CourtListener opinion 4501795

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

J-A26028-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 VIRGINIA DAWN BEIGHEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 GEORGIADES : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 MICHAEL D. GEORGIADES :
 : No. 352 WDA 2019
 Appellant :

 Appeal from the Decree Entered January 31, 2019
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
 No(s): No. FD15-008755-017

 VIRGINIA DAWN BEIGHEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 GEORGIADES : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 Appellant :
 :
 :
 v. :
 :
 : No. 405 WDA 2019
 MICHAEL D. GEORGIADES :

 Appeal from the Decree Entered January 31, 2019
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
 No(s): FD 15-008755-017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 27, 2020

 Virginia Dawn Beighey Georgiades (Wife) and Michael D. Georgiades

(Husband) cross appeal from the trial court's January 31, 2019 divorce decree,

which made final the court's orders, granting in part and denying in part,

Husband's exceptions and Wife's cross-exceptions to the master's report and

recommendation. After our review, we affirm, in part, on the trial court's
 J-A26028-19

opinion, and we remand for correction with respect to the parties PNC money

market account.1

 The parties married in 1998 and separated in 2015. They have three

minor children and one adult child. Since the parties separated, they have

engaged in extensive litigation over various issues, including custody, support,

alimony and equitable distribution.

 Following a hearing, the master issued a report and recommendation,

dated April 17, 2018. The master found that Wife, age 51, an attorney for

U.S. Steel, has been fully employed throughout the marriage and has been

the primary wage earner during the marriage. Husband, who is 56, has an

associate's degree in management information systems; he held various

information technology (IT) positions throughout the marriage. The master

determined that Husband had quit and/or been fired from some positions,

chose not to work at all between 2003 and 2009, and was unemployed

between 2011 and 2013. More recently, Husband worked as an assistant

manager at a gas station; he quit that job to work as a driver for Uber/Lyft.

Husband testified that he chose to be unemployed to care for his children;

Wife, however, testified that she took maternity leave for six months after

____________________________________________

1 The trial court agreed with Husband's exception that in calculating the value
of the marital estate, the court should have used the balance of Wife's PNC
Premium Money Market Account as of the date of separation, $32,070.59,
instead of $11,069.00. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/19, at 28. This will
result in an increase in the value of the marital estate of $21,001.59.

 -2-
 J-A26028-19

each birth, they hired a nanny for seven years, and the children attended day

care.

 The master valued the marital estate at $1,500,805.00. After

considering the factors set forth in section 3502(a) of the Divorce Code, the

master recommended the marital estate be distributed 55% to Husband and

45% to Wife, and that Husband be awarded alimony for four years:

$2,200.00/month for the first 24 months following entry of the divorce decree;

$1,850.00/month for the 12 months thereafter; and $1,500.00/month for the

last 12 months of the four-year period.

 The master also recommended that for 2017, Wife pay Husband

$4,185.00 as alimony pendente lite (APL) and $2,141.65 in child support for

the three minor children. The master noted this amount takes into account

50% shared custody of the three minor children. The master also

recommended that beginning in 2018, Wife pay Husband $3,454.22 in APL,

and $2,195.92 in child support. Upon entry of the final decree in divorce, the

master recommended Wife continue to pay child support in the amount of

$2,195.92/month until further court order.

 Both parties filed exceptions, which the Honorable Jennifer Satler

granted in part and denied in part. The court resolved all issues relating to

alimony, attorney's fees, and equitable distribution, in particular reducing

Husband's share of the marital estate from 55% to 50%, and remanding the

matter to a hearing officer on the issue of support. Following a complex

support hearing, and in accordance with the parameters set by the court, the

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 J-A26028-19

hearing officer recommended Wife pay Husband $5,159.15/month in APL and

child support for the four minor children, and that effective June 14, 2018

(post-emancipation for the oldest child), Wife pay Husband $5,511.00/month

for APL and child support for the three minor children.

 On appeal, Husband raises the following claims:

 1. Whether the trial court erred when it reduced Husband's
 share of the marital estate from 55% to 50%?

 2. Whether the trial court erred in not tax affecting [sic] the
 distributed assets so as to in effect provide Husband less
 than the stated percentage?

 3. Whether the trial court erred in overturning the support
 retroactivity date the master used from 2017 to 2018?

 4. Whether the trial court appropriately allocated costs to
 Husband for expenses of Wife's residences of which Wife had
 exclusive possession?

