CourtListener opinion 4342312

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FILED
 Nov 16 2018, 9:32 am

 CLERK
 Indiana Supreme Court
 Court of Appeals
 and Tax Court

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
 Jonathan R. Deenik Janice Mandla Mattingly
 Deenik Law, LLC Janice Mandla Mattingly, P.C.
 Greenwood, Indiana Carmel, Indiana

 IN THE
 COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

 Kimberly L. Eads, November 16, 2018
 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
 18A-DR-249
 v. Appeal from the Johnson Superior
 Court
 Robert J. Eads, Jr., The Honorable Peter D. Nugent,
 Appellee-Respondent Judge
 Trial Court Cause No.
 41D02-1110-DR-779

 Vaidik, Chief Judge.

 Case Summary
[1] In October 2011, Kimberly L. Eads ("Wife") filed a petition to dissolve her

 marriage to Robert J. Eads ("Husband"). Nearly six years later, in July 2017,

 the trial court issued a decree dissolving the parties' marriage. In the decree,

 the court used a coverture fraction to determine that 77.2% of Husband's

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 1 of 23
 firefighters' pension was earned during the marriage. The court then ordered

 Husband, once he retires, to forward half of 77.2%, or 38.6%, of his monthly

 pension payment to Wife each month and then issue her a Form 1099-R (an

 IRS form for distributions from pensions and retirement plans) so that Wife

 pays the taxes on her share of his pension. In addition, the court found that

 Wife, who receives social-security disability payments for injuries she sustained

 in a car accident, is entitled to rehabilitative maintenance and ordered Husband

 to pay her $1000/month for twenty-four months. Finally, the court ordered

 each party to pay their own attorney's fees.

[2] Both Husband and Wife now appeal. We conclude that the trial court erred in

 calculating the coverture fraction because it included pension rights that

 Husband earned after Wife filed for divorce. We therefore remand this case

 with instructions for the court to apply one of two methods—the date-of-

 retirement approach or the date-of-divorce approach—to determine the portion

 of Husband's pension that was earned during the marriage. We also conclude

 that the trial court erred in ordering Husband to issue Wife a Form 1099-R each

 year and therefore order the court to consider different options of making Wife

 responsible for the taxes on her share of Husband's pension. Although we find

 no abuse of the trial court's discretion in ordering each party to pay their own

 attorney's fees, we find that the record does not support an award of

 rehabilitative maintenance. On remand, the court must determine whether

 Wife is entitled to incapacity maintenance instead of rehabilitative

 maintenance. We therefore affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

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 Facts and Procedural History
[3] Although the dissolution decree covers many topics, this appeal concerns only a

 few of them. Accordingly, we set forth the facts that are relevant to the issues

 the parties raise on appeal.

[4] Husband began working as a firefighter on February 7, 1994. As a firefighter,

 Husband is a member of the 1977 Police Officers' and Firefighters' Pension and

 Disability Fund ("1977 Fund"), which is administered by the Indiana Public

 Retirement System (INPRS). Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23 (Finding 37); see

 also Thatcher v. City of Kokomo, 962 N.E.2d 1224, 1225 n.1 (Ind. 2012) ("The

 ‘1977 Fund' is a disability and pension fund for police officers and firefighters

 established by Indiana Code section 36-8-8-4 that is managed by [INPRS].").

 Members of the 1977 Fund become vested with twenty years of service and are

 eligible for an unreduced retirement benefit when they have twenty years of

 service, are at least fifty-two years old, and have separated from service.

 Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23 (Finding 37); see also Ex. 1. Unlike other

 pensions, the 1977 Fund pension is not subject to a Qualified Domestic

 Relations Order (QDRO).1

 1
 According to INPRS,

 The fund is not required by federal law to honor [QDROs]. The 1977 Fund is not
 authorized by law to split payments between payees. . . . The Fund will not make any
 payments directly to a Fund Member's alternate payee under a QDRO. . . . The Fund
 will also not make any payments prior to the time that distributions would otherwise
 begin to the member by law. This means that the member must have actually retired or

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 [5] About three-and-a-half years after Husband began working as a firefighter, on

 November 15, 1997, Husband and Wife married. In 2000, Wife was involved

 in a car accident and sustained back injuries. See Tr. Vol. II p. 9 (Wife testifying

 that her back injuries prevent her from sitting, standing for long periods of time,

 and concentrating and that her medications make her sleepy). Wife, who

 worked as a finance manager before the accident, has not worked since the

 accident. Id. Wife was eventually awarded social-security disability payments

 dating back to 2000. In 2002 and 2003, Husband was "medically retired" due

 to an injury. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23 (Finding 39); Tr. Vol. III p. 177.

 Husband then returned to work.

[6] On October 25, 2011—which was before Husband, then age forty-five, became

 vested in his 1977 Fund pension—Wife filed for divorce.2 In the petition, Wife

 requested spousal maintenance. Tr. Vol. II pp. 95-97. After Wife filed for

 divorce, Husband and Wife did not live together or commingle assets. The

 separated from employment from a 1977 Fund covered position in order for the Fund to
 begin making payments to the member.

 Ex. 2C.

 2
 According to INPRS, on October 25, 2011, Husband "was not vested in a pension benefit"; however, if
 Husband separated from employment on October 25, 2011, "he could have withdrawn his member
 contribution account balance," which at that time was approximately $67,853.45. Ex. 2C; see also Tr. Vol. II
 pp. 216-17. After becoming vested, however, Husband cannot withdraw his member contributions "because
 [they] are used to fund the 1977 pension benefit." Ex. 2C.

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 divorce was pending for nearly six years. During this time, Husband reached

 twenty years of service and thus became vested in his pension.

[7] The final hearing was held over the course of three days between December

 2016 and February 2017. Husband was still working and thus continuing to

 accrue pension benefits. At the hearing, substantial time was devoted to

 Husband's 1977 Fund pension, as it was one of the parties' two major assets

 (the other being the marital residence). Wife presented evidence from Dan

 Andrews, a Franklin College business and accounting professor and a CPA.

 Specifically, Andrews testified that Husband's monthly benefit amount

 (calculated by INPRS as though Husband had separated from service on

 October 4, 2016—the date of valuation—and would apply for an unreduced

 retirement benefit when he turned fifty-two in July 2018) would be $3254.86

 and that the present value of Husband's 1977 Fund pension was $1,278,133.26.

 See Tr. Vol. II pp. 200, 223; Ex. 2A. Andrews, at Wife's request, then applied

 the coverture fraction formula (discussed below), concluding that Husband

 earned 61.52% of his pension during the marriage. Tr. Vol. II pp. 201-02; Ex.

 2A (although Andrews testified that the coverture is 61.54%, his report provides

 that the coverture is 61.52%).3 Both Husband and Wife asked the trial court to

 3
 According to Exhibit 2A, Andrews calculated the length of marriage as 13.94 years, that is, from November
 15, 1997 (date of marriage) to October 25, 2011 (date Wife filed for divorce). Andrews calculated the term of
 Husband's employment as 22.66 years, that is, from February 7, 1994 (date of hire) to October 4, 2016 (date
 Husband's pension was valued).

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 order the other party to pay their attorney's fees. Tr. Vol. II p. 111; Tr. Vol. III

 p. 49.

[8] On July 5, 2017, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage, which

 it amended in December following the parties' motions to correct error. The

 amended decree addresses Husband's 1977 Fund pension as follows:

 46. The Court finds that the period of time from the date of
 [Husband's] employment (February 7, 1994) until the Date of the
 Decree (July 5, 2017) to be a total period of 281 months.
 However, the parties were not married for the first 40 months of
 [Husband's] employment, and there was [a] 24-month period of
 time in 2002-3 in which [Husband] was not working and
 contributing to his pension. Therefore, the pension vesting
 period was 217 months. (281 months – 64 months). Thus, the
 percentage of the pension earned during the marriage is 77.2%
 (217 divided by 281). [Wife] is entitled to half of that amount, or
 38.6%.

