CourtListener opinion 9882431

Evidence quotes

Clean opinion text

[Cite as M.A.M. v. A.P.H., 2023-Ohio-3503.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
 MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 [M.A.M.] ON BEHALF OF MINOR :
 CHILDREN :
 : C.A. No. 29763
 Appellee :
 : Trial Court Case No. 2020 DV 01557
 v. :
 : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
 [A.P.H.] : Domestic Relations)
 :
 Appellant :

 ...........

 OPINION

 Rendered on September 29, 2023

 ...........

ALAN J. STATMAN, Attorney for Appellant

MICHELLE M. MACIOROWSKI, Attorney for Appellee

 .............

HUFFMAN, J.

 {¶ 1} Father appeals from a consent agreement that he entered into with Mother

and that was then approved by the domestic relations court; the consent agreement

resolved Mother's petition for a domestic violence civil protection order ("protection order")

in favor of the parties' minor children. Father argues that the domestic relations court
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erred in failing to dismiss the petition for four reasons: 1) there was an unreasonable delay

before a full hearing was scheduled on the petition; 2) the domestic relations court lacked

jurisdiction to approve the consent agreement due to proceedings pending in the juvenile

court related to custody of the children; 3) one of the children had never been endangered,

as alleged; and 4) a material term of the agreement was frustrated when the reunification

counselor named in the agreement declined to provide counseling to the parties. The

matter is reversed in part and remanded to the domestic relations court for clarification of

certain provisions of the consent agreement and a determination of whether any of the

provisions address parental rights and responsibilities and therefore infringe upon the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

 Procedural History

 {¶ 2} On October 23, 2020, Mother filed a petition for a protection order against

Father on behalf of their children, N.H. and A.H. The petition stated:

 I got my daughters back from parenting time with [Father] on October 19,

 2020. My daughter, N.H., reported to me that her father had picked her up

 by the throat and screamed at her. I have made a police report and the

 matter is being referred for a Care House investigation. [Father] has a

 history of violence and has two pending criminal charges in Kettering, one

 for assault [and] the other for domestic violence against his former wife that

 occurred in his home. Over the past months, [Father's] behavior has

 become more erratic, angry and violent. My children return home from

 parenting time distressed and afraid. I fear for their safety and well-being
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 during [Father's] parenting time.

 {¶ 3} The domestic relations court issued an ex parte protection order, and Father

was served with it on October 23, 2020. A full hearing was scheduled for November 5,

2020. On March 26, 2021, after a telephone status conference, the court continued the

matter, setting it for a full hearing on June 4, 2021. The record contains no explanation

for the delay between November 2020 and March 26, 2021. On April 15, 2021, Father

filed a motion for supervised parenting time.

 {¶ 4} On May 21, 2021, the parties jointly moved for a continuance, noting that

Father's pending criminal cases had been continued until July 28, 2021. The court

granted the motion and continued the matter until September 16, 2021. The court also

extended the expiration of the ex parte protection order until January 23, 2022 by

agreement of the parties. On October 29, 2021, Mother moved the court to further

extend the ex parte protection order, noting that Father had moved for a continuance of

his pending jury trial in Kettering M.C. No. 20 CRB 01311 (which involved N.H. and arose

from the incident alleged in the petition for the protection order), and the municipal court

had granted the motion. On May 18, 2022, Father filed a motion to set a hearing on the

protection order, noting that a plea deal had been reached in Case No. 20 CRB 01311.

 {¶ 5} On May 19, 2022, Mother responded to Father's motion by asking the court

not to schedule a hearing until Father's "sentencing in all of his criminal matters" was

complete, noting that Father had five separate cases, involving five different victims,

pending for sentencing. Father replied the same day, characterizing Mother's response

as a "delay tactic"; he argued that his sentencing in Case No. 20 CRB 01311 was
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scheduled for the following day (May 20) and that the other matters involved different

people and would not be a basis for a continuance of the proceedings on Mother's

petition. The court set the matter for a full hearing on August 26, 2022.