 5. Whether the trial court erred in assessing the value of the
 marital residence and disturbing the appraised value by
 making Husband responsible for costs of Wife's remodeling
 which she did while having exclusive possession or which
 were spent while the parties were together?

 6. Whether the trial court erred in not valuing the parties'
 personalty and providing Husband only pictures [sic]?

 7. Whether the trial court erred in determining Husband's TIAA
 CREF account was a marital asset when it was a premarital
 asset?

 8. Whether the trial court erred in reducing the master's award
 of cash to Husband?

 9. Whether the trial court erred in designating certain assets
 to Husband as advances on the marital estate which kept
 the same [sic] from the calculation of the marital estate for
 the purpose of awarding Husband 55% of the marital
 estate?

 -4-
 J-A26028-19

Appellant Husband's Brief, at vii-viii.

 On cross-appeal, Wife raises the following issues:

 1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 finding that alimony is necessary in this case?

 2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 adopting the master's recommendation as to the amount of
 alimony payable to Husband?

 3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 adopting the master's finding that Husband's earning
 capacity was $20,000 annually in 2017, and $22,000
 annually in 2018?

 4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 requiring Wife to make a lump sum cash payment of
 $18,750 to Husband as part of the equitable division of
 marital property?

 5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 granting Husband's petition to prohibit bifurcation by order
 dated October 15, 2018, which prevented Wife from
 obtaining a divorce decree in October 2018 after the trial
 court's final order was issued on September 24, 2018?

 6. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 denying Wife's petition for special relief by order dated
 November 9, 2018, thereby precluding Wife from obtaining
 a divorce decree in December 2018, and in failing to
 terminate Husband's [APL] as of June 14, 2018, and/or to
 grant the other relief requested in her petition for special
 relief?

 7. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused it discretion in
 the order dated November 9, 2018, requiring Wife to pay
 Husband $700 in attorney's fees?

 8. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in
 its orders of January 18, 2019, by refusing to terminate
 Husband's [APL] effective as of the date of the final divorce
 decree as requested by Wife in her petition for special relief?

Cross-Appellant Wife's Brief, at 4-5.

 -5-
 J-A26028-19

 Our standard of review in reviewing a trial court's equitable distribution

order is as follows:

 A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of
 equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the
 propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of
 marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
 a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal
 procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which
 requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court
 will not find an "abuse of discretion" unless the law has been
 overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was
 manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
 bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.
 In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award,
 courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We
 measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of
 effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a
 just determination of their property rights.

 Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
 evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
 those determinations so long as they are supported by the
 evidence. We are also aware that a master's report and
 recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
 consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of
 witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and
 assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.

Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386–87 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455–56 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Yuhas v. Yuhas, 79 A.3d

700 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (in assessing propriety of marital property

distribution, abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon showing of

clear and convincing evidence).

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 J-A26028-19

 The relevant factors when fashioning equitable distribution awards are

set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a):

 [T]he trial court must consider the length of the marriage; any
 prior marriages; age, health, skills, and employability of the
 parties; sources of income and needs of the parties; contributions
 of one party to the increased earning power of the other party;
 opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of assets or
 income; contribution or dissipation of each party to the
 acquisition, depreciation or appreciation or marital property, value
 of each party's separate property; standard of living established
 during the marriage; economic circumstances of each party and
 whether the party will be serving as custodian of any dependent
 children.

Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. Super. 2004). "The weight

accorded the various factors is dependent on the circumstances and is a

matter within the court's discretion." Id. (citing Gaydos v. Gaydos, 693 A.2d

1368, 1376 (Pa. Super. 1997) (en banc)). "Our scope of review requires us

to measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating

economic justice between the parties in discerning whether the trial court

misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedure." Gates v.

Gates, 933 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

 Husband first argues the trial court erred when it reduced his share of

the marital estate from fifty-five percent, which the master recommended, to

fifty percent. Husband claims the court's "rationale" is an abuse of discretion.

Appellant Husband's Brief, at 12. We disagree. We note that our review of

the record indicates the trial court considered the statutory factors as they

applied to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the trial court has "the

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 J-A26028-19

authority to divide the award as the equities presented in the particular case

may require." Drake v. Drake, 725 A.2d 717, 727 (Pa. 1999).