 *****

 48. [Wife] presented evidence in the form of a valuation report
 prepared by Dan Andrew[s] for [Husband's] 1977 Police and
 Firefighter pension. (Exhibit 2A). The Court accepts . . .
 Andrew[s'] valuation and places a value of $1,278,133.26 on said
 pension. However, only 77.2% of that amount was earned
 during the marriage, or $986,718.83.

 Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The court then divided the $986,718.83 equally,

 awarding Husband and Wife each $493,359.42. Id. at 27 (Finding 59). As to

 how Wife would receive her share of Husband's pension, the court explained:

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 6 of 23
 62. Because the parties do not have sufficient assets to divide the
 value of [Husband's] pension, the Court elects to divide the
 monthly benefit instead.

 63. [Husband's] pension benefit at age 52 is calculated to be
 $3,254.86 per month . . . . [Husband] could apply for a reduced
 pension benefit January 1, 2017 in the amount of $2,894.22.
 (Exhibits 1, 2A, 2B, 2C).

 64. Upon his retirement, [Husband] shall forward 38.6% . . . of
 his monthly pension each month to [Wife], as a [QDRO] is not
 possible with the Firefighter Pension. Because [Husband] . . .
 cannot determine his income tax liability before his earnings are
 calculated, [Husband] shall forward the pension amount directly
 to [Wife] and, each year, issue her a Form 1099 for her share of
 the pension.

 65. The Court chooses this method of distributing [Husband's]
 pension due to the parties lacking sufficient resources to
 otherwise allocate sufficient assets and the inability of the
 pension to be divided by [QDRO].

 Id. at 28.4

[9] As for Wife's request for spousal maintenance, the court found:

 4
 This method of distributing Husband's retirement benefits is referred to as the deferred-distribution method.
 Under this method, the court makes no immediate division of the retirement benefits but determines the
 future benefits to which the non-owning spouse is entitled. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d 721, 726 (Ind. Ct.
 App. 2015), trans. denied. Traditionally, the benefits have been stated as a share of the owning spouse's future
 benefit, and payment can be ordered to come directly from the owning spouse. Id. Under the other method,
 the immediate-offset method, the court determines the present value of the retirement benefits and awards the
 non-owning spouse his or her share of the benefits in an immediate lump-sum award of cash or property
 equal to the value of his or her interest. Id.

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 74. The Court finds that [Wife] is disabled and in need of
 maintenance. [Wife] has been determined to be disabled by the
 Social Security Administration and receives Social Security
 Disability payments. [Wife] has been unable to work for several
 years.

 *****

 82. The Court GRANTS [Wife's] request for spousal
 maintenance. The Court has reviewed I.C. 31-15-7-2 and the
 trial exhibits and agrees that [Wife] is in need of spousal
 maintenance. While [Wife] does currently receive disability
 income, it is not sufficient to sustain her needs. Pursuant to I.C.
 31-15-7-2(3), the Court finds that [Husband] shall pay to [Wife]
 the sum of $1,000.00 or 16.2% of his monthly income as
 rehabilitative maintenance for a period of twenty-four (24)
 months.

 Id. at 29-30. Finally, the trial court ordered Husband and Wife to pay their own

 attorney's fees:

 86. Each party will receive sufficient funds from the sale of the
 marital residence out of which to pay his or her attorney fees.
 Accordingly, each party shall be responsible for his or her
 attorney fees and costs.

 Id. at 30.

[10] Wife now appeals, and Husband cross-appeals.

