consequently, we further conclude that the trial court

 did not err in denying Wife's motion to correct error or in failing to grant her

 relief from judgment.

[20] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

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