 Here, Judge Satler reiterated the master's reasoning for the

recommended distribution:

 Wife's earning capacity is much greater than Husband's and she
 will have the opportunity to increase her sole and separate estate
 throughout her future employment. Wife is 51 and Husband is
 56. The [m]aster is going to be awarding alimony to Husband for
 a 4[-]year period so that when he reaches age 60 he will be able
 to draw down on the IRA or 401(k) funds he will be receiving in
 equitable distribution without penalty. Hopefully he will have
 improved his earnings by working full time. Plus, when the
 alimony ends, he will continue receiving child support for [A.G.]
 and [J.G] until they graduate from [h]igh [s]chool. While the
 [m]aster is mindful that Wife will be solely responsible for
 children's college education, under current Pennsylvania law,
 parents have no obligation to support their children through
 college, so this is not a factor the [m]aster may address.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/19, at 19-20. The trial court pointed to the following

factors in support of its decision to reduce Husband's award: (1) the master's

analysis presumed, in error, that Husband would incur a penalty if he withdrew

money from the funds he would receive in equitable distribution via a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order; and (2) Husband chose to be unemployed or under-

employed for a significant part of the parties' marriage, which the master had

acknowledged. The trial court also noted Husband had received nearly

$100,000 in APL as of the time of trial, over $85,000 from two years' worth

of Wife's severance payments from the law firm of Greenberg Traurig, and

would continue to receive alimony for four years and child support beyond

that. See id. at 21. The trial court acknowledged Wife's contributions to

 -8-
 J-A26028-19

building the marital estate, stating, "[I]n choosing to remain either

unemployed or under-employed, Husband was also choosing to not contribute

to [the parties'] standard of living, their station in life, and to their marital

assets." Id. Examining the equitable distribution award as a whole, we do

not find that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded the parties

a 50/50 distribution. Morgante, supra.

 Next, Husband claims the court erred in overlooking the tax

consequences of the distribution award, which he characterizes as "negative"

and "uneven." See Appellant Husband's Brief, at 15. Pursuant to section

3502(a)(10.1) of the Divorce Code, the court must consider the "Federal,

State and local tax ramifications associated with each asset to be divided,

distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and

certain." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(10.1). Contrary to Husband's claim, the

trial court did consider tax ramifications, pointing out that the marital estate

was "cash poor and asset heavy." The bulk of Husband's award was in the

form of withdrawals from Wife's IRAs to IRAs of Husband's designation, which

the court recognized would result in Husband incurring taxes upon withdrawal.

The court also considered the fact that the assets awarded to Wife, contrary

to Husband's assertion, were not "cash assets." Appellant Husband's Brief, at

13. The marital estate consisted primarily of retirement accounts and real

property. The marital home and vacation home were both awarded to Wife,

and she will incur substantial taxes and expenses if the properties are sold in

 -9-
 J-A26028-19

order to generate cash. We find no error or abuse of discretion. See Carney

v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127 (Pa. Super. 2017).

 In his third issue, Husband argues the court erred in overturning the

support retroactivity date.2 Husband filed a motion to modify support on

January 25, 2018. The master recommended support retroactive to January

1, 2017. The trial court determined the effective date was January 25, 2018,

the date of filing, since Husband had not requested retroactive modification to

a date earlier than the date of filing. Further, Husband offered no evidence to

support retroactive modification. See Trial Court Opinion, at 26-27 ("At no

point in his Motion does Husband set forth justification for retroactively

modifying the support order prior to his filing date of January 25, 2018.

Likewise, at trial Husband offered no testimony that he was physically or

mentally precluded from previously filing for modification of support, or that

Wife had made misrepresentations to him that precluded him from previously

fling for a modification of support." ). See also Pa.R.C.P. 1910.17(a) (fixing

effective date of support order at date of filing complaint).

 In his fourth issue, Husband challenges the court's allocation of costs

for home maintenance expenses, and claims the court erred in finding

Husband was advanced $8,250.00 for Wife's payments for improvements to

the marital residence. We find no abuse of discretion, and we rely on the trial

court's opinion to dispose of this claim. See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 22-
____________________________________________

2 We note Husband's argument on this issue is numbered 6, not 3. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

 - 10 -
 J-A26028-19

23 (Husband received benefit of value of maintenance and improvement

expenses in calculation of marital estate; one-half of costs properly treated as

advance to Husband).

