CourtListener opinion 9928185

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 BETH E. ANKETELL v. MARTIN KULLDORFF
 (AC 45871)
 Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Sheldon, Js.

 Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis-
 solved, appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment granting the
 plaintiff's postjudgment motion for clarification and for postjudgment
 interest. In accordance with the dissolution judgment, the defendant
 was required to transfer $175,000 from the retirement funds of his choice
 to the plaintiff by way of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).
 In its decision, the trial court indicated that such amount could be
 adjusted to reflect any gains or losses that occurred prior to the judg-
 ment. The defendant appealed from the dissolution judgment, asserting
 claims of error unrelated to the division of his retirement funds. The
 orders of the judgment were stayed during the pending appeal, and,
 consequently, the retirement funds were not transferred. This court
 affirmed the trial court's judgment, and our Supreme Court denied the
 defendant's petition for certification to appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff
 filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court clarify
 whether the $175,000 award of retirement funds was to be adjusted for
 gains and losses prior to the time of transfer and, if it was not, that the
 court award the plaintiff statutory (§ 37-3a) interest. The trial court
 awarded the plaintiff 5 percent annual interest, pursuant to § 37-3a, for
 each of the three full years that the funds were not paid and for ten
 months of the fourth year. The trial court indicated that the accrual of
 interest would cease as of the issuance of its order and would begin to
 accrue again only if there was a delay beyond that which was necessary
 to prepare the QDROs. In his appeal, the defendant did not challenge
 the court's award of interest for the three year period during which his
 appeal from the dissolution judgment was pending but only claimed,
 inter alia, that the trial court improperly awarded interest for the ten
 month period of the fourth year. Held that the trial court's award of
 postjudgment interest to the plaintiff for the ten month period was not
 improper: contrary to the defendant's claim that the trial court abused
 its discretion in awarding the plaintiff postjudgment interest for the
 unpaid months of the fourth year because, during that time, the plaintiff
 and her counsel were responsible for the delay in the transfer of the
 funds, the trial court properly found that the defendant had wrongfully
 withheld the $175,000, as the parties disagreed as to whether the award
 was subject to adjustment for gains or losses, and the defendant did
 not claim, at any point during the hearing on the plaintiff's motion or
 during the additional time provided by the trial court thereafter for the
 defendant to respond to the plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest,
 that the plaintiff had prevented the execution of the QDROs nor did he
 seek to present any evidence contradicting the statement of the plaintiff's
 counsel that the QDRO company would not proceed with the transfer;
 moreover, the defendant conceded that, in arguing his appeal, he was
 relying on evidence that was not presented at the hearing on the plain-
 tiff's motion, and this court declined to conclude, on the basis of evidence
 not presented to the trial court, that the plaintiff had refused to accept
 the retirement funds and that, as a result, the trial court had abused its
 discretion in awarding postjudgment interest; furthermore, the trial court
 reasonably concluded that it would not be an abuse of its discretion to
 compensate the plaintiff for the inequity of being deprived of the $175,000
 award for an extended period, which included the period that encom-
 passed the wrongful detention of the funds that continued until the
 court issued its decision on the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for
 clarification and interest, as such reasoning was consistent with the
 statutory purpose of postjudgment interest; additionally, contrary to the
 defendant's claim, the trial court did not award the plaintiff interest for
 any period after the issuance of the trial court's order, but, rather,
 ordered that interest would accrue again only if there was an unneces-
 sary delay in the execution of the QDROs, which it had the authority
 to do.
 Argued October 12, 2023—officially released January 16, 2024

 Procedural History

 Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Windham and tried to the court, Green, J.; judg-
ment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other
relief, from which the defendant appealed to this court,
Alvord, Prescott and Lavine, Js., which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court; thereafter, our Supreme
Court denied the defendant's petition for certification
to appeal; subsequently, the court, Green, J., granted
the plaintiff's motion for clarification and request for
postjudgment interest, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
 Martin Kulldorff, self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
 Scott T. Garosshen, with whom was Linda L. Mor-
kan, for the appellee (plaintiff).
