CourtListener opinion 7360844

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J-S19035-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 LISA C. PIERCE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 : PENNSYLVANIA
 :
 v. :
 :
 :
 KEVIN PIERCE :
 :
 Appellant : No. 106 EDA 2022

 Appeal from the Order Entered December 3, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
 2006-08798-DI

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 26, 2022

 Appellant, Kevin Pierce ("Husband"), appeals from the Order entered on

December 3, 2021, awarding Appellee, Lisa C. Pierce ("Wife"), the tentative

sum of $90,954.85 from Husband's Pennsylvania State Employee Retirement

System ("SERS") pension account, to be paid at the rate of $1,000.00 per

month. After careful consideration, we affirm.

 Our examination of the record below, with particular attention to the

parties' 2008 Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") and their 2009

Amended Property Settlement Agreement ("APSA") confirms that the trial

court opinion and order of December 3, 2021, appropriately summarizes the

pertinent facts and sets forth the provisions of each agreement, as follows:

 This matter [came] before [the trial court] on "Plaintiff[/Wife's]
 Petition to Enforce the Property Settlement Agreement, Amended
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
 J-S19035-22

 Property Settlement Agreement, and Agreed Order filed August 2,
 2021."

 ...

 The parties were married in 1991 and separated in 2006. On
 September 3, 2008, they entered into a Property Settlement
 Agreement ("2008 PSA") which was incorporated into their
 September 16, 2008, Decree in Divorce.

 Paragraph 10-14 of the 2008 PSA contains terms governing the
 parties' responsibilities/entitlements regarding the marital
 residence, Defendant/Husband's pension, certain debts, and child
 support. Stated as summarily as possible, in Paragraph 10, Wife
 was responsible for all expenses relating to the marital residence,
 including the first and second mortgage payments to HSBC, and
 she was required to refinance those mortgages or sell the
 residence. Paragraph 11 determined that Wife's entitlement in
 Husband's SERS pension was $1,000.00 per month; subject,
 however to suspension if Husband continued to pay the mortgages
 in temporary satisfaction of his child support obligation.

 After contempt litigation initiated by Husband [against Wife], the
 parties subsequently entered into an Amended Property
 Settlement Agreement on August 27, 2009 (2009 APSA).

 Paragraphs 10-14 of the 2008 PSA were expressly superseded by
 the 2009 APSA, while the balance of the 2008 PSA remained in
 effect. The parties agree that the 2009 APSA is the contract in
 dispute in these proceedings.

 For the purposes of the instant controversy, the relevant
 provisions of the 2009 APSA are Paragraphs 1-3, 6 and 7.
 Paragraphs 1-3 provide a 3-stage step down of Husband's
 financial obligations to Wife predicated on his paying the
 mortgages encumbering the marital residence "in lieu of
 $1,000.00 in the monthly pension payment." As noted above, per
 the 2008 PSA, the mortgages were Wife's obligation, and Wife was
 entitled to $1,000 per month from the SERS pension. The 2009
 APSA altered these obligations as follows:

 1. Kevin Pierce will continue to pay the monthly
 mortgage payment on the property at 114 E.
 Summit Avenue, West Grove, PA, in lieu of $1,000

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 J-S19035-22

 in child support and in lieu of $1,000 in the monthly
 pension payment until June, 2011. Payments will
 be made directly to the mortgage company. APSA,
 Paragraph 1.

 2. Effective July 1, 2011, Kevin Pierce's monthly
 payment responsibility will be reduced to $1,500 a
 month. The stated amount will be in lieu of $500
 in child support and in lieu of $1,000 in the monthly
 pension payment. Payments will be made directly
 to the mortgage company. Also effective July 1,
 2011, Lisa Pierce will make monthly payments to
 Kevin Pierce in the amount of $500 a month to
 cover the balance of the monthly mortgage
 payment until July 2013. These payments are to
 be received on or before the 1st day of each month.
 APSA, Paragraph 2.