 In his fifth issue, Husband argues the court erred in assessing the value

of the marital residence and disturbing the appraised value by making

Husband responsible for costs of Wife's remodeling which she did while having

exclusive possession or which were spent while the parties were together.

Husband provides no corresponding argument to this claim in his brief. His

fifth argument pertains to an automobile and Wife's severance payments.

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 2119, "[t]he argument

shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and

shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively

displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent." Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

Compliance with the rule aids this Court in identifying and addressing an

appellant's claims. We conclude, therefore, that Husband has abandoned this

claim. "[T]his Court will not consider an argument that has been abandoned."

See Koller Concrete, Inc. v. Tube City IMS, LLC, 115 A.3d 312, 320-21

(Pa. Super. 2015) (Superior Court will not address issue presented in

statement of questions involved where no corresponding analysis is included

in the brief); see also Lechowicz v. Moser, 164 A.3d 1271, 1276 (Pa. Super.

2017) (Superior Court will not consider argument that is not properly

developed); Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. 1996)

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 J-A26028-19

(issues not properly developed or argued in argument section of appellate

brief are waived).

 In his sixth claim, Husband argues the court erred in not valuing the

parties' personalty. This claim, too, has been abandoned. As noted above,

Husband's sixth argument pertains to the retroactivity of support. See supra

note 2. His argument on this point is numbered "X," and that argument

merely challenges the court's reliance on the master's credibility

determinations. See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 19; Morgante, supra;

see also Jayne v. Jayne, 663 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. Super. 1995) (in

determining issues of credibility, master's findings must be given fullest

consideration for it was master who observed and heard testimony and

demeanor of witnesses) citing Schuback v. Schuback, 603 A.2d 194, (Pa.

Super. 1992) and Dukmen v. Dukmen, 420 A.2d 667, 670 (Pa. Super.

1980). We find no error or abuse of discretion.

 Next, Husband claims the trial court erred in determining Husband's

TIAA CREF account was a marital asset. The trial court found that this 401k

account, which was obtained though Husband's employment prior to the

marriage, increased in value during the marriage, and that the increase was

properly determined to be marital property. We find no error or abuse of

discretion, and rely on the trial court's discussion of this issue in its opinion.

See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 15-16 (given lack of evidence of value

before marriage, and given evidence of increase in value during marriage,

court considered entire value to be marital property).

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 J-A26028-19

 In his seventh issue, argued as "VIII" in his brief, Husband claims the

court erred in reducing the master's award of a cash payment of $25,000.00

to $18,750.00, as a result of the reduction of the equitable distribution award

from 55% to 50%. Based on our discussion above on issue one, we find this

claim meritless.

 In his final issue, Husband claims the trial court erred in designating

certain assets to Husband as advances on the marital estate. Once again, we

find no corresponding argument on this issue. This issue is waived. See

Koller, supra.

 We now turn to Wife's cross-appeal. In her first three issues, Wife

claims the court erred in: (1) adopting the master's recommendation of

alimony; (2) adopting the master's recommendation as to the amount of

alimony; and (3) adopting the master's recommendation as to the duration of

the alimony award.

 Following divorce, alimony provides a secondary remedy and is
 available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs
 of the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable
 distribution. An award of alimony should be made to either party
 only if the trial court finds that it is necessary to provide the
 receiving spouse with sufficient income to obtain the necessities
 of life. The purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and
 punish the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs
 of the person who is unable to support [himself or] herself through
 appropriate employment are met. Alimony is based upon
 reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of
 living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as
 the payor's ability to pay. An award of alimony may be reversed
 where there is an apparent abuse of discretion or there is
 insufficient evidence to support the award.

 - 13 -
 J-A26028-19

Cook v. Cook, 186 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations and

quotations omitted). In determining "whether alimony is necessary and to

establish the appropriate nature, amount, and duration of any alimony

payments, the court is required to consider all relevant factors, including the

17 factors that are expressly mandated by statute." Lawson v. Lawson, 940

A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis in original).

 After our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's alimony

award. We rely on the trial court's opinion to dispose of these issues. See

Trial Court Opinion, supra at 28-31 (court considered statutory factors under

section 3701(b), noted Wife's earning capacity exceeds Husband's earning

capacity, limited duration of alimony to four years, and made alimony award

modifiable in event Husband obtained job grossing $40,000/year).

