CourtListener opinion 4369010

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

J. S66034/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JAMIL HASSOUNAH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 v. :
 :
LUCIA MARIA RIBERIO De SILVA, : No. 1512 EDA 2018
 :
 Appellant :

 Appeal from the Decree, April 10, 2018,
 in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
 Civil Division at No. C0048CV-2013-02082

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2019

 Lucia Maria Riberio De Silva ("Wife") appeals from the April 10, 2018

divorce decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northhampton

County. We affirm.

 The record reflects that on September 29, 2016, Wife and

Jamil Hassounah ("Husband") appeared before a special master ("master")

for an equitable distribution hearing. The master set forth the following:

 The parties stipulated that the date of marriage was
 January 23, 1993. There was no agreement with
 regard to the date of separation. Husband contends
 that the date of separation was December, 2012.
 Wife contends that it was January or March of 2013.

 It is the parties' first marriage. They have one minor
 child, a daughter, who at the time of hearing was
 11 years old.
 J. S66034/18

 Husband is controlling and domineering. Wife was
 simply not credible and [was] unrealistic.

 The parties entered into a series of Stipulations with
 regard to various assets as set forth below.

 Wife currently resides in the marital property. The
 marital home is of significant size. Currently, only
 Wife and the parties' daughter reside at the marital
 home.

 Husband is an engineer and has had a series of jobs
 over the years. To find employment, Husband has
 moved to various places including Canada, Texas,
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire.

 The parties had joint accounts at Bank of America.
 However, when Husband moved to a new location,
 he would open up a separate bank account through
 Bank of America at that particularly [sic] location.
 Husband did so while the parties were married as
 well as after separation. While wife suggested that
 this was nefarious, the undersigned makes a specific
 finding that Husband's method of banking was
 nothing beyond the controlling actions of a spouse.
 In other words, Husband set up this system so he
 would be able to control the flow of money into joint
 funds. However, although this system would provide
 Husband the opportunity to prevent funds from
 being deposited in a joint account, there was no
 credible evidence that Husband did anything wrong.

 Neither party was particularly responsive with regard
 to discovery. On the date of the hearing, Wife
 provided a series of documents to Husband. It did
 not appear that Wife provided these items in
 discovery. However, the items that Wife was
 providing were bank records wherein they were
 Husband's bank records for accounts that he was
 owner of either in joint name or, for the vast
 majority of them, in his own name, only.
 Accordingly, despite the fact that they were late and
 the production was not timely, over Husband's
 objection, they were admitted into evidence.

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 J. S66034/18

 Both parties are originally from Brazil. Husband
 acknowledged that he sent a significant sum of
 money to Brazil during the course of the marriage.
 Wife claims these transfers were done without Wife's
 knowledge or consent. In addition, the amount of
 the transfers was at issue. Husband acknowledged
 that it was $139,000.00. Wife claimed it was more.

 Husband was involved in an extramarital affair. In
 fact, Husband, prior to separation, made a transfer
 from a marital Bank of America account to Carleen
 King, the woman with whom he was having the
 extramarital relationship. This transfer was for
 $3000.

 From the time that the parties moved from Brazil,
 they moved due to Husband's employment.
 Husband earned a significant income and continues
 to do so.

 The assets of the parties with their approximate
 values are as follows:

 REAL ESTATE

 1. Marital Residence—4688 Derby Lane,
 Bethlehem, PA—$310,000.00. There is no
 mortgage. Wife desires to keep the marital
 home. Taking into account 3.5% costs of sale,
 the equity is $299,150.00.

 2. Rental property—124 Founders Court,
 Bethlehem, PA—net equity: $75,841.00. The
 parties own a rental property which has a
 stipulated value of $152,000.00. In addition,
 this property is subject to a mortgage with a
 payoff of $76,159.34. The equity in the rental
 property as of the time of the hearing was
 approximately $75,841.00. Taking into
 account 3.5% costs of sale, the equity is
 $73,187.00.