 3. Effective July 1, 2013, Kevin Pierce's monthly
 payment responsibility will be reduced to $1,000 a
 month. The stated amount will be in lieu of the
 $1,000 per month pension payment. Payments will
 be made directly to the mortgage company. Also
 effective July 1, 2013, Lisa Pierce will make
 monthly payments to Kevin Pierce in the amount
 of $1,000 a month to cover the balance of the
 monthly mortgage payment until at which time the
 mortgage is satisfied. These payments are to be
 received on or before the 1st day of every month.
 Once the mortgage is satisfied, Kevin Pierce will
 sign the property over to Lisa Pierce as sole owner.
 APSA, Paragraph 3.

 Paragraph 6 of the 2009 APSA commits Wife "to be responsible
 for all taxes, homeowners' insurance and all other expenses
 associated with the property [the marital residence]."

 Paragraph 7 of the 2009 APSA creates an option for either party
 to terminate the APSA "before the mortgage [sic] is satisfied," by
 giving 3 months written notice of intent to terminate. APSA
 Paragraph 7(a).

 -3-
 J-S19035-22

 It further provides that once notice is given, Wife was obligated to
 vacate the marital residence within 3 months, and the property
 was to immediately be marketed for sale. Significantly, it also
 provided that, "During the time the property is listed for sale,
 Kevin Pierce [Defendant] will be responsible for the full amount of
 the mortgage payments until the property is sold." APSA,
 Paragraph 7(b).

 Pursuant to Paragraph 7(c) of the 2009 APSA, Wife would not
 begin receiving her $1,000 pension payments until the property
 was sold and Husband was relieved of making mortgage payments
 on the property.

 The parties agreed that once the property was sold, "all proceeds
 will be divided 50/50." APSA, Paragraph 7(d).

 [In the trial court's opinion, most] crucial to the present dispute
 are the provisions of Paragraph 7(e) and (f), which provide:

 (e) Once the property is sold, the total amount of
 the mortgage payments paid by Kevin Pierce toward
 the mortgage in lieu of monthly pension payments
 from the date of separation until the time the property
 is sold will be deducted from Lisa Pierce's portion of
 the [marital] value of the pension which was valued
 at $206,792.

 (f) The total amount of the mortgage payments
 paid by Kevin Pierce toward the mortgage in lieu of
 monthly pension payments from the date of
 separation until the time the property is sold will be
 determined once the property is sold and deducted
 from Lisa Pierce's portion of the [marital] value of the
 pension. If a balanced exists at this time, a QDRO will
 be written to state that Lisa Pierce will receive $1,000
 a month until the remaining balance of Lisa Pierce's
 [marital] value of the pension is met.
 APSA Paragraphs 7(e) and (f).

 In July of 2011, Husband filed a Petition for Special Relief/Petition
 to Enforce the original PSA and APSA. Husband alleged, among
 other things, that Wife had failed to pay the 2009 and 2010 real
 estate taxes on the marital residence.

 -4-
 J-S19035-22

 After hearing, [the trial court] entered an order on September 23,
 2011 . . . deducting $12,642 from Wife's eventual share of the
 pension and requiring her to vacate the property and leave it in
 "move in condition" by December 1, 2011. That order also
 required Wife to pay Husband $3,000 representing payments from
 her to him pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the 2009 APSA. That sum
 was also to be deducted from the pension monies to her.

 The parties agree that Husband's July 2011 filing triggered the
 notice of termination requirement under Paragraph 7(a) of the
 2009 APSA.

 Wife moved out of the residence on December 4, 2011. Husband
 claims it was not left in "clean, habitable condition" (his words),
 and he incurred $14,899.55 to render it marketable.

 However, he did not market it for sale as he had agreed to do,
 because it was still "under water"—the balances of the 1st and 2nd
 mortgages exceeded its fair market value. Instead, Husband
 decided to lease the property out at $1,100 effective 2/1/2012
 (later increased to $1,125). While the lease was effective
 February 1, 2012, Husband had made the decision to rent in
 December, before Wife had even vacated the property. All rents
 were received and deposited by Husband.

