CourtListener opinion 9898149

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Marriage of
 No. 83845-8-I
 LAURIE JEAN GUDNASON
 DIVISION ONE
 Appellant,
 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 and

 HELGI GUDNASON,

 Respondent.

 BIRK, J. — Laurie Gudnason appeals a superior court order vacating a

qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) which had divided her former spouse

Helgi Gudnason's pension benefits in their dissolution. The superior court ruled

the QDRO did not reflect the intent of the parties' separation contract and decree

of dissolution, vacated it, and entered a new QDRO carrying out the parties'

original intent. We affirm.

 I

 On February 15, 2007, Laurie1 petitioned for dissolution of her marriage with

Helgi. They had been married 24 years.

 A

 In 2008, the parties entered into a separation contract. The parties agreed

they were "desirous of making a full and final settlement, separation, division and

 1 We use the parties' first names for clarity, meaning no disrespect.
 No. 83845-8-I/2

disposition of their marital and property rights and obligations by means of this

document." They agreed the contract embodied "in its entirety the agreements of

the parties concerning the disposition of their property . . . and all other issues

between them." They agreed no modification of the agreement shall be valid

"unless in writing." They agreed "each spouse will execute any deeds, bills of sale,

assignments, promissory notes, transfers or other instruments and documents

necessary to complete and effectively carry out the terms of this agreement."

 Concerning property division, the parties recited they had "acquired the

property set forth in Exhibits A and B hereof." (Emphasis omitted.) The contract

provided, "The property described in Exhibit A shall be the sole and separate

property of the wife. The property set forth in Exhibit B shall be the sole and

separate property of the husband." (Emphasis omitted.) The contract allocated

the marital property to each spouse as their "sole and separate property, free from

any right, claim, title or interest" of the other. The parties warranted to each other

neither had "any right, title or interest in any property of any kind or description

whatsoever, other than as set forth herein." Specific to retirement benefits, the

contract provided, "Both parties warrant that they have no vested or non-vested

interest in any pension plan, retirement plan, profit-sharing plan or any other

employee benefit other than those benefits as set forth herein." (Emphasis added.)

 The contract allocated to Helgi "[a]ll retirement rights" accrued to him

through employment including his Puget Sound Electric Workers' (PSEW)

"pension and retirement benefits" (the Plan), except for a portion of these benefits

 2
 No. 83845-8-I/3

allocated to Laurie. The allocation to Laurie was subject to a calculation approved

in In re Marriage of Bulicek, 59 Wn. App. 630, 632, 639, 800 P.2d 394 (1990). The

formula was as follows:

 ½ x Total months of x Monthly Benefit at
 Service during marriage retirement based on electing a
 Total months of accredited survivor annuity
 Service at retirement date

 The contract stated, "All" rights in the Plan were allocated to Helgi except

those identified as allocated to Laurie, the entirety of Laurie's allocation was

subject to the Bulicek formula, and the contract made no allocation not subject to

the Bulicek formula. Exhibit B, allocating property to Helgi, included that "[t]he date

of separation to be used is 2/15/07." Although exhibit A, allocating property to

Laurie, omitted this specific date, exhibit A, like exhibit B, described the Bulicek

formula by reference to the "[t]otal months of Service during marriage," and both

parties signed the contract in its entirety.2 The provision allocating a portion of

Helgi's retirement benefits to Laurie concludes, "To be divided by QDRO to be

drafted by husband's attorney no later than 30 days after entry of the Decree."

 In the terminology of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

(ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, a "domestic relations order" is "any

judgment, decree, or order that concerns ‘the provision of child support, alimony

payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other

dependent of a participant' and is ‘made pursuant to a State domestic relations law

(including a community property law).' " Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 846, 117

 2 In addition, the 2011 QDRO that Laurie drafted used February 15, 2007,

as the end date for her accrual of benefits under the Bulicek formula.

 3
 No. 83845-8-I/4

S. Ct. 1754, 138 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)). Such

an order is "qualified" if it "meet[s] certain requirements" listed in the statute. Id.

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)-(E)). A state court order that is "qualified" is

exempt from ERISA's provisions guarding against the alienation of benefits and

"creates or recognizes an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate

payee the right to, a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant

under a plan." Id. at 846-47. In Boggs, the court emphasized the surviving spouse

annuity and QDRO provisions strongly implied that other state-law community

property claims are not consistent with ERISA, and for that reason and others held

ERISA preempted a deceased spouse's Louisiana law testamentary bequest of

her interest in a participant's plan benefits. Id. at 844, 848.

 On April 25, 2008, the superior court entered a dissolution decree that

incorporated the separation contract by reference. The decree awarded each

spouse as their separate property the property set forth in the separation contract.

Neither party appealed the decree.

 B

 On May 13, 2008, Helgi's attorney sent a proposed QDRO (2008 QDRO)

to Laurie's attorney. The proposal made Laurie the "Alternate Payee,\ reiterated