 Opinion

 BRIGHT, C. J. In this postjudgment marital dissolu-
tion matter, the self-represented defendant, Martin Kull-
dorff, appeals from the judgment of the trial court award-
ing the plaintiff, Beth E. Anketell, postjudgment interest
pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in
awarding the plaintiff postjudgment interest for certain
time periods. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. The parties married in 2011, and the
plaintiff initiated the dissolution action in 2016. After
a two day court trial in September, 2018, the court,
Green, J., rendered judgment dissolving the parties'
marriage on December 3, 2018. The court ordered, inter
alia, that the ‘‘[d]efendant shall transfer $175,000 to the
plaintiff from retirement funds/accounts of his choice
by way of a qualified domestic relations order
[(QDRO)]. . . . This figure may be adjusted to reflect
any gains or losses that have occurred prior to the
judgment.'' The defendant appealed and asserted claims
of error unrelated to the division of his retirement
funds.1 This court affirmed the judgment; Anketell v.
Kulldorff, 207 Conn. App. 807, 810, 263 A.3d 972, cert.
denied, 340 Conn. 905, 263 A.3d 821 (2021); and our
Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certi-
fication to appeal on November 30, 2021. Anketell v.
Kulldorff, 340 Conn. 905, 263 A.3d 821 (2021).
 On January 7, 2022, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment
motion to implement court orders. In that motion, the
plaintiff stated that the parties disagreed as to how to
implement the court's orders regarding counsel fees.2
The plaintiff's counsel, Attorney Carol A. Brigham, also
filed a motion for advice for communicating directly
with the defendant, who had filed a self-represented
appearance ‘‘ ‘in addition to' '' his attorney's appear-
ance. At a February 14, 2022 hearing on those motions,
Brigham informed the court that the communication
issue had been resolved, and she also addressed the
division of the defendant's retirement funds. Brigham
explained: ‘‘I believe [the defendant] has submitted the
original paperwork. I believe [the plaintiff] has provided
her Social Security number, and I believe both parties
need to fund . . . the [QDRO] service, and [they] need
to provide any other information that the company
would need. So, I think at this point we just want to
ensure that both parties fund this . . . immediately,
actually. I think my client believes they both owe $975,
and I'm sure the service will not undertake the prepara-
tion until the payment is made. So, I would suggest they
both pay within a week.''
 In response, the defendant stated: ‘‘So, this was
delayed because of the communication issues between
me and . . . Brigham as soon as it was agreed to use
 this . . . service. I was the one who filled in all the
information that they needed, except I didn't remember
[the plaintiff's] Social Security number, so they were
requesting to get that Social Security number, but I'm
. . . glad that she has provided [it] at this time. They
haven't sent a bill yet. As soon as they send a bill, I
will pay my part of it. There's one issue . . . I thought
they were charging per company, but they [are] actually
charging per retirement account, and my retirement is
split into more than half a dozen different accounts, so
I specified three accounts, but I think they are going
to—I'm going to revise that. I'll send them an email
later today. So there [are] only two accounts. . . . I
don't have enough money in one account. I can't do
one account, so I have to do two. But that will save
both me and [the plaintiff] $325 each. So, I'm going to
make that change to save a little bit of money for both
of us.''
 On March 14, 2022, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment
motion requesting that the court clarify whether the
$175,000 award ‘‘was to be adjusted for gains and losses
until the time of transfer'' and that the court ‘‘award
the plaintiff statutory interest from December 3, 2018,
to the present if the QDRO allocation is not adjusted
for gains and losses . . . .'' The defendant filed a
response to that motion on June 7, 2022, stating that
he had ‘‘done all the required paperwork and paid the
fee. The transfer can proceed as soon as [the plaintiff]
and her attorney give the green light. . . . My under-
standing is that statutory interest is a concept used for
delinquent debts. I am not and have not been delinquent.
The retirement transfer was put on hold during the
appeal process, governed by judicial rules beyond my
control. Subsequent delays were due to (i) . . . [the]
unwillingness [of the plaintiff's counsel] to directly com-
municate with me as a [self-represented] party, increas-
ing the time it took to agree on a company to execute
the QDRO, and (ii) this subsequent court motion, which
has stalled the transfer process. . . .
 ‘‘Brigham said that there [is] a Connecticut statute
in support of her claim for statutory interest. . . . If
she had sent me a copy of such a statute, and it says
what she claims, I would have paid the required amount
upon reading it. Since she did not send me a copy, I
do not know if it exists or if she was bluffing to intimi-
date me and/or impress the judge.