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 NON-QUALIFIED ASSETS

 3. Bank of America Interest Checking x8575—
 titled in Husband's name—$11,121.00 as of
 date of separation.

 4. Bank of America Money Market Savings
 x3804—joint names—$56.00 as of date of
 separation.

 5. Bank of America Money Market Savings
 x8285—in Husband's name—$3,002.00 as of
 date of separation.

 6. Bank of America Savings x4878—in Husband's
 name—$31,353.00 as of date of separation.

 7. TD Bank Mutual Fund x0331—in Husband's
 name—$3,863.00 as of date of separation.

 8. TD Bank Mutual Fund x8309—in Husband's
 name—$37,903.00 as of date of separation.

 9. Fidelity Investments x8459—in joint names—
 $755.00 as of date of separation.

 10. Bank of America x6759—in Wife's name—
 $558.00

 11. 2002 Buick Rendezvous—in Husband's name
 which Wife drives—$2,522.00.

 12. 2008 Honda Accord—in Husband's name—
 $7,244.00

 QUALIFIED ASSETS

 13. Charles Schwab-IRA Rollover x3842—in
 Husband's name—$286,981.00

 14. St[.] Jude Medical Inc. Retirement Savings
 Plan 401K—in Husband's name—$3,469,00.

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 J. S66034/18

 LIABILITIES

 1. Husband has credit card debt at Chase in the
 amount of $3,058.00.

 2. Husband has credit card debt at Bank of
 America in the amount of $1,357.00.

 3. Husband has a 2013 IRS debt in his name
 alone in the amount of $12,000.00.

Master's report, 12/23/16 at 1-6.

 The trial court set forth the following procedural history:

 Both parties filed timely exceptions to the Master's
 Report. The parties presented oral argument on
 their exceptions on May 30, 2017. On August 15,
 2017, we issued an Order denying [Wife's]
 exceptions and denying [Husband's] first exception.
 We granted [Husband's] second exception,
 correcting the address of the marital home to
 4988 Derby Lane, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. On
 September 6, 2017, [Wife] filed a Notice of Appeal to
 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania from our
 August 15, 2017 Order of Court. On October 10,
 2017, the Superior Court issued an Order quashing
 [Wife's] appeal on grounds that this court's
 August 15, 2017 Order was interlocutory and,
 therefore, not appealable. However, the matter
 became appealable on April 10, 2018, following the
 entry of the Divorce Decree by Judge Baratta.
 Accordingly, on May 7, 2018 [Wife] filed a second
 Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court from the
 April 10, 2018 Divorce Decree.

Trial court opinion, 6/28/18 at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

 The record reflects that the trial court ordered Wife to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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 J. S66034/18

Wife timely complied. Thereafter, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)

opinion.

 Wife raises the following issues for our review:

 [1.] Did the Master err in allocating the TD Bank
 mutual fund accounts of [Husband] solely to
 him as "non–qualified assets" rather than
 taking them into account as "qualified assets"
 since they are retirement accounts of
 [Husband] which represented marital property?

 [2.] Did the Master err in his recommendation that
 the martial [sic] value of all of the Bank of
 America accounts with the exception of the
 Bank of America account ending in the
 numbers 6759 be allocated to [Husband]?

 [3.] Did the Master err in his calculation of the
 martial [sic] estate which did not take into
 account the full value of the transfers of
 martial [sic] assets which [Husband] made to
 family members in Brazil without [Wife's]
 knowledge or consent?

 [4.] Did the Master err in giving [Husband] "credit"
 against the duration of his alimony obligation
 for the time period between December of 2012
 and October of 2014?

 [5.] Did the Master err in his determination of value
 of the various Bank of America accounts
 representing martial [sic] property available for
 equitable distribution?

 [6.] Did the Master err in denying [Wife's] claim for
 attorney's fees?

Wife's brief at 6.[1]

1 We have reordered Wife's issues for ease of disposition.

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 J. S66034/18

 A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an
 award of equitable distribution. Our standard of
 review when assessing the propriety of an order
 effectuating the equitable distribution of marital
 property is whether the trial court abused its
 discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to
 follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find
 an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of
 clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not
 find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been
 overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised
 was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
 partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the
 evidence in the certified record. In determining the
 propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts
 must consider the distribution scheme as a whole.
 We measure the circumstances of the case against
 the objective of effectuating economic justice
 between the parties and achieving a just
 determination of their property rights.

Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654, 662-663 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations,

quotations and brackets omitted)

 Wife first complains that because the master expressed the clear

intent in his report to distribute 55 percent of the parties' qualified assets to

Wife and because the master mischaracterized the TD Bank mutual fund

account as a nonqualified asset, the trial court erred in denying her

exception as to the distribution of qualified assets, and she is, therefore,

entitled to 55 percent of the TD Bank mutual fund account. Contrary to

Wife's assertion, the master clearly set forth his intent in the master's report

as follows:

 There are a series of qualified assets which are
 marital in nature. These shall be subject to a
 Qualified Domestic Relations Order [(QDRO)]. It is

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 J. S66034/18

 noted that Husband has post-separation retirement
 accounts. Utilizing the appropriate factors of the
 Divorce Code, the undersigned makes a specific
 finding that Wife is entitled to a disproportionate
 share of the marital qualified assets, namely, the
 Charles Schwab IRA Rollover as well as the St. Jude
 Medical Inc. Retirement Savings Plan. The two
 marital qualified assets have a value of
 approximately $290,450.00 of which over 90% is in
 the Charles Schwab IRA Rollover.

 Wife is entitled to a [QDRO] of slightly greater than
 55% of the qualified asset, specifically, the fixed
 figure of $160,000.00 (55% is $159,747.50). The
 [QDRO] shall be through the Charles Schwab IRA
 Rollover. The parties are directed to utilize the
 services of John Hand, Esquire. The parties shall
 split the costs of the [QDRO] equally.

 In light of the parties' past litigation history,
 the undersigned desires to ensure that there is
 no ambiguity with regard to this distribution.
 Wife shall be entitled to the [QDRO] of
 $160,000.00 from the Charles Schwab IRA
 rollover. Husband shall be entitled to the
 remainder of all of the remaining qualified
 assets in his name including but not limited to
 the remainder of the Charles Schwab IRA
 rollover, the St. Jude Medical Inc. Retirement
 Savings Plan as well as any and all other
 qualified assets including any
 post-separation/non-marital qualified assets.

 It is noted that the figure of the [QDRO] to
 Wife is the fixed amount of $160,000.00 and
 not subject to adjustments, credits, etc. This
 framework is set forth, on purpose, to prevent
 the parties from further litigation.

Master's report, 12/23/16 at 13-14 (emphasis added).

 Because this claim entirely lacks record support, it is meritless.

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 We will simultaneously dispose of Wife's second and third issues, as

they both challenge the equitable distribution scheme. Wife complains that

the trial court erred in denying her exception to the allocation of liquid

assets. Wife also challenges the value of a Bank of America account.

Specifically, Wife complains that it was inequitable that she received one

Bank of America account totaling $558 while Husband received the balance

of the Bank of America accounts, totaling $87,298, when the parties have

disparate incomes. (Wife's brief at 30.) Wife further disputes the aggregate

value of the Bank of America accounts by claiming that the master ignored

evidence that Husband transferred money to family members in Brazil that

went "above and beyond the $139,000" that the master concluded that

Husband had transferred. (Id. at 36.) Wife acknowledges that she received

the marital residence, valued at approximately $300,000, but claims that

that award "did not in any way limit the ability of the [m]aster to equalize

the distribution of liquid assets." (Id. at 31.)

 With respect to the equitable distribution scheme, the trial court found

that:

 [t]he Master distributed the parties' real estate and
 non-qualified assets to account for [Wife's]
 preference to keep the parties' former marital home.
 [Wife] testified before the Master that she wanted to
 retain possession of the marital home because she
 was familiar with the area and had a support system
 nearby.

 The parties' former marital residence was valued at
 $299,150.00. The parties also owned a rental

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 J. S66034/18

 property with $73,187.00 in equity. Separately, the
 parties had five Bank of America accounts totaling
 $46,090.00, two TD Bank Mutual Fund accounts
 containing $41,766.00, and a Fidelity Investments
 account containing $755.00. The parties also had
 two vehicles, a 2002 Buick Rendezvous, worth
 $2,522.00, and a 2008 Honda Accord, worth
 $7,244.00.