 Husband sold the home to his tenants in June, 2021. He alleges
 he was solely responsible for the mortgage payments, taxes, and
 expenses once Wife deeded the home to him in April 2020. Wife
 allege[d] that Husband was responsible for those obligations after
 she moved out in December 2011.

 [The trial court determined that] to calculate what, if anything,
 Wife [was] owed . . . from Husband's SERS pension, [it was
 necessary to review] the various operative provisions of the 2009
 APSA [with reference to] the "termination" provisions of
 Paragraph 7. [The court set out to identify what] the start and
 end points [were] for calculating mortgage payments made "in
 lieu of pension payments" and to determine the amount of those
 payments. [The trial court also considered other] mandates by
 the APSA . . . before determining [Wife's] entitlement, if any.

Trial Court Order and Opinion, 12/3/21, at 1-5, 10.

 -5-
 J-S19035-22

 In summary, the trial court found that August 27, 2009, was the start

date and December 4, 2011, was the end date for capturing mortgage

payments made in lieu of monthly pension payments. It then arrived at a

tentative net pension amount of $90,954.85 due Wife by deducting, inter alia,

$57,736.00 in mortgage payments made in lieu of pension payments. This

timely appeal followed.

 Husband presents the following questions for this Court's consideration:

 1. Did the Court err to place upon Husband the unreimbursed
 "responsibility" in 2009 to pay the mortgage when no such duty
 existed?

 2. Was it not error for the Court to relieve Wife from the terms of
 the PSA and APSA 7(e)(f) which required her to repay him for
 all sums he had paid after the Court found that Wife had
 repeatedly breached both the PSA of 2008 and the APSA of
 2009 and breached from 2009 to 2020[?]

 3. Did not the Court err by not perceiving that the terms of the
 APSA of 2009 were ambiguous where the Court's conclusion
 was wholly inconsistent with the PSA of 2008 that Wife would
 have the house and all the debt and profits while ignoring APSA
 7(e) statement that "Once the property is sold, the total
 amount of the mortgage payments paid by Kevin Pierce toward
 the mortgage in lieu of monthly pension payments from the
 date of separation until the time the property is sold will be
 deducted from Lisa Pierce's portion of the marital value of the
 pension. . .?

 4. Where Wife was wholly liable for both mortgages on the marital
 home per PSA and APSA and was to indemnify and hold
 Husband harmless from debt, was it not error for the Court to
 interpret the language of APSA of 2009 to switch the entire
 debt to Husband where the language did not say nor inform

 -6-
 J-S19035-22

 Husband in any way that he would be "fully liable for all debt"
 without fair consideration to support the radical change in the
 contract?

Brief of Appellant at 5-7.

 As the instant issue relates to the effect of the parties' property

settlement agreement, our standard of review is as follows.

 In Pennsylvania, we enforce property settlement agreements
 between husband and wife in accordance with the same rules
 applying to contract interpretation. A court may construe or
 interpret a [marital settlement agreement] as it would a contract,
 but it has neither the power nor the authority to modify or vary
 the [agreement] unless there has been fraud, accident or mistake.

 It is well-established that the paramount goal of contract
 interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties' intent.
 When the trier of fact has determined the intent of the parties to
 a contract, an appellate court will defer to that determination if it
 is supported by the evidence.

 Further, where...the words of a contract are clear and
 unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from
 the express language of the agreement itself.

Conway v. Conway, 209 A.3d 367 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Bianchi v.

Bianchi, 859 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted)). See also Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (explaining where property settlement agreement did not merge

into divorce decree, it stood as a separate contract subject to law governing

contracts).

 "On appeal from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement,

we must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused

its discretion." Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa. Super.

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 J-S19035-22

2007) (quoting Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Pa.Super.