 {¶ 6} On July 11, 2022, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother's petition for lack

of prosecution. He noted that he had not seen his children since October 23, 2020. He

also asserted that the criminal case involving N.H., Case No. 20 CRB 01311, had been

fully resolved on May 20, 2022. Citing R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d) and McCue v. Marlin, 187

Ohio App.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1298, 930 N.E.2d 855 (7th Dist.), Father asserted that "key

prohibitions" of the ex parte protection order exceeded the domestic relations court's

jurisdiction and interfered with parenting time rights that had been previously determined

by the Montgomery County Juvenile Court.

 {¶ 7} In response to the motion to dismiss. Mother argued that Father's multiple

continuances of his criminal matters, the pandemic, and scheduling issues related to

having a visiting judge had caused the delays, not her failure to prosecute. Mother

asserted that there were no provisions in the ex parte protection order granting custody

or suspending parenting time, denied forum shopping, and argued that McCue was

distinguishable. She also pointed out that the domestic relations order was an ex parte

order, not a final order, and argued that the children were entitled to a full hearing on

whether they were in danger of domestic violence by Father, which was within the

jurisdiction of the domestic relations court.

 {¶ 8} On August 5, 2022, the domestic relations court denied the motion to dismiss.

The court noted that, since the filing of the parties' joint motion to continue, several
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attorneys had entered appearances on Father's behalf and then withdrawn, but Father

had been represented at the time of each continuance. The court also noted that

Father's criminal matters had been continued several times, which had led to

continuances of the domestic relations matter without objection from Father. The court

ordered that the August 26, 2022 full hearing would proceed as scheduled. The court

did not address the jurisdictional argument raised in Father's motion.

 {¶ 9} On August 25, 2022, Father requested a continuance due to the illness of

counsel. The court granted the continuance and reset the full hearing for October 27,

2022. On that date, after lengthy negotiation, the parties entered into the consent

agreement, which is discussed more fully below and which was read into the record.

 {¶ 10} On December 12, 2022, Father filed a motion to dismiss the consent

agreement as to A.H., because no threats or violence against A.H. had been alleged.

On January 25, 2023, the court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that the parties'

consent agreement included A.H. The court also ordered that the consent agreement

be typed and submitted to the court by February 7, 2023, and that if it was not submitted,

the parties' exhibit that was signed and submitted to the court on October 27, 2022, would

be adopted by the court as the parties' consent agreement.

 {¶ 11} Also on January 25, 2023, Father filed a motion asking the court to set a

hearing on the pending protection order. He noted that the reunification counselor

named in the consent agreement, Dr. Antoinette Cordell, had declined to provide

counseling services. Father argued that the specific inclusion of Dr. Cordell in the

consent agreement had been a material term that was now "impossible," that the parties
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had been unable to agree on an alternative counselor, and that due process required a

full hearing. On February 7, 2023, Mother filed a typed copy of the consent agreement

as requested by the court. On February 9, 2023, the court ordered Mother to respond to

Father's January 25, 2023 motion for a hearing within 14 days. In her response, Mother

indicated that she took "no position" on the matter and deferred to the judgment of the

court.

 {¶ 12} On March 10, 2023, the court denied Father's motion to schedule a full

hearing. The court noted that Father's assertion that the parties had been unable to

agree on an alternative counselor indicated to the court that "the act of reunification

counseling" itself was a material part of the agreement, but not the specific counselor.

The court noted that Mother had filed a retyped and "signature verified" version of the

consent agreement, and that Father had "apparently declined to authorize his signature"

on the typed agreement. The court therefore adopted the consent agreement that

Mother had signed and submitted to the court on October 27, 2022.

 {¶ 13} Father appeals, raising four assignments of error.

 Jurisdiction

 {¶ 14} For ease of analysis, we will first consider Father's second assignment of

error:

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE

 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDER BECAUSE THE

 DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO

 ISSUE AN ORDER THAT INTERFERED WITH THE ORDER OF THE
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 JUVENILE COURT.

 {¶ 15} Father argues that the consent agreement impermissibly interfered with

Father's custodial rights and parenting time by requiring him to stay away from N.H. and

A.H. and not contact them. Father argues that Mother engaged in forum shopping,

asserting that she acknowledged during the ex parte hearing that the juvenile court had

denied her an ex parte order before she filed her petition in the domestic relations court.

