CourtListener opinion 4570686

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MEMORANDUM DECISION
 Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
 this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
 regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 29 2020, 8:53 am
 court except for the purpose of establishing
 CLERK
 the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
 Court of Appeals
 estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
 Denise F. Hayden Janet L. Manship
 Lacy Law Office, LLC Pritzke & Davis, LLP
 Indianapolis, Indiana Greenfield, Indiana

 IN THE
 COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

 Tammy J. Page, September 29, 2020
 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
 20A-DR-317
 v. Appeal from the Hamilton
 Superior Court
 Darren Page, The Honorable David K. Najjar,
 Appellee-Respondent. Judge
 Trial Court Cause No.
 29D05-1609-DR-8452

 Najam, Judge.

 Statement of the Case
[1] Tammy J. Page ("Wife") appeals and Darren Page ("Husband") cross-appeals

 the trial court's dissolution of their marriage. Together, they raise nine issues

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DR-317 | September 29, 2020 Page 1 of 16
 for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in

 its decree of dissolution. We affirm in all respects except that we reverse and

 remand with instructions for the court to correct the decree with respect to

 which party shall claim the Child as a dependent in which tax years.

 Facts and Procedural History
[2] Husband and Wife were married in October of 2014, and had one child of the

 marriage, L.P. ("the Child"). In September of 2016, less than two years after

 their marriage, Wife filed her petition for dissolution. Following a multi-day

 final hearing, the trial court entered its decree of dissolution of the parties'

 marriage in December of 2019.

[3] In its decree, the court entered detailed findings and conclusions in relevant part

 as follows:

 5. Both parties are fit to be parents and can properly care for
 the [C]hild. Both parents clearly love the [C]hild.

 6. [Wife] is seeking primary physical custody of the [C]hild.
 [Husband] is seeking equal parenting time.

 7. A custody evaluation prepared by Randall Krupsaw,
 Ph.D. recommended [Wife] to have primary physical custody of
 the child until the child reached the age of 5, then to increase
 [Husband's] parenting time up to approximately 50%. Dr.
 Krupsaw also recommended the parties share joint legal custody
 of the child.

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 8. Dr. Krupsaw also recommended the appointment of a
 parenting coordinator to assist the parties in implementing
 parenting time, communication, and other parenting matters,
 and for the parties to engage in counseling to improve their
 parenting and coparenting skills.

 9. The Court finds Dr. Krupsaw's evaluation and
 recommendations to be thorough and well taken. The Court also
 notes that Dr. Krupsaw's evaluation process took place over
 several months at the beginning of this case, culminating in his
 submission of the report to the Court in December of 2017. The
 Court notes that much activity has taken place in this case since
 then and that activity, and the aging of this case in general, has
 not always reflected positively on either party. This additional
 evidence, presented at the four days of the Final Hearing, have
 caused the Court to conclude that deviation from some of Dr.
 Krupsaw's recommendations is appropriate.

 10. [Wife] presented the testimony and written report of Sarah
 Szerlong, Ph.D. as a rebuttal of Dr. Krupsaw's report. While the
 Court finds Dr. Szerlong's report and testimony note valid
 criticisms of Dr. Krupsaw's methods and findings, the Court does
 not find that these criticisms make much impact on Dr.
 Krupsaw's overall conclusions and recommendations.
 Furthermore, Dr. Szerlong's testimony and report do not sway
 the Court much at all in its determination of the best interests of
 the [C]hild with respect to custody and parenting time.

 11. [Wife] has testified and presented evidence to support her
 contentions that [Husband] poses a threat to the [C]hild and that
 his parenting time should be limited, or at least that he should
 not have more than the minimum parenting time afforded by the
 Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. The Court cannot find that
 the evidence, taken as a whole, supports this contention. [Wife]
 has made much of a situation which resulted in [Husband]
 hitting his older son with a skateboard. [Husband] does not deny
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 that this happened, but all the evidence suggests it was an
 unintentional act which did not affect the [C]hild of this marriage
 and is not part of a larger pattern of violence or harsh discipline.

