CourtListener opinion 4369364

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[Cite as Hostetler v. Hostetler, 2019-Ohio-609.]

 COURT OF APPEALS
 STARK COUNTY, OHIO
 FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PATRICIA A. HOSTETLER JUDGES:
 Hon. John W. Wise, P. J.
 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
 Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
-vs-
 Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052
GARY L. HOSTETLER and 2018 CA 00054

 Def.-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
 OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
 Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case
 No. 2017 DR 00207

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part and
 Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 19, 2019

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant For Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee

JOHN H. SIMPSON ARNOLD F. GLANTZ
2859 Aaronwood Avenue NE 3722 Whipple Avenue NW
Massillon, Ohio 44646 Canton, Ohio 44718
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 2

Wise, John, P. J.

 {¶1} Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Gary L. Hostetler appeals from his

judgment entry of divorce from Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Patricia A. Hostetler in

the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. The relevant

facts leading to this appeal are as follows.

 {¶2} Appellant Gary and Appellee Patricia were first married in April 1967. That

marriage ended in a divorce.

 {¶3} On January 8, 1982, they were married again. They had two children

together, both of whom are now adults.

 {¶4} At some point in December 2016, appellee moved out of the marital

residence. Appellee asserts appellant refused to allow her to return home following a

surgery. She then filed a complaint for divorce in Stark County on March 10, 2017.

Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim on January 19, 2018. Appellee filed an

answer to the counterclaim on March 5, 2018.

 {¶5} In the meantime, appellee was forced to file motions to compel discovery

three times. Furthermore, appellant failed to appear for scheduled depositions on March

16, 2018, and March 23, 2018.

 {¶6} After two continuances, the case proceeded to a bench trial on March 29,

2018. A judgment entry of divorce was issued on April 10, 2018. The parties had no

marital debts at the time of the divorce, and the court rendered a division of property as

further discussed infra. The court also awarded no spousal support, finding that

"[appellee] has sufficient liquid assets to support herself in a comfortable manner."
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 3

Judgment Entry at 7. However, the court ordered appellant to pay $2,646.00 to appellee

for attorney fees and costs. Id. at 8.

 {¶7} On May 9, 2018, Appellant Gary filed a notice of appeal (2018CA00052).

He herein raises the following two Assignments of Error:

 {¶8} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EQUALLY DIVIDING [APPELLANT]

GARY'S PENSION.

 {¶9} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING GARY TO PAY

[APPELLEE] PATRICIA'S ATTORNEY'S FEES."

 {¶10} Appellee Patricia also filed a notice of appeal on May 9, 2018

(2018CA00054). On July 11, 2018, this Court issued an order consolidating the two

appeals, and designating appellee as the cross-appellant. She herein raises the

following four Assignments of Error as if on cross-appeal:

 {¶11} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE AN ADDITIONAL

30 DAYS TO SHOW THAT A PORTION OF THE TD AMERITRADE ACCOUNT WAS

PREMARITAL.

 {¶12} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION IN TREATING THE TRANSFER OF THE COLUMBIANA COUNTY,

OHIO REAL ESTATE AS A GIFT.

 {¶13} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DIVISION OF ASSETS AS THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO

SUBTRACT THE VALUE OF THE VEHICLE PURCHASED BY THE
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 4

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT USING A WITHDRAWAL FROM HER SAVINGS

ACCOUNT PRIOR TO DIVIDING THE ASSETS.

 {¶14} "IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO

AWARD SPOUSAL SUPPORT."

 Final Appealability

 {¶15} Before we reach the merits of the present appeal and cross-appeal, it is

incumbent that we consider our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The existence of a final

appealable order is a jurisdictional question that an appellate court can raise sua sponte.

McHenry v. McHenry, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014 CA 00146, 2015–Ohio–2479, ¶ 23, citing

Savage v. Cody–Ziegler, Inc., 4th Dist. Athens No. 06CA5, 2006–Ohio–2760, 2006 WL

1514273, ¶ 31. As a general rule, a judgment that leaves issues unresolved and

contemplates that further action must be taken is not a final appealable order. See

Moscarello v. Moscarello, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00181, 2015–Ohio–654, ¶ 11,

quoting Rice v. Lewis, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 11CA3451, 2012–Ohio–2588, ¶ 14 (additional

citations omitted).

 {¶16} Two facets of the divorce decree at issue in this matter warrant a closer look

in this regard. The first is the trial court's order that Appellant Gary's TD Ameritrade stock

account would be recognized as his separate property if he could document to counsel

that the stocks were premarital, within thirty days of the decree. Judgment Entry of

Divorce, April 10, 2018, at 6. The trial court added: "If no documentation is provided, then

the stocks are all deemed marital." Id. Appellant, in his cross-appellee's brief, informs us

that "as it turns out," he did not provide the necessary documentation regarding the
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 5

Ameritrade account. Brief of Cross-Appellee at 3. Accordingly, we deem the trial court's

ruling on said asset now resolved.

 {¶17} The second issue to consider concerns the contents of a safe in the marital

residence. Due to appellant's inaction during the divorce, the trial court issued the

following order:

 Husband is ordered to allow a lock smith access to the safe and

 permission to open the safe, in any way feasible, even if the safe has to be

 drilled or damaged. All attempts should be made to open the safe without

 damage. Husband shall permit an appraiser from Dutton [Auctions] to

 inventory and appraise the contents of the safe and Husband's guns. The

 items shall be divided equally, or at Husband's discretion, Husband shall pay

 to Wife one half of the value of the items. Cost of the lock smith and appraiser

 shall be divided equally.

 {¶18} Judgment Entry of Divorce at 7-8.