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 Discussion and Decision
 I. Husband's Firefighters' Pension
[11] It is well settled that in a dissolution action, all marital property, whether

 owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the

 marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint

 efforts, goes into the marital pot for division. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a);

 Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). "Final

 separation" generally means the date that the petition for dissolution of

 marriage is filed. Ind. Code § 31-9-2-46. "Property" is defined in part as all the

 assets of either party or both parties, including:

 (1) a present right to withdraw pension or retirement benefits;

 (2) the right to receive pension or retirement benefits that are not
 forfeited upon termination of employment or that are vested (as
 defined in Section 411 of the Internal Revenue Code) but that are
 payable after the dissolution of marriage; and

 (3) the right to receive disposable retired or retainer pay (as
 defined in 10 U.S.C. 1408(a)) acquired during the marriage that
 is or may be payable after the dissolution of marriage.

 Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98(b). "The requirement that all marital assets be placed in

 the marital pot is meant to insure that the trial court first determines that value

 before endeavoring to divide property." Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234,

 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). "Indiana's ‘one pot' theory prohibits the exclusion of

 any asset in which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial

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 court's power to divide and award." Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d at 110 (quotation

 omitted). While the trial court may decide to award a particular asset solely to

 one spouse as part of its just and reasonable property division, it must first

 include the asset in its consideration of the marital estate to be divided. Id.

[12] After determining what constitutes marital property, the trial court must then

 divide the marital property under the presumption that an equal division is just

 and reasonable. Barton v. Barton, 47 N.E.3d 368, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015),

 trans. denied. This presumption may be rebutted by relevant evidence that an

 equal division would not be just and reasonable, such as the extent to which the

 property was acquired by each spouse before the marriage. Ind. Code § 31-15-

 7-5. However, the trial court must state its reasons for deviating from the

 presumption of an equal division in its findings and judgment. Barton, 47

 N.E.3d at 379.

[13] We first note that Husband does not argue on appeal that his 1977 Fund

 pension is not "property" because it was not vested when Wife filed for divorce.

 See In re Marriage of Adams, 535 N.E.2d 124, 125-26 (Ind. 1989) (holding that a

 police pension that vested after the dissolution petition was filed but before the

 dissolution decree was entered was "property" according to Section 31-19-2-

 98(b)(2)5 as a right to receive pension or retirement benefits not forfeited upon

 termination), reh'g denied; see also Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d 1293, 1294

 5
 At the time of Adams, this statute was located at Indiana Code section 31-1-11.5-11 (repealed in 1997).

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 (Ind. 1990) (applying Adams to situation where the husband's pension vested

 after the dissolution decree was entered and concluding: "In contrast to Adams,

 Danny Kirkman's right to pension benefits was neither vested nor had it

 become ‘not forfeited upon termination' prior to the entry of the dissolution

 decree"); but see Granzow v. Granzow, 855 N.E.2d 680, 684 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App.

 2006) (calling into doubt Kirkman's use of "the date of dissolution as the point

 on which to identify marital property subject to division"). Accordingly, we

 start from the premise that Husband's 1977 Fund pension is marital property to

 be divided between the parties.

[14] Wife argues that the trial court erred "by utilizing a coverture fraction" to

 exclude a portion of Husband's 1977 Fund pension from the marital pot

 because it resulted in an unequal division of the marital property "without

 sufficient justification," contrary to Indiana law. Appellant's Br. pp. 8, 10. But

 it was Wife's own expert who applied the coverture fraction to Husband's

 pension (in both his report and at the hearing). See Tr. Vol. II p. 201 (Andrews

 testifying that Wife asked him to calculate the coverture). Wife has therefore

 invited any error concerning the trial court's application of the coverture

 fraction to Husband's pension. In any event, the trial court included Husband's

 "pension rights" "in the marital pot." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24 (Finding

 47). The court explained, however, that it was setting aside a portion of the

 pension to Husband because it was earned before the parties' marriage; the

 court then equally divided the rest of the pension. Id. (Finding 46). This

 satisfies Indiana law.