 12. [Wife's] evidence and testimony regarding the dangers
 [Husband] may pose to the health and safety of the [C]hild are
 not supported by anything other than her own words. [Wife's]
 concerns that [Husband] will remove the [C]hild from the
 country and deprive her of contact with the [C]hild are
 unsupported by any evidence presented to the Court. [Wife] has
 restricted [Husband's] phone access with the [C]hild, his access
 to the [C]hild while the [C]hild is at preschool, and his ability to
 travel with the [C]hild. She has testified that additional
 counseling will not shake her belief that he is a danger to the
 [C]hild. Her belief is her reality, but the Court does not find that
 belief to be supported by anything else in the record. The Court
 cannot find that [Husband] is a danger to the [C]hild. The Court
 cannot find that [Husband's] time with the [C]hild should be
 restricted. Furthermore, the Court finds that [Wife's] belief about
 the threat [Husband] poses is an enormous obstacle to the parties'
 ability to co-parent the [C]hild.

 13. The Court finds that it is in the best interests of the [C]hild
 to spend as much time as possible with both parties. To that end,
 the Court will order the parties to share physical custody of the
 [C]hild equally.

 14. The parties shall implement a 2-2-3 schedule . . . with
 [Wife] having the first two days of that week and alternating
 thereafter.

 ***

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 21. With respect to legal custody, the Court finds it is in the
 best interests of the [C]hild that [Husband] have sole legal
 custody.

 22. The Court finds that the parties have deep communication
 issues and that a situation involving the parties communicating
 with one another often over parenting decisions would not be in
 the best interests of the [C]hild at this time. The Court expresses
 hope that improved communication between the parties over
 time, perhaps working with parenting coordinators or counselors,
 may allow the parties to communicate with one another to a
 degree where joint legal custody is possible.

 23. As perhaps the prime example of the inability of the
 parties to jointly make decisions, and why the Court is awarding
 sole legal custody to [Husband], the Court would point to a
 situation which occurred over a blanket the [C]hild had left with
 [Wife] during [Husband's] parenting time. Once brought to his
 attention, [Husband] proposed a simple solution almost
 immediately. [Wife], however, continued the conversation over
 texts for multiple hours, raising irrelevant topics and elevating the
 tone and hostility of a conversation that started off very simply
 and matter of fact. Furthermore, [Wife] presented this text
 conversation as an exhibit to attempt to demonstrate her
 willingness to communicate and solve problems. The Court
 finds, however, that [Wife's] communication style created more
 problems that it solved in that conversation, that she failed to
 recognize the very simple solution proposed immediately by
 [Husband], and that upon reflection she still fails to recognize the
 conversation actually reflects very poor communication and co-
 parenting skills on her part.

 24. The Court will adopt Dr. Krupsaw's further
 recommendations for a parenting coordinator and counseling for
 the parties to improve their co-parenting skills. [Husband], in
 exercising sole legal custody, will still be required to
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 communicate with [Wife], to inform her of decisions he has
 made and important events happening in the [C]hild's life. A
 parenting coordinator and counseling can help both parties
 improve their communication skills and their ability to co-parent
 the [C]hild.

 ***

 27. In exercising sole legal custody, [Husband] shall make
 decisions for the [C]hild on important matters concerning the
 [C]hild's health, education, and religious upbringing. Each party
 shall make day to day decisions for the care of the [C]hild while
 the [C]hild is in their care. [Husband] should discuss the
 important decisions with [Wife] to seek her input prior to making
 a decision, but the decision will be his alone. Additionally, both
 parties should have free and unfettered access to information
 from the [C]hild's school and medical providers and should
 communicate directly with the school or medical provider. Both
 parties may attend any and all school events open to parents and
 may attend any and all doctor visits or other medical or health
 care appointments.

 ***

 29. Both parties are employed. [Wife] works for J.C. Hart and
 is paid a salary as well as commissions and/or bonuses.
 Although her commissions and bonuses are not guaranteed, she
 has always received them and has no expectation that she will
 not receive them in the future. Additionally, she receives a
 reduction in her housing expenses of approximately 25% through
 her employment. [Husband] works for Equian and is paid a
 salary.

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 30. The Court finds that [Wife's] commissions and bonuses, as
 well as the direct benefit she receives for her housing, should be
 included as her income for child support purposes.