 ‘‘[Brigham] is asking for statutory interest not only for
the Appellate Court period, but also for the subsequent
delays caused by her. During [that] delay . . . the stock
market has gone down, and the unnecessary . . . delay
in the retirement transfer has therefore caused a finan-
cial loss to me and my children. If there is to be an
adjustment, the natural thing would be for me to be
compensated for that unnecessary loss . . . .''
 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the plain-
 tiff's motion for clarification on June 8, 2022, and Attor-
ney Kenneth Caisse appeared on behalf of the plaintiff.
Both parties were placed under oath at the beginning
of the hearing. Caisse explained that the transfer from
the defendant's retirement accounts had not occurred
because the company that the parties hired to process
the QDROs ‘‘would not proceed until there was a resolu-
tion of this interest [issue] so that they could have a
proper amount, or calculation, to be able to make the
transfers. So, they're waiting on a resolution of this
particular motion. I would report to the court that at this
point what we're primarily requesting is the statutory
interest, which is 10 percent, which the court has
authority to do pursuant to [§] 37-3a . . . .'' Shortly
thereafter, the following exchange occurred between
the court and the defendant:
 ‘‘The Court: . . . [D]o you want to be heard before
Attorney Caisse argues?
 ‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, please. First of all, I submitted
a response to the motions. I don't know if Your Honor
has read that.
 ‘‘The Court: I did read that.
 ‘‘[The Defendant]: Thank you. I also would like to,
just for the record, since I'm now under oath, to just
state that all those things are truthful, and that—so I
want to do that under oath. So, I've been doing that
here by doing that. I would also like to have a copy of
the Connecticut statute. I know that Attorney Brigham
mentioned that in March I think. And I don't know why
I haven't received . . . a copy of [it]. I know you men-
tioned the number, but I didn't . . . have time to write
down the number.''
 After the defendant submitted a copy of an email that
he had sent to Caisse explaining why he was unable to
prepare a financial affidavit, he explained that he would
need more time to go through his retirement account
records. At that point, the court asked Caisse: ‘‘[I]f I
grant . . . [the plaintiff's] request for the statutory
interest then that would obviate the need for [the defen-
dant] to provide those documents. That would solve the
problem, would it not?'' Caisse responded affirmatively,
and the court proceeded to hear argument on the plain-
tiff's request for statutory interest.
 Caisse argued that ‘‘the court intended that [the plain-
tiff] be able . . . to do what she wants with [the retire-
ment funds as] of December, 2018.
 ***
 ‘‘If she had, she could have invested—maybe she gets
. . . 15 percent during this period of time . . . . Or
she could have used it for whatever other reason she
had. . . . But she hasn't been able to do that.'' Caisse
also provided the court and the defendant with copies
of the cases he cited in support of an award of postjudg-
 ment interest pursuant to § 37-3a.
 After hearing from the parties as to other issues unre-
lated to the present appeal, the court noted that it would
issue a ruling clarifying its decision and addressing the
plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest. At that
point, the defendant stated: ‘‘So, I have no opportunity
to read the [cases] provided and the Connecticut stat-
ute, I guess?'' The court responded, ‘‘I'm not ruling
[now], so anything that you want to submit between
now and the ruling is fine.''3
 On June 13, 2022, the defendant filed another
response to the plaintiff's motion for clarification, in
which he argued that ‘‘[t]he retirement transfer did not
become payable until after the appeal was denied on
November 30, 2021. I have submitted all the paperwork
required for the transfer. Delays in 2022 are due to the
plaintiff and her previous attorney, as explained in [his
June 7, 2022 response to the plaintiff's motion for clarifi-
cation].'' After addressing the case law cited by Caisse
at the June 8, 2022 hearing, the defendant noted that
Caisse had ‘‘argued for statutory interest based on an
increase in [the defendant's] retirement savings from
2018 to 2021. Much of this increase was due to contribu-
tions that I made to my retirement accounts after the
divorce was finalized.'' The defendant did not submit
any documents in support of his claims in that response.