Father relies on R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d) and McCue, 187 Ohio App.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1298,

930 N.E.2d 855. Father urges us to take judicial notice that there were pending motions

regarding parental time and responsibilities in the juvenile court, which had "been

continued repeatedly" due to pending matters in the domestic relations court.

 {¶ 16} Although Father did not specifically move to dismiss Mother's petition for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, his July 2022 motion to dismiss "for lack of prosecution"

did raise the issue that the protection order interfered with his custody rights. The trial

court did not address the issue, implicitly denying the suggestion that the protection order

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

 {¶ 17} We have previously held that a de novo standard of review applies to a trial

court's decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Zimmerman v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Health Dept., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26816,

2016-Ohio-1423, ¶ 13. "De novo review requires an ‘independent review of the trial

court's decision, without any deference to the trial court's determination.' " Jackson v.

Internatl. Fiber, 169 Ohio App.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-5799, 863 N.E.2d 189, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.);

see also Fifth Third Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Leveck, 2022-Ohio-546, 185 N.E.3d 641, ¶ 10
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(2d Dist.).

 {¶ 18} The Ohio Supreme Court has noted that "domestic-violence civil protection

orders are creatures of statute," R.C. 3113.31, which "establishes a comprehensive

statutory scheme for issuing, modifying, and terminating domestic-violence protection

orders." Cyran v. Cyran, 152 Ohio St.3d 484, 2018-Ohio-24, 97 N.E.3d 487, ¶ 13. "The

statute vests the court with broad discretion to tailor domestic-violence civil protection

orders to fit the needs of each particular case." Id., citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d

34, 37-38, 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997).

 {¶ 19} R.C. 3113.31 states, in pertinent part:

 (E)(1) After an ex parte or full hearing, the court may grant any protection

 order, with or without bond, or approve any consent agreement to bring

 about a cessation of domestic violence against the family or household

 members or persons with whom the respondent is or was in a dating

 relationship. The order or agreement may:

 ***

 (d) With respect to a petition involving family or household members,

 temporarily allocate parental rights and responsibilities for the care of, or

 establish temporary parenting time rights with regard to, minor children, if

 no other court has determined, or is determining, the allocation of parental

 rights and responsibilities for the minor children or parenting time rights[.]

 {¶ 20} In McCue, 187 Ohio App.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1298, 930 N.E.2d 855, upon

which Father relies, a protection order was issued against a father for the protection of
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his minor child, N.M. Id. at ¶ 1. Father and mother were not married, and in 2007, they

had litigated custody, paternity, and visitation rights. Id. at ¶ 2-3. In 2008, mother

reported allegations of abuse to the juvenile court after father's visitation with N.M.

pursuant to the parenting order of that court. Id. at ¶ 4. The alleged incident was

investigated by a Children Services caseworker and the guardian ad litem, and no

evidence of abuse was found. Id.

 {¶ 21} During the investigations in juvenile court, mother filed a petition for a

protection order in the domestic relations court, and an ex parte protection order was

issued. Id. at ¶ 5. After a full hearing, the magistrate found that father had engaged in

domestic violence that resulted in the child's being an abused child. Id. at ¶ 15. The

magistrate designated mother as the residential parent, suspended father's visitation

rights, and ordered him to have no contact with the child. Id.

 {¶ 22} Father objected to the magistrate's order for lack of jurisdiction based on

R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d). Id. at ¶ 16. The trial court agreed that the magistrate had "had

no jurisdiction to issue temporary orders allocating parental rights and visitation." Id. at

¶ 17. It struck two paragraphs of the protection order related to parental rights and

responsibilities but left the rest of the protection order in effect.

 {¶ 23} Father appealed, arguing that, because the juvenile court had jurisdiction

over visitation and parental rights issues with respect to the child, the domestic relations

court could not issue a protection order. Id. at ¶ 21. The Seventh District disagreed,

although it did strike additional provisions from the protection order. The court noted that

a "protection order is not a custody proceeding," and any "rulings in a protection order
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dealing with the custody of a minor child are only temporary orders that last until the

custody matter is litigated in a domestic relations or juvenile court." (Citations omitted.)