 31. The Court finds [Wife's] weekly gross income for child
 support purposes is $1,531.19 per week. [Husband's] gross
 income for child support purposes is $3,313.77 per week.

 32. [Wife] shall pay for work related childcare for the [C]hild
 and shall receive the credit for such expense on the child support
 worksheet. Currently that expense is $227.50 per week.

 33. [Husband] shall provide health insurance coverage for the
 [C]hild and shall receive the credit on the child support
 worksheet.

 34. [Husband] shall be considered the custodial parent for
 child support purposes and shall provide the controlled expenses
 for the [C]hild, as those are generally defined in the Indiana
 Child Support Guidelines.

 35. Pursuant to the child support worksheet attached,
 [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] the sum of $218.00 per week for
 the support of the [C]hild. . . .

 ***

 37. The parties shall split the tax exemption and other tax
 benefits attributable to the [C]hild, with [Wife] claiming the
 [C]hild in 2019 and odd numbered years thereafter and
 [Husband] claiming the [C]hild in 2020 and even numbered years
 thereafter. . . .

 ***
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 40. The Court declines to retroactively modify child support in
 this matter, in light of the totality of the evidence received by the
 Court.

 41. The Court does not find that [Husband] is in arrears on his
 prior child support obligation. He was ordered, in the
 Preliminary Order, to pay $342.00 per week for the support of the
 [C]hild. Through and including September 13, 2019, his
 obligation totaled $30,438.00. The evidence is that he paid
 $31,044.00 in direct support payments . . . . Therefore, the Court
 does not find that an arrearage exists . . . .

 42. The parties stipulated to the value of a number of items of
 property and evidence was presented with respect to the value of
 certain disputed items. The Court finds, generally, that the
 presumption of an equal split of the marital estate has not been
 overcome.

 43. With respect to the stipulated values of items of property,
 the Court will accept those stipulations. With respect to the
 disputed values of property, the Court finds that the values set
 forth [i]n [Husband's] exhibit DD shall be accepted as the value
 of the property at the time [Wife] filed for divorce.

 44. [Husband] has argued that he be awarded a share of the
 marital estate greater than 50%. [Husband] cites the short
 duration of the marriage and the fact that most of the marital
 estate was acquired prior to the marriage. [Wife] has requested
 an equal division of the marital estate but has also cited the
 unequal income earned by the parties and unequal earning
 potential of the parties as factors in her favor should the Court
 divide the marital estate unequally. The Court is unconvinced
 that any property, except for college accounts or accounts and
 vehicles belonging to [Husband's prior-born] children, should be
 excluded from the marital estate. Likewise, considering the

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 parties were in a relationship for many years prior to their
 marriage, and property was transferred freely between them
 during that time, the Court is unconvinced that an unequal
 division of marital property is improper. Therefore, the
 presumption should remain.

 ***

 50. . . . In order to effectuate an equal division of property,
 [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] the sum of $168,506.14 within 60
 days of this Decree. [Wife's] counsel shall prepare any necessary
 Qualified Domestic Relations Order, or similar order, in order to
 transfer the equalization payment. [Husband] shall cooperate in
 all respects with the preparation of such order . . . .

 ***

 53. The Court finds that an award of attorney fees is proper.
 The Court finds that [Wife] has prolonged the litigation in this
 case substantially and without cause. The bulk of testimony and
 evidence received in this case concerned the custody of the
 parties' [C]hild and parenting time. [Wife] requested a custody
 evaluation. When the results of that evaluation were not in her
 favor, she obtained a critique of that evaluation and has dragged
 out a Final Hearing over four days scheduled over a span of
 seven months. This Court found, in January of 2018, that
 [Husband] did not present a danger to the [C]hild, yet [Wife] has
 persisted in that belief and has pursued litigation to that effect
 since the inception of this case. [Wife] has placed restrictions on
 [Husband's] parenting time both before and after the provisional
 hearing in January of 2018. While [Husband] has not sought to
 hold [Wife] in contempt of court, and the Court makes no
 finding that [Wife] has violated a court order, the Court does find
 that [Wife's] actions are unjustified and have unnecessarily
 prolonged litigation in this case. For these reasons, the Court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DR-317 | September 29, 2020 Page 9 of 16
 awards [Husband] the sum of $15,000.00 towards his attorney
 fees and litigation costs . . . .