 On September 27, 2022, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision granting the plaintiff's motion for clari-
fication and request for postjudgment interest. In that
decision, the court explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough the
adjustment based on gains and losses was stated to
be permissive, the period contemplated by the court
included only the time between the conclusion of the
September, 2018 trial and the December, 2018 issuance
of its final orders. The orders of the judgment were
stayed because of the then pending appeal and the funds
were not and have not been transferred now that . . .
the court's judgment [has] been affirmed in its entirety.
The plaintiff argues that application of § 37-3a (a) would
be an appropriate means of addressing the protracted
delay in transferring the funds. The defendant disagrees,
[arguing] that the funds were not wrongfully withheld
and that any gains or losses could be ascertained to
arrive at a figure. It is undisputed that no funds have
been transferred by QDRO.
 ***
 ‘‘The defendant . . . withheld the transfer of funds
awarded to the plaintiff . . . on the basis of a good
faith belief that he was legally entitled to retain the
funds while filing various appeals from the judgment.
The defendant's appeal of the judgment effectively
served to stay the transfer of the funds and deprived
the plaintiff of her use of the funds for forty-five months.
 ‘‘Pursuant to § 37-3a, the court has the discretion to
 fashion an equitable and appropriate remedy and may
award postjudgment interest to the plaintiff. . . . In
the present action, the remedy of postjudgment interest
in accordance with § 37-3a would serve to compensate
the plaintiff for the detention of $175,000, which was
payable on December 3, 2018, the date that the court
dissolved the marriage of the parties. Considering the
protracted history of this case, it would not be an abuse
of discretion for the court to compensate the plaintiff
for the inequity of having been deprived of the funds
during this extended period of time. . . .
 ‘‘The court determines that it may award the plaintiff
no more than 10 percent interest, annually, beginning
from December 3, 2018, through the date that the court
issues its decision on the plaintiff's motion for clarifica-
tion and request for statutory interest.
 ***
 ‘‘As of the issuance of these orders, the court finds
that the defendant has wrongfully withheld the $175,000
due and payable by QDRO to the plaintiff for a period
of forty-six months. Accordingly, the court will award
[5 percent] statutory, annual interest to the plaintiff
pursuant to § 37-3a (a). This will occasion an additional
payment of $8750 for each of the three full years that
the funds were not paid and an additional $6800 for the
unpaid months of the fourth year. The total additional
amount is $33,050. The accrual of interest will cease as
of the issuance of this order. . . .
 ‘‘The defendant is to transfer $175,000 to the plaintiff
within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order
and the additional $33,050 is to be transferred within
thirty (30) days. If there is delay beyond that which is
necessary to prepare the QDROs, interest will again
begin to accrue on the 31st day beyond the issuance
of these orders to terminate only upon the execution of
the QDROs.'' (Citations omitted.) This appeal followed.4
 On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the
court's award of $26,250 in postjudgment interest for
the three years during which his appeal from the disso-
lution judgment remained pending. Instead, he claims
that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff interest
for the period thereafter. Specifically, he claims that the
court improperly awarded (1) $6800 in postjudgment
interest for the ten month period from December, 2021,
to September, 2022, and (2) 5 percent interest after
October, 2022.5
 We begin our analysis with the applicable standard
of review and relevant legal principles regarding awards
of interest pursuant to § 37-3a. ‘‘A decision to [award]
postjudgment interest is primarily an equitable determi-
nation and a matter lying within the discretion of the
trial court. . . . Under the abuse of discretion standard
of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption
in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only
 upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus,
our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions
of whether the trial court properly applied the law and
reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it
did.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Customers Bank v. Tomonto Industries, LLC, 156
Conn. App. 441, 452, 112 A.3d 853 (2015); see also Tilsen
v. Benson, 347 Conn. 758, 796, 299 A.3d 1096 (2023)
(‘‘[a]n appellate court will not disturb a trial court's
orders in domestic relations cases unless the court . . .
could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the
facts presented'' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
 Pursuant to statute, ‘‘interest at the rate of ten per
cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed
in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of
money after it becomes payable.'' General Statutes § 37-
3a (a). ‘‘ ‘Although § 37-3a does not use the word
‘‘wrongful'' to describe a compensable detention of
money under the statute, [our Supreme Court] has long
employed that term to describe such a detention. . . .