Id. at ¶ 26. The court further noted that a "court in a protection order proceeding cannot

issue a permanent decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities, nor can it modify

an existing decree." Id. Further, "when the domestic relations court presiding over the

protection order is not the court that has jurisdiction over parental rights and

responsibilities, the domestic relations court has no authority to issue orders regarding

parental rights or visitation." Id. at ¶ 27. The Seventh District noted that every "court

that has looked at this issue has come to the same conclusion," citing several other cases.

Id. It was significant to the Seventh District that one of the purposes of R.C.

3113.31(E)(1)(d) was "to prevent forum shopping." Id. at ¶ 28.

 {¶ 24} The Seventh District found that the remedy was not simply to vacate or

reverse the protection order, because many aspects of the protection order did not relate

to parental rights or visitation and thus were not affected by the appeal. Id. at ¶ 30. The

court found that R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d) controlled the scope of a protection order. In the

court's view, the only question on appeal was whether the domestic relations court had

been thorough enough in excising portions of the protection order that appeared to

infringe on the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 29. The court concluded that it

had not, and it struck additional portions of the protection order. Specifically, the court

vacated paragraphs which: prohibited father from entering multiple locations, including

the child's residence, school, and child care facilities, "because visitation would be

severely hampered, or perhaps made impossible," if father could not enter these facilities;
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ordered him to stay 500 feet away from the child; and prohibited him from contacting the

child. Id. at ¶ 31-34.

 {¶ 25} The Seventh District concluded that, because a custody proceeding was

pending in the juvenile court, mother "could have requested any other protection for N.M.

that was available through a protection order directly in the juvenile court." Id. at ¶ 36.

It further concluded that "forum shopping may have occurred in this case," noting that

mother had not agreed with the process used in or the result of the juvenile court

proceedings, so she had filed for a protection order in the domestic relations court. Id.

at ¶ 37. The court found that R.C. 3113.31(E)(1) could be enforced without completely

vacating the protection order, and that the remaining portions of the protection order that

did not deal with parental rights and responsibilities could stand Id. at ¶ 37. The

protection order was affirmed as modified by the deletion of three additional paragraphs.

Id.

 {¶ 26} Here, the parties entered into a consent agreement to resolve the petition

for a protection order. Pursuant to the consent agreement, paragraph 4 of the ex parte

protection order was removed, which had prevented Father from entering or interfering

with "the residence, school, business, place of employment, day care centers, or child

care providers of the children." Paragraphs 5 and 6, which had required Father to stay

away from and not be within 500 feet of the children and to not initiate contact with the

children had the words "except as modified herein" written at the bottom of the

paragraphs. The substance of this modification was unclear. The consent agreement

further stated that the parties agreed to begin reunification counseling with Dr. Antoinette
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Cordell and that Dr. Cordell would speak with Father's counselor, the children's

counselor, and the parties; supervised visitation would begin "at the recommendation of

the reunification counselor." Further, the parties acknowledged in the agreement that

there were juvenile court cases pending regarding the children, that the "consent

agreement shall be dismissed in conjunction with further juvenile court orders," and that

the provisions of the consent agreement should begin "ASAP and not [be] delayed."

 {¶ 27} At the October 27, 2022 hearing, when the consent agreement was read

into the record, the domestic relations court indicated it's understanding that there was

an action pending in the juvenile court related to a shared parenting plan, which it

recognized was still in effect and would be dealt with in that court; the court stated that

the shared parenting plan would not be "subject to this Court's action * * * if we go forward

on the [protection order.]" Also at the hearing, Father indicated that he believed the

consent agreement to which he had agreed was "best for the children right now" and that

he was satisfied with it.

