CourtListener opinion 4451230

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

J-S06002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 SARA POIST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 MARK POIST, :
 :
 Appellant : No. 1877 EDA 2018

 Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2016
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
 No(s): 2013-27844

 SARA POIST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 MARK POIST, :
 :
 Appellant : No. 1879 EDA 2018

 Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2018
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
 No(s): 2013-27844

 SARA POIST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 MARK POIST, :
 :
 Appellant : No. 1880 EDA 2018

 Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2018
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
 No(s): 2013-27844

 SARA L. POIST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 J-S06002-19

 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 MARK E. POIST :
 :
 Appellant : No. 2291 EDA 2018

 Appeal from the Order Entered June 18, 2018
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
 No(s): No. 2013-27844,

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J. FILED OCTOBER 29, 2019

 In these consolidated appeals, Mark E. Poist ("Husband"), an attorney

proceeding pro se, appeals from the May 15, 2018 equitable distribution order

and divorce decree that ended his marriage to Sara L. Poist ("Wife") and

resolved all outstanding economic claims. Husband also purports to appeal

two interlocutory rulings that occurred during June 2016 and February 2018,

respectively, and a third post-divorce order in which the trial court denied

Husband's motion to recuse. We quash the interlocutory appeals filed at 1877

and 1879 EDA 2018,1 dismiss the appeal filed at 2291, and affirm the May

2018 order and decree.

____________________________________________

1 While we quash the appeals docketed at 1877 and 1879 EDA 2018, we
confront the merits of Husband's challenges to those rulings in addressing the
remaining appeal that is properly before this Court. See Betz v. Pneumo
Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012) ("an appeal of a final order subsumes
challenges to previous interlocutory decisions"); Pa.R.A.P. 341 note ("A party
needs to file only a single notice of appeal to secure review of prior non-final
orders that are made final by the entry of a final order[.]").

 -2-
 J-S06002-19

 Husband and Wife married on August 29, 2009, and separated on July

15, 2013. No children were born of the marriage. Wife filed a divorce

complaint on September 11, 2013. As it relates to an issue on appeal, Wife

did not request in her complaint reasonable counsel fees as an equitable

measure pursuant to § 3702(a) of the Divorce Code. Approximately two and

one-half years later she filed an affidavit pursuant to § 3301(d) attesting that

the parties have been separated for at least two years and that the marriage

is irretrievably broken. Husband responded with a counter-affidavit disputing

that the marriage was irretrievably broken. He subsequently requested the

court to order the parties to attend marriage counseling. The trial court

granted that entreaty, and directed the parties to attend three counseling

sessions prior to the ensuing § 3301(d)(1)(ii) hearing to determine the status

of the marriage. The parties complied, and following the evidentiary hearing

on June 14, 2016, the trial court found that Wife satisfied both prerequisites

for divorce under § 3301(d), i.e., "that the parties have lived separate and

apart for a period of at least two years and that the marriage is irretrievably

broken." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3301(d)(1)(ii).2 This determination is the genesis of

Husband's interlocutory appeal that we docketed at 1877 EDA 2018.

____________________________________________

2Effective December 5, 2016, the required period of living separate and apart
was reduced to at least one year. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3301 Historical and Statutory
Notes.

 -3-
 J-S06002-19

 The trial court directed that the parties argue their economic issues

before a divorce master, who filed his report and recommendation on

September 20, 2017. The master recommended an equal split of the marital

estate totaling $54,169.41, with Wife transferring to Husband $11,840.30

from her pension via a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO"). While

Wife presented additional evidence regarding her counsel fees totaling

$15,000, and the master stated an inclination to grant the fees accrued in

response to Husband's obdurate and vexatious conduct, it ultimately declined

to award counsel fees because Wife did not request them in her divorce

complaint. See Master's Report, 8/31/17, 5-6.

 Husband filed timely exceptions to the master's report and demanded a

de novo hearing to determine the equitable distribution of marital property.