 Appellant's App. Vol. II at 28-39. This appeal ensued.

 Discussion and Decision
[4] Wife appeals and Husband cross-appeals from the trial court's decree of

 dissolution. The decree includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon,

 which the court entered sua sponte following a multi-day final hearing. As our

 Supreme Court has explained, in our review of such appeals we

 will "not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly
 erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
 trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." D.C. v.
 J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation and
 citations omitted). Where a trial court enters findings sua sponte,
 the appellate court reviews issues covered by the findings with a
 two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence
 supports the findings, and whether the findings support the
 judgment. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (citation
 omitted). Any issue not covered by the findings is reviewed
 under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court
 should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the
 evidence. Id.

 Additionally, there is a well-established preference in Indiana
 "for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family
 law matters." In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind.
 1993). Appellate courts "are in a poor position to look at a cold
 transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who
 saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their
 testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly
 understand the significance of the evidence." Kirk v. Kirk, 770
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 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind.
 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). "On appeal it is not enough
 that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must
 positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is
 a basis for reversal." Id. "Appellate judges are not to reweigh the
 evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should
 be viewed most favorably to the judgment." Best v. Best, 941
 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

 Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123-24 (Ind. 2016) (emphasis added).

[5] Most of the parties' arguments on appeal simply disregard our Supreme Court's

 instructions for how appellate review works in family law matters. Wife argues

 that the trial court erred when it did not follow Dr. Krupshaw's

 recommendations regarding primary physical custody and legal custody of the

 Child, even though Wife herself challenged Dr. Krupshaw's report in other

 aspects, and even though the court's conclusions here were based on evidence

 of Wife's poor communication skills with Husband. She also asserts that the

 trial court erred when it permitted Husband to exercise unsupervised parenting

 time with the Child because, according to her, Husband is a threat to the

 Child's well-being. Wife does not acknowledge the trial court's clear rejection

 of her evidence on this issue.

[6] Further, Wife complains about the court's order for her to pay $15,000 of

 Husband's attorney's fees and court costs, asserting that nothing she did here

 was procedurally or substantively out of bounds, but that also simply asks us to

 reweigh the facts and circumstances before the trial court. And she additionally

 asserts that the court erred when it did not impute to Husband's income

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 bonuses he had received in the past, even though Husband's past bonuses were

 from a different employer than his current employer, the last of those bonuses

 was in 2017, two years prior to the final hearing, and there was no testimony

 that such bonuses were expected to continue for Husband into the future.

 Similarly, on cross-appeal Husband asserts that the trial court erred when it

 applied the presumption that the marital estate should be divided equally,

 asserting that the marriage here was short in duration and the parties each

 brought their own assets into the marriage, even though the trial court did not

 find Husband's evidence on this point persuasive.

[7] Each of the foregoing arguments is nothing more than a request for this Court

 to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Nothing about any of these

 arguments "positively require[s] the conclusion contended" by the advancing

 party. Id. (quoting Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307). We are not a court of original

 jurisdiction. We may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the

 witnesses. Thus, we decline to address these arguments further.

[8] We separately address Wife's contention that the court erred when it did not

 order Husband to pay child support from the date she filed the petition for

 dissolution until the entry of the preliminary order some fifteen months later. 1

 In response to this issue, Husband asserts that the court had discretion on

 1
 Between the entry of the preliminary order and the final decree of dissolution, the court found that
 Husband had no arrearage in child support and then, going forward, modified Husband's support order to
 $218 per week.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DR-317 | September 29, 2020 Page 12 of 16
 whether to retroactively apply a modification of Husband's support. But Wife's

 argument is not that the court failed to retroactively apply a modification; her

 argument is that the court failed to consider an award of support at all from the

 date of her petition for dissolution to the date of the preliminary order.

[9] In any event, we cannot say that the court erred on this issue. Upon the filing

 of her petition for dissolution, it was Wife's burden under Indiana Code Section

 31-15-4-1(a) to move for an order of temporary support, the filing of which

 required the court to "immediately schedule a preliminary hearing" and then

 "determine (1) after the hearing; and (2) not later than twenty-one (21) days

 after the petition is filed" whether to order temporary support. Ind. Code §§ 31-

 15-4-5, -6 (2020).