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 [15] Husband challenges the trial court's division of his 1977 Fund pension.

 Specifically, he argues that the trial court improperly calculated the percentage

 of his pension that was earned during the marriage as 77.2%. He claims that

 the percentage should be lower, because the court improperly included pension

 rights that he earned after Wife filed for divorce. Husband is correct.

[16] The court calculated 77.2% using a coverture fraction. Specifically, the court

 found:

 46. The Court finds that the period of time from the date of
 [Husband's] employment (February 7, 1994) until the Date of
 the Decree (July 5, 2017) to be a total period of 281 months.
 However, the parties were not married for the first 40 months of
 [Husband's] employment, and there was [a] 24-month period of
 time in 2002-3 in which [Husband] was not working and
 contributing to his pension. Therefore, the pension vesting
 period was 217 months. (281 months - 64 months). Thus, the
 percentage of the pension earned during the marriage is 77.2%
 (217 divided by 281). [Wife] is entitled to half of that amount, or
 38.6%.

 Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24 (emphasis added). The court then ordered

 Husband to forward 38.6% "of his monthly pension each month" to Wife. Id.

 at 28 (Finding 64).

[17] Determining the portion of a pension that was earned during a marriage "is one

 of the most difficult tasks in all of equitable distribution." 2 Brett R. Turner,

 Equitable Distribution of Property 3d, Defined Benefit Plans: The Coverture

 Fraction § 6.25 (Nov. 2017 update). Because neither the employer nor the

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 employee normally makes specific contributions to such a plan, the court

 cannot use a proration of funds. Id. Rather, the court can use a proration of

 time. Id. This proration is used to determine the coverture fraction, that is, the

 portion of the pension that was earned during the marriage.6 Id. There are two

 formulas used to calculate the coverture fraction. The first one, which a "large

 majority" of courts use, is the date-of-retirement approach:

 Date-of-retirement coverture fraction = creditable time during marriage
 total creditable time

 Id.; see also Morey v. Morey, 49 N.E.3d 1065, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

 (explaining that the numerator is the period of time during which the marriage

 existed while pension rights were accruing and the denominator is the total

 period of time during which pension rights accrued). For example, if the

 employee is employed for 20 years, 12 of which occurred during the marriage,

 then 12/20 or 60% of the pension was earned during the marriage. Turner,

 supra, § 6.25. To compute the total marital interest in the pension, the fraction

 is multiplied by the employee's monthly benefit at retirement. Id.

[18] The second formula, which a "small but significant minority" of courts use, is

 the date-of-divorce approach:

 Date-of-divorce coverture fraction = creditable time during marriage
 total creditable time at divorce

 6
 According to Turner, "marital share fraction" is more accurate terminology than "coverture fraction."
 Turner, supra, § 6.25 at n.0.50.

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 Id. Although the numerators are the same in both formulas, this fraction uses

 total creditable time at divorce as the denominator, because the fraction is

 multiplied by what the monthly payment would be at divorce. Id. As Turner

 explains it, "[d]ifferent formulas are required because the denominator of the

 fraction must match exactly the period of time over which the employee

 acquired the benefit by which the fraction is being multiplied." Id. For

 example, an employee works 30 years: 5 years before the marriage, 15 years

 during the marriage, and 10 years after the marriage. According to the evidence

 presented, the employee's pension payment would have been $1000 per month

 had he retired at divorce. Thus, the coverture fraction is years married divided

 by years of employment at divorce, or 15/20 (75%). Id. To compute the total

 marital interest in the pension, the fraction is multiplied by what the monthly

 payment would be at divorce (not the actual pension payment, which

 presumably would be larger), 75% x $1000 per month= $750 per month. Id.

[19] Here, the trial court did not use either formula. We therefore remand this case

 with instructions for the court to re-calculate the coverture fraction,

 acknowledging that Husband has since turned fifty-two and might be retired.