Thereafter, he filed a motion to compel discovery of a litany of documents that

he asserted he was entitled to review. Wife responded, and the trial court

disposed of Husband's motion on the record in open court on February 2,

2018. Three days later, the court entered an order stating, "The hearing of

February 2, 2018, has been dispositive of ALL discovery issues/discovery

requests with respect to the equitable distribution hearing[.]" Order, 2/5/18.

This order is the origin of Husband's interlocutory appeal docketed at 1879

EDA 2018.

 On March 8, 2018, Husband filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude

Wife from offering testimony or exhibits at trial that reference issues that had

 -4-
 J-S06002-19

not been raised in her divorce complaint, including, inter alia, her counsel fees

and expenses. The trial court did not immediately rule on the motion, but

prior to the May 15, 2018 de novo equitable distribution trial, it granted the

motion in part. The court precluded Wife from presenting "testimony and

exhibits related to [her] request for counsel fees and expenses pursuant to

[the equitable considerations in] Section 3702 of the Divorce Code [but it

permitted] testimony and exhibits related to counsel fees and expenses . . .

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(7)," which relates to the award of counsel

fees as a sanction for dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious conduct. Trial Court

Order, 5/15/18, at 3-4.

 Following the trial, on May 15, 2018, the trial court entered the

"Equitable Distribution Order and Divorce Decree" that represents the final,

appealable order in this litigation, and Husband filed a timely notice of appeal.3

He presents nine questions for our review:

____________________________________________

3 On May 25, 2018, following the entry of the divorce decree order but prior
to the filing of the notice of appeal on June 14, 2018, Husband filed in the trial
court a motion for recusal, which the trial court denied on June 18, 2018. That
appeal, which is listed on our docketed at 2291 EDA 2018, is not justiciable.
Stated plainly, the issue concerning the trial judge's recusal is either moot
because it relates to the now-resolved divorce proceedings, or to the extent
that Husband anticipates some undisclosed post-decree proceeding before the
trial judge, the claim is premature. See Warmkessel v. Heffner, 17 A .3d
408, 412 (Pa.Super.2011) ("As a general rule, an actual case or controversy
must exist at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as
moot.") If necessary, Husband can file a recusal motion in any future
proceeding where he is before the trial judge. Hence, whether we dismiss
that appeal as moot or as not ripe for review, the current procedural posture
does not permit this Court to address the merits of this appeal.

 -5-
 J-S06002-19

 1. Did the trial court err by making findings of facts not supported
 by competent or adequate evidence and/or predicated on errors
 of law when applying the factors required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502 to
 divide the marital estate in an equitable manner?

 2. Did the trial court err by failing to properly apply the factors
 required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502 to divide the marital estate in an
 equitable manner and to give a reasoned explanation for that
 division, as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 3506?

 3. Did the trial court err by failing to give any consideration in the
 equitable distribution process to [Husband's] evidence of [Wife's]
 student loans and car loans, acquired prior to the marriage, but
 paid off during the marriage and prior to the parties' separation?

 4. Did the trial court err by failing to give any consideration to the
 parties' refund/liability regarding the filing of 2013 taxes?

 5. Did the trial court err by failing to give any consideration to
 checks written out by [Wife] around and after the date of
 separation from the parties' joint checking account, or to monies
 withdrawn by [Wife] from the joint account after [Wife]
 unilaterally withdrew approximately half (1/2) the monies in
 September 2013, but continued to withdraw from [Husband's]
 remaining amount?

 6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err as a matter of
 law in awarding attorneys' fees sua sponte upon a finding of
 dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct by [Husband]?

 7. Did the trial court err and commit reversible error when it did
 not grant a continuance prior to the irretrievable breakdown
 hearing on June 14, 2016?

 8. Did the trial court err and commit reversible error when it
 refused to require [Wife] to answer, and properly object, to
 discovery pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
 and other applicable local rules?

 9. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and its discretion in
 failing to recuse itself from this matter?

Husband's brief at 9-10. Wife neglected to file a brief.