 In her fourth issue, Wife claims the trial court erred and/or abused its

discretion in adopting the master's finding that Husband's earning capacity

was $20,000 in 2017 and $22,000 in 2018. Husband has an irregular

employment history; the master found, and the trial court agreed, that

Husband had been unemployed or under-employed for most of the parties'

marriage. Regardless of whether this was by the parties' agreement, the fact

remains, as the trial court noted, that "Husband is likely not an attractive

candidate for employers," Trial Court Opinion, supra at 32, and it will take

some time for him to realize his financial worth. We find no error or abuse of

discretion. See id. ("Husband's recent work history of either full-time

employment at $9.50/hour or part-time employment at $20/hour justifies

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 J-A26028-19

Master Ferber's assessment of an earning capacity of $20,000 for 2017 and

$22,000 for 2018.").

 In her fifth issue, Wife claims the court erred or abused its discretion in

requiring Wife to make a lump sum cash payment to Husband in the amount

of $18,750.00. The master's recommendation of the lump sum cash payment

recognized that Husband's share of the equitable distribution award was

largely comprised of retirement assets. That, coupled with the fact that no

award was given for counsel fees, and that Husband's attorney testified that

he had not been paid regularly, supports the court's determination. We accept

this as consistent with the trial court's goal of effectuating economic justice

between the parties. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102(a)(6) (providing that it is

Commonwealth's policy effectuate economic justice between divorced

parties). See also Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1185 (Pa. Super.

2003) (objective of Divorce Code is to effectuate economic justice between

parties who are divorced and ensure fair and just determination and

settlement of property rights). We find no error or abuse of discretion.

 In her sixth issue, Wife claims the court erred or abuse its discretion in

granting Husband's petition to prohibit bifurcation, by order dated October 15,

2018. Wife contends this prevented her from obtaining a divorce decree after

the trial court's September 24, 2018 order, which made final the report and

recommendation of the master, and continued her APL obligation instead of

converting it upon entry of a decree to the lesser amount of alimony.

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 J-A26028-19

 The trial court reasoned that because both parties planned to appeal

and litigation would be ongoing, it would be inappropriate to permit bifurcation

and entry of the decree. Further, the court's September 24, 2018 order,

though disposing of the equitable distribution issues, remanded the matters

for a support hearing before a special master. That hearing was held on

December 4, 2018.

 Wife presents little argument on this issue, and cites to no statutory

authority or case law to support her claim. Wife merely states that the

economic claims had been decided and, thus, bifurcation was not required to

move forward with the entry of the divorce decree. In an appellate brief,

parties must provide an argument as to each question, which should include

a discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). "This

Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an

argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of

advocate and neutral arbiter. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in

an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived."

Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371–372 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc) (some citations omitted). Notably, Wife ignores the import of this

Court's decision in DeMasi v. DeMasi, 597 A.2d 101 (Pa. Super. 1991).

There, we stated:

 [A] divorce is not final for purposes of APL until appeals have been
 exhausted and a final decree has been entered. Thus, while APL
 typically ends at the award of the divorce decree, which also
 should be the point at which equitable distribution has been
 determined, if an appeal is pending on matters of equitable

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 J-A26028-19

 distribution, despite the entry of the decree, APL will continue
 throughout the appeal process and any remand until a final Order
 has been entered.

Id. at 104 (emphasis in original). See Shuda v. Shuda, 283 Pa. Super. 253,

423 A.2d 1242, 1244 (1980) (considerations of public policy require

dependent party be entitled to support, in form of APL before entry of decree;

since there is absolute right of appeal from decree, these same considerations

require that dependent party be entitle to support during the pendency of

appeal). See also Prol v. Prol, 840 A.2d 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (award of

APL not dependent upon status of parties but on state of litigation). We find

no error or abuse of discretion.

 In her next issue, Wife claims the court erred and/or abused its

discretion in ordering her to pay Husband $700 in attorney's fees. We find no

abuse of discretion. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(7) (right of participants to

receive counsel fees); see also Trial Court Opinion, supra at 33-35 (court

found Wife's petition for special relief obdurate and vexatious; petition was

filed less than one month after court had considered and made clear its

resolution of the issue of bifurcation/APL).

 Finally, Wife claims the court erred and/or abused its discretion in its

January 18 2019 order, refusing to terminate Husband's APL. This claim is

meritless. See DeMasi, supra.

 The purpose of equitable distribution is to "equitably divide, distribute

or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital property between the parties

without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions and in such manner

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 J-A26028-19

as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors." 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

3502(a). The trial court had the broad discretion to distribute the marital

property equitably, in the manner it deemed just, under the circumstances.