 To assist the trial court, we illustrate how each of the formulas would work in

 this case.

[20] Using the date-of-divorce approach, the numerator of the coverture fraction is

 the creditable time during marriage, which is calculated from November 15,

 1997, the date of marriage (since Husband was already accumulating pension

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 benefits when the parties got married),7 to October 25, 2011, when Wife filed

 for divorce. See Barton, 47 N.E.3d at 380 & n.15 (calculating the numerator

 from the date of marriage to the date the dissolution petition was filed); Turner,

 supra, § 6.25 at n.28 (explaining that the ending date for the numerator is the

 "date of classification," which in Indiana is the date of "final separation"). This

 is a period of 167 months.8

[21] The denominator is the total creditable time at divorce, which is calculated

 from February 7, 1994 (Husband's date of hire) to October 4, 2016 (date

 Husband's pension was valued).9 This is a period of 271 months. 167/271 is

 61.62%.10 To compute the total marital interest in the pension, 61.62% is

 multiplied by Husband's estimated monthly benefit amount of $3254.86

 (calculated by INPRS as though Husband had separated from service on

 October 4, 2016, and would apply for an unreduced retirement benefit when he

 7
 The earliest starting date is the date of marriage. However, the date of marriage is not always the starting
 date because the employee could have started working after the date of marriage. In such a case, the date
 would be the date the employee started earning pension rights.
 8
 Although Husband testified, and the trial court found, that Husband did not accrue pension rights for
 twenty-four months while he was "medically retired," INPRS and Andrews said he did. See Exs. 1 & 2C; see
 also Ind. Code § 36-8-8-12(e) ("Time spent receiving disability benefits, not to exceed twenty (20) years, is
 considered active service for the purpose of determining retirement benefits."); Tr. Vol. II p. 218 (Andrews
 testifying that "time off on disability in the 77 Plan counts as time served"). Therefore, the twenty-four
 months should be included.
 9
 If Husband's pension could have been valued on the date Wife filed for divorce, that date presumably
 would have been used. However, Husband's pension was not vested when Wife filed for divorce and
 therefore had no value (other than Husband's member contributions). Neither party objected to using
 October 4, 2016.
 10
 This is almost the same number that Andrews calculated—61.52%. See Tr. Vol. II p. 202; see also Ex. 2A.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 15 of 23
 turned fifty-two in July 2018), which is $2005.64. According to the trial court's

 finding, Wife would be entitled to 50% of this monthly payment, or $1002.82.

[22] The date-of-retirement approach can also be used. As with the date-of-divorce

 approach, the numerator is 167 months. However, the denominator, the total

 creditable time, cannot be determined until Husband retires. If, on remand,

 Husband has retired, the denominator would be from February 7, 1994

 (Husband's date of hire), to Husband's date of retirement. To compute the total

 marital interest in the pension, the resulting fraction would be multiplied by

 Husband's actual monthly pension payment. If, however, Husband is still

 working, this formula can be used, but the denominator cannot be calculated

 until Husband retires. Likewise, the monthly benefit amount would be not

 known until Husband retires. If, on remand, Husband is still working, the trial

 court may place the formula in its order for the parties to calculate at Husband's

 retirement.

[23] Husband's next argument addresses taxes on Wife's portion of his pension.

 According to Indiana Code section 31-15-7-7, "The court, in determining what

 is just and reasonable in dividing property under this chapter, shall consider the

 tax consequences of the property disposition with respect to the present and

 future economic circumstances of each party." Here, the trial court ordered

 Husband, upon retirement, to forward a percentage of his monthly pension

 payment each month "directly to [Wife] and, each year, issue her a Form 1099

 for her share of the pension." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28 (Finding 64); see

 Cross-Appellee's Br. p. 6 (stating that the trial court was likely referring to Form

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 16 of 23
 1099-R). Husband contends that Form 1099-R is not the proper way to

 transfer the tax burden on Wife's portion of his pension to her. We agree.