 The Master's Report provided that [Wife] would
 receive the parties' former marital residence, as she
 requested. She also received the 2002 Buick
 Rendezvous and the funds in one Bank of America
 account, containing $558. Overall, the Master's
 Report distributes $302,230.00 in assets to [Wife].
 [Husband] receives the remaining assets, totaling,
 $167,729.00. Additionally, the Master attributed the
 parties' credit card debt and any IRS debt to
 [Husband]. [Husband] was also responsible for
 transfers he made to his relatives in Brazil, totaling
 $139,000.00. Under this allocation, [Wife] received
 more than 50% of the marital assets.

 [Wife] contends that the distribution is inequitable
 due to the disparity of the parties' respective
 incomes. We disagree. The Master's Report
 considered all statutory factors, including the parties'
 incomes. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)[.] We concur
 with the Master's recommended distribution, which
 provides [Wife] with the parties' largest asset, the
 former marital residence. Therefore, we suggest this
 claim of error is without merit.

Trial court opinion, 6/28/18 at 10-11 (record citations omitted).

 With respect to the equitable distribution scheme, we have reviewed

the record and find no abuse of discretion. Regarding Wife's contention that

the evidence demonstrated that Husband transferred more than $139,000 to

family members in Brazil during time of their marriage, the master found

that Wife's testimony on this issue was not credible. (Master's report,

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 J. S66034/18

12/23/18 at 12.) The trial court deferred to the master. (Trial court

opinion, 6/28/18 at 13.) We have repeatedly reiterated that:

 it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
 evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not
 reverse those determinations so long as they are
 supported by the evidence. We are also aware that
 a master's report and recommendation, although
 only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration,
 particularly on the question of credibility of
 witnesses, because the master has the opportunity
 to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of
 the parties.

Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455-456 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations,

quotations, and brackets omitted).

 We decline Wife's invitation to revisit this credibility determination on

appeal.

 Wife combines her next two issues and complains that it was error to

credit Husband for payments that he made to pay household expenses

through a Bank of America account for the 22-month period during which

the parties were separated but which preceded Wife's filing her claim for

alimony pendente lite and alimony which depleted the marital value of that

Bank of America account and resulted in Husband's receiving a "double dip"

credit.2 (Wife's brief at 21-25.)

2 In her Issue 4 argument, Wife merely states that "[t]he argument covering
this issue is set forth above in regard to Wife's Exception to the
determination of the duration of Husband's alimony obligation." (Wife's brief
at 29.)

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 J. S66034/18

 We review alimony awards for an abuse of discretion. Middleton v.

Middleton, 812 A.2d 1241, 1247 (Pa.Super. 2002). The alimony statute in

the Divorce Code provides: "Where a divorce decree has been entered, the

court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, to either party only if it

finds that alimony is necessary." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a). The alimony

statute lists 17 factors that the court must consider in "determining whether

alimony is necessary and in determining the nature, amount, duration and

manner of payment of alimony." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b).3 The purpose of

3 The statute provides:

 (b) Factors relevant.--In determining whether
 alimony is necessary and in determining the
 nature, amount, duration and manner of
 payment of alimony, the court shall consider all
 relevant factors, including:

 (1) The relative earnings and earning
 capacities of the parties.

 (2) The ages and the physical, mental
 and emotional conditions of the
 parties.

 (3) The sources of income of both
 parties, including, but not limited
 to, medical, retirement, insurance
 or other benefits.

 (4) The expectancies and inheritances
 of the parties.

 (5) The duration of the marriage.

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 (6) The contribution by one party to
 the education, training or increased
 earning power of the other party.

 (7) The extent to which the earning
 power, expenses or financial
 obligations of a party will be
 affected by reason of serving as
 the custodian of a minor child.

 (8) The standard of living of the
 parties established during the
 marriage.