 {¶ 28} Pursuant to McCue, 187 Ohio App.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1298, 930 N.E.2d 855,

the remedy to any argument that the domestic relations court infringed upon the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not simply to dismiss the entire protection order but to

excise any portions of the order that usurp the juvenile court's jurisdiction. In our view,

this same reasoning would apply to a consent agreement that resolves a petition for a

protection order. Father, an experienced family law attorney, could have declined to

enter into the consent agreement or moved to modify it pursuant to R.C. 3113.31(E)(8)(b),

and he failed to do so. We also note that Father took inconsistent positions during these
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proceedings. For example, he filed a motion for supervised parenting time in the

domestic relations court while parenting proceedings were pending in the juvenile court;

he filed a motion to set a hearing on the ex parte protection order; and he filed a motion

to dismiss, arguing in part that provisions of the ex parte protection order exceeded the

domestic relations court's jurisdiction, but then he purportedly consented to the

jurisdiction of the domestic relations court by entering into the consent agreement, noting

twice on the record his satisfaction with doing so.

 {¶ 29} Pursuant to McCue, Father's assigned error is sustained in part. Because

it is unclear the extent to which the consent agreement infringes on the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court, we will remand for the domestic relations court to clarify the terms of certain

provisions that were "modified" and to determine, with respect to each of the agreement's

terms, whether they infringe upon the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to

parenting issues. In all other respects, the assignment of error is overruled.

 Unreasonable Delay

 {¶ 30} We will next consider Father's first assignment of error, which states:

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE

 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER BECAUSE OF THE

 UNREASONABLE DELAY OF A FULL HEARING PURSUANT TO R.C.

 3113.31.

 {¶ 31} Pointing to R.C. 3113.31(D)(2)(a), Father argues that the court was required

to schedule a full hearing within 10 court days after the ex parte hearing. However,

Father acknowledges the continuances he sought and focuses his argument on the delay
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that occurred "between September 2021 and August 2022." According to Father, neither

Mother nor the court showed good cause "to justify nearly a year of delay before a full

hearing." Father asserts that, at the very least, a full hearing should have been held after

May 20, 2022, when the criminal matter involving N.H. was resolved.

 {¶ 32} Mother responds that "all six of [Father's] attorneys agreed that, in order to

protect [his] right against self-incrimination, the criminal cases should be resolved prior to

a full hearing on the protection order." She argues that Father then "apparently withdrew

his consent" to the continuances, although "the facts of the matter had not changed" and

there would still have been concerns about self-incrimination if he were subject to cross-

examination regarding the facts of a matter for which criminal charges were pending.

 {¶ 33} With respect to the timing of a full hearing, R.C. 3113.31(D)(2)(a) provides:

 If the court, after an ex parte hearing, issues an order described in division

 (E)(1)(b) or (c) of this section, the court shall schedule a full hearing for a

 date that is within seven court days after the ex parte hearing. If any other

 type of protection order that is authorized under division (E) of this section

 is issued by the court after an ex parte hearing, the court shall schedule a

 full hearing for a date that is within ten court days after the ex parte hearing.

 The court shall give the respondent notice of, and an opportunity to be heard

 at, the full hearing. The court shall hold the full hearing on the date

 scheduled under this division unless the court grants a continuance of the

 hearing in accordance with this division. Under any of the following

 circumstances or for any of the following reasons, the court may grant a
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 continuance of the full hearing to a reasonable time determined by the court:

 ***

 (ii) The parties consent to the continuance.

 ***

 (iv) The continuance is needed for other good cause.

 {¶ 34} Further, a "court has supervisory power and control over its docket." State

ex rel. Buck v. McCabe, 140 Ohio St. 535, 537, 45 N.E.2d 763 (1942). Independent of

any statute, as an incident to its authority to hear and determine causes, a court has the

"power to grant continuances. Granting or refusing to grant a motion for continuance

rests within the sound discretion of the court." Id.

 {¶ 35} As noted above, Father specifically limits the issue of delay raised in this

assignment of error to the period between September 2021 and August 2022. During

that time, subpoenas were issued on September 7, 2021, for the full hearing set for

September 16, 2021. On October 29, 2021, Mother sought an extension of the ex parte

order of protection, due to Father's having obtained a continuance of the trial involving

N.H. until February 9, 2022. She noted that the custody litigation in juvenile court had also

been continued until February 2022, at Father's request. The court granted the motion.