[24] According to the IRS, Form 1099-R should be filed "for each person to whom

 you have made a designated distribution or are treated as having made a

 distribution of $10 or more from," among other things, retirement plans and

 pensions. IRS, About Form 1099-R, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-

 form-1099-r. But Wife is not receiving a distribution from her pension; rather,

 Husband is receiving a distribution from his pension and then giving Wife a

 portion of it as part of the property settlement. Once Husband retires and starts

 receiving his pension, he will receive a Form 1099-R from INPRS for the full

 amount of his annual benefit and thus be responsible for taxes on the full

 amount. Accordingly, Form 1099-R is not a proper way to transfer Wife's tax

 burden to her.11 On remand, the trial court can address the tax consequences by

 reducing Wife's percentage of Husband's monthly pension payment to account

 for the fact Husband is paying taxes on her portion. Or, if Husband has retired

 and his monthly pension payment is known, the trial court can determine the

 net, or after-tax, amount of Husband's monthly pension payment based on his

 11
 As explained earlier, Husband's 1977 Fund pension is not subject to a QDRO. However, when a deferred-
 distribution award is implemented through a QDRO, the plan administrator gives a separate benefit check to
 each spouse, and each spouse is responsible for his or her own tax consequences. 2 Brett R. Turner,
 Equitable Distribution of Property 3d, Defined Benefit Plans: Deferred Distribution Method § 6.32 (Nov. 2017
 update).

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 17 of 23
 withholding12 and then multiply the coverture fraction by Husband's net

 monthly pension payment.

 II. Maintenance Award
[25] Wife contends that the trial court erred in awarding her "rehabilitative"

 maintenance instead of "incapacity" maintenance. Spousal-maintenance

 awards in Indiana are "restricted to three, quite limited options": incapacity,

 caregiver, and rehabilitative. In re Marriage of Gertiser, 45 N.E.3d 363, 367 (Ind.

 2015) (quotation omitted). Indiana Code section 31-15-7-2 sets forth the

 requirements of each:

 A court may make the following findings concerning
 maintenance:

 (1) If the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally
 incapacitated to the extent that the ability of the incapacitated
 spouse to support himself or herself is materially affected, the
 court may find that maintenance for the spouse is necessary
 during the period of incapacity, subject to further order of the
 court.

 (2) If the court finds that:

 12
 According to INPRS, it must "withhold federal taxes on monthly payments. You may choose not to have
 taxes withheld. Make sure to complete the tax withholding forms when you apply for benefits." INPRS,
 [1977 Fund] Member Handbook: Taxation of Retirement Benefits,
 https://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooktaxationofrtmtbenefits.htm. If the trial court is worried that
 Husband will withhold too many taxes, thus decreasing the amount that Wife receives each month, the court
 can order Husband to withhold a specific amount.

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 (A) a spouse lacks sufficient property, including marital
 property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for the
 spouse's needs; and

 (B) the spouse is the custodian of a child whose physical or
 mental incapacity requires the custodian to forgo
 employment;

 the court may find that maintenance is necessary for the spouse
 in an amount and for a period of time that the court considers
 appropriate.

 (3) After considering:

 (A) the educational level of each spouse at the time of
 marriage and at the time the action is commenced;

 (B) whether an interruption in the education, training, or
 employment of a spouse who is seeking maintenance
 occurred during the marriage as a result of homemaking or
 child care responsibilities, or both;

 (C) the earning capacity of each spouse, including
 educational background, training, employment skills, work
 experience, and length of presence in or absence from the
 job market; and

 (D) the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient
 education or training to enable the spouse who is seeking
 maintenance to find appropriate employment;

 a court may find that rehabilitative maintenance for the spouse
 seeking maintenance is necessary in an amount and for a period

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 19 of 23
 of time that the court considers appropriate, but not to exceed
 three (3) years from the date of the final decree.