See Carney, supra at 131; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). We conclude the trial

court has carried out the purpose and objective of the Divorce Code. The

parties have failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that "the law has

been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will[.]" Carney,

supra at 131 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we remand for correction of the

order in accordance with this decision, see supra n.1, and we affirm in all

other respects on Judge Satler's opinion. We direct the parties to attach a

copy of Judge Satler's opinion in the event of further proceedings.

 Affirmed in part; remanded for correction of the order. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2020

 - 18 -
 Circulated 01/09/2020 11:04 AM

 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
 PENNSYLVANIA
 FAMILY DIVISION

VIRGINIA DAWN BEIGHEY No.: FD 15-08755-017
GEORGIADES, 352 WDA2019

 Appellee/Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant,

 v. OPINION

MICHAEL D. GEORGIADES, BY:

 Appellant/Defendant/Cross-Appellee.
 HONORABLEJENNIFERSATLER
 5073 Family Law Center
 440 Ross Street
 Pittsburgh, PA 15�19

 U) :· -. COPIES TO:

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 Counsel for
LU Appellee/Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant:
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 0-.i David A. Miller, Esq.
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 ;'l-�-

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 650 Smithfield Street, Suite 1700
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 ·-' .I
 Pittsburgh, PA 15222
 I
 L.i - ·.....,:

 Counsel for
 Appellant/Defendant/Cross-Appellee:
 John A. Adamczyk, Esq.
 310 Grant Street, Suite 1515.
 Pittsburgh, PA 15219
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNT_Y,
 PENNS.YL VANIA
 FAMILY DIVISION

VIRGINIA DAWN BEIGHEY FD 15-08755-017
GEORGIADES, No.: 352 WDA 2019

Appellee/Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant,

 v.·

MICHAEL D. GEORGIADES,

Appellant/Defendant/Cross-Appellee.

 Opinion

 SATLER,J. May 23,2019

 Appellant/Defendant/Cross-Appellee Michael D. Georgiades (Husband)

appeals this Court's Orders set forth as follows: .

 • The Order of Court dated September 24, 2018, which made the Master's

 Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2018, a final order of court;

 • The Order of Court dated November 28, 2018, which denied Husband's

 request to vacate the October 15, 2018 Order of Court and remand all of the

 original exceptions to the Master's Report and Recommendation dated April

 17,2018;and

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 • The Order of Court dated January 18, 2019, which denied Husband's

 exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation of December 4, 2018.

Appellee/Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant Virginia Dawn Beighey Georgiades (Wife)

appeals this Court's Orders set forth as follows:

 • The Orders of Court dated May 10, 2018, which denied Wife's Petition for

 Special Relief from the Master's Report and Recommendation dated April 17,

 2018;

 • . The Order of Court dated September 24, 2018, which made the Master's

 Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2018, a final order of court;

 • The Order of Court dated October 15, 2018, which granted Husband's Petition

 · to Prohibit Bifurcation;

 • The Orders of Court dated November 9, 2018, which denied Wife's Petition

 for Special Relief and granted Husband's counsel fees; and

 • The Orders of Court dated January 18, 2019, which authorized entry of the

 divorce decree and kept APL in effect pending further order of court.

A Decree of Divorce dated January 31, 2019, was 'filed on February 1, 2019.

Husband timely filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2019, after which Wife

timely filed her cross-appeal on March 14, 2019. The appeals were consolidated and

docketed at 352 WDA 2019.

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 BACKGROUND

 Husband and Wife met in Florida and were married on June 6, 1998. Four

· children were born during the marriage: E.G., N.G., A.G., and J.G. The parties

 lived in Florida until June 2013 when they relocated to Pittsburgh. The parties'

 marriage began deteriorating and they eventually separated. Wife filed a

 Complaint in Divorce on September 2, 2015, followed shortly thereafter by

 Husband's Petition Raising Claims filed on September 8, 2015.

 Since that time, the parties have engaged in extensive litigation regarding

 issues of date of separation, exclusive possession, custody, APL, child support, and

 discovery. Following a half-day hearing on the issue of date of separation, the

 Court determined the date of separation to have been July 31, 2015. By Order of

 Court dated November 20, 2017, the case was referred to the permanent Master to

 hear testimony and issue a Report and Recommendation (\Report\") concerning all