 {¶19} While the aforesaid provision presumably hampered an exact accounting

on the court's property division chart attached to the decree, we note R.C. 3105.171(J)

states that a court addressing marital and/or separate property "may issue any orders

under this section that it determines equitable ***." Furthermore, on appellate review, the

trial court's property division should be viewed as a whole in determining whether it has

achieved an equitable and fair division of marital assets. See Briganti v. Briganti, 9 Ohio

St.3d 220, 459 N.E.2d 896 (1984). We find the court's aforesaid ruling as to the safe

does not create an issue of lack of final appealability under the circumstances presented.

 {¶20} We will therefore proceed to an analysis of the claims herein presented.
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 6

 Appellant Gary's Direct Appeal

 I.

 {¶21} In his First Assignment of Error, appellant, a retired police officer, maintains

the trial court erred in dividing his public pension.

 {¶22} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(B), "[i]n divorce proceedings, the court shall ***

determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. In

either case, upon making such a determination, the court shall divide the marital and

separate property equitably between the spouses, in accordance with this section. * * *"

 {¶23} R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) further states: "Except as provided in this division or

division (E)(1) of this section, the division of marital property shall be equal. If an equal

division of marital property would be inequitable, the court shall not divide the marital

property equally but instead shall divide it between the spouses in the manner the court

determines equitable. In making a division of marital property, the court shall consider

all relevant factors, including those set forth in division (F) of this section."

 {¶24} An appellate court generally reviews the overall appropriateness of the trial

court's property division in divorce proceedings under an abuse-of-discretion standard.

Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 421 N.E.2d 1293. In order to find an abuse

of discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision was unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v.

Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. In order to make an equitable

division of property, the trial court should first determine the value of the marital assets.

See Eisler v. Eisler (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 151, 152, 493 N.E.2d 975. In performing this
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 7

function, the trial court has broad discretion to develop some measure of value. See

Berish v. Berish (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 432 N.E.2d 183.

 {¶25} Generally, pension or retirement benefits earned during the marriage are

marital assets and a factor to be considered in the just division of property. Hoyt v. Hoyt

(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 177, 178, 559 N.E.2d 1292. Specifically, "[w]hen considering a fair

and equitable distribution of pension or retirement benefits in a divorce, the trial court

must apply its discretion based upon the circumstances of the case, the status of the

parties, the nature, terms and conditions of the pension or retirement plan, and the

reasonableness of the result." Id., at paragraph one of syllabus.

 {¶26} In the case sub judice, appellant is retired from the Massillon Police

Department, drawing as of the date of trial $5,060.37 per month on his Ohio Police and

Fire Pension, while appellee is retired from the Massillon City Schools, where she worked

as a bus driver and custodian. She draws $1,075.91 per month on her SERS pension.

The trial court, referencing the date of the parties' marriage, ruled as follows on the

subject of their public pensions:

 The parties shall divide equally by QDRO/DOPO, the marital portion

 of [Appellant] Husband's and [Appellee] Wife's pensions using the 1982

 date. If possible, Wife's pension shall be offset against Husband's pension

 and then an equal division.

 {¶27} Judgment Entry of Divorce at 6-7.

 {¶28} Based on the first sentence of the above provision, it appears the trial court

in this case initially chose to apply a coverture fraction approach, using the dates of the

marriage's duration. A coverture fraction is generally structured as follows: "The
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 8

numerator of the coverture fraction is the number of years the [party] participated in the

pension plan during the marriage and the denominator is the total number of years the

[party] participated in the plan." Ferris v. Ferris, 5th Dist. Fairfield 00 CA 58, 2001 WL

194779.

 {¶29} However, it is not clear to this Court if the second sentence is an alternate

order, mandating a set-off of both parties' full pension amounts "if possible," or if the

second sentence is merely intended to logistically reinforce the first. In any case,

appellant maintains that it would have been more equitable to simply have permitted

each party to retain his or her pension. However, upon review, we find the proper remedy

is to remand the pension division issue for clarification by the trial court. See, e.g., Balog

v Balog, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA96-08-077, 1997 WL 311587.

 {¶30} Appellant's First Assignment of Error is sustained to the extent that further

clarification by the trial court is required.

 II.

 {¶31} In his Second Assignment of Error, appellant maintains the trial court

abused its discretion in ordering him to pay appellee's attorney fees of in the amount of

$2,646.00. We disagree.

 {¶32} An award of attorney fees in a domestic relations action is within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of

discretion. Chattree v. Chattree, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99337, 8 N.E.3d 390, 410,

2014–Ohio–489, ¶ 79, citing Wildman v. Wildman, 5th Dist. Licking No. 12–CA–21,

2012–Ohio–5090, ¶ 79. "*** [A] domestic relations court, well-versed in the ordinary flow

of divorce litigation through its doors, is in a much better position to determine whether
 Stark County, Case Nos. 2018 CA 00052 and 2018 CA 00054 9

a particular case has been unduly hampered by one or more of the participants."

Compton v. Compton, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00199, 2016-Ohio-4626, ¶ 14.

 {¶33} The pertinent statute, R.C. 3105.73(A) states: "In an action for divorce,

dissolution, legal separation, or annulment of marriage or an appeal of that action, a

court may award all or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either

party if the court finds the award equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable,

the court may consider the parties' marital assets and income, any award of temporary

spousal support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court

deems appropriate." (Emphasis added).

 {¶34} In the case sub judice, the trial court determined appellant had not

cooperated with the necessary inventory and appraisal of items in the parties' safe, even

refusing admittance of an appraiser ordered by the court. Accordingly, the court ordered

payment of $2,646.00 for appellee's attorney fees and costs that she was \forced to incur