2005)). "Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not

bound by the trial court's interpretation." Mazurek v. Russell, 96 A.3d 372,

378 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Stamerro, supra at 1257).

 When analyzing contracts which involve clear and unambiguous
 terms, a court must look to the writing itself to give effect to the
 parties' understanding. The court must construe the contract only
 as written and may not rewrite the contract or give it a
 construction that conflicts with the plain, ordinary and accepted
 meaning of the words used.

Sorace v. Sorace, 665 A.2d 125, 127 (Pa. Super. 1995) (internal citations

omitted).

 Where the contract terms are ambiguous, however, the court is free to

receive extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.

 A contract will be found to be ambiguous only if it is fairly
 susceptible of different constructions and capable of being
 understood in more than one sense. It is the function of the court
 to decide, as a matter of law, whether the contract terms are clear
 or ambiguous. The fact that the parties have different
 interpretations of a contract does not render the contract
 ambiguous.

Tuthill v. Tuthill, 763 A.2d 417, 420 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal citations

omitted).

 Initially, we note Husband fails to provide a discrete argument for each

of the above questions raised. Instead, his brief presents a single, overarching

argument that the court erroneously interpreted the PSA and APSA to place

upon him sole responsibility for mortgage payments on the marital property

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 J-S19035-22

from the 2011 commencement of the termination period until the 2020 sale

of the property to the long-time tenants.

 Husband's argument to this end is at times difficult to follow. The

challenging form chosen by him is to present piecemeal excerpts from the trial

court's Order and Opinion of December 3, 2021, followed by brief responses

in which Husband asserts court error in some respect.

 Read as a whole, however, a coherent argument emerges that under

the terms of Paragraphs 7(e) and (f) of the 2009 APSA, Wife's eventual share

of Husband's pension should have been reduced by the dollar amount of the

mortgage payments Husband paid from 2011 to 2020. Therefore,

notwithstanding the brief's divergence from the directive in Rule of Appellate

Procedure 2119 that an argument "shall be divided into as many parts as there

are questions to be argued"1, we decline to find waiver and choose to address

Husband's argument on the merits.

 The present controversy centers on how the interplay between

Subsections 7(b) and, collectively, 7(e) and (f) of the 2009 APSA affected the

parties' respective obligations regarding monthly pension payments made

____________________________________________

1 The full text of Rule 2119(a) provides:

 (a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as
 many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall
 have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type
 distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein,
 followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
 deemed pertinent.

 -9-
 J-S19035-22

during the termination period. As noted, supra, subsections 7(e) and (f)

provide as follows:

 (e) Once the property is sold, the total amount of the mortgage
 payments paid by Kevin Pierce toward the mortgage in lieu of
 monthly pension payments from the date of separation until the
 time the property is sold will be deducted from Lisa Pierce's
 portion of the marital value of the pension which was valued at
 $206,792.85.

 (f) The total amount of the mortgage payments paid by Kevin
 Pierce toward the mortgage in lieu of monthly pension payments
 from the date of separation until the time the property is sold will
 be determined once the property is sold and deducted from Lisa
 Pierce's portion of the marital value of the pension. If a balance
 exists at this time, a QDRO will be written to state that Lisa Pierce
 will receive $1,000 a month until the remaining balance of Lisa
 Pierce's marital value of the pension is met.

APSA Paragraph 7(e) and (f).

 Subsection 7(b), meanwhile, provides that upon the decision to

terminate the APSA,

 "Lisa Pierce will be required to vacate the property within 3
 months and the property will be immediately placed on the market
 until sold. During the time the property is listed for sale, Kevin
 Pierce will be responsible for the full amount of the mortgage
 payments until the property is sold.

APSA Paragraph 7(b) (emphasis added).