 (9) The relative education of the
 parties and the time necessary to
 acquire sufficient education or
 training to enable the party
 seeking alimony to find appropriate
 employment.

 (10) The relative assets and liabilities of
 the parties.

 (11) The property brought to the
 marriage by either party.

 (12) The contribution of a spouse as
 homemaker.

 (13) The relative needs of the parties.

 (14) The marital misconduct of either of
 the parties during the marriage.
 The marital misconduct of either of
 the parties from the date of final
 separation shall not be considered
 by the court in its determinations
 relative to alimony, except that the
 court shall consider the abuse of
 one party by the other party. As
 used in this paragraph, "abuse"

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 J. S66034/18

alimony is not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to

meet the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support herself

through appropriate employment. Grandovic v. Grandovic, 564 A.2d 960,

965 (Pa.Super. 1989). Alimony following divorce is a secondary remedy and

is available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the

parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award and

development of an appropriate employable skill. Id.

 Here, the master explained the alimony award as follows:

 There was a dispute with regard to the date of
 separation. Wife filed an alimony and child support
 obligation through Domestic Relation[s] which began
 on October, 2014. However, in 2013, Husband
 contributed approximately $62,000.00 to an account
 that was utilized by Wife and paid Wife's expenses.

 shall have the meaning given to it
 under section 6102 (relating to
 definitions).

 (15) The Federal, State and local tax
 ramifications of the alimony award.

 (16) Whether the party seeking alimony
 lacks sufficient property, including,
 but not limited to, property
 distributed under Chapter 35
 (relating to property rights), to
 provide for the party's reasonable
 needs.

 (17) Whether the party seeking alimony
 is incapable of self-support through
 appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b).

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 In 2014, until the payments were done via Court
 Order, this figure was $49,000.00. Accordingly, the
 date of separation is December, 2012 when Husband
 moved out of the marital home and moved to
 New Hampshire.

 From December 2012, the parties were separated.
 Husband paid marital expenses such as the property
 taxes, living expenses, etc. Husband's pattern was
 to deposit his paycheck into an account controlled by
 him (alone) and then transfer funds into the joint
 account for the benefit of the parties.

 From the time period that he moved to
 New Hampshire, Wife controlled the joint account.
 Wife testified to the contrary. Wife's testimony was
 not credible. It was not supported by any
 documentation, to the contrary, it was directly
 contradicted by all of the documentary evidence
 provided. Wife received the benefit of the funds
 transferred into the joint account in 2013 and 2014.
 The currently [sic] alimony and child support
 obligation began on [sic] October, 2014.

 In a transparent attempt of Wife to claim that
 Husband had utilized this account, therefore,
 minimizing his credit and/or pushing back the start
 of his alimony payments, Wife claims that they were
 not separated. Wife's claims were without merit.

 Accordingly, the date of separation is December of
 2012. Husband shall receive credit for alimony
 payments starting as of the date of separation.

 Calculated in Husband's current support obligation is
 his salary which had an approximate base of
 $155,000.00 as well as a year-end bonus that he
 receives in December which has traditionally been
 approximately $20,000.00 per year.

 Notably, Wife desires post-divorce alimony. The
 current amount of spousal support/alimony
 pendent lite is $2,193.00 per month. As the date of
 marriage was January 23, 1993 and the date of

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 separation is determined by the undersigned to be
 December, 2012, the parties were married just
 under 20 years.

 Accordingly, Husband shall receive credit from
 January 1, 2013 moving forward. Accordingly, as of
 December, 2016, Husband will have paid
 approximately four years of alimony.

 ....

 The decision to award post-divorce alimony, in light
 of the Alimony Pendente Lite paid to date, by
 reference, incorporates all of the factors set forth in
 the statute. As many of the factors have been
 addressed above, they will not be addressed in detail
 again. However, there are numerous factors which
 the undersigned has taken into consideration in
 establishing a post-divorce alimony award. They
 include, in particular, the following: 1, 3, 7, 10, 12,
 14, 16, and 17. Although Wife is receiving greater
 than 50% of the marital estate, under the
 circumstances, (and utilizing the factors above) Wife
 shall receive post-divorce alimony, it is noted that
 Wife is receiving a disproportionate percentage of
 the marital estate. Accordingly, Wife shall be
 entitled to alimony until June 31, 2019 in an amount
 in accordance with the Northampton County
 Domestic Relation guidelines. Wife will have
 received a total of six and one half years of alimony
 for a marriage approximately 20 years. This is in
 addition to receiving a disproportionate amount of
 the non-qualified assets as well as receiving a
 disproportionate amount of the marital qualified
 assets.