[The] earliest cases interpreting § 37-3a reveal that the
term ‘‘wrongful'' invariably was used interchangeably
with ‘‘unlawful'' to describe the narrow category of
claims for which prejudgment interest was allowed
under the statute, namely, claims to recover money that
remained unpaid after it was due and payable. . . .
Consistent with this precedent, [our Supreme Court]
. . . clarified that, under § 37-3a, proof of wrongfulness
is not required ‘‘above and beyond proof of the underly-
ing legal claim.'' . . . In other words, the wrongful
detention standard of § 37-3a is satisfied by proof of
the underlying legal claim, a requirement that is met
once the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor on
that claim.' '' Paniccia v. Success Village Apartments,
Inc., 215 Conn. App. 705, 731, 284 A.3d 341 (2022); see
also Marulli v. Wood Frame Construction Co., LLC,
154 Conn. App. 196, 206, 107 A.3d 442 (2014), cert.
denied, 315 Conn. 928, 109 A.3d 923 (2015).
 ‘‘The trial court's discretion in awarding interest is
quite broad, and the court may consider whatever fac-
tors may be relevant to its determination.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Salce v. Wolczek, 314 Conn.
675, 696–97, 104 A.3d 694 (2014). ‘‘A court's discretion
must be informed by the policies that the relevant stat-
ute is intended to advance. . . . [T]he policy behind
[§ 37-3a] is to compensate the successful party for the
loss of the use of the money that he or she is awarded
from the time of the award until the award is paid in
full.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marulli v.
Wood Frame Construction Co., LLC, supra, 154 Conn.
App. 207.
 The defendant first claims that the court improperly
awarded the plaintiff $6800 in postjudgment interest
because ‘‘[i]t was the plaintiff and [her] attorneys who
did not do what was necessary for her to receive those
 funds.'' We are not persuaded.
 As previously noted in this opinion, in his response
to the plaintiff's motion for clarification and request for
statutory interest, the defendant argued that the delays
beginning in 2022 ‘‘were due to (i) . . . [the] unwilling-
ness [of the plaintiff's counsel] to directly communicate
with me as a [self-represented] party, increasing the
time it took to agree on a company to execute the
QDRO, and (ii) this subsequent court motion, which
has stalled the transfer process. . . . If [the plaintiff's
counsel] had sent me a copy of [§ 37-3a], and it says
what she claims, I would have paid the required
amount upon reading it. Since she did not send me a
copy, I do not know if it exists or if she was bluffing
to intimidate me . . . . [The plaintiff's counsel] is ask-
ing for statutory interest not only for the Appellate
Court period, but also for the subsequent delays caused
by her.'' (Emphasis added.)
 On appeal, however, the defendant argues that,
although ‘‘there was a disagreement about the plaintiff's
request for 10 percent in statutory interest, there was
no reason to hold up the transfer of the $175,000, about
which there was no disagreement. At the hearing, the
plaintiff's attorney stated that the QDRO company
‘would not proceed until there was a resolution of this
interest,' but they would have moved ahead with the
$175,000 transfer if both parties agreed and paid the
fee.'' (Emphasis in original.)
 Initially, we note that, although the defendant claims
on appeal that there was ‘‘no reason to hold up the
transfer of the $175,000,'' the plaintiff's motion for clari-
fication indicated that the parties, in fact, disagreed as
to whether that amount was subject to adjustment for
gains or losses. More importantly, during the June 8,
2022 evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff's motion for
clarification, when the defendant had an opportunity to
address the trial court immediately after the plaintiff's
counsel stated that the QDRO company ‘‘would not
proceed'' with the transfer, he neither claimed that the
plaintiff had prevented the execution of the QDROs
nor sought to present any evidence contradicting the
statement of the plaintiff's counsel. In fact, despite
being provided with additional time after that hearing
to respond to the plaintiff's request for postjudgment
interest, the defendant again neither addressed coun-
sel's explanation as to why the transfer had not
occurred nor sought to present evidence to support his
claim that the plaintiff was responsible for the delay
after November 30, 2021. After forgoing those opportu-
nities to present evidence in support of his claim, the
defendant now attempts to do so on appeal.