[10] Here, Wife filed her petition for dissolution on September 27, 2016, along with

 her motion for preliminary relief. The court then set the hearing on the request

 for preliminary relief for October 18, 2016. However, on October 4, Wife

 moved to continue that hearing, which the court granted. Wife again moved to

 continue the preliminary hearing once more after that, and she either

 affirmatively consented to or at least did not object to several additional

 extensions of time entered by the court thereafter. And, during the preliminary

 hearing in January of 2018, after Husband pointed out that Wife "has not made

 a request for a hearing in regards to any kind of child support or provisional

 order" prior to the preliminary hearing, the court noted, "[a]nd the request for

 preliminary hearing has been pending for . . . a long time." Tr. Vol. II at 52-53.

 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DR-317 | September 29, 2020 Page 13 of 16
 [11] Construing the record most favorably to the trial court's judgment, as we must,

 the record suggests that the court considered and rejected Wife's request to

 make child support retroactive to the date of the petition for dissolution because

 Wife had been dilatory in pursuing, or otherwise had delayed the

 commencement of, the preliminary hearing on support. We cannot say that the

 court abused its discretion in that assessment. The Indiana Code provided Wife

 with an opportunity to have a temporary order on child support determined in a

 timeframe commensurate with the filing of the petition for dissolution. But, for

 her own reasons, Wife delayed seeking that relief. There is no trial court error

 on this issue.

[12] We also separately address Wife's argument that the decree of dissolution on

 the equalization payment was unclear as to whether a qualified domestic

 relations order would be required to effectuate that payment. Again, the court

 found:

 [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] the sum of $168,506.14[ 2] within 60
 days of this Decree. [Wife's] counsel shall prepare any necessary
 Qualified Domestic Relations Order, or similar order, in order to
 transfer the equalization payment. [Husband] shall cooperate
 with the preparation of such order . . . .

 Appellant's App. Vol. II at 37-38. We conclude that Wife's assertion on this

 issue is not supported by cogent reasoning. The decree of dissolution

 2
 This amount was reduced by $15,000 to account for the amount of attorney's fees the court ordered Wife to
 pay to Husband.

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 unambiguously directs Husband to pay a sum certain by a date certain. If a

 qualified domestic relations order, or other order, is required to effectuate

 Husband's payment of that amount within that time, the parties are to

 cooperate to make that order happen. There is nothing unclear about the

 court's instructions, and we affirm its judgment.

[13] Finally, we address Husband's argument that the trial court erroneously

 allocated claiming the Child as a dependent for tax purposes to Wife for odd-

 numbered years and then to Husband for even-numbered years. Prior to the

 final hearing, the parties had stipulated to the court that Wife would claim

 Child in tax year 2018, that Husband would claim the Child in tax year 2019,

 and that they would then be free to argue at the final hearing how to proceed

 from there. Appellee's App. Vol. II at 2-3. The court accepted that stipulation.

 However, in its decree, the court ordered Wife to claim the Child in tax year

 2019 and then for the parties to alternate claiming the Child each year

 thereafter.

[14] We agree with Husband that this appears to be an oversight by the trial court.

 In effect, the court ordered Wife to claim the Child in back-to-back years,

 although its decree states the court's intent for the parties to alternate years

 when claiming the Child. Reading the stipulation accepted by the court and the

 decree of dissolution together, we think the court intended to have Husband

 claim the child in the odd-numbered years—including 2019—and to have Wife

 claim the child in the even-numbered years. Accordingly, we reverse this aspect

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 and only this aspect of the court's decree of dissolution and remand with

 instructions for the court to correct the decree accordingly. 3

[15] In sum, we affirm the trial court's decree of dissolution in all respects except the

 first year in which Husband shall claim the Child as a dependent on his taxes.

 On that issue, we agree with Husband that he shall claim the Child as his

 dependent in tax year 2019 and odd-numbered years thereafter and that Wife

 shall claim the Child in the even-numbered years thereafter.

[16] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

 Bradford, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.

 3
 Husband also requests appellate attorney's fees and costs. We deny that request.

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