 Husband contends that nothing in subsections 7(e) and (f) makes

crediting his mortgage payments against Wife's share of his pension

conditional upon Wife's retaining residency in the marital home. Indeed, he

claims Wife obtained a windfall by the trial court's refusal to decrease her

share of the pension by the cumulative total of monthly mortgage payments

 - 10 -
 J-S19035-22

he made on the marital house from 2009 through 2020.2 He insists he would

not have made the payments if he had known they would not be applied to

reduce Wife's pension share.

 The trial court, on the other hand, read the provisions at issue in light

of both the stated purpose of the APSA, which was to enable Wife to retain

stable housing, and the specific language of Section 7(b) making Husband

solely responsible for "the full amount" of the mortgage payments if the APSA

were terminated, which had the dual effect of requiring Wife to vacate the

home and triggering the immediate duty to place the marital home for sale.

 Most critical to the present inquiry, the trial court reasoned, was how

the APSA established Husband's mortgage payment obligations differently

depending on whether or not Wife lived in the marital residence. Specifically,

the APSA qualified Husband's mortgage payments as being "in lieu of monthly

pension payments" to Wife only in those provisions that applied when Wife

lived in the marital residence. See APSA, Sections 1-3. The implication in

such a construct was that Wife was receiving the valuable benefit of reliable

housing and would, therefore, incur a deduction from her eventual share of

Husband's pension equal to Husband's contribution to the mortgage

payments.

 In contrast, chief among the APSA provisions setting forth the changing

rights and responsibilities applicable after the termination of the APSA, Wife's
____________________________________________

2There was agreement below that the tenants paid approximately $1,100 to
$1,200 per month in rent during the eleven-year termination period.

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 J-S19035-22

consequential eviction, and the duty to place the home for immediate sale was

subsection 7(b). Most notable in subsection 7(b), the trial court opined, was

the elimination of language that mortgage payments would be made "in lieu

of pension payments." Instead, such language was replaced with a new

requirement that "Husband is responsible for the full amount" of the monthly

mortgage payments until the property was sold. Section 7(b) (emphasis

added).

 This feature of termination-period mortgage payments constituted a key

distinction from the parties' shared responsibilities outlined in APSA

subsections 1, 2, and 3, the trial court observed, and it, thus, supported the

conclusion that Husband's mortgage payments occurring after he triggered

the termination phase were not made in lieu of pension payments.

 After careful review of this record in light of governing authority cited

above, we adopt the cogent rationale and well-considered decision of the trial

court as expressed in its order and opinion of December 3, 2021. To this end,

we concur with the trial court's determination that section 7(b) provided clear

and predominant guidance to the parties that triggering the termination

provisions of the APSA would preclude further deductions of Husband's

mortgage payments from Wife's share of the SERS pension.

 When read together with the mandate within section 7(b) that Husband

bears sole responsibility for the full mortgage payment after termination of

the APSA, the requirement in sections 7(e) and (f) that the court calculate the

amount of "mortgage payments made in lieu of pension payments" between

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 J-S19035-22

the dates of the parties' separation and the sale of the home, respectively,

must be understood as limiting such qualifying payments to those made prior

to the termination of the APSA. Consistent with such a limit is the

accompanying provision that the property be immediately listed for sale upon

commencement of the termination period.

 As such, we agree with the trial court that the 2009 APSA, as a whole,

unambiguously established that the end point for calculating mortgage

payments made "in lieu of pension payments" was December 4, 2011, when

Husband triggered the mandatory termination of the APSA and eviction of Wife

from the marital property. Accordingly, we affirm the order entered below.

 Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/26/2022

 - 13 -
 Circulated
 Received 1/26/2022 4:27:47 PM Superior 06/28/2022 03:12
 Court Eastern PM
 District
LISA C. PIERCE, IN THE COURR T O' FCOMMON•PL EAS
 L IA OF
 Plaintiff, CHEST i'hfZ•Wff4Y27R9P•P•(,XikiriNCW Eos En District
 DA 2o2

 VS. CIVIL DIVISION--FAMILY

KEVIN PIERCE, No. 2006-08798-DI
 Defendant,

 ORDER

 AND NOW, this \• -