 {¶ 36} On May 18, 2022, Father moved the court to set a hearing on the ex parte

protection order, and the court set the hearing for August 26, 2022. On July 11, 2022,

Father filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, unreasonable delay, and lack of

jurisdiction. The court denied the motion on August 5, 2022, ahead of the full hearing

that Father had requested. On August 25, 2022, Father requested another continuance
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due to illness of counsel; the court rescheduled the full hearing for October 27, 2022, and

it occurred on that date.

 {¶ 37} In our view, the delay in scheduling the full hearing for October 27, 2022,

was of Father's own making. Father repeatedly continued his criminal matters and the

litigation in juvenile court, and he filed two motions to dismiss during the period in

question.

 {¶ 38} Father's first assignment of error is overruled.

 Dismissal Related to One of the Children

 {¶ 39} Father's third assignment of error states:

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE

 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER WITH REGARD TO

 THE MINOR CHILD[,] A.H.[,] BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ALLEGATION

 OF DANGER POSED TO HER.

 {¶ 40} Father argument under this assignment of error relies on R.C.

3113.31(D)(1), which provides:

 If a person who files a petition pursuant to this section requests an ex parte

 order, the court shall hold an ex parte hearing on the same day that the

 petition is filed. The court, for good cause shown at the ex parte hearing,

 may enter any temporary orders, * * * that the court finds necessary to

 protect the family or household member * * * from domestic violence.

 Immediate and present danger of domestic violence to the family or

 household member * * * constitutes good cause for purposes of this section.
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 Immediate and present danger includes, but is not limited to, situations in

 which the respondent has threatened the family or household member * * *

 with bodily harm * * *.

Father asserts that, in the absence of any allegation that he had threatened A.H. with

bodily harm or had physically harmed her, there was no evidence that she was in danger

from him and no basis for a protection order.

 {¶ 41} Mother specifically included A.H. in the petition for the protection order.

Mother asserts that A.H. was present and witnessed Father's treatment of N.H.; Mother's

response to Father's motion to dismiss the consent agreement stated that A.H. had

testified in Father's criminal trial regarding her observation of the violence inflicted upon

N.H. The ex parte order and the consent agreement included A.H. Father knew the

terms of the consent agreement when he signed it, including the fact that it included A.H.

in its terms. Father expressed his satisfaction with the consent agreement twice on the

record. For these reasons, Father's argument that the matter should have been

dismissed with respect to A.H. is without merit.

 {¶ 42} Father's third assignment of error is overruled.

 Reunification Counseling as a Material Term of the Consent Agreement

 {¶ 43} Father's fourth assignment of error states:

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SET THE DOMESTIC

 VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER HEARING BECAUSE A

 MATERIAL TERM OF THE PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER WAS

 FRUSTRATED.
 -18-

 {¶ 44} Father asserts that the trial court should have granted his motion for a

hearing on the protection order after the consent agreement was entered because he had

relied on the provision that Dr. Cordell would be the reunification counselor when he

entered into the consent agreement, as evidenced by the fact that the agreement

specifically named her. He argues that, if the parties had intended for the reunification

counselor to be "interchangeable," the agreement would not have identified the counselor

specifically. Mother responds that neither party nor their counsel had actually spoken

with Dr. Cordell on October 27, 2022, to obtain her agreement to reunification counseling;

as such, the use of Dr. Cordell for reunification counseling could not have been a material

term upon which the agreement rested.

 {¶ 45} We agree with the domestic relations court that Father's assertion in his

January 25, 2023 motion that he and Mother had been unable to agree on a reunification

counselor after Cordell declined to serve in that role indicates that "the act of reunification

counseling was the material part of this agreement, not the specific counselor." We

further conclude that Father's argument that the consent agreement should be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction, while also arguing that the domestic relations court erred in failing

to hold a full hearing on the petition for the protection order, fails in its duplicity. Father's

fourth assignment of error is overruled.

 Conclusion

 {¶ 46} Having sustained in part Father's second assignment of error, the domestic

relations court's judgment is reversed in part, and the matter is remanded for clarification

of the provisions of the consent agreement and an examination of whether any of those
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provisions infringe on the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In all other respects, the

judgment of the domestic relations court is affirmed.

 .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.