 In the appendix to his appellant's brief, the defendant
includes documents that were not presented to the trial
court. Specifically, he includes copies of emails
exchanged among the parties, the plaintiff's counsel,
 and the company that the parties hired to execute the
QDROs.6 The defendant concedes that he is relying on
evidence that was not presented at the June 8, 2022
hearing ‘‘with respect to evidence that the plaintiff and
[her] attorneys are responsible for the delay after
December, 2021,'' but contends that, ‘‘[i]f an attorney
is dishonest, courts should allow subsequent evidence
about that.'' In other words, the defendant asks this
court to conclude, on the basis of evidence not pre-
sented to the trial court, that the plaintiff ‘‘refused to
accept the funds'' and, therefore, that the court abused
its broad discretion in awarding postjudgment interest
pursuant to § 37-3a. We decline to do so.
 This court cannot find facts and, therefore, ‘‘we can-
not consider evidence not available to the trial court
to find adjudicative facts for the first time on appeal.''
State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465, 478, 102 A.3d 52 (2014);
see also Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370, 385, 107 A.3d
920 (2015) (‘‘[a]n appellate court cannot find facts or
draw conclusions from primary facts found, but may
only review such findings to see whether they might
be legally, logically and reasonably found'' (emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord-
ingly, because the documents on which the defendant
relies were not before the trial court, we will not con-
sider them on appeal. See, e.g., Rainbow Housing Corp.
v. Cromwell, 340 Conn. 501, 523 n.12, 264 A.3d 532
(2021) (‘‘[t]his evidence was not presented to the trial
court and cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal''); Cunningham v. Planning & Zoning Commis-
sion, 90 Conn. App. 273, 278–79, 876 A.2d 1257 (granting
motion to strike references in party's brief to conserva-
tion plan ‘‘[b]ecause the conservation plan was not in
evidence before the trial court when it rendered its
judgment''), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 915, 888 A.2d 83
(2005); DiBello v. Barnes Page Wire Products, Inc., 67
Conn. App. 361, 374–75, 786 A.2d 1234 (2001)
(‘‘[b]ecause the defendant's claim is predicated entirely
on a document extraneous to the record, we cannot
consider it''), cert. granted, 260 Conn. 915, 796 A.2d 560
(2002) (appeal withdrawn June 26, 2002).
 Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we con-
clude that the court correctly applied the law and rea-
sonably concluded as it did. The court properly found
that the defendant wrongfully withheld the $175,000
beginning on December 3, 2018, and that the wrongful
detention continued until the court issued its decision
in September, 2022. The court reasoned that, ‘‘[c]onsid-
ering the protracted history of this case, it would not
be an abuse of discretion for the court to compensate
the plaintiff for the inequity of having been deprived of
the funds during this extended period of time.'' Such
reasoning is consistent with the statutory purpose of
postjudgment interest, which ‘‘is not to punish defen-
dants but, rather, to compensate plaintiffs for the loss
of the use of their money, after the fact finder has
 determined that the money is due and owing, during
the pendency of any appeals.'' DiLieto v. County Obstet-
rics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 60 n.18,
74 A.3d 1212 (2013).
 To be sure, the court could have declined to award
the plaintiff interest if it found that the plaintiff refused
to accept the $175,000 at some earlier date. See, e.g.,
Gebbie v. Cadle Co., 49 Conn. App. 265, 277–78, 714 A.2d
678 (1998) (holding that trial court properly declined to
award defendant interest on payments due from earlier
date given ‘‘the pivotal fact that the defendant refused
to accept [those] payments''). The defendant, however,
provided no basis for the court to make such a finding
and, instead, argued that the plaintiff and her attorneys
caused the delay by filing the postjudgment motion for
clarification and request for statutory interest. Given
the defendant's arguments before the trial court, and
considering the evidence in the record, we cannot con-
clude that the court abused its discretion in finding that
the wrongful detention continued until the court issued
its decision on the plaintiff's postjudgment motion. See,
e.g., Bruno v. Bruno, 177 Conn. App. 599, 613, 176 A.3d
104 (2017) (‘‘[a]lthough an earlier date may have been
within the court's discretion, we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion'').
