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CourtListener opinion 4293283

Date unknown · US

Extracted case name
pending
Extracted reporter citation
629 A.2d 1014
Docket / number
1817 MDA 2017
QDRO relevance 5/5Retirement relevance 5/5Family-law relevance 5/5gold label pending
Research-use warning: This page contains machine-draft public annotations generated from public opinion text. The headnote is not Willie-approved gold-label work product and is not legal advice. Verify the full opinion and current law before relying on it.

Machine-draft headnote

Machine-draft public headnote: CourtListener opinion 4293283 is included in the LexyCorpus QDRO sample set as a public CourtListener opinion with relevance to pension / defined benefit issues. The current annotation is conservative: it identifies source provenance, relevance signals, and evidence quotes for attorney/agent retrieval. It is not a Willie-approved legal headnote yet.

Retrieval annotation

Draft retrieval summary: this opinion has QDRO relevance score 5/5, retirement-division score 5/5, and family-law score 5/5. Use the quoted text and full opinion below before relying on the case.

Category: pension / defined benefit issues

Evidence quotes

QDRO

y 8, 2016. Between July 14, 2016 and November 30, 2016, Husband filed eight petitions challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement, all of which were denied by the trial court. On December 14, 2016, the parties came to an agreement and executed a Qualified Domestic Relations Order addressing Wife's entitlement to a portion of Husband's pension payout. However, beginning on January 4, 2017 through November 14, 2017, Husband filed another six petitions challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement. The trial court denied each petition. On November 27, 2017, Husband filed a timely pro se notice of appeal from the trial cour

pension

history of this case as follows: Husband and [Lysbeth W. Clark (Wife)] signed a post- nuptial agreement on December 27, 1984. As stated in paragraph twelve (12) of the Agreement, Wife is entitled to a percentage of Husband's Philadelphia Electric Company pension when Husband begins drawing on it. Paragraph 12 also contains a formula to determine Wife's monthly portion of Husband's pension payout. In 1995, Husband retired and Wife began receiving her portion of Husband's pension payment directly from Husband. The amount of this payment was $532.30 per month. Husband began withholding monthly payments to Wife i

domestic relations order

Between July 14, 2016 and November 30, 2016, Husband filed eight petitions challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement, all of which were denied by the trial court. On December 14, 2016, the parties came to an agreement and executed a Qualified Domestic Relations Order addressing Wife's entitlement to a portion of Husband's pension payout. However, beginning on January 4, 2017 through November 14, 2017, Husband filed another six petitions challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement. The trial court denied each petition. On November 27, 2017, Husband filed a timely pro se notice of appeal from the trial cour

Source and provenance

Source type
courtlistener_qdro_opinion_full_text
Permissions posture
public
Generated status
machine draft public v0
Review status
gold label pending
Jurisdiction metadata
US
Deterministic extraction
reporter: 629 A.2d 1014 · docket: 1817 MDA 2017
Generated at
May 14, 2026

Related public corpus pages

Deterministic links based on shared title/citation terms and QDRO / retirement / family-law retrieval scores.

Clean opinion text

J-A15028-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 LYSBETH W. CLARK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 BRUCE L. CLARK :
 :
 Appellant : No. 1817 MDA 2017

 Appeal from the Order November 15, 2017
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
 No(s): CI-1979-May-262

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2018

 Bruce L. Clark (Husband) appeals pro se from the order denying his

motion for the "Determination of the Obvious Validity of the Defendant's and

the Court's Documented Identical Versions of the Postnuptial Agreement of

1984." We affirm.

 The trial court summarized the relevant factual history of this case as

follows:
 Husband and [Lysbeth W. Clark (Wife)] signed a post-
 nuptial agreement on December 27, 1984. As stated in paragraph
 twelve (12) of the Agreement, Wife is entitled to a percentage of
 Husband's Philadelphia Electric Company pension when Husband
 begins drawing on it. Paragraph 12 also contains a formula to
 determine Wife's monthly portion of Husband's pension payout.
 In 1995, Husband retired and Wife began receiving her portion of
 Husband's pension payment directly from Husband. The amount
 of this payment was $532.30 per month. Husband began
 withholding monthly payments to Wife in October 2015. Husband
 stated the reason he stopped making the payments was because
 Wife interfered with his relationship with their daughter and their
 grandchildren.
 J-A15028-18

Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/17, at 4-5 (citations omitted).

 On July 6, 2016, Wife filed a petition to enforce the postnuptial

agreement and for counsel fees, which the trial court granted on July 8, 2016.

Between July 14, 2016 and November 30, 2016, Husband filed eight petitions

challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement, all of which were denied

by the trial court. On December 14, 2016, the parties came to an agreement

and executed a Qualified Domestic Relations Order addressing Wife's

entitlement to a portion of Husband's pension payout. However, beginning on

January 4, 2017 through November 14, 2017, Husband filed another six

petitions challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement. The trial court

denied each petition. On November 27, 2017, Husband filed a timely pro se

notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying as moot Husband's most

recent motion challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement. The trial

court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 15, 2017.

 In reviewing Husband's brief, we are unable to discern the issue or

issues that Husband wishes this Court to review because Husband has failed

to include a statement of questions involved. We have recognized that the

omission of a statement of questions involved is "particularly grievous since

the statement . . . defines the specific issues this court is asked to review."

Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Pa. Super. 1993).

"When the omission of the statement of questions [involved] is combined with

the lack of any organized and developed arguments, it becomes clear that

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 J-A15028-18

appellant's brief is insufficient to allow us to conduct meaningful judicial

review." Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996).

 Additionally, Husband's brief fails to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2111(a) mandates that an appellant's brief shall

consist of the following matters, separately and distinctly entitled, and in the

following order:

 (1) Statement of jurisdiction.

 (2) Order or other determination in question.

 (3) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard of
 review.

 (4) Statement of the questions involved.

 (5) Statement of the case.

 (6) Summary of argument.

 (7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to challenge
 the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if applicable.

 (8) Argument for appellant.

 (9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

 (10) The opinions and pleadings specified in paragraphs (b) and
 (c) of this rule.

 (11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of the
 matters complained of on appeal, filed with the trial court
 pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that no order
 requiring a statement of errors complained of on appeal
 pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered.

 (12) The certificates of compliance required by Pa.R.A.P. 127 and
 2135(d).

 -3-
 J-A15028-18

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (emphasis added).

 Husband's pro se brief does not contain any of the sections mandated

by Rule 2111(a). Moreover, Husband's brief fails to include citations to legal

authority and record citations. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that an

appellant develop an argument with citation to and analysis of relevant legal

authority); see also Papadoplos v. Schmidt, Ronca & Kramer, P.C., 21

A.3d 1216, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2011) (finding waiver where the appellants

advanced only a cursory argument in support of their issue, and failed to cite

to any pertinent legal authority). Based upon these deficiencies, Husband's

claim is waived.1 For this reason, we find no basis upon which to disturb the

trial court's order.

 Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

1 Although Husband is proceeding pro se in this appeal, he must still comply
with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jones v. Rudenstein,
585 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citing Farretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 n.46 (1975)). Husband's pro se representation does not relieve him
of his duty to properly raise and develop appealable claims. Smathers, 670
A.2d at 1160. We have explained:

 [A]ny layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal
 proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that
 his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.

Kovalev v. Sowell, 839 A.2d 359, 367 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation,
quotation marks and brackets omitted).

 -4-
 J-A15028-18

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 07/11/2018

 -5-