 From a practical perspective, Wife is receiving a
 sizable retirement account, the house she desires
 without a mortgage, the vehicle she drives, and an
 income stream for a total of 6.5 years which is an
 additional 2.5 years.

 For Husband, although he has less [than] 50% of
 marital component of the retirement accounts, he

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 has post-separation accounts. He must refinance
 the Founders Court property within 90 days. If he
 cannot, it must be listed for sale. In addition, he has
 less than 50% of the non-qualified accounts, but
 these are more liquid, but he is also is [sic]
 responsible for the debt incurred. He is responsible
 for the transfers to Brazil and to his paramour.

Master's report, 12/23/16 at 17-19.

 After reviewing the record, the trial court agreed with:

 the Master's determination that [Wife] received the
 benefit of the funds [Husband] deposited into the
 parties' joint checking account between December
 2012 and October 2014. Over this period, [Wife]
 received the benefit of approximately $111,000.00,
 or more than $5,000 per month. The current amount
 of spousal support/alimony pendente lite, set by
 Domestic Relations, is $2,193.00 per month.
 Therefore, we believe it was appropriate for the
 Master to give [Husband] credit toward his alimony
 obligation dating back to the parties' separation in
 December 2012.

 [Husband] has not received a "‘double dip' credit" in
 the equitable division of marital assets, as [Wife]
 suggests in her brief. The income [Husband]
 received after the parties' separation in December
 2012 was his separate property. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
 § 3501(a)(4) ("marital property does not include . . .
 [p]roperty acquired after final separation until the
 date of divorce"). [Husband's] contribution to the
 parties' joint checking account, characterized by the
 Master as alimony and used primarily for the benefit
 of [Wife], did not have the effect of reducing the
 total value of the marital estate. If anything, [Wife]
 argues that she should obtain a ‘double dip credit,' in
 that she would like to enjoy the benefit of the
 $111,000.00 [Husband] contributed to the parties'
 joint checking account and she would like to extend
 [Husband's] alimony obligation for an additional
 twenty-two months. We do not believe this remedy
 is appropriate as the evidence supports the fact that

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 J. S66034/18

 [Husband] made the necessary deposits into the
 parties' joint checking account, and that [Wife]
 received the full benefit of those funds.

Trial court opinion, 6/28/18 at 6-7 (record citations omitted).

 We have carefully reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion.

 Wife finally complains that the trial court erred in denying her request

for counsel fees.

 Inasmuch as appellant challenges the award of
 counsel fees, our standard of review is, once again,
 an abuse of discretion. Furthermore:

 The purpose of an award of counsel fees
 is to promote fair administration of
 justice by enabling the dependent spouse
 to maintain or defend the divorce action
 without being placed at a financial
 disadvantage; the parties must be on par
 with one another.

 Counsel fees are awarded based on the
 facts of each case after a review of all
 the relevant factors. These factors
 include the payor's ability to pay, the
 requesting party's financial resources,
 the value of the services rendered, and
 the property received in equitable
 distribution.

 Counsel fees are only to be awarded upon a showing
 of need. In essence, each party's financial
 considerations dictate whether such an award is
 appropriate.

Gates v. Gates, 933 A.2d 102, 109 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

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 Here, the master determined that nothing in the record supported an

award of counsel fees. (Master's report, 12/23/16 at 21.) In denying Wife's

request for counsel fees, the master concluded that Wife accumulated her

attorney's fees for "no defensible reason," that she "took a series of

meritless positions," that she failed to comply with discovery rules, and that

she failed to demonstrate need. (Id. at 21.) We discern no abuse of

discretion.

 Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/19/19

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