 Finally, the defendant claims that the court improp-
erly ordered that, ‘‘[i]f there is delay beyond that which
is necessary to prepare the QDROs, interest will again
begin to accrue on the 31st day beyond the issuance
of these orders to terminate only upon the execution
of the QDROs.'' In his principal brief on appeal, the
defendant outlines the events that transpired in the
months after the court's September 27, 2022 decision
and argues that he is not responsible for the ensuing
delay in executing the QDROs. According to the defen-
dant, the court awarded the ‘‘plaintiff statutory interest
into the future without knowing whether the plaintiff
or the defendant might be responsible for future
delays.'' We disagree.
 The court did not award the plaintiff interest for any
time after September, 2022. Instead, the court ordered
that ‘‘[t]he accrual of interest will cease as of the issu-
ance of this order'' and that 5 percent interest would
accrue again if there was any unnecessary delay in the
execution of the QDROs. There is no question that the
court has the authority to issue such an order to com-
pensate the plaintiff for any unnecessary delay in satis-
fying the judgment. Nevertheless, as the plaintiff's coun-
sel conceded during oral argument before this court,
that order is not self-executing, and the trial court would
need to make a finding that the defendant was responsi-
ble for the unnecessary delay in executing the QDROs.
At this point, however, the court has not been asked
to make that determination, and the defendant has not
been ordered to pay interest for any period after the
 court's September, 2022 decision.7 Accordingly, we
reject the defendant's claim.
 The judgment is affirmed.
 In this opinion the other judges concurred.
 1
 Specifically, the defendant claimed ‘‘that the trial court (1) erred by
failing to identify the presumptive child support obligation under the child
support guidelines . . . before entering a support order based on a devia-
tion, (2) erred in calculating the parties' incomes, (3) erred in awarding the
plaintiff a lump sum property settlement, (4) abused its discretion in award-
ing appellate attorney's fees to the plaintiff, and (5) abused its discretion
in entering its custodial orders.'' Anketell v. Kulldorff, 207 Conn. App. 807,
810, 263 A.3d 972, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 905, 263 A.3d 821 (2021).
 2
 In October, 2021, the trial court granted the plaintiff's postjudgment
motion for attorney's fees. Although the defendant appealed from that judg-
ment, he withdrew his appeal on December 13, 2021.
 3
 Although Caisse urged the court ‘‘not to accept any further writings from
[the defendant] regarding [the postjudgment interest] issue,'' the court did
not alter its instruction to the defendant.
 4
 While this appeal was pending, the parties executed two QDROs
assigning the plaintiff $208,050 from two of the defendant's retirement
accounts: $52,600 from one account and $155,450 from a second account.
The first was signed by the parties in January, 2023, and the second was
signed by the defendant in May, 2023, and by the plaintiff in June, 2023.
After a hearing on August 31, 2023, the court, Chadwick, J., signed both
QDROs on September 1, 2023.
 5
 The defendant also asserts that (1) Caisse ‘‘lied in court'' regarding the
growth rate of the defendant's retirement accounts in arguing for 10 percent
statutory interest and (2) ‘‘there has been a pattern of false accusations and
perjury . . . .'' (Citation omitted.) Neither claim warrants much discussion.
 First, any claim predicated on the actual growth rate of the retirement
accounts necessarily fails given that the court awarded the plaintiff interest
pursuant to § 37-3a. Indeed, the court expressly stated that granting the
plaintiff's request for statutory interest ‘‘would obviate the need for [the
defendant] to provide'' records of his retirement accounts. Second, the
alleged ‘‘pattern of false accusations and perjury'' is unrelated to the issue of
postjudgment interest. The defendant identifies three incidents that occurred
more than three years before the June 8, 2022 hearing on the plaintiff's
motion for clarification. Each incident involved child support payments,
which are not at issue in this appeal. Insofar as the defendant suggests
that those incidents provide a basis for reversing the court's award of
postjudgment interest, we are not persuaded. Accordingly, we limit our
discussion to the defendant's primary claims challenging the only judgment
from which the defendant has appealed.
 6
 Some of the emails were exchanged before the June 8, 2022 hearing,
but many of them were not exchanged until after the court issued its memo-
randum of decision in September, 2022.
 7
 Of course, if the court orders the defendant to pay interest for that
period, the defendant may appeal from the judgment awarding the plaintiff
additional interest.