[26] In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the trial court's authority in

 ordering maintenance is limited to these three statutory options. Cannon v.

 Cannon, 758 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ind. 2001) ("Where none of these circumstances

 exist, a court may not order maintenance without the agreement of the

 parties."). This is because the policy regarding spousal maintenance reflects a

 clear legislative intent to retain fairly strict limits on the power of courts to order

 maintenance without the consent of the parties. Id.

[27] In its findings, the trial court quoted only Section 31-15-7-2(1), which addresses

 incapacity maintenance, but then found that Wife was "disabled" and entitled

 to "rehabilitative maintenance" under Section 31-15-7-2(3) for twenty-four

 months (unlike incapacity maintenance, which lasts for the duration of the

 incapacity until further order of the court, rehabilitative maintenance may not

 exceed three years from the date of the final decree). 13 However, the trial

 court's findings do not address the requirements for rehabilitative maintenance.

 And Wife concedes that "[t]here is no evidence of record which would support

 a finding of ‘Rehabilitative Maintenance.'" Appellant's Br. p. 12. Further

 adding to the confusion is the fact that the trial court found that Husband "does

 13
 Wife posits that the trial court awarded her rehabilitative maintenance for twenty-four months so that it
 ended "at approximately the time she will begin receiving her share of [Husband's] monthly pension benefit."
 Appellant's Br. p. 13.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 20 of 23
 not have the financial means to meet all the obligations this Court has now

 burdened him with and pay the spousal maintenance award." Appellant's App.

 Vol. II p. 30 (Finding 84) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we remand this case

 to the trial court with instructions to determine whether Wife is entitled to

 incapacity maintenance, taking into consideration Husband's ability to pay.

 Barton, 47 N.E.3d at 375-77. If the court awards Wife incapacity maintenance,

 it should last for the "period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court."

 III. Attorney's Fees
[28] Both Husband and Wife asked the trial court to order the other party to pay

 their attorney's fees, but the court ordered Husband and Wife to pay their own

 fees. The court reasoned that they will each "receive sufficient funds from the

 sale of the marital residence." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30 (Finding 86).

 Wife contends that the trial court erred in not ordering Husband to pay her

 attorney's fees. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1, a trial court may

 order a party in a dissolution proceeding to pay a reasonable amount of the

 other party's attorney's fees. Barton, 47 N.E.3d at 377. The court has broad

 discretion in deciding whether to award attorney's fees. Id.

[29] In determining whether to award attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding,

 trial courts should consider the parties' resources, their economic condition,

 their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other

 factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award. Id. A party's misconduct

 that directly results in additional litigation expenses may also be considered. Id.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DR-249 | November 16, 2018 Page 21 of 23
 Consideration of these factors promotes the legislative purpose behind the

 award of attorney's fees, which is to ensure that a party who would not

 otherwise be able to afford an attorney is able to retain representation. Hartley

 v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 286-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). When one party is in a

 superior position to pay fees over the other party, an award is proper. Id.

[30] Wife argues that the court should have ordered Husband to pay her attorney's

 fees of $22,000 due to her disability as well as Husband's superior earning

 capacity and conduct during the divorce proceedings, such as his failure to

 appear at some of the hearings and his failure to fully comply with discovery.

 The trial court made several findings regarding the parties' financial situation.

 That is, the court found that the parties were living "well above their means

 while married," that a "balloon payment" on the mortgage became due during

 the dissolution proceedings, and that "[Husband] and [Husband] alone has

 been responsible for the obligations relating to the marital residence during the

 almost 6-year pendency of this case." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30 (Findings

 83 & 84). Although the trial court did not make any findings regarding

 Husband's conduct, the trial court was well aware that the divorce had been

 pending for nearly six years. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

 ordering each party to pay their own attorney's fees. However, because this

 case is being remanded, the court can revisit the topic of attorney's fees if it

 chooses.

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 [31] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

 Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

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