 -6-
 J-S06002-19

 Husband's first five issues assail the trial courts' equitable distribution

order. The following principles guide our review of these claims:

 Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a
 marital property distribution is whether the trial court
 abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure
 to follow proper legal procedure. An abuse of discretion is
 not found lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and
 convincing evidence.

 Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 18 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting
 McCoy v. McCoy, 888 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa.Super. 2005)). As we
 previously observed, in the context of an equitable distribution of
 marital property, a trial court has the authority to divide the award
 as the equities presented in the particular case may require.
 Mercatell, 854 A.2d at 611. "In determining the propriety of an
 equitable distribution award, courts must consider the distribution
 scheme as a whole. We measure the circumstances of the case
 against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the
 parties and achieving a just determination of their property
 rights." Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 387 (Pa.Super.
 2015) (quoting Biese v. Biese, 979 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa.Super.
 2009)).

Cook v. Cook, 186 A.3d 1015, 1025–26 (Pa.Super. 2018).

 Issues one and two challenge the trial court's consideration of the

statutory factors outlined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 35024 in dividing the marital estate.

____________________________________________

4 Pursuant to the Divorce Code, the following factors are relevant to the
equitable division of marital property:

 (1) The length of the marriage.

 (2) Any prior marriage of either party.

 (3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income,
 vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of
 each of the parties.

 -7-
 J-S06002-19

Specifically, he argues that the trial court attributed improper weight to factors

three, four, seven, eight, and ten, and he asserts that the court failed to

explain the reasons for its decision. Husband's brief at 34. Similarly,

Husband's next three issues relate to the weight of the evidence that the trial

____________________________________________

 (4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or
 increased earning power of the other party.

 (5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital
 assets and income.

 (6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not
 limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

 (7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,
 preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property,
 including the contribution of a party as homemaker.

 (8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

 (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the
 marriage.

 (10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the
 division of property is to become effective.

 (10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated
 with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which
 ramifications need not be immediate and certain.

 (10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with
 a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate and
 certain.

 (11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any
 dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).

 -8-
 J-S06002-19

court attributed to his evidence regarding Wife's premarital student loan debt,

the parties' tax liability for 2013, and Wife's post-separation withdrawals from

the marital bank account. None of these five contentions merits relief.

 First, the certified record belies Husband's assertions that the trial court

improperly applied the equitable distribution factors or failed to disclose the

reasons for its determination. Indeed, the trial court's equitable distribution

order and divorce decree set forth all of the relevant facts, compiled an

inventory of the marital assets, addressed every applicable statutory factor,

and explained the court's rationale in detail. See Equitable Distribution Order

and Divorce Decree, 5/15/18, at 1-9.

 Moreover, absent deficiencies in the certified record, we may not re-

weigh the evidence in Husband's favor and apply the statutory factors anew.

Brubaker v. Brubaker, 201 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa.Super. 2018) ("it is within the

province of the trial court to weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this

Court will not reverse those determinations so long as they are supported by

the evidence."). Herein, the record sustains the trial court's equitable

distribution of the marital estate, including the manner in which the court

equitably resolved the payment of Wife's premarital loans with marital funds,

Wife's alleged appropriation of $9,000 from a joint savings account, and the

parties' respective tax liability for 2013. See Equitable Distribution Order and

Divorce Decree, 5/15/18, at 2-3, 16, 17. Accordingly, we will not disturb it.

Brubaker, supra at 184.

 -9-
 J-S06002-19

 Husband's last three issues relate to Wife's award of attorneys' fees for

Husband's dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct, the trial court's denial

of Husband's request for a continuance prior to the June 2016 evidentiary

hearing to determine the status of the marriage, and the court's alleged

indifference to Husband's discovery requests.

 As it relates to Husband's dispute of the counsel fees, we note that the

trial court imposed counsel fees pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503, which provides

as follows:

 The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel
 fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter:

 ....

 (7) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction
 against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious
 conduct during the pendency of a matter.

42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7).

 Concerning the two remaining arguments, this Court reviews both the

propriety of a discovery order and the denial of a continuance request for an

abuse of discretion. Gallo v. Conemaugh Health Sys., Inc., 114 A.3d 855,

860 (Pa.Super. 2015); In the Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 965 (Pa.Super.

2017). As we recently reiterated, "[a]n abuse of discretion is more than just

an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have

abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised

was manifestly unreasonable, or the results of partiality, prejudice, bias, or

 - 10 -
 J-S06002-19

ill-will." Id. (quoting In re J.K., 825 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2003))

(cleaned up).

 Upon our thorough review of the record, we agree with the discussion

of these issues that Judge Rhonda Lee Daniele presented in her Equitable

Distribution Order and Divorce Decree filed on May 14, 2018, and we adopt

the court's comprehensive rationale as our own. See Equitable Distribution

Order and Divorce Decree, 5/15/18, at 9-16.

 Order affirmed. Appeals docketed at 1877 and 1879 EDA 2018 quashed.

Appeal docketed at 2291 EDA 2018 dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/29/19

 - 11 -
 2013-27844-0067
 Circulated Divorce Decree,
 09/30/2019 AM 1
 09:54 Page

 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA =
 CIVIL ACTION - LAW

SARA L. POIST1 NO. I 3-27844

 V.

MARKE. POIST

 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION ORDER AND DIVORCE DECREE

 Defendant-Husband's Equitable Distribution Exceptions, which he filed on September 20, 20 I 7

are before the Court. Following a hearing on March 12, 2018, we now issue this Equitable Distribution

Order and Divorce Decree.

 FINDINGS OF FACT

 The parties were married on August 29, 2009, and they separated on July !5, 2013. Plaintiff-

Wife filed her Divorce Complaint on September l l, 2013. Plaintiff-Wife reinstated the Divorce

Complaint on October 31, 2013, and the Reinstated Complaint was served upon Defendant-Husband in a

timely manner. Plaintiff-Wife's Divorce Complaint included a request for equitable distribution.

 On January 28, 2014, Defendant-Husband filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Divorce

Complaint. In his Counterclaim, Defendant-Husband included a request for equitable distribution.

 Plaintiff-Wife received her undergraduate degree from West Chester University and a master's

degree from the University of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff-Wife had completed her education prior to the date

of marriage.

 Plaintiff-Wife is a social worker. From 2006-2009, Plaintiff-Wife worked for Horizon Health. In

June of 2009, she became an employee of Eagleville Hospital. Plaintiff-Wife's current job title at

Eagleville Hospital is program manager of an adult psychiatric unit/social worker.

 Plaintiff-Wife's biweekly gross pay in 2018 is $2,692, which equates to a gross salary of

$69, 992/year.

 Plaintiff-Wife currently resides in an apartment in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

 Defendant-Husband received an undergraduate degree from Loyola University Maryland and a

law degree from Loyola University New Orleans College of Law (Class of2008).

I
 On February 22, 2018, Plaintiff-Wife tiled Notice to Retake Prior Surname, which is Sara L. Dodge.
 2013-27844-0067 Divorce Decree, Page 2
 Following law school, Defendant-Husband worked as a law clerk in Berks County for Judge John

Boccabella. Thereafter, Defendant-Husband worked for a couple of law firms for a brief period. From

July of 2012 until January of 2017, Defendant-Husband worked as an attorney for the law firm O'Brien,

Belland & Bushinsky, LLC.

 In January of 2017, Defendant-Husband began employment as an attorney with the City of

Philadelphia Law Department's tax division.

 Defendant-Husband resides in Philadelphia (1112 Kent Lane) with his girlfriend and their infant

child. Defendant-Husband's girlfriend is employed as a certified nursing assistant. In April of 2017, ·

Defendant-Husband's parents purchased the Philadelphia residence in which Defendant-Husband resides.

Defendant-Husband's parents reside in Key West, Florida. Defendant-Husband pays rent to his parents,

but Defendant-Husband and his parents have not executed a lease agreement.

 Defendant-Husband's parents purchased the Philadelphia residence using approximately $61,288

as a clown payment. This down payment was withdrawn from a Filbrandt & Company (\Filbrandt\")